



A-level HISTORY 7042/2P

Component 2P The Transformation of China, 1936–1997

Mark scheme

June 2023

Version: 1.0 Final



2 3 6 A 7 0 4 2 / 2 P / M S

Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts. Alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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Level of response marking instructions

Level of response mark schemes are broken down into levels, each of which has a descriptor. The descriptor for the level shows the average performance for the level. There are marks in each level.

Before you apply the mark scheme to a student's answer read through the answer and annotate it (as instructed) to show the qualities that are being looked for. You can then apply the mark scheme.

Step 1 Determine a level

Start at the lowest level of the mark scheme and use it as a ladder to see whether the answer meets the descriptor for that level. The descriptor for the level indicates the different qualities that might be seen in the student's answer for that level. If it meets the lowest level then go to the next one and decide if it meets this level, and so on, until you have a match between the level descriptor and the answer. With practice and familiarity, you will find that for better answers you will be able to quickly skip through the lower levels of the mark scheme.

When assigning a level, you should look at the overall quality of the answer and not look to pick holes in small and specific parts of the answer where the student has not performed quite as well as the rest. If the answer covers different aspects of different levels of the mark scheme you should use a best fit approach for defining the level and then use the variability of the response to help decide the mark within the level, ie if the response is predominantly Level 3 with a small amount of Level 4 material it would be placed in Level 3 but be awarded a mark near the top of the level because of the Level 4 content.

Step 2 Determine a mark

Once you have assigned a level you need to decide on the mark. The descriptors on how to allocate marks can help with this. The exemplar materials used during standardisation will help. There will be an answer in the standardising materials which will correspond with each level of the mark scheme. This answer will have been awarded a mark by the Lead Examiner. You can compare the student's answer with the example to determine if it is the same standard, better or worse than the example. You can then use this to allocate a mark for the answer based on the Lead Examiner's mark on the example.

You may well need to read back through the answer as you apply the mark scheme to clarify points and assure yourself that the level and the mark are appropriate.

Indicative content in the mark scheme is provided as a guide for examiners. It is not intended to be exhaustive and you must credit other valid points. Students do not have to cover all of the points mentioned in the Indicative content to reach the highest level of the mark scheme.

An answer which contains nothing of relevance to the question must be awarded no marks.

Section A

- 0 1** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution.

[30 marks]

Target: AO2

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Shows a very good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to present a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. The answer will convey a substantiated judgement. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context. **25–30**
- L4:** Shows a good understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance and combines this with an awareness of the historical context to provide a balanced argument on their value for the particular purpose given in the question. Judgements may, however, be partial or limited in substantiation. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context. **19–24**
- L3:** Shows some understanding of all three sources in relation to both content and provenance together with some awareness of the historical context. There may, however, be some imbalance in the degree of breadth and depth of comment offered on all three sources and the analysis may not be fully convincing. The answer will make some attempt to consider the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. **13–18**
- L2:** The answer will be partial. It may, for example, provide some comment on the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question but only address one or two of the sources, or focus exclusively on content (or provenance), or it may consider all three sources but fail to address the value of the sources for the particular purpose given in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context. **7–12**
- L1:** The answer will offer some comment on the value of at least one source in relation to the purpose given in the question but the response will be limited and may be partially inaccurate. Comments are likely to be unsupported, vague or generalist. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context. **1–6**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- as a university student in a large Chinese city, Jing had directly experienced the early phases of the Cultural Revolution, which fanned out from action by radicals at Qinghua University in Beijing to others around the country. The source is therefore highly valuable as evidence of one directly caught up in the Cultural Revolution at an early stage
- considering events early in the ‘fifty days’ from May to August 1966 and shortly after the ‘May 16 Circular’ had confirmed the Cultural Revolution’s direction of travel – for example by establishing the CCRG – Jing’s account is valuable since it comes at a time when the Cultural Revolution was gaining momentum
- the purpose of the source is to raise awareness of the growing violence perpetrated by those involved in the Cultural Revolution and to criticise it, which is valuable since it is an example of China’s continued interest in ‘scar literature’ following the Cultural Revolution, and so Jing will have felt able to speak frankly of his experiences
- the tone of the source is fearful (‘I became afraid’); valuable in showing the immense psychological impact those caught up in the Cultural Revolution felt, with some of the victims Jing writes about, no doubt, being held in the notorious ‘jetplane’ position, for example.

