AQA

GCE Philosophy
June XXXX

(Specification XXXX)

Ethics and Philosophy of Mind (A2)

Specimen mark scheme

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all examiners participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Section A – Ethics

Q1: What does it mean to say that an ethical theory is *deontological*? (3 marks – AO1)

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

- It is based on the idea of duty, what is right, or rights.
- It focuses on acts (and sometimes, in addition, motives) conforming to certain rules.
- It is not based on achieving good consequences or developing a particular character.

Q2: Briefly explain ethical naturalism. *(5 marks – AO1)*

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation. The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

- How things turn out to be can be derived from how the world naturally is
- Moral facts, being natural, are a matter of discovery not decision.

(GE Moore states that naturalism is a reductive doctrine since is reduces moral values to something else.)

Q3: Explain the difference between cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of ethics.
(5 marks – AO1)

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation The student makes logical links between precisely identified points with no redundancy
	4	A full explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is correct and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

- **Cognitivism**: when you state/make moral utterances (statements, judgements) you are making factual claims or claims about factual states of affairs/you are expressing propositions, which can be true/false.
- **Non-cognitivism**: when you state/make moral utterances, you are not asserting propositions or making claims about factual states of affairs. You are expressing attitudes – so expressing emotions and/or giving commands. As such, what you say cannot be true or false.

Note: credit can be given for examples which highlight the distinction, but only if there is an explanation of the example(s).

Q4: How might a utilitarian attempt to justify preventative imprisonment (imprisoning someone to prevent them from committing a crime, rather than because they have committed a crime)? *(12 marks – AO1)*

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout
	7-9	A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
	4-6	A clear answer, in a coherent logical form. The content of the answer is largely correct, though not necessarily well integrated. Some points are made clearly, but relevance is not always sustained. Technical philosophical language is used, though not always consistently or appropriately
	1-3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

- Not an issue about rights – so *not* an issue about depriving someone of a right to liberty.
- A utilitarian bases moral decisions upon the consequences of the action, not the action itself. Where the consequences of an act create the greater pleasure (utility) for the greater number of people, this act is therefore deemed to be 'morally good'
- What precisely is the utilitarian trying to do here? Increase pleasure or prevent/reduce pain?
- Which 'consequences' are relevant here?
- How does the utilitarian deal with predictions: the likelihood of someone committing a crime/the consequences?
- How does the utilitarian deal with measuring/weighting the pleasures/pains and whose pleasures/pains count?

Notes:

- Credit can be given for examples, but only if they are clearly related to the justification.
- Students may choose to focus on one variant of utilitarianism, or consider a range of formulations.

Students who respond by addressing criticisms which can be made of the utilitarian position (e.g. it takes no account of the rights of the person being imprisoned) can receive credit, but only if the utilitarian argument itself is clearly articulated.

Q5: Is Aristotle's doctrine of the mean useful for making moral decisions?
(25 marks – 5 AO1, 20 AO2)

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1 - 5 AO2 - 20	21-25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained. A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones. Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.
	16-20	The student argues with intent throughout and the argument is largely sustained. A complete response to the question. The content is correct and there is detail – though not necessarily consistently. The conclusion is clear, with a range of appropriate arguments used to support that conclusion. Arguments are stated clearly and integrated coherently and defended. There is a balancing of arguments, with weight being given to each – so crucial arguments are noted against less crucial ones. There may be trivial mistakes – as long as they do not detract from the argument. Technical philosophical language is used clearly and consistently throughout.
	11-15	A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed. A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content. Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.
	6-10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear. Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
	1-5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

Candidates should demonstrate that they understand the doctrine of the mean and its function within Aristotle's ethical theory:

- The ultimate end of human action is happiness (eudaimonia).
- To understand what happiness is, we need to look at the distinctive function (ergon) of human beings.
- This is activity in accordance with reason.
- Moral virtues (*arete*) are dispositions, in which our feelings are guided by reason, so that our behaviour is appropriate to the situation.
- The guidance of reason requires the avoidance of excess/deficiency in both feeling/action – therefore, each virtue is a 'mean' between these extremes.
- When making a moral decision, the moral agent has to use his/her reason to identify the mean.

