AQA Qualifications

A-LEVEL
PHILOSOPHY

Unit 4 Philosophical Problems
Mark scheme

2170
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A-level Philosophy Unit 4

Generic mark scheme for part (a) questions (15 marks)

AO1: Knowledge and understanding
Level 2 **5–8 marks** At the top end of this level, there is a clear grasp of textual material. Detail must be present. At the lower end of this level subtle detail may be lacking without affecting the general grasp of the material. Philosophical sophistication should be present at the top end of the level.
Level 1 **1–4 marks** There is a partial grasp of arguments/positions. Detail is omitted. At the bottom end of this level there is little grasp of the material. At the top end a grasp of at least one topical idea is in evidence.
0 marks No relevant philosophical points.

AO2: Interpretation, analysis and application
Level 2 **4–7 marks** At the top end, relevance will be sustained. Examples are appropriate and their implications made apparent. Some detail may be lacking at the lower end of the level. Textual material is applied in a directed manner regarding the requirements of the question.
Level 1 **1–3 marks** Analysis of arguments or positions is partial or lacking. Examples are not fully analysed. Implications may not be drawn out. The response may not always sustain relevance and there may be misinterpretation of key ideas.
0 marks No relevant philosophical points.

Generic mark scheme for part (b) questions (45 marks)

AO1: Knowledge and understanding
Level 3 **8–10 marks** There will be a clear grasp of the issues with appropriate detail. The text will have been engaged. Key positions/arguments are presented with clarity and philosophical sophistication.
Level 2 **4–7 marks** There is a general grasp of the material shading into a basic grasp at the lower end. Textual detail is lacking. At the top end of this level a clear understanding of at least one argument must be present.
Level 1 **1–3 marks** A rudimentary or fragmentary grasp of the material is in evidence. Textual detail is lacking or misunderstood. At the top end a partial grasp of an argument or position must be in evidence.
0 marks No relevant philosophical points.

AO2: Interpretation, analysis and application
Level 3 **9–11 marks** The analysis is detailed. Examples are well constructed and their implications are apparent. Textual material is appropriately directed and relevance sustained.
Level 2 **5–8 marks** Examples or analogies should be present. The implications may not be fully drawn out but there is a clear sense of directedness. Detail is present at the top end, though the analysis as a whole may lack sophistication or be characterised as ‘general’.
Level 1 **1–4 marks** The material may not directly impinge on the question. Examples are not fully analysed or explained. At the lower end of this level material may be misinterpreted. The analysis might be characterised as ‘basic’.
0 marks No relevant philosophical points.

AO3: Assessment and evaluation
Level 5 20–24 marks The evaluation displays accuracy and penetration. At least two arguments are treated in detail. A sophisticated grasp of the issues is apparent. Depth is demonstrated through the exploration of points, examples and their implications. Counter-arguments are considered. Positions are argued for and clearly related to the material discussed. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.
Level 4 15–19 marks There is an accurate and developed treatment of at least one argument. Counter argument is in evidence. A detailed treatment is expected at the top end of this level. Alternatively, a range of arguments may be present but a detailed treatment is lacking. Examples and counter-examples are used evaluatively. The assessment shows a sophisticated grasp of a position. The response is legible, and technical language is employed with partial success. There may be occasional errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar and the response reads as a coherent whole.
Level 3 9–14 marks At the top end of this level, there is a clear grasp of evaluative issues, but the assessment lacks penetration. There may be a juxtaposition of contrasting stances rather than developed assessment of a position. Use of examples may be limited to illustration with evaluative issues underdeveloped. This features strongly at the lower end of this level. Generality, rather than detailed treatment is likely to be a dominant characteristic. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 2 5–8 marks Evaluative points may be asserted rather than argued. There is little development of points and examples might be met with counter-assertions. Some arguments might be tangential. Sophistication may be lacking. The response may be legible, with a basic attempt to employ technical language, which may not be appropriate. There may be frequent errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 1 1–4 marks Evaluation is misdirected or lacking in any detail. Arguments may be weak or absent. There is no development of issues. At the top end of this level there must be an indication of one evaluative issue. Technical language may not be employed, or it may be used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.
0 marks No relevant philosophical points.

0 1 Outline and illustrate Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact.

[15 marks]

AO1

- The distinction is known as Hume's Fork and is an epistemological distinction. The two kinds of knowledge identified are regarded as exhaustive.
- Relations of ideas are known a priori, they are logically certain, necessarily true. They are demonstrable, known through reason.
- They do not provide any information about the world. Relations of ideas may help express relations between physical phenomena but they do not themselves carry any descriptive load. (Mathematics).
- Matters of Fact are known through experience not reason. They are *a posteriori* and contingent. They are not certain.
- They provide knowledge of the world.

AO2

- Analysis is likely to include detail regarding the negation of relations of ideas being inconceivable by the mind, unlike the negation of matters of fact.
- Matters of fact can be presented via internal or external senses.
- Matters of fact rest on the relation of cause and effect.
- Illustrative examples of relations of ideas are likely to be drawn from mathematics and logic. There may be reference to denial resulting in self-contradiction. Matters of fact are likely to be illustrated by reference to science or everyday affairs.

0 2 Assess Hume's analysis of the concept of 'necessary connection' and how we acquire it.

[45 marks]

AO1

- We have an idea that causal sequences are necessary. We think that when one thing happens another must happen**.**
- Hume is concerned with the source of this "must". He attempts to find a sense impression that is its source.
- Hume thinks that all meaningful ideas must be ultimately based on sense impressions. He examines possible sources of an external impression.
- He cannot find such an impression and concludes that there must be some other principle of equal weight and authority to account for this idea. The principle is repetition.
- The only difference in perceiving a casual sequence once and many times is the many. So this is the source of the idea or feeling. We see conjunctions not connections.

AO2

- There should be an account of the search for the impression of necessary connection. If we examine objects in the world, all we see is one thing following another but no impression of a connection between them.
- In the case of the mind controlling the body, all we witness is a mental event being followed be a physical one but no impression of how this connection occurs. There is a similar outcome in the power of the mind to call up ideas. All we have is one thing following another.
- Even if we appeal to the way God operates his laws of nature, we still have no impression of how He does this. All we have is regularity.
- Repetition is located as the source of the impression or idea. It is a 'feeling' we get after witnessing many instances.

AO3

- In saying that repetition causes the idea of cause or necessary connection, Hume could be accused of using the concept to explain the concept.
- There is a problem in regarding repetition as the source as repetition is not itself an impression. It could be argued that this is a case where we have an idea without any corresponding impression and this is inconsistent with Hume's epistemology. There should not be another principle of equal weight and authority to account for the formation of ideas. There may be arguments in favour of a Kantian position, ie causality is a category imposed on our experience but not derived from sense experience.
- It might be argued that repetition is the source of an internal impression, a feeling, and this is the source of our idea. There are problems with this. It is unlike other internal impressions identified by Hume, eg emotions, pain, hunger etc. Most seriously it is difficult to see how the impression and the corresponding idea could be distinguished in terms of force and vivacity in this case. There is the added problem of why this feeling arises out of the repetitions of events in the material world but not in the case of human actions. A feeling with no particular identifiable affective content is somewhat elusive.
- There is too much emphasis on repetition. Some causal connections are inferred from single observations, examples from astronomy might be given or how often do you need to touch flames? There are also examples of repetitions where no causal connection is inferred. Accidents on a cosmic scale or statistically freakish correlations might be used to illustrate the point. Repetition is neither necessary nor sufficient and therefore not a satisfactory explanation.
- There might be a discussion of Hume's definitions of 'cause', eg whether they have the same meaning, examples that fit one but not another or one is philosophical the second is psychological. The third definition seems to involve a sense of necessity that goes beyond a feeling based on repetition.

