

# **General Certificate of Education June 2013**

Classical Civilisation
The Second Punic War
AS Unit 2F

1021

## **Final**

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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#### INTRODUCTION

The information provided for each question is intended to be a guide to the kind of answers anticipated and is neither exhaustive nor prescriptive. **All appropriate responses should be given credit.** 

Where Greek and Latin terms appear in the Mark Scheme, they do so generally for the sake of brevity. Knowledge of such terms, other than those given in the specification, is **not** required. However, when determining the level of response for a particular answer, examiners should take into account any instances where the students uses Greek or Latin terms effectively to aid the clarity and precision of the argument.

Information in round brackets is not essential to score the mark.

#### **DESCRIPTIONS OF LEVELS OF RESPONSE**

The following procedure must be adopted in marking by levels of response:

- read the answer as a whole
- work down through the descriptors to find the one which best fits
- determine the mark from the mark range associated with that level, judging whether the answer is nearer to the level above or to the one below.

Since answers will rarely match a descriptor in all respects, examiners must allow good performance in some aspects to compensate for shortcomings in other respects. Consequently, the level is determined by the 'best fit' rather than requiring every element of the descriptor to be matched. Examiners should aim to use the full range of levels and marks, taking into account the standard that can reasonably be expected of s after one year of study on the Advanced Subsidiary course and in the time available in the examination.

Students are **not** necessarily required to respond to all the bullet points in order to reach Level 5 or Level 4, but they should cover a sufficient range of material to answer the central aspects of the question.

#### **QUALITY OF WRITTEN COMMUNICATION**

The Quality of Written Communication will be taken into account in all questions worth 10 or more marks. This will include the student's ability

- to communicate clearly, ensuring that text is legible and that spelling, punctuation and grammar are accurate
- to select and use an appropriate form and style of writing, and
- to organise information clearly and coherently, using specialist vocabulary when appropriate.

### LEVELS OF RESPONSE FOR QUESTIONS WORTH 10 MARKS

Level 4	<ul> <li>Demonstrates</li> <li>accurate and relevant knowledge covering central aspects of the question</li> <li>clear understanding of central aspects of the question</li> <li>ability to put forward an argument which for the most part has an analytical and/or evaluative focus appropriate to the question and uses knowledge to support opinion</li> <li>ability generally to use specialist vocabulary when appropriate.</li> </ul>	9-10
Level 3	<ul> <li>Demonstrates</li> <li>a range of accurate and relevant knowledge</li> <li>some understanding of some aspects of the question</li> <li>some evidence of analysis and/or evaluation appropriate to the question</li> <li>some ability to use specialist vocabulary when appropriate.</li> </ul>	6-8
Level 2	Demonstrates either • a range of accurate and relevant knowledge or • some relevant opinions with inadequate accurate knowledge to support them.	3-5
Level 1	Demonstrates  either  • some patchy accurate and relevant knowledge  or  • an occasional attempt to make a relevant comment with no accurate knowledge to support it.	1-2

LEVELS C	OF RESPONSE FOR QUESTIONS WORTH 20 MARKS	
Level 5	<ul> <li>• well chosen accurate and relevant knowledge covering most of the central aspects of the question</li> <li>• coherent understanding of the central aspects of the question</li> <li>• ability to sustain an argument which     has an almost wholly analytical and/or evaluative focus, responds to the precise terms of the question, effectively links comment to detail, has a clear structure reaches a reasoned conclusion is clear and coherent, using appropriate, accurate language and makes use of specialist vocabulary when appropriate.</li> </ul>	19-20
Level 4	<ul> <li>Demonstrates</li> <li>generally adequate accurate and relevant knowledge covering many of the central aspects of the question</li> <li>understanding of many of the central aspects of the question</li> <li>ability to develop an argument which     has a generally analytical and/or evaluative focus, is broadly appropriate to the question,     mainly supports comment with detail and has a discernible structure     is generally clear and coherent, using appropriate, generally accurate language and generally makes use of specialist vocabulary when appropriate.</li> </ul>	14-18
Level 3	<ul> <li>Demonstrates</li> <li>a range of accurate and relevant knowledge</li> <li>some understanding of some aspects of the question</li> <li>some evidence of analysis and/or evaluation appropriate to the question</li> <li>some ability to structure a response using appropriate language, although with some faults of spelling, punctuation and grammar</li> <li>some ability to use specialist vocabulary when appropriate.</li> </ul>	9-13
Level 2	<ul> <li>either a range of accurate and relevant knowledge</li> <li>or some relevant opinions with inadequate accurate knowledge to support them</li> <li>and sufficient clarity, although there may be more widespread faults of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</li> </ul>	5-8
Level 1	<ul> <li>either some patchy accurate and relevant knowledge</li> <li>or an occasional attempt to make a relevant comment with no accurate knowledge to support it</li> <li>and little clarity; there may be widespread faults of spelling,</li> </ul>	1-4