Content and argument

- that university students were the motor of the Cultural Revolution, ‘mobilised to attack’ academics in violent struggle sessions and indeed this is valuable since many of these would go on to form the nucleus of the ‘Red Guards’, who Mao described as ‘revolutionary successors’, using them to implement his vision for the Cultural Revolution
- that those associated with traditional Chinese culture (‘philosophy department...Chinese literature department’) were targeted even at this early stage of the Cultural Revolution. By August, groups of Red Guards had broadened their attacks on the ‘four olds’ beyond the universities into the cities, and the source is valuable in showing this direction of travel
- academics were a central target of the Cultural Revolution. Central to this early phase of the Cultural Revolution were attacks on academics deemed to have criticised Mao and his revolutionary ideals, for example the historian Wu Han, whose opera ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’ was interpreted by 1966 as an implicit criticism of Mao
- central to the Cultural Revolution was the use of violence to implement change, through both the destruction of property and – shown here – the university staff ‘being beaten’ by the students involved. This violence escalated during the ‘active’ period of the Cultural Revolution. What the source does not show are the attempts later in June by the Party to stem this violence, through the ‘white terror’ and the introduction of unpopular ‘work teams’ into universities. The source implies a level of Party complicity that was in fact not the case.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- Deng Xiaoping had been a central figure in the CCP for many years, and after the failures of the Great Leap Forward had played a key role in directing the Chinese economy and had been roundly criticised by Mao for his pragmatic policies. The source is therefore valuable in coming from a key player in the CPP and one who would inevitably bear the brunt of much criticism during the Cultural Revolution
- by October 1966 the Cultural Revolution had deepened and Mao had begun to intervene directly in its course, for example through his dazibao ‘Bombard the Headquarters’ and the publication of the ‘Sixteen Points’ that referred to the need to overthrow those who had chosen ‘the capitalist road’. It is valuable since it comes from a time when Mao was using the Cultural Revolution to attack his enemies
- the purpose of the source is to persuade the delegates of the Central Work conference – and Mao himself – that Deng is sufficiently humble and penitent so as to avoid the harsh punishments that were befalling so many CCP leaders deemed counter-revolutionary at the time. Deng’s previous policies would no doubt have been roundly criticised during the conference and the source is valuable in showing the need for CCP leaders to make such humble self-criticisms as the Cultural Revolution developed
- the tone of the source is apologetic (‘I have a very inadequate grasp’); valuable in showing the climate of fear that surrounded those associated with the old order in China and their strong desire to abase themselves in order to avoid punishment.

Content and argument

- that the Cultural Revolution had developed into a Party purge, with men like Deng forced to make humiliating self-criticisms in front of their peers, and the CCP generally. Indeed, in this second phase of the Cultural Revolution the CCRG had expanded its criticisms to include Party leaders accused of taking the ‘capitalist road’. The source is therefore valuable in showing how the scope of the Cultural Revolution had quickly widened
- that Deng had become a key scapegoat for those seeking to criticise the old order and as a justification for political and economic change. This can be seen in Deng’s extensive self-criticisms in the source. Together with Liu Shaoqi, Deng bore the brunt of criticisms, accused of being both a ‘rightist’ (as mentioned in the source) and as a ‘capitalist roader’. In fact, Deng’s self-criticisms were sufficiently humble for him to avoid the fate of Liu, and whilst both he and his family were victimised for much of the Cultural Revolution, Deng was eventually rehabilitated unlike Liu, who suffered many beatings and died in 1969
- that Mao had assumed clear leadership of the Cultural Revolution by October 1966 and this is clear in the source through Deng’s constant reference to ‘Mao Zedong Thought’. Indeed, in the preceding weeks, Mao had carefully honed his own personality cult, publicly praising and addressing Red Guard groups, swimming in the Yangtze to demonstrate his vitality, and the source is highly valuable in showing just how ‘front and centre’ Mao was as the Cultural Revolution developed
- that Mao was using the Cultural Revolution – as it developed – to exact a harsh revenge on his political rivals. Together with Liu, Deng had directed economic policy in China following the failures of the Great Leap Forward that had been attributed to Mao, and in a very different direction. The source is valuable in showing how Mao reinvigorated his own political position during the Cultural Revolution by directing criticisms against those he saw as old rivals.