- There is too much emphasis on the repetition of similar events. The concept of similarity is problematic. The formulation of imaginative scientific hypotheses is not confined to postulating causal connections between objects and events which merely look the same. Hume underplays our rationality in the discovery of causal connections. There is too much emphasis on custom and habit and Hume may have difficulty in accounting for 'secret causes' within such strictures.
- Similarity judgements are sometimes made **after** the identification of causal powers.
- Is it correct to say we do not see causal power? There might be reference to the court case example: "You saw him pile up the wood shavings and light them", "Yes", "So you saw him cause the fire", "No I didn't see that" (Hanfling).
- It is not clear how Hume's account of 'cause' in terms of feeling and repetition can account for how causal necessity can support counterfactuals. A similar point might be made in regard to the persistence of causal connections.
- There might be arguments in favour of natural necessity. There is more to causation than constant conjunction and habit. There is a difference between the regularity of cows moving to the corner of a field on the appearance of storm clouds and a scientist assigning theoretical causal powers to a black hole. The latter is not just an extension of the former. Important breakthroughs have been made with uncustomary transitions.
- There might be reference to repetitions that occur simultaneously and the issue of why we identify one event rather than the other as the cause.

0 3 'Hume's account of ideas as copies naturally coming together in the mind fails to explain thinking and the acquisition of knowledge'. Assess this claim.

[45 marks]

AO1

- All ideas are ultimately derived from sense impressions of the external or internal senses. Ideas are fainter copies of impressions. There are no innate ideas.
- Complex ideas are formed by the imagination combining simples, augmenting etc.
- Deficiency in a sense organ from birth will result in a corresponding deficiency in the ideas associated with that organ.
- Thinking consists of ideas, considered as a kind of mental image, coming together as the result of the Principles of Association which operate automatically.
- The Principles are resemblance, contiguity in space and time and cause and effect.

AO2

- The role of the imagination may be illustrated by golden mountains, mermaids etc**.**
- Principles can be illustrated with Hume's examples or similar. Picture and original, rooms next to each other, wound and pain.
- Hume claimed that the Principles operate purely naturally and are exhaustive. They cover **all** human thinking. He saw himself as doing for psychology what Newton had done for physics.
- Hume's challenge to find an idea that does not derive from a sense impression and possible counter examples, God, infinity, necessity, the shade of blue.
- If no impression for an idea can be found, then the idea should be dismissed.

AO3

- His dismissal of the shades of blue as singular is too cavalier. Even if it is singular it is still sufficient to falsify a generalisation.
- It is not singular as it can apply to anything that can be graded on a scale.
- The problem cannot be resolved be an appeal to the combinations of the imagination. A colour patch is a simple idea and the imagination is confined to manipulating simples, not forming them. There may be a resolution in terms of Hume being broadly right but his thesis is too particularised.
- Hume's thesis is inconsistent with his account of how we acquire the concept of necessary connection. Repetition is not an impression.
- Hume's challenge and his treatment of counter examples may be discussed. The idea of God as human properties on a large scale is more plausible for some properties than others, eg not plausible for transcendence. Or it may be argued that God's properties and human ones differ in kind not degree. Also Descartes' claim that infinity is a positive concept and not derived from negating the finite may be discussed. Other examples might include abstract ideas, universals etc.
- The Principles are inadequate as an account of thinking. Resemblance is not sufficient on its own as you need some active power of the mind to recognise resemblances and bring them together as a result of this recognition. Hume's account is too passive.
- Contiguity in space fails. As Kemp-Smith pointed out it is objects that are spatially related **not** our images of the objects. It's not clear that it makes sense to refer to ideas as being in space at all. You cannot transfer the way we talk about objects to **ideas** of those objects.

- Cause and effect also fails. It's not your image of a gun that causes your image of a dead man; rather the association is due to your knowledge of what guns can do. The relation does not hold between images qua images.
- There may be some support for innatist positions eg Descartes, Plato, Chomsky might be adapted for the discussion but relevance needs to be sustained.
- Hume's position is too dependent on the copy principle. He underplays the active, organisational features of the mind. The Principles also fail here. Our acquisition of general principles is hard to explain in terms of imprinting or copying. This might be expanded into a discussion of knowledge in general or the formulating of imaginative scientific hypotheses, extrapolating, comparing, deciding on relevance of data etc.
- The above issues may be approached through a discussion of Kant's categories and an active model of the mind. Something has to be done with impressions in order for them to become data. There might be reference to general principles.
- There may be references to holistic accounts of perception. The fact that our experiences can be sub-divided does not imply that we experience in terms of sub-divisibles.
- There might be reference to Bennett-type points regarding how Hume would know that a blind man has no idea of colour. Response would be that the criteria used for saying that someone did do not apply and those are the only criteria available.

0 4 Outline the simile of the large and powerful animal (beast) and **one** of its purposes.

[15 marks]

AO1

- The animal is described as large and powerful and is compared with the crowd or the people.
- If it got out of control, it would be dangerous. It needs to be pacified.
- The trainer corresponds to the sophist or democratic politician.
- He observes the behaviour, moods, noises and reactions of the beast.
- He pacifies the beast by pandering to its whims.

AO2

- The trainer claims that his observations are a 'science' which can be taught.
- Whatever pleases the animal is called 'good', what displeases it is called 'bad'.
- The trainer has no idea of what is really good for the animal. He cannot distinguish between short-term wants and long-term needs.
- The purpose may be selected from an attack on democratic politics with the appropriate comparisons, the activity and claims of the sophists, the limitations of the empirical method of observation or the opposite of what true philosophy should be.

0 5 Assess whether Plato's ideal republic would be perfect.

[45 marks]

AO1

- The Republic is the blueprint for the ideal state.
- The rulers have knowledge of the Forms.
- Knowledge of justice is particularly important. Their decisions proceed from knowledge rather than belief or ignorance.
- The thesis that knowledge is virtue and the implication for ruling.
- There will probably be reference to the personal qualities and training of the rulers.

AO2

- Individuals will have assigned roles and functions.
- There may be reference to a rigid class system and the 'noble lie'.
- Similes are likely to be used to illustrate points. The Forms may be explained and illustrated through the cave simile.
- The sense of duty of the ruler is represented by the reluctant return to the cave.
- The ship simile might feature to illustrate the philosopher's knowledge and what he has to overcome. The alternative is a disaster.