In addressing issues, candidates should focus clearly on the *usefulness* of the doctrine of the mean:

- Issues about clarity: how clear is what Aristotle actually says about the doctrine of the mean? Is what he says sufficiently clear to be usable, or does it require refinement? Is there an issue about circularity?
- Issues about calculation: does Aristotle give sufficient guidance about how we should work out what the mean might be?
- Issues about relativism: Aristotle allows for the particular situation and individual to be taken into account – so "the mean relative to us" - but he also seems to think that there is an answer to the question "Where does the mean lie?" Is this plausible?
- Issues about generalisability: does the doctrine of the mean work for all the virtues?
- Issues about conflicting virtues: are there situations in which virtues can conflict and how useful is the doctrine of the mean there?

Note: a critique which focuses exclusively on issues to do with teleology or the metaphysics of virtue theory should only be credited when the issue of *practical application* is specifically addressed.

Section B – Philosophy of Mind

Q6: What are qualia? *(3 marks – AO1)*

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
3 AO1	3	A full and correct answer is given precisely, with little or no redundancy.
	2	The substantive content of the answer is correct, but there may be some redundancy or imprecision.
	1	Fragmented points.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

Features of mental states which are:

- introspectively accessible
- subjective ('what it is like)
- intrinsic or non-representational.

Q7: Briefly explain the philosophical zombie argument for (property) dualism.

(5 marks – AO1)

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
	2	One or two relevant points made, but not precisely. The logic is unclear.
	1	Fragmented points, with no logical structure
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

- A world which is a physical duplicate of (has all the same physical properties as) ours is logically possible

- It is also possible that no one is that world is conscious (they act like us but without qualia, i.e. they are philosophical zombies)

- So the totality of the actual physical properties does not include qualia

  OR

- Philosophical zombies are logically possible

- Philosophical zombies lack qualia

- Philosophical zombies are physical duplicates of (have all the same physical properties as) people who have qualia

- So qualia are not physical properties

Q8: Briefly outline Descartes' indivisibility argument. *(5 marks – AO1)*

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
5 AO1	5	A full, clear and precise explanation The student makes logical links between precisely identified points, with no redundancy.
	4	A clear explanation, with logical links, but some imprecision/redundancy
	3	The substantive content of the explanation is present and there is an attempt at logical linking. But the explanation is not full and/or precise.
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Indicative content

- My mind and my mental states cannot be divided (as a physical entity cannot be divided (my mind is a 'unity')

- Physical entities can be divided.

- If X and Y do not have all and the same essential properties they cannot be the same kind of thing (X cannot = Y) (Students may want to appeal to Leibniz's law.)

- Therefore: Minds (being indivisible) cannot be identical to anything physical (being divisible).

Q9: What are the similarities and differences between interactionist dualism and epiphenomenalist dualism? *(12 marks – AO1)*

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
12 AO1	10-12	A full and precise answer, set out in a clear, integrated and logical form. Points are made precisely, with little or no redundancy. The content is correct, showing a detailed understanding. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently throughout
	7-9	A correct answer, set out in a clear logical form. The content of the answer is correct. The material is clearly relevant and the points are made clearly and precisely. Integration is present, but may not be sustained. There may be some redundancy or lack of clarity in particular points, but not sufficient to detract from the answer. Technical philosophical language is used appropriately and consistently.
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	1-3	There are some relevant points made, but no integration. There is a lack of precision – with possibly insufficient material that is relevant or too much that is irrelevant. There may be some attempt at using technical philosophical language.
	0	Nothing written worthy of credit

Indicative content

Similarities:

- They both hold that the mind (or at least some mental states) is (or are in some way) ontologically distinct (as a separate substance or property) from the body/brain/physical world

- They both take this view because of key differences between the mental and the physical (e.g. qualia, indivisibility/divisibility, conceivability independently of each other etc.)

- They both hold that some physical events (probably in the brain) have mental (i.e. non-physical) effects

Differences:

- Interactionist dualists claim that mental states can have physical effects (e.g. when you want to raise your arm and then raise it) whereas epiphenomenalist dualists claim that non-physical mental states are causally impotent (they cause nothing).

- Some epiphenomenalists claim that non-physical mental states do not even cause other non-physical mental states whereas interactionist dualists think they sometimes to.