Source C: in assessing the value of this source, students may refer to the following:

Provenance, tone and emphasis

- as the now undisputed leader of China, Mao Zedong had been the ‘driving force’ of the Cultural Revolution since mid-1966 and other groups involved in it either looked to Mao for leadership or used his name for justification. The source is therefore highly valuable in coming from a figure so central to the Cultural Revolution and the way it developed. That said, Mao is bound to defend the Cultural Revolution both in terms of its aims and actions and it was not possible to truly criticise it until Mao’s death some years later, so its agenda – whilst important evidence – should be considered carefully
- February 1967 was a tumultuous period, with Mao responding to radical and reactionary challenges. The ‘January Storm’ had seen radical groups seize control of Shanghai, and this was followed by a spontaneous PLA crackdown in parts of China and criticism of the Cultural Revolution by some senior CCP leaders in the ‘February Countercurrent’. The source is valuable in showing Mao’s actions at a time when the development of the Cultural Revolution had become unclear to many
- the purpose of the source is to reassert Mao’s authority within the Politburo at a time when some of its members believed that the Cultural Revolution had run its course and should be ended and so it is valuable in showing Mao’s use of his authority over those in the Party. Mao can be brutally frank in such a meeting, since it was not a matter of public record, and the source is valuable in showing this side to Mao
- the tone of the source is critical (‘you shall not succeed’); valuable as an example of Mao’s continued paranoia and determination to exert his leadership and influence over China, which was a key theme throughout the Cultural Revolution.

Content and argument

- that actions had been taken to abate the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution (‘you attempt to negate...’) and Mao was challenging this through determined attacks on those in the Politburo who had done so; indeed, the Politburo became almost moribund by the end of February and the source is valuable for showing this direction of travel. That said, the source does not show that Mao himself had ordered action against the Shanghai radicals, replacing them with a group of his own choosing, and this in turn had led to the Countercurrent that is the focus of the meeting described in Source C
- that the CCRG continued to be the driving force behind the Cultural Revolution and had Mao’s support (‘it’s been correct up to 97%’). It had formed at Mao’s behest in 1965, and had been the motor for much of the developments up to and beyond the point Source C was produced, and indeed the CCRG had been given a key role in the administration of Shanghai just weeks previously. The source is valuable in showing how central the CCRG was, but it cannot show how later in the year – as the Cultural Revolution ran out of control – that the CCRG was blamed for Red Guard excesses and Jiang Qing was forced to denounce them
- Mao’s reference to Lin Biao and ‘his power’ is highly valuable in showing how important the People’s Liberation Army – headed by Lin – were in the development of the Cultural Revolution to this point, and thereafter. Lin’s sponsorship of the ‘Little Red Book’ had been important in developing the ideology of the Red Guards, and the PLA itself had reaped substantial rewards from its role, being the dominant political force in China by the end of the 1967. It held a crucial role in shoring up Mao’s position
- that Mao sought to project the Cultural Revolution as being in the hands of ‘the people’ rather than the Party, and that this had deepened by early 1967. Mao’s threats to ‘go back to the mountains to fight a guerrilla war’ against the Party demonstrate how power in the PRC had shifted by this point, taking power away from the Party and into the hands of others, which Mao portrayed as the people themselves. This alludes to the creation of ‘May 7 Cadre Schools’ and the rustification movement established later in the year, when party officials and millions of Red Guards were ordered into the countryside to ‘learn from the people’.