AO3

- The individual is in a precarious position. His role is decided for him and it is difficult to see how self-development could amount to very much. It would be unrecognisable from what we mean by that term. There is a similar issue with self-improvement and autonomy.
- Plato's view seems to involve a pessimistic position on human nature, incapable of development, swayed by sophistry and needs to be pacified (beast). People are incapable of deciding what is good for them. This could be taken as an incentive to improve education rather than a justification for Plato's elitism.
- There are problems with rule by an intellectual elite. The decisions they make and the rationale for those decisions will not be understood by the masses and will be treated as illusory.
- The rulers would be so removed from the people that any kind of empathy would be difficult. This is not ideal. A possible response would be that the rulers' understanding of the people would be akin to that of parent and child.
- There might be reference to Popper's criticism that Plato's state would be a closed society. It would be a static state rather than a dynamic one with no obvious way of improving.
- Participation is itself a political ideal and it cannot be ideal to dispense with it. Self-determination is not valued. Without participation there is no responsibility and this produces degraded individuals.
- There are problems with the qualities of the rulers and with what kind of individuals such intense and lengthy training might produce. It might be argued that it would be virtually impossible to find such qualities or Plato might be accused of defining perfection into the nature of the rulers.
- Some of the rulers' qualities might not be ideal. It is not clear that lack of ambition is a desirable quality in a ruler. Would Churchill have been a better ruler if he lacked ambition? Similar points may apply to ruling out of a sense of duty as there is a clear implication that the ruler does not want to rule. Having no interest in material wealth or no fear of death may be qualities that accentuate the problem of remoteness.
- Some of the above points might be responded to with examples of where ambition and the thirst for power have had dreadful consequences.

- There might be a discussion of whether any ideal state could be based on a lie no matter how noble. The rigid class divisions are of overriding importance and even the murder of children is subordinated to their maintenance.
- The Form of the Good is unattainable and therefore cannot be the goal of political science (Aristotle).
- There might be a discussion of the ship simile and the distinction between knowledge of means and knowledge of ends. The former does not guarantee the latter.
- The claim that knowledge is virtue may be questioned. One can know what is right and not do it. Examples of weakness of the will or bloody-mindedness might feature. Plato's rulers would not be susceptible to such defects due to their personal qualities. So it seems that problems are being ruled out by definition.
- It is not clear how knowledge of the Forms will resolve moral or political dilemmas. Can such problems be resolved by the acquisition of knowledge? It seems possible that even when all the facts are known there can still be real disagreement on what should be done. It is not clear how reason can solve such cases, or how knowledge of the universal resolves all particular problems. This is problematic especially when you consider the uniqueness of individual issues.
  For example, whether it was right for Gauguin to leave his wife in order to fulfil himself as an artist was a problem for **him** not all artists. Appeals to the function of an artist will not solve this.
- Rule by experts carries dangers of rule by those who have absolute knowledge. Historical examples might feature, eg Bronowski sifting the soil at Auschwitz and saying this was the result of those who had absolute knowledge.
- There is the possibility of unchecked corruption and the impotence of the ruled. Could such fears be allayed by an appeal to the qualities of the rulers or is past experience a more convincing appeal? The 'perfect state' requires infallibility and experience teaches us to be wary of such claims.
- There is a problem with distributive justice. How are those who guard the rulers to be rewarded? What would they value?
- There might be a discussion of the Theory of Forms as underpinning the perfect state but such a discussion must remain focused on the question.
- There might be a defence of democracy in terms of the only system with built-in safeguards.
  There are significant differences between democracy today and that of Plato's time. His picture of the masses does not correspond to an educated electorate. Alternatively, it may be argued that there are similarities in terms of being influenced by sound bites or short-termism in general. There is, however, nothing ideal about rule in which the ruled have no say.
- There is no one 'good' for society as a whole. To think that there is and that it is or could be known by experts is to ignore the freedom and rationality of the public.
- Decisions regarding what are morally right or politically right actions have an irreducibly personal element to them and this cannot be removed by claims to have objective knowledge.
- Plato's perfect state would involve censorship and the inculcation of false beliefs to keep society in check. This is not ideal and involves regarding the people as inherently ignorant and incapable of rational decision and choice. Censorship would imply infallibility on the part of the censor but no one is infallible.
- It may be argued that there need not be **one** way of organising an ideal state.

0 6 'Plato fails to justify his claim that the world of sense experience is merely appearance and not reality.' Assess this claim.

[45 marks]

AO1

- It is the world of the Forms that is ultimately real.
- The Forms should be contrasted with sensible particulars which constitute the world of sense experience.
- Sensible particulars are imperfect copies of the Forms. They partake in the Forms.
- The properties of the Forms include immutability, not located in space, eternal, are the objects of reason not the senses, perfect etc. These may be contrasted with the objects of sense experience.
- The Forms have a hierarchical structure. The position of the Form of the Good is likely to be highlighted.
- Knowledge and belief are different faculties and require different objects.

AO2

- Expect references to the cave simile to illustrate the claim. The world of sense experience corresponding to the shadows, the sun representing the Form of the Good, the difficulty of adjusting to the truth and the sad position of those who do not know the truth.
- There might be a comparison of empirical science with those who can accurately predict the occurrence of the shadows on the wall. There might be reference to Rationalism.
- There should be references to why Plato thought there had to be Forms. Knowledge has to be of what is unchanging, of what is always true. It must be infallible and none of these conditions is satisfied by sensible particulars.
- There is likely to be a distinction between knowledge, belief and ignorance.
- There might be reference to the general formula that it is by F-ness that F things are F.
- No sensible particular can be identified with a Form. They will partake of it at some times but not at others.

AO3

- Although the simile of the cave is a haunting allegory it is not itself an argument. The difficulty of convincing those in the cave of their illusory status may not serve its intended purpose especially if the revelation cannot be clearly explained.
- Even if one accepts that knowledge and belief are different faculties, it does not follow that their respective objects belong to ontologically distinct realms. One could argue that reason and emotion are distinct faculties but the same object could be their subject.
- It is not clear why knowledge requires something unchanging as its object and therefore we do not have to suppose an unchanging world as its domain. A similar point might be made in relation to eternal existence, namely why should existing eternally make a difference? Aristotle's point about whiteness can be adapted.
- Talk about more real or less real lacks sense. Something is either real or it is not.
- A point of Wittgenstein's might be adapted along the lines that if one world is a mystery, then having two would double the mystery rather than solve it.

- Questions regarding what counts as knowledge should be resolved by an analysis of how the term is actually used. Its meaning would be constituted by the sum total of appropriate usages and this need not involve another world at all.
- Distinctions between knowledge and belief are well made within the world of sense experience and these distinctions carry no implications for a world beyond the senses. Examples can be given to illustrate this. There might be reference to knowledge as justified true belief. This does not involve objects of a different ontological type. It is the justification that matters.
- Plato might be accused of altering the concept of knowledge beyond recognition. His conception limits it use to what can be known a priori. The utility of such knowledge might also be questioned.
- Solutions to the problem of universals are available that do not involve the acceptance of an ontologically separate realm. There could be reference to Aristotle, Russell, universals as abstractions from particulars, as mental existents, as subsisting or Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances.
- There are difficulties in specifying the relation between the world of appearance and reality.
  It is not clear what 'partaking' consists of. There are other problems if we arrive at universals by extracting what particulars have in common, will there be something in common between the Form and the particular? This can be extended into a discussion of the third man argument of Parmenides. There could be a defence of Plato, eg the Form of man is not a man.
  There is some lack of clarity over the range of particulars that have a Form. There might be reference to the Forms of manufactured objects and eternal existence or to the Forms of such things as dung (Parmenides).
- There might be an examination of the logic of the terms 'appearance' and 'reality' and a discussion of the difficulty of regarding an entire world as an appearance. There might be reference to the learning of concepts by application.
- Discussions of the world of the Forms are expected to be more sophisticated than asserting there is no empirical evidence for it. Given what Plato meant by such a world talk about empirical evidence is misplaced. A discussion might consist of whether it makes sense to talk about a world beyond sense experience. If this approach is taken expect discussions of Ayer's verification principle. There may also be counters to its adequacy as a theory of meaning, eg it fails in its own terms.