punctuation and grammar.

#### LEVELS OF RESPONSE FOR QUESTIONS WORTH 30 MARKS Level 5 **Demonstrates** well chosen accurate and relevant knowledge covering most of the central aspects of the question coherent understanding of the central aspects of the question ability to sustain an argument which has an almost wholly analytical and/or evaluative focus, responds to the precise terms of the question, 27-30 effectively links comment to detail, has a clear structure reaches a reasoned conclusion is clear and coherent, using appropriate, accurate language and makes use of specialist vocabulary when appropriate. Level 4 **Demonstrates** generally adequate accurate and relevant knowledge covering many of the central aspects of the question understanding of many of the central aspects of the question ability to develop an argument which has a generally analytical and/or evaluative focus, is broadly appropriate to the question, 20-26 mainly supports comment with detail has a discernible structure is generally clear and coherent, using appropriate, generally accurate language and generally makes use of specialist vocabulary when appropriate. Level 3 Demonstrates a range of accurate and relevant knowledge some understanding of some aspects of the question some evidence of analysis and/or evaluation appropriate to the question 13-19 some ability to structure a response using appropriate language, although with some faults of spelling, punctuation and grammar some ability to use specialist vocabulary when appropriate. Level 2 **Demonstrates** either a range of accurate and relevant knowledge or some relevant opinions with inadequate accurate 7-12 knowledge to support them and writes with sufficient clarity, although there may be more widespread faults of spelling, punctuation and grammar. Level 1 **Demonstrates** either some patchy accurate and relevant knowledge or an occasional attempt to make a relevant comment with no accurate knowledge to support it 1-6 and little clarity; there may be widespread faults of spelling,

punctuation and grammar.

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#### Mark Scheme

Unit 2F The Second Punic War

#### Section 1

#### Option A

O1 Plutarch goes on to say that the young Fabius trained himself to excel in two skills. What were they?

**Two from**: physical fitness (1) / fighting ability (1) / public speaking (1)

(2 marks)

What two choices, according to Livy, did Fabius offer the Carthaginian Senate when he addressed it following the siege of Saguntum in 218 BC?

peace (1) / war (1)

(2 marks)

03 What was the Carthaginian response to this offer?

they told the Romans to choose / refused to choose (or similar) (1)

(1 mark)

04 How vividly does Plutarch show Fabius' character in this passage?

Discussion might include: nickname 'lambkin' to show 'grave & gentle nature'; emphasis on 'quiet & grave' disposition; right from early on talks of 'extraordinary caution'; suggests not quick on the uptake (learning 'slowly & laboriously'); 'docile, almost submissive' reinforces caution and could suggest he was 'dull & stupid'; then reinforces this was only appearance: dismisses these 'superficial qualities'; key phrases 'greatness of spirit', 'lion-like temper', 'unshakeable resolution'; 'depths of his soul' reinforces that these were *not* superficial qualities; finally takes 'lack of energy' & 'caution' and depicts as positives ('freedom from .. passions' and 'soundly based judgement'); key final words 'steadfast' & 'resolute' backed with 'never acted on impulse' & 'not easily persuaded'.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(10 marks)

To what extent did Fabius show 'soundly based judgement' (line 14) during the Second Punic War? Give reasons for your answer and refer to the books of Livy and Plutarch you have read.

You might include discussion of Fabius':

- dealings with the Carthaginian Senate
- role after Lake Trasimene
- actions in the months following Cannae
- actions at Tarentum
- response to the appointment of Scipio Africanus
- reaction to Scipio's successes
- character as reflected in the passage and elsewhere.