- Epiphenomenalist dualists see the physical world as a causally closed system (all physical events have physical causes) whereas interactionists do not.

Q10: Are mental states ontologically reducible to brain states?

(25 marks – 5 AO1, 20 AO2)

Marks	Levels of response mark scheme	
25 AO1- 5 AO2- 20	21-25	The student argues with clear intent throughout and the argument is sustained. A complete and comprehensive response to the question. The content is correct and the student shows detailed understanding. The conclusion is clear, with the arguments in support of the conclusion stated precisely, integrated coherently and robustly defended. The overall argument is sustained and reasoned judgements are made, on an ongoing basis and overall, about the weight to be given to each argument – so crucial arguments are identified against less crucial ones. Technical philosophical language is used precisely, clearly and consistently throughout.
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	11-15	A clear response to the question in the form of an argument, demonstrating intent. The content is correct, though not always detailed. A conclusion and reasons are given and the reasons clearly support the conclusion. There may be a lack of clarity/precision about the logical form/content. Counter-arguments are given, but there may be a lack of balance. Stronger and weaker arguments may be noted, but not necessarily those which are crucial to the conclusion. Technical philosophical language is used clearly throughout.
	6-10	The response to the question is given in the form of an argument, but the argument lacks coherence. Relevant points are recognised/identified and mentioned. Alternative positions might be articulated and played off against each other, rather than being used as counter-arguments. But the logic of the argument is unclear. Attempts are made to use technical philosophical language.
	1-5	Several reasonable points are made and possibly some connections, but no clear answer to the question based on an argument. There may be a lot of missing content, or content is completely one-sided. There might be some use of philosophical language.
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Indicative content

- The view that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states is the view taken by type identity theory

- Some might students might distinguish between type identity and token identity theories

- Examples may be given of pain = c-fibres (just as water = H_2O)

- It may (rightly) be distinguished from the claim that mental state terms mean the same as terms about brain states (i.e. it is not an analytically reductive theory in the manner of behaviourism)

Arguments in favour:

- It is consistent with the widely accepted view that the physical world is causally closed and that energy is conserved (no 'nomological danglers")

- It makes one's mental states potentially discoverable by brain scanning technologies - it arguably solves the problem of other minds

- Naturalistic arguments: The purely physical origins, and physical constitution of each individual human being, and the material evolutionary origins of the species suggest there is no place for an immaterial mind. Minds don't exist independently of certain complex biological arrangements of matter (i.e. brains)

- Evidence for the neural dependence of all mental phenomena (the effects of drugs and brain damage, MRI of the brain) is best explained by supposing them to be properties of brains.

- Successful reductions in the history of science (e.g. sound to compression waves of air), give reason to believe that an equivalent reduction is possible in neuroscience

- Ockham's razor: reduction to the brain is to be preferred over dualism as the simpler theory, so long as it explains the phenomena (at least) as well as dualism.

- Responses to dualist arguments: e.g. 'morning star/evening star' examples, the mind is indeed divisible when the brain is divided, e.g. brain bisection, brain processes cannot be divided

- We may not have (or ever have) the theoretical/conceptual apparatus needed to understand/carry out a naturalistic reduction of the mind to the brain but this does not show that it is not reducible in such a way.

Arguments against:

- Arguments for the mind being ontologically independent of anything physical including the brain: Indivisibility argument from Descartes, conceivability argument from Descartes, the conceivability/possibility of 'zombies', the impossibility of physical things having intrinsic intentionality etc... (This may be taken to   *(cont.)* prove a version of dualism, either substance or property.)

- The multiple realisability of mental states in different brain states shows that mental states cannot be type-identical (though they may 'supervene' upon brain states - i.e. if brain state then same mental state but not vice versa)

- Our vocabulary of mental states and processes does not mean the same as our vocabulary of physical states and processes occurring in the brain and so we cannot be talking about the same things. [The distinction between meaning and reference may be

used in response to this argument - i.e. the identity theory does not make an analytical reduction.]

- We must ascribe an integrated set of intentional states to persons (holistically) in order to make sense of them. These mental states are related to each other by the normative constraints of rationality. However, brain states, *qua* physical, are related to each other by physical laws. So there can be no psycho-physical bridge laws linking mental states and physical states (anomalous monism).