0 7 Outline and illustrate Mill's concerns regarding the emergence of a tyranny of the majority.

[15 marks]

AO1

- The term 'majority' refers to democracy.
- One might think there can be no real objection to a democratically elected government as such a government enacts the will of the people.
- Historically there have been attempts to limit the power of rulers whose interests did not coincide with those of the ruled.
- There was a shift to representative government and the idea of a coincidence of interests.
- A nation does not require protection from itself.
- There is a problem regarding what is meant by the will of the people.

AO2

- In practice the will of the people may turn out to be the will of the numerically greater or those who are more politically active. They may seek to oppress minorities and this would amount to a tyranny of the majority.
- Examples of social tyranny may involve references to current opinion, prejudice or superstition. Such tyranny is more penetrating than the enacting of laws.
- There is the risk of an ascendancy of a dominant class deciding moral issues.
- There needs to be safeguards against the majority dictating on moral matters so even the powers of the elected need to be limited.
- Examples might be given to illustrate Mill's historical remarks.
- Mill's concerns extend beyond liberalism. They will apply to any system that involves rule by an elected majority.

0 8 Assess whether Mill was right to emphasise the importance of free speech to a free society.

[45 marks]

AO1

- There should be reference to Mill's arguments. Infallibility, dead dogma, heretical ideas, supplements.
- There is no real distinction between truth and utility.
- The individual needs to develop as a rational and progressive being. This in turn will also benefit society.
- The appeal to the need for a free market of ideas.
- Deciding for oneself is the only principle consistent with autonomy.
- Free speech and incitement.

AO2

- None of us is infallible. Even if all of mankind were of one opinion that would not give them the right to silence a dissenter.
- The utility of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion and should therefore be discussed.
- Preventing free discussion is bad for both receivers of and dissenters from the opinion.
- Limiting free speech hampers rational and mental development.
- There should be some unpacking of Mill's arguments, eg opposed ideas or heretical ones may contain portions of truth, some beliefs (Christianity) need invigorating and sometimes we should play devil's advocate to foster discussion and argument.
- We select from the free market of ideas with rational and free discussion as the currency that is common to all.

AO3

- Censorship is not compatible with a free society as individuals are not free to decide for themselves. The matter is taken out of their hands and this also fails to respect their rationality. This may be associated with a pessimistic view of human nature. Alternatively it may be argued that censorship can protect values
- Censorship involves an infallibility assumption on the part of the censor as he is deciding the issue in advance of any discussion. Ben Gibbs has argued that the censor need not have any feelings of infallibility. This seems to miss Mill's point that deciding for others and depriving them of the opportunity of discussion **logically** amounts to an assumption of infallibility and this is mistaken as no one is infallible. Mill's point is logical not psychological.
- Free speech is essential to the pursuit of truth. Historical examples may be given to demonstrate the benefits of free enquiry and how freedom in general is enhanced.
- It may be argued that we do not have free speech as we are limited by various laws, eg defamation or restrictions on discussion of cases that are sub-judice, However, these are minor exceptions and have their own rationale which is consistent with truth and other freedoms. Defamation requires that the statements are false and injurious and court cases can be discussed after their conclusion.
- There may be discussions of limiting free speech in the national interest. Wartime situations are unusual and free speech may be limited to ensure the future survival of free speech. More difficult cases will involve just how broadly the term 'national interest' is to be interpreted and the danger of setting precedents.

- There might be a discussion of free speech and cases of incitement. Mill's angry crowd is likely to feature where the key issue is impending direct physical harm. This might be contrasted with the offence of inciting racial hatred and the extent to which these considerations may apply.
  This can be extended to any discussion where what is incited is an attitude rather than direct action. It may be argued that attitudes are inevitably linked with actions and history has taught us this. The issue of remoteness of risk may be explored together with whether this remains consistent with Mill's position.
- Related to the above is the issue of free speech causing offence and whether this is a sufficient condition for intervention. It might be argued that offence is an issue that a rational being of mature faculties should be able to deal with. There is also the issue of whether 'offence' should be interpreted negatively in terms of not real harm, or positively in terms of constituting actual harm or damage. There is a problem that there might be some level of description at which virtually anything could be seen as offensive so where are lines to be drawn or how do we decide on 'reasonableness'? Is it possible to draw a line at grossly offensive or does that merely shift the issue?
- Free speech involves questioning the values of a society but such values are invigorated by discussion. Strong values have stood the test of time. They may just as plausibly be reinforced so there's no real conflict with a conservative approach.
- There are inherent dangers in strict governmental control of information. A misinformed electorate undermines democratic principles and operates with an illusion of freedom. This can only be exposed or prevented where there is genuine free speech.
- There may be some discussion of freedom of the press and such freedom is open to abuse so restrictions are necessary. Such abuses can only be recognised and exposed within a general climate of freedom and it is through free speech that reasonable limits can be discussed and decided. Virtually any system is open to abuse but this does not imply that the system itself should be abandoned.
- Mill has been accused of being obsessive about freedom. There may be a discussion of whether this is justifiable. Giving a theoretical justification for your position is not generally a characteristic of obsessiveness. There could be a distinction between being obsessive and being vigilant. It may be argued that a state that is not concerned with freedoms has probably already lost them (not a dominant theme in eg speeches of Nazi leaders).
- Our understanding of issues is enhanced through listening to alternative viewpoints and the arguments that support them.
- The above point may be made in terms of the improvement of our rational faculties. The analogy of how a muscle is strengthened through use may feature.
- It is not necessary to question everything as we need a framework to take as a given in which free speech can take place.
- The free market of ideas can only be effective if it is genuinely free. There may be analogies with free markets in economics. Rational arguments will correspond to market forces. Is this view too idealistic? There could be references to the tactics and manipulative techniques of public speaking. There could also be discussion of the conditions necessary for their recognition and freedom is one of them.
- Free speech is essential to informed decision making and life choices and is therefore inextricably linked with freedom of action. These are essential to a free society.
- Too much state interference and restrictions is not compatible with Mill's conception of man as a progressive being. Appeals to how easily people can be swayed by rhetoric should be seen as an incentive to improve knowledge and education rather than as a justification of suppression.

0 9 'Experiments in living are vital to human freedom, progress and development and Mill was fully justified in defending them.' Assess this claim.