Factors suggesting showed 'soundly based judgement' might include some but not necessarily all of the following:

- with Carthaginian Senate: his 'unshakeable resolution' allowed him to face down Carthaginian Senate allowing Rome to effectively choose time and theatre for war
- after Trasimene: similar qualities saw him elected Dictator after Lake Trasimene (because
  of 'strength & dignity of character' says Plutarch); correct to stand out v Minucius, despite
  Senate's support for Minucius; proved by his rescue of Minucius whose 'passions' led him
  into ambush; similar split in Senate over Varro; again judgement of Fabius proved right by
  events at Cannae
- after Cannae: his decisive nature and sensible measures calmed the panic in Rome after Cannae; now generally with Senate's support he promoted delaying tactics (in line with 'extreme caution' but also showing 'soundly based judgement'); ideal combination for fighting off continuing criticism from some elements within Senate; gradual wearing down of Hannibal could only be endured with man 'not easily persuaded' he was wrong at the helm (given losses suffered by and appeals from allies etc.; also thirst for retribution in Rome)
- Tarentum: another side to his character; move to aggression in the capture of Tarentum; unusually decisive (out-thinking the enemy & acting before they were prepared); suggests his delaying tactics did not represent an immoveable over-caution but pragmatism
- Fabius/Scipio: 'lion-like temper' made it clear that Fabius would not give up his approach
  in favour of Scipio without the young pretender matching Fabius' 'unshakeable resolution';
  Scipio proved to be the right choice in the end but had to match up to the qualities of
  Fabius to prove it; enough 'hot-headed young men' had already caused problems for
  Fabius' caution to be understandable, rather than a simple error of judgement
- response to Scipio: attempts to stop young men joining Scipio and to have Scipio recalled
  can perhaps be put down to a mix of his innate caution, the loss of his son and the effects
  of old age; despite these less than worthy final days Scipio was only in a position to bring
  the war to a close because of Fabius' efforts over the long term to set up such a
  possibility
- credit for relevant reference to how his character as shown in the passage influenced his judgement: e.g. his leadership style - 'extraordinary caution' was what Rome needed in her time of crisis; equally important were the 'freedom from passions' (passions responsible for failings of his contemporary generals); credit also for reference with evidence as to how his 'lion-like temper' and 'unshakeable resolution' affected his judgement.

Factors suggesting his judgement was less 'soundly based' might include:

- with Carthaginian Senate: did his intransigent approach give the Carthaginian Senate no real opportunity to avoid war and save face at same time? Credit for examining whether less 'black & white' negotiating skills here might have avoided later problems
- after Trasimene: despite his clear achievements in early years of war did his confrontational nature (no grey areas) affect his judgement leading to splits in Roman leadership and so causing early defeats? Could a more inclusive approach by Fabius have tempered the extreme actions of Minucius & Varro?
- After Cannae: for all his actions after Cannae, it can be argued that Hannibal's caution, not Fabius' judgement, saved Rome; had Hannibal marched on Rome while she was in disarray there was nothing Fabius could have done; his caution may well have caused a disastrous split if others in Rome had argued for a quick response as Hannibal approached
- Tarentum: despite his own moral display in turning down plunder offered him after the
  victory at Tarentum, Fabius was unable to control his men who indulged in rape & pillage;
  this led to an unnecessary (& unhelpful) argument over morality between Fabius & Scipio
  (over events at Tarentum & Locri)
- Fabius/Scipio: seems to be a case of the basic character facets acting against Roman interests; the opposition to Scipio in the Senate is even admitted by Plutarch as being through 'jealousy'; his attitude became 'more violent and extreme'; he even tried to override decisions of the Senate; this lack of judgement could have cost Rome the war
- response to Scipio: demands that Scipio should be recalled following successes in Africa show Fabius has 'lost it'; having lost his son & facing old age his 'unshakeable resolution' and being 'not easily persuaded' have become weaknesses that have driven out any 'greatness of spirit'
- again credit for relevant reference to passage: e.g. his leadership style 'extra caution'
  may have been some help in forming his judgement in the early days of war but things
  drifting towards stalemate later because of this; 'was not easily persuaded' is a strength
  according to Plutarch in the passage, but was as often a weakness, affecting his
  judgement when other people were right and he was wrong; credit for any other examples
  if argued with evidence to support.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(20 marks)