Section B

0 2 'The CCP's successful consolidation of power in China, in the years 1949 to 1952, was due to its policy of land reform.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16–20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6–10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the CCP's successful consolidation of power in China, in the years 1949 to 1952, was due to its policy of land reform might include:

- landlords as a class had been connected to the GMD throughout the Civil War and had been mainstays of the GMD regime; this, together with Communist ideology that critiqued private ownership, meant that the CCP viewed landlords as a class enemy. It was almost natural, therefore, that the CCP took steps to remove a group they saw as rivals in China in order to secure its own position, with as many as one in five landlords' families experiencing an execution. In the eyes of the CCP this removal of a class enemy and counter-revolutionary threat was essential in increasing Communist control in China
- during the Civil War, much of the CCP's support had been drawn from the peasantry and its popularity with the peasants had increased through a programme of land reform in areas under CCP control. The CCP had thus seen the benefits of such a policy, and the widespread attacks on landlords and others with 'feudal tails' in this period – together with the redistribution of around 45% of China's land to more than half the population – was crucial in the CCP's consolidation of power. It brought the CCP greater support from the most numerous groups of people in what was a largely rural nation
- central to the programme of land reform across many of the 'newly liberated areas' in this period was a series of 'struggle sessions' facilitated – but not always controlled – by CCP cadres, and at which landlords were frequently subject to brutality at the hands of the peasants themselves. This aspect of the land reform programme was highly important in the CCP's consolidation of power, since it not only made use of the peasants as a mass movement, but also made the peasantry complicit in the process; they had enthusiastically participated in the destruction of the old order in a way that could now not be undone
- the destruction of the landlord class created a 'power vacuum' in much of rural China which served the purposes of the CCP well, since many of the Party's regional leaders and cadres were drawn from the wealthy peasant class, a group the land reform programme had sought to protect at the expense of the landlords. It allowed the CCP cadres and other party organisations such as the PLA to fill the gap left in traditional, rural China by the removal of the landlords and so help to transform these areas along CCP lines.

Arguments challenging the view that the CCP's successful consolidation of power in China, in the years 1949 to 1952, was due to its policy of land reform might include:

- there were limitations to how effective the programme of land reform was in aiding the CCP's consolidation of power. It was not applied uniformly – little was done in areas populated by national minorities, for example, and in some places came about from spontaneous peasant action rather than directed by the CCP. It therefore varied from region to region, often went further than Mao had envisaged, and so the CCP was not fully in control of the process
- the role of mass mobilisation campaigns in Chinese cities were very important in consolidating Communist power, both in terms of gaining the active support of the Chinese people and in increasing the political control of the CCP. The 'Resist America, Aid Korea' movement was intended to stimulate Chinese nationalism for the benefit of the CCP and remove Western interests and influence from the PRC. Campaigns like the three- and five- 'antis' were intended to remove corruption among Party cadres and industrialists respectively
- the role of violence, intimidation and coercion was also central to the consolidation of CCP authority in this period, since it allowed the Communists greater control of China through terror. Campaigns like the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries and Thought Reform resulted in executions and suicides – some against arbitrary targets – and the development of the *laogai* labour camp network no doubt

served to ensure compliance among many. Greater CCP control through coercive measures like the *danwei* and *dangan* ensured that many Chinese people accepted the CCP out of necessity

- the activities and ‘soft power’ of the People’s Liberation Army in this period was also a vital force in consolidating Communist power. It had an active role both in governing large parts of China and undertaking pacification campaigns against counter-revolutionary forces, and the PLA’s role in reconstruction after the Civil War – rebuilding infrastructure and bridges – for example, brought tangible benefits to many after years of chaos. The propaganda value of the PLA – both as a role model to the Chinese people and in indoctrinating more than half a million conscripts each year – also helped to strengthen the CCP’s position in China and so consolidate its power.

On balance, whilst CCP action in the cities was important, in many ways rural China was the true battleground in consolidating Communist power following the Civil War and so land reform and attacks on landlords were indeed the most important factor. In a predominately rural nation, winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the peasants was of paramount importance, as was the removal of the landlord class.