[45 marks]

AO1

- Such experiments allow us to develop our own mode of being. This is important for our own sake and for the benefit of society.
- We should avoid sheep or ape-like imitation. This does not exercise our rational faculties.
- There are differences in physical and spiritual needs, and in what gives pleasure and pain.
- There should be no interference in such experiments if they are in conformity with the Harm Principle.
- Emphasis is placed on the importance of eccentricity and non-conformity.

AO2

- People need different stimulations and environments. (Diversity).
- Analogies might be drawn with the growth of a tree and a machine.
- The dominance of average opinion needs to be countered, especially on moral matters (in a broad sense).
- Eccentricity is seen as a sign of mental vigour and should be pursued for its own sake.
- There might be some account of Mill's position on custom and the ape-like imitation that it engenders. Mill's example of China might feature. There might be references to custom and stagnation.
- Expect the Harm Principle to be unpacked and applied. The individual is sovereign over his own mind and body.

AO3

- Actions are valuable for **what** they involve or what they produce rather than for the manner in which they are chosen. However, it is still preferable for such actions to be chosen feely and through the exercise of our rational faculties.
- There may be a focused discussion on whether experiments in living are self-regarding within the terms of the Harm Principle. Can the distinction between self and other-regarding be sustained?
  It may be argued that there is some level of description at which our actions always affect others (no man is an island). Or, there are boundaries even if they are not clear cut. Borderlines cases do not show there are no borders otherwise it is difficult to explain how we can recognise such cases.
- The claim that experiments in living are valuable as they are one's own choices might be regarded as inconsistent with utilitarian considerations. The possibility of a clash between two absolute principles might be developed.
- Eccentricity might be seen as a sign of mental weakness rather than strength. Expect examples of cases to demonstrate this but there is no need to multiply them once the point has been made.
- Mill seems to condone the eccentric or unusual for its own sake. Is this a sufficient justification?
  It might be argued that they derive value by demonstrating a contrast and show that alternatives are at least possible.
- Eccentricity requires a general background of conformity in order to have value and in order to be recognised. The background is also important. Mill does not pay sufficient attention to the distinction between individual variation within a fixed background of stability, and variation of the background itself.
- Mill overestimates rationality. In regard to experiments in living, people can make disastrous choices. Some of these could be irreversible. Are they worth it simply because they are one's own choices? There might be some discussion of paternalism or it might be argued that even bad choices have a value as others can learn from them.

- Paternalism is incompatible with the ideals of democratic participation and personal responsibility. A person entrusted with voting decisions is sufficiently responsible to decide his/her own life. There would be an inconsistency in a Government appealing to the public vote as its justification and also claiming that the public was incapable of making rational decisions.
- If custom is to be rejected, it should be because of its content, not just simply because it is custom. Customs have stood the test of time and Mill himself uses a similar argument to justify his version of rule-utilitarianism.
- Mill sees too close a connection between custom and despotism. There might be a defence of Mill: he is warning us about the blind endorsement of custom. Blind acceptance will stunt the growth of our mental faculties. This would result in despotism of the mind and would be incompatible with the progression of mankind.
- Custom provides stability and social utility. It is the glue of a cohesive society. It allows for the possibility of firm expectations. There might be reference to a conservative view, eg Burke's idea of a partnership between the living and the dead. There might be reference to radical positions endorsing cohesion.
- It might be argued that unbridled experiments in living result in a society becoming highly individualistic. Cohesion and identity are lost. Such societies become weak, decadent and vulnerable to attack (historical examples).
- There might be some discussion of Mill's account of the ideal conditions for genius to flourish and whether it is historically accurate, selective, whether a necessary connection is established etc. Historical examples are likely to feature.
- There might be contrasts or comparisons with other positions on how to best promote the individual/society (Marxism, anarchism). There may be a comparison with Sartre's claim that it is choosing in sincerity that confers value. If this approach is taken it should do more than merely list or juxtapose alternatives.

1 0 Explain and illustrate the method of doubt and indicate its positive conclusion.

[15 marks]

AO1

- The purpose is to find a certainty upon which all knowledge can be based.
- He is using sceptical doubt to achieve something positive, to find something that cannot be doubted. He doubts in classes of beliefs.
- The senses can be doubted as they have been mistaken in the past.
- The dream argument and the claim that there are no distinguishing features between dreaming and waking.
- The evil demon hypothesis and the possibility of global scepticism.

AO2

- The connections between the stages should be made. Consideration of objects in close proximity leads into the dream argument.
- The consideration of general truths leads to the demon hypothesis.
- Illustrations of the method, eg of sense deception, general truths should be given.
- The conclusion is the certainty of a thinking self. To imagine there is a deceiving demon, there must be an I to do the imagining, or to be deceived by a demon there must be an I to be deceived. There might be reference to the cogito as the first certainty as it would hold even if there were no God, just the demon. The cogito is the foundation for knowledge.

1 1 Assess whether Descartes succeeds in establishing the certainty of God's existence.

[45 marks]

AO1

- Candidates are likely to discuss both the ontological argument and the trademark argument. Note that full marks can be obtained through a detailed discussion of the ontological argument.
- Descartes reformulates the ontological argument. There might be reference to Anselm by contrast.
- Descartes defines God as the perfect being, existence is implied by perfection. 'God exists' is a necessary truth.
- He draws analogies with triangles and their properties, mountains and valleys. The anticipated objection results in identifying God as a unique concept. There is an internal relation between God and existence.
- The trademark argument appeals to the causation of our idea of a perfect being.
- The causal adequacy principle states that an effect cannot be greater or have more reality than its cause.
- The idea of a perfect or infinite being is stamped upon us like a trademark. We could not produce it ourselves as we lack these properties, ie infinity & perfection.

AO2

- The ontological argument is purely a priori and would provide certainty. It turns on an analysis of the concept of God.
- The trademark argument turns on the validity of the causal adequacy principle which Descartes supports with empirical examples (heat and stone).
- There might be analysis of the anticipated objection, 'my thought imposes no necessity on things'. The disanalogy of God with mountain/valley, triangles.
- There might be some discussion of formal and objective reality, total and efficient causes though this need not be detailed. The causal adequacy principle holds in the realm of things and ideas. In the ontological argument existence is regarded as a perfection and this is why a perfect being could not lack it. God must possess all perfections.

AO3

- In regard to the ontological argument, Kant's criticisms are likely to feature prominently. Existence is not a property or a predicate. We do not add to conceptual content when we say something exists.
- The subject-predicate form of the sentence attributing existence is superficial and confusing. We are led astray by surface grammar.
- To say that something has properties x, y, z and it exists is not to add a further property. It is just to say there is something that has x, y and z.
- Attributions of existence do make a difference to our knowledge (dark matter and sea monsters). Kant's own example of 100 real thalers affecting his financial position might be discussed. Differences between knowledge and conceptual content might be explored.
- Kant's treatment might be refined by Russell's analysis of the issue. Existence (and non-existence) is to be analysed in terms of the propositional function. To say that men exist is not to attribute existence as a property to men, it is to say that the propositional function 'x is a man' is true for some value of x.
- Schopenhauer-type objections might feature. If you incorporate existence into the concept under discussion via perfection, then there are no limits to what you can define into existence. Gaunilo's island might be adapted here. There are differences as the connection between God and perfection is internal whereas with anything else it would be external. An island would exist contingently whereas God would exist necessarily. We know in advance that the island does not exist whereas we do not know that God does not exist.