#### Option B

## Why did the arrangements described in the passage fail to bring victory to Hannibal? Make three points.

Three from: Scipio struck before Hannibal was ready (1) / confused the Carthaginians (1) / Roman trumpets upset elephants (1) by changing tactics (1) / using light troops (1) / (which) negated the effect of the elephants (1) / Masinissa won cavalry encounter (1) / Romans used javelins to great effect (1) / Romans more united than Carthaginians (1) / Carthaginian mercenaries failed to perform (1) / Romans overwhelmed Carthaginian veterans by sheer numbers (1) / Roman cavalry got behind Carthaginians (1) / Hannibal outperformed tactically by Scipio (1) reversed tactics from Cannae (1)

(3 marks)

#### 07 What did Hannibal do after he fled to Hadrumetum? Make two points.

**Two from**: he was summoned back to Carthage (1) / urged Carthaginians to seek peace (1) / went into exile or (eventually) left Africa (1) / by ship (1) / to King Antiochus (1) / (possibly) committed suicide when defeated helping Antiochus v Rome (1) tried to live as a civilian (1) (2 marks)

#### 08 To what extent does the passage suggest that Livy admired Hannibal's tactical ability?

Discussion might include: he is describing the enemy who has lost to Rome; might expect triumphal dismissal of Hannibal, **but** immediately 'he had tried everything he could' with 'remarkable skill' (even admitted by Scipio and 'all the military experts'); detailed look at his tactics (with positive tone): elephants positioned to prevent Romans from 'keeping their ranks' (emphasized by this being of 'the greatest importance'); auxiliaries in key place to allow supervision by main force ('scum' & 'no loyal feelings' makes clear this was necessary); second reason for using auxiliaries in this way ('to meet the first violence...' & 'to blunt the enemy's swords'); his 'highest hopes' were kept back, again with sympathetic explanation (would be 'fighting fresh'); ditto placement of Italians (not something pro-Roman Livy would want to emphasise?); credit for bringing out implied criticism of both Hannibal's choice of allies and consequent need to adapt tactics to cover these weaknesses; also for suggesting that Livy is expressing pity for Hannibal by setting him up as a quasi-tragic figure.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(10 marks)

How far was Hannibal responsible for Carthage losing the Second Punic War and how far was he let down by his fellow Carthaginians? Give reasons for your answer and refer to the books of Livy you have read.

You might include discussion of:

- Hannibal's actions in the months following Cannae
- his responses to changes in Roman policy
- support he received from the Carthaginian Senate
- the responsibility of his fellow commanders, including Hasdrubal Barca.

Factors suggesting Hannibal's own actions were responsible might include some but not necessarily all of the following:

- after Cannae: his failure to follow Maharbal's advice to strike at once was the key moment
  of the war; with Rome on the run (45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry lost at Cannae) there
  was no organized resistance left in the capital. Hannibal's allowing days of looting etc.
  and misreading of the Roman psyche (e.g. hostage episode) cost him the war
- Roman policy: given the advantage of splits in Roman leadership (e.g. headstrong approach of Varro v caution of Fabius Maximus), Hannibal had early successes, but once Fabius was appointed Dictator post-Cannae, Hannibal was totally outsmarted by his policies; unable to respond other than by taking out Rome's allies one at a time (with considerable losses to his own army) he was sucked into an apparent stalemate which softened him up for the change of emphasis led by Scipio; here again he failed to respond, allowing the war to be taken to Africa where his return was too little too late
- support: although the Carthaginian Senate was slow to send reinforcements, this could be seen as understandable given the distance and a realization that the crossing of the Alps may have represented an over-stretching of resources (Hannibal's idea reached alone & in the face of fierce resistance even from his own men); all compounded by his 'one man band' maverick approach; even so, a march on Rome after Cannae would probably have brought victory
- fellow commanders: Rome really only produced two generals to equal Hannibal (Fabius & Scipio) and at different times; Hasdrubal & other Carthaginian generals were no worse than Varro etc. but the overall failure was Hannibal's in not managing to outsmart first Fabius and then Scipio; other generals (on either side) were really side issues.