0 3 'The most significant impact of the Great Leap Forward on China, in the years 1958 to 1962, was economic.'

Assess the validity of this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21–25**
- L4:** Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. It will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment relating to the question. The answer will be well-balanced with some judgement, which may, however, be only partially substantiated. **16–20**
- L3:** Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information, which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features, but may, however, be unspecific or lack precision of detail. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be a good deal of comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance, but a number of statements may be inadequately supported and generalist. **11–15**
- L2:** The answer is descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way, although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist. **6–10**
- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that the most significant impact of the Great Leap Forward on China, in the years 1958 to 1962, was economic might include:

- one significant impact of the Great Leap Forward was that it represented a clear turning point in the PRC's economic fortunes. It had been preceded by the First Five Year Plan, which had seen notable increases in production through careful state planning and implementation. The Leap – with its reliance on local cadres and mass peasant mobilisation – is widely recognised as an economic failure at several levels. Compared to previous economic policy, the Leap set back Chinese economic development for years; a clear and significant economic impact
- another economic impact of the Great Leap Forward was the change in economic direction it had led to by 1961. As the Leap became increasingly discredited, those now responsible for economic policy – including Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping – began to reintroduce strong state planning, greater use of experts and a focus on larger scale projects which would lead to more pragmatic economic planning until the mid-1960s. This change in direction from a largely ideological economic policy had a significant impact on the nature of the Chinese economy
- the Great Leap Forward led to significant setbacks in China's drive for industrialisation a clear and adverse economic impact. Ideological disputes with the USSR over the nature of the Leap led to the removal of Soviet experts from China, and halted production at around half of the industrial plants the USSR had sponsored. The reliance on 'backyard furnaces' during the Leap severely damaged Chinese steel output, with most of the 'people's steel' of such poor quality that it was unusable. This had the impact of damaging China's aspirations to become a key industrial power to rival Britain and the United States
- by far the most infamous economic impact of the Great Leap Forward was the damage caused to agriculture and agricultural output through a combination of pressure on peasants to produce steel on the communes, reliance on the discredited Soviet expert Lysenko and falsified production figures. Output declined to levels well below those of the First Five Year Plan, with only 143 million tons of grain produced in 1960, which had the devastating impact of producing famine in the PRC and from it took many years to recover.

Arguments challenging the view that the most significant impact of the Great Leap Forward on China, in the years 1958 to 1962, was economic might include:

- the rapid development and growth of the commune system in China had a highly negative impact on Chinese rural society. Unlike the collectives of the First Five Year Plan, these were imposed on the peasantry through local cadres – who were frequently overzealous – and the structure of the communes eroded traditional Chinese peasant and family life. The communal canteens and 'happiness homes' of the communes were considered to have had such a damaging impact on the Chinese peasantry that much of the communes' structures were reversed from 1961 onwards
- whilst the decline in agricultural production was, on the face of it, an economic impact, it led to a catastrophic famine that affected Chinese society in a devastating way. It led to massive upheaval, as around 25 million peasants attempted to move to cities for work and food, and to massive deaths through starvation, especially in central China and Tibet (where around a quarter of the population died). The impact on Chinese society of this cataclysmic famine cannot be understated
- the Great Leap Forward also resulted in political upheaval in China. Inevitably associated with the failure of the Leap, Mao attracted cautious criticism in 1959, which led to the targeting and purging of Peng Dehuai from the Party and a wider party purge in 1960, which saw around a million lose their posts. As the direction of political travel changed, however, others gained greater influence within the CCP as a result of the Leap's failings. Most notable were Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping,

whose increased roles and prominence by 1961 – and for some years thereafter – was a direct result of the Leap

- although the Great Leap Forward resulted in a number of political changes that impacted on China, the effect it had on Mao Zedong's power and influence could be argued to be the most significant. Although he was able to resist early criticism, by 1961 Mao had assumed a greater responsibility for the Leap's failings, making self-criticisms in 1961 and again in 1962 at the 7000 Cadre Conference, and stepped down from his post of Chairman of the State Council. This caused Mao's prestige and political role to diminish in China until the mid-1960s.