- There might be Plantinga-type points that the idea of a perfect island is incoherent. You could always add something to your idea of a perfect island. But there are counters to this. Gaunilo speaks of the best island, the most excellent land superior to any existing land or the Isles of the Blessed. If part of what is meant by 'best' is existence, then I should not say that this idea is in my understanding until **after** I know it exists. This principle would hold regardless of what **else** was meant by 'best'. We could even disagree about that without making a difference as the essential point concerns existence. (The issue of disagreement needs careful handling. That there could be disagreement does not show that there is no idea and neither does it show that just about anything could be part of the idea).
- There are other points that might be referred to. If you could **always** add to the alleged idea of a perfect island or whatever, then it would be infinitely removed from perfection. So how could we distinguish a palm-tree paradise from a floating sheet of ice? They are both equally removed from perfection, ie an infinite distance away. Alternatively it might be argued that 'perfection' is relative to context. It can refer to that of which you will never find a better example rather than that which cannot be imagined to be better. Appeals to ordinary usage might feature.
- There may be standard objections from within the empiricist tradition. No existential proposition is logically certain, a priori arguments cannot tell us what exists, circularity issues. The argument should be treated as a potential counter-example to such claims.
- In regard to the trademark argument, it might be argued that talk about different levels or degrees of reality is confused. Something is either real or it is not. The concept does not admit of degrees (Hobbes).
- Descartes confuses the idea of a perfect being with a perfect idea. You can have a memory of something perfect without having a perfect memory. The point concerns the object-directedness of 'perfect', ie a psychological event and the content of the idea.
- If the idea of God was innate you would expect it to be universal but it is not. Appeals to latency do not convince as it's difficult to distinguish something being elicited from something being taught.
- There are alternative accounts of how we acquire the idea of God, eg Hume, Freud, Marx.
  There might be responses to such accounts. Hume's thesis is not convincing for properties like immutable, incorporeal or transcendent etc. God's properties are different in kind not degree, eg God's love is not possessive, physical, exclusive, contingent etc. Similar remarks apply to an idealised father figure, eg would such a figure be lacking in emotion, unchanging, radically different from the world? There might be discussion of unfalsifiability issues or what possible set of observations could ever verify such a claim.
- There are likely to be discussions of the causal adequacy principle. Evolution is a strong counter-example as the emergence of conscious beings could not have been predicted from the total and efficient causes. A meaning can also be given to 'greater' in terms of physical and mental complexity.
- Other examples are likely to include cake mixture and the resulting sponge cake, discarded cigarettes and forest fires, or chaos theory. There is some scope for discussion here. Descartes would have been aware of the transformation of properties (wax example). Such transformations are predictable and understandable if one includes both total and efficient causes which Descartes does. It's also not clear how sponginess is greater or more real than liquidity: rather it is different. In the case of the fire in what sense is this formally more real than the discarded cigarette?
  If chaos theory is discussed it should be clear that we have not simply discovered that butterflies cause earthquakes and the term 'cause' is acquiring a quite different meaning to that of Descartes.
  Talk about small changes within a system bringing massive ones begs the question as to what counts as a system. The history of the world's weather, the solar system, the succession of British monarchs would all lead to assigning inappropriate causes to future events in the system. Candidates appealing to chaos theory are expected to do more than simply assert that butterflies cause hurricanes, tidal waves etc. Those appealing to discarded cigarettes need to do more than claim that Descartes thought that something big cannot come from something small.
- The causal adequacy principle excludes the infinite coming from the finite **not** the finite coming from the finite or modes coming from the finite.

1 2 'Descartes was wrong to claim that mind and body were separate and distinct substances. His arguments fail and he is left with an insoluble problem.' Assess this claim.

[45 marks]

AO1

- There might be reference to what Descartes meant by 'substance', ie something capable of existing in its own right, can only be destroyed by God, each mind is an individual substance.
- Mind and body have different essential natures, thinking and extension.
- 'Essential' refers to that which could not be lost without the thing in question ceasing to be a thing of that sort.
- There should be awareness of Descartes' arguments for his position, knowledge argument in both its forms, the appeal to God's omnipotence and indivisibility.
- The insoluble problem is that of interaction.

AO2

- The arguments are intended to demonstrate the mind's independence from the body.
- The arguments should be unpacked. Mind is indubitable, body is not, my knowledge of my mind cannot depend on what I do not yet know (body), God has the power to do what is clearly and distinctly conceived, and mind is indivisible whereas body is divisible. There should be an awareness of Descartes' faculties response to indivisibility. The exercise of any faculty requires the entire self as subject and it is this self that cannot be divided.
- Interaction said to take place at the pineal gland.
- The pilot and the ship should be treated as a disanalogy. The mind pervades the whole body. The example of pain is likely to feature.

AO3

- If the essential nature of mind is having conscious experiences, then Descartes is vulnerable to the example of the dreamless sleep. His response to this fails as dream time is not co-extensive with sleep time.
- To identify 'thinking' as an essential attribute does not imply that it is the sole attribute.
- The concept of an immaterial substance is incoherent as 'substance' implies materiality.
- The appeal to the pineal gland fails to solve the interaction problem. The mind, lacking spatial properties, cannot literally be 'in' anything. The claim is meaningless rather than false.
- The discussion of the intermingling thesis (pilot and ship) is hard to reconcile with Descartes' official position.
- The first form of the knowledge argument fails. It misuses Leibniz' Law in the context of expressions denoting intentional states, eg knowing, believing, doubting etc (Carruthers). Expect examples to illustrate the distinction between facts about an object and attitudes projected on to an object. The masked man fallacy or Lois Lane loving Superman or tribes worshipping the evening star are likely to feature.
- The second form also fails. Even if my knowledge of my mental states does not depend on my body, it won't follow that the states themselves are not dependent. In its stronger form the claim that tings we know cannot depend on things we do not know clearly fails. Diseases we know may depend on bacteria we do not yet know. Many such examples are available. The order in which we come to know things or how we do (epistemology) does not imply causal independence or ontological priority. There might be a discussion of conceptual distinctness and causal independence.