Factors suggesting lack of support was responsible might include the following:

- after Cannae: realistically (and given his earlier problems with siege warfare) he was right
  not to march on Rome after the overwhelming victory at Cannae; with patience & support
  he should have been able to wear Rome down by attrition; unfortunately support wavered
  and he had to 'go it alone'
- Roman policy: despite Fabius' delaying tactics Hannibal was able to pick off Rome's allies
  one by one, weakening her position constantly; had he received reinforcements and
  support from equally committed/able generals, victory would still have been likely; while
  he was facing Fabius (and still basically on top) there was no one to take on Scipio away
  from Italy; even so Zama was by no means a formality but Hannibal could not do
  everything on his own (by now he was weary and growing old), but still received Livy's
  plaudits for his one-man efforts
- support: the distance from Carthage to Italy did not help but the inbred nature of the Carthaginian Senate led to jealousy & mistrust from Hannibal's fellow countrymen; hence a lack of support (moral, financial and strategic); credit for examples at key points in war (e.g. immediately post-Cannae; lack of Carthaginian direction in Numidia allowing Scipio to spread Roman influence)
- fellow commanders: Hasdrubal Barca did his best but under his leadership Carthaginians were routed at the Ebro in 217, partly negating Hannibal's achievements in Italy; later in 217 C Scipio twice defeated Hasdrubal's armies in battles in Spain; Hasdrubal was killed in Italy in 207 by Scipio's army (key defeat for Carthage); no other general noted by Livy for making any major contribution (apart from Masinissa who was won over to Rome); Hannibal basically left to fight alone to the end.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(20 marks)

#### Section 2

#### **Option C**

10 How disastrous were the decisions of the Roman Senate throughout the Second Punic War? Give reasons for your answer and refer to the books of Livy and Plutarch you have read.

You might include discussion of

- why the Senate declared war in 218 BC
- its responses to Hannibal's early victories
- its decisions after Cannae
- its support for Scipio Africanus in the later years of the war
- its part in the final victory and the establishing of terms for peace.

Factors suggesting Rome won despite 'disastrous decisions' by the Senate might include some but not necessarily all of the following:

- declaration of war 218: Senate split during Saguntum; caution prevailed & embassy sent; Hannibal took advantage by completing capture of the city; effect on Roman Senate 'shattering... grief;... shame... fear'; only then did Senate start to act, and then too late to catch Hannibal
- responses to H early victories: Senate always on back foot; question of tactical abilities of Roman leaders (credit for reference to effects of cursus honorum on appointments); Hannibal allowed to recover after crossing Alps; Ticinus: C Scipio's pre-battle speech seems critical of Senate (he doesn't know his men; feels he should be in Spain); hence indecisive victory for Hannibal; arguments between Consuls re how to proceed from here (little guidance from Senate); Trebia: Sempronius' over-confidence allowed Carthaginian victory; no co-ordination between him & Scipio, suggesting Senate not in control; all Senate able to do was offer sacrifices; Trasimene: Senate fell out with Flaminius who had awkward relationship with Servilius (fellow consul); Flaminius went into action at Trasimene in dispute with Senate; his rashness caused Rome another defeat (15,000 dead); initial panic in Rome (including Senate); lots more religious responses (instead of action); Cannae: Senate split between whether to support Minucius or Fabius; even worse with election of Varro; faced Hannibal at Cannae with colleague Paullus in dispute; hence great defeat at Cannae
- after Cannae: Senate in disarray after Cannae; reappointment of Fabius (and failure of Hannibal to press home advantage) let Rome get off the hook, but Senate continued to dither; stresses at times over whether to support Fabius (e.g. when Hannibal started rumours about Fabius' financial conduct); in effect the successful years were because of rule by Fabius, not the Senate
- support for Scipio: divisions in Senate as Scipio's more positive approach in Spain came
  into conflict with Fabius' Italian policies; Fabius used Locri situation to launch attack on
  Scipio at key time (while preparations for Africa being made); Senate at first sided with
  Fabius; nothing made easy for Scipio who had to fight for every concession
- *final victory*: even after his victory at Zama Scipio was still afflicted by warring factions in the Senate; Lentulus tried to wrest leadership in Africa away from him.