On balance, whilst the impact of the Leap spread way beyond the Chinese economy to produce social tragedy and political upheaval, the root cause of these wider changes came from the economic damage that the Leap produced. These unchecked short-term economic impacts are what then led to a wider range of greater issues.

0 4 To what extent did Deng Xiaoping's policies, in the years 1978 to 1986, benefit the Chinese people?

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5:** Answers will display a very good understanding of the full demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively delivered. The supporting information will be well-selected, specific and precise. It will show a very good understanding of key features, issues and concepts. The answer will be fully analytical with a balanced argument and well-substantiated judgement. **21–25**
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- L1:** The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment. **1–5**
- Nothing worthy of credit. **0**

Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments supporting the view that Deng Xiaoping’s policies, in the years 1978 to 1986, benefited the Chinese people might include:

- the late 1970s saw Deng implement policies in rural China from which many peasants benefited, at least in the short term. With greater incentives to produce on private plots – since Chinese peasants were now allowed to sell any surplus – grain and cotton production increased sharply. As a result, many peasant families’ living standards improved as they aspired to become a ‘ten thousand yuan household’
- as part of the Four Modernisations, entrepreneurship became possible and was even encouraged, and some Chinese people benefited greatly from this. As Deng permitted the growth of private enterprise and reduced price controls, it became possible for businesses to make significant profits, and many Chinese entrepreneurs became wealthy. This was especially the case in the Special Economic Zones such as Xiamen, where a combination of deregulation and foreign investment stimulated industry and employment opportunities
- there were greater educational opportunities for Chinese students in this period, especially those at China’s expanding university network. Central to the Four Modernisations, the period saw a drive both in improving basic literacy and in the range of academic opportunities and research in higher education. Together with opportunities for students to study abroad, many young people benefited
- the period saw a greater social mobility, with opportunities opening up for many Chinese people through the slogan ‘To get rich is glorious’. High wages were available in some of the Special Economic Zones which led to migration to cities, and the position of women in the PRC was further strengthened by a new Marriage Law in 1980. Deng’s move away from the strict ideological approach seen during the Cultural Revolution gave many Chinese the genuine prospect of improving themselves.

Arguments challenging the view that Deng Xiaoping’s policies, in the years 1978 to 1986, benefited the Chinese people might include:

- although a case can be made that in the early part of this period prosperity in the countryside increased, by its end, the withdrawal of much state support meant that many peasants did not benefit from Deng’s policies. The state grain trade monopoly ended in 1984 and this led to a reduction in prices. This, together with peasant vulnerability under the ‘household responsibility system’ – with land ownership replaced by 15-year leases – created greater insecurity in much of rural China
- the impact of the ‘One Child Policy’ – strictly enforced by 1980 – had an adverse impact on many Chinese people at several levels. It was seen as highly coercive, supported as it was with criminal prosecutions and threats of sterilisation and led to a rise in female infanticides – a traditional issue that under the CCP had previously been reduced – in parts of rural China
- the Four Modernisations had led many Chinese people to anticipate political as well as economic reforms, but the reality was a period of oppression from which many Chinese people did not benefit, and many suffered from it. Deng balanced economic reform with his ‘four cardinal principles’ which saw the oppression of those involved in the ‘democracy wall’ in the late 1970s and in demonstrations in Chinese universities in 1986 which led to another wave of arrests
- the period saw elevated levels of corruption and exploitation – especially in Chinese cities – as Party cadres and industrialists used insider information to make profits at the expense of others, as seen in Heilongjiang in the late 1970s. At a time when the economic position of many workers – especially those in the Special Economic Zones – became more fragile, a strong case could be made that Deng’s policies led to the enrichment of a few whilst the majority of the Chinese people became more vulnerable.

On balance, whilst Deng's policies in this period no doubt created greater opportunities for many Chinese people – and from which many gained – it could be argued that for most Chinese people their lives became more vulnerable. The removal of state support in both rural and urban China – and greater exposure to a market economy – meant that the lives of many Chinese people became more fragile in this period.