- The appeal to God's omnipotence does not advance matters. Ideally you want a mind-body thesis that is independent of religious belief. Even if God has the power to create mind and body separately, it does not follow that God has exercised that power. There is a difference between the exercise and the use of a power and Descartes' reference to 'may' exist separately leaves it unclear whether he had realised this.
- The mere **possibility** of distinctness could be accepted by contingent identity theorists.
  Mental states could have been something else but it just so happens they are brain states.
- The indivisibility argument does not obviously misuse Leibniz' Law as it concerns properties of the thing rather than attitudes directed at the thing.
- The problems of the indivisibility argument are likely to focus on counter-examples such as split or multiple personality cases, Freud's tripartite division of the mind or split brain experiments.
  These might be treated in some detail and counter arguments might be supplied. A supporter of Descartes may claim that cases of split or multiple personality are misdescribed as two or more distinct persons inhabiting one body. It leads to unacceptable numbers of 'people' in one body; the criteria used for distinguishing such persons are different from those used in normal cases. There is over reliance on memory as the criterion of identity but if this is what is essential what happens to person A when B is in control as B does not have A's memories? Does A cease to exist and then re-emerge from nowhere?
  Freud's key concepts may be assessed, especially that of an unconscious mind. There are issues regarding falsification, whether Freud was prepared to revise his key concepts at all and whether there are even possible observations that would verify such a theory (Cioffi). If the theory is not genuinely scientific, need it worry a supporter of Descartes?
  Split brain cases may issue in a discussion of whether they justify talk about the mind literally being split. They may be assimilated to a person doing two things simultaneously and not being conscious of one of them. Are the cases significantly different?
- There are problems in explaining how brain damage or surgery can have effects on the mind if mind and body are independent. Aphasia cases might be discussed as language impairment has implications for our ability to think and thus for our essential nature. Responses may claim that damage is to the instrument of expression only. This would imply that we could never know what the mind of such a person was like. There may be some support for this response through recent revelations regarding deep coma patients who had lost all communicative powers but were aware of what was happening around them.
- There might be references to solutions of interaction contemporary with Descartes, eg occasionalism, or two clocks. Issues regard fortunate accidents, reliance on God, or failure to explain causation by substituting an alternative.
- We need some form of dualism to accommodate undeniable facts of consciousness, eg qualia, intentionality, subjectivity or the structure of conscious experience. There may be some discussion of alternatives to Descartes, eg Ryle's claim that Descartes made a category mistake and how convincing is this? There might be some discussion of how Descartes might respond to such alternatives. Any such discussion should remain focused on the central issues of the question. They should not just be general discussions of materialism.

1 3 Explain what Nietzsche means by the sceptic, the critic and the new philosopher.

[15 marks]

AO1

- The sceptic is an example of a scepticism which is disdainful. It is undermining and withholds belief.
- The critics are essentially those who experiment. Their chief role is to subdue the past. There may be limits to their experimentation.
- The new philosopher will also be an experimenter but will be prepared to push experimentation beyond the acceptable. He will not be disillusioned by ideals of truth or other traditional values or intellectual ideals.

AO2

- The kind of scepticism Nietzsche means is a new kind. It is associated with the coming of Frederick the Great. It is a German or 'manly' scepticism. It provides freedom of spirit but also keeps the heart in line. It is what brought Europe under the dominance of the German spirit.
- The critics aim to render the past intelligible. They are codifiers by which they 'tame' the past. They present a history of morals. They say this is how things were.
- The new philosopher will recognise the importance and centrality of the will to power. The will to truth **is** the will to power. He does not say what was but what will be. He commands, creates values rather than receives them.
- There might be examples of the will to power.
- The new philosophers might be sceptics but it is not essential to them. Neither are they just critics. Scepticism and criticism may be stages a new philosopher passes through. But they are not the ultimate ends. They are essentially his tools.

1 4 Assess Nietzsche's account of past philosophy and how philosophy should proceed.

[45 marks]

AO1

- He presents a survey of past philosophy and of how philosophers have been bewitched by the use of language.
- The concern with objective truth is pretence.
- The right question to ask is what function do concepts play.
- The ultimate issue is whether they promote life. Whether they are life-enhancing.
- Ad hominem arguments are used to support his position.
- There might be references to truth and perspectivism.

AO2

- Past philosophers have sought justifications for what they instinctively want to believe (their heart's desire). This is then presented as objective truth arrived at through unassailable reason.
- Examples of ad hominem arguments are likely to be given. Kant, Plato et al.
- There may be reference to the inherent dangers of language and how we can be led astray.
  The subject-centred grammar of our language imposes our interpretation on the world. This may be illustrated with Descartes' Cogito or the free will issue.
- Freud's concept of a 'rationalisation' may be used to elucidate Nietzsche's position.
- Certain concepts regarded as fundamental, eg causation, are invented and not objectively discovered.
- Physiological states are important.
- The fundamental concept that had to be recognised before any progress can be made is the will to power. This is purely natural.

AO3

- Nietzsche is perceptive in recognising what is embedded in language. An analysis may reveal a particular world view together with assumptions regarding the way things are and the way things must be. There is a problem regarding what language the analysis will be conducted in.
  There might be reference to Wittgenstein's 'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world'. This does **not** mean English, French etc.
- Nietzsche may be implying that a philosopher never comes to a repugnant conclusion but what kind of claim would this be? There are prima facie counter examples but it's not clear how these would be dealt with. Clearly it would trivialise the thesis if one replied that they must have 'really' wanted that conclusion but didn't realise it. The issue is whether such counters are at least in principle possible.
- Nietzsche's account of past philosophers is too selective. Examples of other philosophers may warrant different conclusions, eg work in formal logic, modal logic, sense-data and uniqueness of reference, formal validity. Such studies may be difficult to accommodate within the prejudice thesis.
- Ad hominem arguments fail to establish the falsehood of a thesis. You do not dispose of an argument by attacking either the motives or the character of its proponents. Nietzsche could respond by saying he is not interested in falsehood or truth but the function the concepts fulfil and it is here the theses fail as they are not life enhancing or fail to acknowledge the will to power.
- There are issues with truth. Do we ask whether Nietzsche's pronouncements are true or whether they are life-enhancing? Does his own use of language reveal presuppositions about the world? There seems to be a truth claim involved regarding the will to power but is this consistent?
  And if no truth claim is involved, then it could be rejected by those adversely affected by its unbridled instantiation on the grounds of pursuing their rational self-interest and enhancing their lives. There may be discussion of a general problem in giving a true account that undermines truth.

- There are some difficulties with Nietzsche's treatment of traditional philosophical problems.
  It is rather simplistic to deal with the free-will issue by dismissing the will as a common prejudice. One should be wary of prejudices that occur on a universal scale. The dismissal also appears to assume the truth of his claims regarding the will to power.
- If Nietzsche has found problems inherent in **any** language, then how is he to express this and prescribe how we are to progress?
- Kant is criticised for arguing from possibilities to faculties (opium example) but Nietzsche uses similar arguments and strategies to justify claims about instincts and the fundamental will.
- Philosophers like Plato, Kant, and Berkeley etc have to be addressed on their own merits.
  The complexity and logic of their arguments cannot be substituted by an appeal to what they want. This would be anti-intellectual and could not be the way forward for any discipline. Nietzsche could respond by saying any discipline that glorifies a sham needs to be exposed and it is only then that real progress can be made. It seems such a response will involve a truth judgement.
- Nietzsche claims that the writings of past philosophers are caused by their physiological states. We are also told that causation is a fiction.
- There might be realist arguments to support the claim that we have good independent reasons to justify our concepts. Some concepts have to be learned by application before any interpretation becomes possible so how can **they** be a matter of interpretation?
- There might be a discussion of the role the will to power or the key notion of exploitation will play in the new philosophy. A number of issues arise here, eg is the will to power a metaphysical concept? How do we know about it? Are counter-examples possible in principle to its supposed universal application? Is the will to power itself a way of seeing the world? And are other ways equally plausible? Does it manifest itself in too many different and diverse ways for it to be an explanatory concept? There might be a discussion of whether talk about an unconscious will makes sense.
- There might be discussion of 'exploitation'. There are other candidates for the essence of life assuming it makes sense to talk of life having an essence. Or our ability to take a moral stance on exploitation distinguishes us from the rest of nature. There might be a discussion from an existentialist position. Sartre would claim that any attempt to justify our actions in terms of some natural given is an act of bad faith and fails to confront the human condition of absolute freedom. Whether we choose to exploit or not is up to us and we are totally responsible for that choice.
  We cannot justify it by claiming we are instantiating a purely natural principle. Spencer's defence of the massacre of Native Americans was an irreducibly moral judgement in spite of his claim that it was instantiating the principle of survival of the fittest.
- We do not discover principles in nature. They do not come labelled so. It is for us to interpret nature in particular ways and the will to power is one way amongst others.