Factors suggesting Rome won because of, rather than despite, the Senate's decisions might include:

- declaration of war 218: after giving Carthage fair chance to negotiate, 2<sup>nd</sup> embassy sent
  with Fabius Maximus' strong words; offered peace, ensuring Carthage was seen as the
  aggressor; meanwhile immediate steps taken to prepare armies for action in Spain & gain
  allies there
- responses to H early victories: C Scipio and a fleet were sent promptly to prevent Hannibal from entering Italy; he won an early victory in effect cutting Hannibal off from Spain & forcing him over the Alps; Ticinus: thanks to prompt moves by Senate Scipio was able to be in place ready to face the (tired) Carthaginians at Ticinus; it was not the Senate's fault that Scipio failed; meanwhile the Senate opened hostilities on other fronts (e.g. Sicily); good tactics to isolate Hannibal; Trebia: all planned with 2 consuls and big army to face down Hannibal; not much more the Senate could have done; not their fault the 2 generals failed to co-ordinate their attacks and so failed; time then for annual change of Consuls (prevented long-term strategy from being implemented); Trasimene: another clash of personalities; Flaminius gained approval of masses and disobeyed Senate by his actions here; hence defeat despite Senate not because of their actions; Cannae: good move by Senate to appoint Fabius Dictator, but election of Varro as Consul brought further conflict; Varro came out on top; hence defeat at Cannae (fault again of Consuls. not Senate)
- after Cannae: Senate acted promptly by appointing Fabius as Dictator and backing him even under the stresses caused by his delaying tactics (inability to support allies; sitting and watching Hannibal apparently prospering etc.)
- support for Scipio: despite Fabius managing to cause some problems (Locri and casting doubt on Scipio's character/integrity) the Senate backed Scipio's mission in a limited way, then more whole-heartedly after his early victories in Africa
- *final victory*: Senate held their nerve (despite further trouble stirred by Fabius) and backed Scipio at Zama even though could not be sure which way it would go; following victory they backed Scipio allowing him to push through peace terms which effectively ended the Second Punic War.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(30 marks)

#### Option D

11 How far do you think Livy exaggerates the contribution of Publius Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War? Give reasons for your answer and refer to the books of Livy and Plutarch you have read.

You might include discussion of

- · Scipio's actions before and at Cannae
- his performance in Spain from 212 BC
- his rivalry with Fabius Maximus
- why the Senate chose him to lead the actions in Sicily and Africa
- his achievements there.

Factors suggesting he uses exaggeration might include some but not necessarily all of the following:

- before & at Cannae: hints in Livy even then that he was to be something special (possibly building up contribution with benefit of hindsight): similarly, saving of father at Ticinus introduced by Livy as being great portent; speech after Cannae a sort of programme for his future service to Rome (and, while apparently listened to & acted on despite his youth, was this speech actually dreamed up by Livy to suit his pro-Roman stance at a time when things were going wrong?)
- Spain: his youth at time of appointment in Spain in 212 coincided with sea change in Roman approach (& fortunes); is this why Livy (over) emphasises Scipio' attention to religious observance (to contrast these strongly with those of earlier less successful Roman generals)?; also emphasis on character focuses strongly on points that suit Livy's message (for example mercy to enemies, e.g. Baeculian hostage in 209); also emphasis on tactical skills (e.g. defeat of Hasdrubal at Baecula); again it is possible (likely?) that the great speeches 'quoted' by Livy to demonstrate Scipio's leadership skills are put in his mouth by Livy for propaganda purposes; his successes in Spain may be boosted to emphasise the contrast with the stalemate in Italy
- Scipio & Fabius: Having used Fabius in the early years of the war as his 'positive example', the stalemate reached by 206 required a new 'hero'; Livy in effect turns on Fabius (painting him as a bad loser) and describing his 'violent & extreme' attitude to Scipio, in order to bolster his picture of Scipio, whereas Scipio would have been in no position to even consider this if Fabius hadn't saved Rome after Cannae and worked Hannibal into a position where he would be beaten over the intervening decade; Scipio was lucky to be put in a position to deliver the final coup de grace
- choice as leader. Livy focuses on the good qualities which allowed Scipio to win over a
  doubting Senate (despite his age & fierce opposition from traditionalists); emphasising
  how Scipio got his way by raising troops from volunteers and using Sicily as stepping
  stone to Africa, Livy plays down his possibly unconstitutional acts of defiance (e.g. threat
  to seek support from beyond Senate in 205) and the charges of arrogance which he faced
  and, while acknowledging that he was fortunate to have support from Metellus at this key
  time, he does seem to play down Metellus' contribution
- achievements in Sicily/Africa: having set up the picture of Scipio which suits his propaganda purposes Livy goes on to ram home these characteristics: he downplays the contribution of others, focusing on Scipio's strong points, with even more stress than before on his brilliant religious observance & tactical skill; he gives Scipio all the credit for Zama after describing (apparently verbatim) a most unlikely conversation between Scipio and Hannibal, further evidence of Scipio as a propaganda creation; the part Scipio plays in the ensuing peace process portrays him again as an (unlikely) paragon; possibly any commander could have beaten Hannibal by this point; wasn't it as much the 13 years of 'softening him up' that saw Hannibal (and Carthage) defeated?