15 'Nietzsche's account of religious belief in terms of sacrifice, protection and the production of mediocrity is narrow and confused'. Assess this claim.

[45 marks]

AO1

- The ladder of religious sacrifice (cruelty) should feature.
- The rungs are sacrificing what is close to us, followed by our instincts and then God himself.
- Religion and in particular, Christianity, has developed a moral system to protect the weak from the strong.
- There might be reference to the slave revolt.
- This has resulted in the modern, sickly European (mediocrity).
- The will to power manifests itself in the saint or ascetic but it is turned in on itself.

AO2

- The ladder of sacrifice may be illustrated. The first period is prehistoric religion, the Romans (Tiberius on Capri) or Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son.
- The second stage may be illustrated by the extreme case of the terrifying glance of the ascetic living rapturously contrary to nature.
- In the third stage there is nothing left to sacrifice. Hope, faith, harmony and justice are all sacrificed. This period may involve the worship of stupidity, heaviness, fate and finally nothingness. In the modern age we are familiar with this (the TV advert, I believe in science not miracles).
- Natural values have been transformed under Christianity. The meaning of 'good' is now closer to stupidity.
- Religion is described as a neurosis clearly implying irrationality. The sacrifice of freedom, pride and spiritual self-confidence and the denial of the world and the will might be referred to.

AO3

- Sacrifice has to be seen in the context of what the religious believer actually believes. You can portray anything as absurd by removing it from that which gives it a meaning.
- Nietzsche neglects the ultimate sacrifice by God for man. This is an integral part of the belief system.
- One can paint lurid pictures of sacrifice but one could also show a picture of Mother Teresa. It is not sacrifice per se that is despicable.
- It is not obvious how one goes about sacrificing an instinct. There are other problems with instincts, eg the independent evidence for them. For them to be genuinely explanatory we need more than the behaviour to identify them. Otherwise there will be circularity problems.
- We are owed an account of how it is possible to live contrary to nature. Such claims seem to set us apart from nature.
- If by 'natural' we mean a widespread phenomenon that is found in diverse societies, then there is nothing unnatural about religion.

- There are problems with functionalist or quasi-functionalist accounts of practices. Giving social functions is different from the accounts the agents themselves would give for their participation in such practices. Do such accounts override those of the agents? And what are the criteria that would justify such a claim? It would be difficult to do this in terms of a truth criterion given what else Nietzsche says about truth.
- If religion can reverse natural values in order to protect the weak from the strong, then it is in the rational self-interest of the weak to pursue it.
- If the weak have succeeded in protecting themselves, then are they not now the strong? This is similar to the argument that Socrates advances against Callicles.
- It might be equally plausible to claim that 'natural' values are a device invented to protect certain groups from the strength of the masses.
- There might be some discussion of values within the existentialist tradition. There might be reference to choice as discussed by Sartre, Kierkegaard et al. It could be seen as an act of bad faith to claim that one's values were vouchsafed by nature or that contrary values conflict with natural principles. This would be to disguise the nature of freedom and choice rather than the enactment of freedom.
- Examples are available where acting out of Christian values has got nothing to do with the protection of the individual in question. Redescribing such actions in terms of protection will result in implausible hidden-purpose explanations.
- To reverse the force of nature would require a force of greater strength.
- Nietzsche's account may be seen as narrow as he neglects central features of religious systems. Religion can be seen as a response to fundamental questions regarding the nature of human existence, eg why there is something rather nothing. A reasonably complex religious system can offer some explanation of this together with one's own place in the world. It can offer some account of conscience or it is possible for a scientist to see himself as unravelling God's plan of the universe.
- Nietzsche offers lurid descriptions of the saint which one might find appealing in a similar way that pictures of Uriah Heep might be used to question the Christian value of humility. It might be argued that equally lurid pictures might be used to illustrate Nietzsche's new morality. It might be argued that the look of the ascetic is open to other interpretations, including the one the ascetic himself would give.
- Judgements of mediocrity are made within societies. It is not clear that it makes sense to describe entire societies in such a way (perhaps in terms of intellectual achievement but that is not the issue here). To make comparisons in terms of value systems may imply you can stand outside all of them and see which one comes closer to an absolute standard. It may be argued that such an enterprise is quite inconsistent with Nietzsche's approach to philosophy.
- Nietzsche's account has an underlying assumption regarding the inherent irrationality of religion, eg describing it as a neurosis or as an on-going suicide of reason. There are, however, attempts to portray religious belief as rational (Aquinas, Pascal, James et al) and these must be addressed on their own merits and not dismissed by attacking the motives of the proponents.
- Nietzsche's account of religion is not entirely negative in that it can have positive uses. However, a religious believer could not accept such an account of his activities without collapsing the entire situation. It could be seen positively in terms of emphasising what enables us to stand out from nature, take a view on it and act accordingly. There is a difference between regarding religion as a means to an end and regarding it as an end in itself.
- Religious language has its own criteria of significance and there are problems in judging this from an external viewpoint. There may be references to Wittgenstein, Winch etc.
- The will to power and exploitation are central themes but it could be argued that their choice is too selective or restrictive. Illustrations of other possible themes are also available.

- Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the psychology of religion though there are implied and stated points regarding its ultimate falsehood. Are such judgements derivable from psychological descriptions? There is a gap or lack of rational argument regarding the truth of religious claims.
- Nietzsche might claim that reason and argument are only functions of the will to power but any argument to support such a claim will also be an example of this.
- There might be some discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. He is being consistent in giving the account he does, he is not concerned with ultimate truth or the discussion of effects is sufficient to demonstrate the irrationality of a practice.
- It could be argued that certain practices could not be life-enhancing given what they involve but this may involve some appeal to reason and truth to set up what the limits could be.
- There is a strain in Nietzsche throughout between two kinds of explanation; one in terms of conscious reasons the other in terms of hidden purposes. The language and style he uses does not always clearly differentiate the two.
- It is not clear why there should be self-directed cruelty. We need independent reasons for supposing there to be such a thing and for assigning such importance to it. There is a danger of having too wide criteria of application.

Assessment objective grid

A2 Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15-mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 45-mark question	Total marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	8	10	18
AO2	7	11	18
AO3	0	24	24
Total	**15**	**45**	**60**