Factors arguing against this might include:

- Cannae: only shown as a relatively minor character before Cannae, clearly not senior enough to influence early battles in 217/6, so no exaggeration here; despite his speech after Cannae he quickly moves out of focus, while Fabius is built up for several books as the saviour of Rome
- Spain: whether or not the grand speeches are genuine or creations of Livy, Scipio clearly played a major part in the change of fortunes here; his youth at the time of his appointment in Spain in 212 was remarkable; likewise his attention to religious observance was clearly genuine and a fundamental reason for his self-confidence; also emphasis on good character backs up the idea that this was a major factor in his success (e.g. mercy to enemies above); there is little doubt that his tactical skills were excellent (see for example his defeat of Hasdrubal at Baecula) and quite possible that the speeches are representative of what he said, if not verbatim
- Scipio & Fabius: Livy is supported by Plutarch in seeing Fabius as being unreasonable in
  his opposition to Scipio; both give full credit to Fabius for his earlier achievements but
  emphasise how, despite great opposition in parts of the Senate, Scipio was not afraid to
  challenge the accepted view of continuing Fabius' containment policy; it must have
  required the sort of character & determination Livy describes for Scipio to succeed despite
  the many vested interests which opposed him
- choice as leader. Livy is honest in admitting that the charges of arrogance and luxurious living were partly true; also that only the support of Metellus saw him appointed and under something of a cloud (he could have been recalled if the Locri decision had gone against him); these do not contradict the fact that he was seen by enough of the Senate (and certainly the people) as the right man for the new phase of the war and that he did the job
- achievements in Sicily/Africa: despite the points quoted against Scipio in the 'pro exaggeration' bullet point above, it does remain essentially true that he was decisive in facing crises, politically aware (e.g. in substituting Romans for Sicilian cavalry), skilful (e.g. in playing Masinissa & Syphax off against each other), religiously observant, tactically brilliant (both in planning for and in winning the battle of Zama), and a real diplomat during the final peace talks with Carthage.

Apply Levels of Response at beginning of Mark Scheme.

(30 marks)

## Assessment Objectives Grid Unit 2F The Second Punic War

#### Section 1

#### Either Option A

_	AO1	AO2	TOTAL
01	2	-	2
02	2	-	2
03	1	-	1
04	5	5	10
05	8	12	20
TOTAL	18	17	35

## Or

## Option B

	AO1	AO2	TOTAL
06	3	-	3
07	2	-	2
08	5	5	10
09	8	12	20
TOTAL	18	17	35

#### Section 2

#### **Either**

## Option C

	AO1	AO2	TOTAL
10	12	18	30
TOTAL	12	18	30

#### Or

### Option D

	AO1	AO2	TOTAL
11	12	18	30
TOTAL	12	18	30

#### **OVERALL**

	AO1	AO2	TOTAL
TOTAL	30	35	65
%	46%	54%	100%