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General Certificate of Education
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Philosophy PHIL2

Unit 2

An Introduction to Philosophy 2

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EXAMINERS

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a student is likely to use. It is not, however, proscriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication.

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasises that although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.	**Level 2**

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.	**Level 1**
4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.	**Level 2**

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be no creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level. Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.	**Level 1**
5–9 marks There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed. Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.	**Level 2**
10–15 marks Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 3**
16–21 marks The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.	**Level 4**

22–25 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.	**Level 5**
26–30 marks Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear. The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.	**Level 6**

Theme 1: Knowledge of the external world

Total for this theme: 45 marks

01 Explain and illustrate **two** differences between primary and secondary qualities. *(15 marks)*

Locke: secondary qualities as 'powers to produce sensations in us'. Hume: they 'are nothing but impressions in the mind'. Students may approach this question either by reference to the properties of the object or through the ideas produced. Expect references to Democritus, Locke, Hume, Russell.

Anticipate the following:

- Primary qualities are 'utterly inseparable' from bodies, secondary qualities are 'powers to produce sensations in us'. (Locke) Secondary qualities are defined in dispositional terms, primary qualities are not.
- Building on this, we cannot imagine an object without primary qualities, we can imagine them without secondary (dispositional) properties.
- The primary qualities of an object at the macro level are also properties of the object at the micro level – the 'corpuscles'. Secondary qualities do not belong to the corpuscles.
- The ideas which secondary qualities produce are mind-dependent, the ideas that primary qualities produce are mind-independent/depend on interactions with the perceiver.
- The ideas which secondary qualities produce do not resemble the physical object, the ideas that primary qualities produce (when veridical), do resemble the physical object.
- Primary qualities constitute the substance of the material body, secondary qualities are accidents.

AND/OR

- Primary qualities have quantifiable, 'objective' properties which are amenable to scientific measurement. Secondary qualities have an irreducible qualitative dimension; they are 'subjective' and seem to elude such precise measurement. This may be treated as two separate points.
- Secondary qualities are only available to one of the senses. Primary qualities are available to more than one sense.
- Primary qualities exist in both the object and as ideas. The ideas, when veridical, resemble the object. Secondary qualities only exist as ideas; they represent the object.
- Scientific descriptions would refer to primary qualities only.

Illustrations: Students are expected to be able to cite examples of primary and secondary qualities. Typically examples of primary qualities include extension, shape, size, motion, solidity, etc. Typically examples of secondary qualities include colour, sound, smell, taste, etc. Examples of their application may feature e.g. the ubiquitous 'apple', or Russell's table, Descartes' wax example suitably applied.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02 'The strengths of idealism outweigh the weaknesses' Discuss. *(30 marks)*

Idealism involves the denial of material substance and also involves the view that physical objects be regarded as collections of ideas/sense-data; to be is to be perceived. Expect references to Berkeley, who argues for idealism through an examination, and eventual collapse of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction. In order to distance idealism from solipsism students would be expected to recognise that objects continue to exist unperceived by you and me because they are constantly perceived in the eternal mind of God.

Indicative content

- What are the details of Berkeley's argument against the primary/secondary quality distinction? The crucial move involves the examination of primary qualities. Students should be able to show how primary qualities cannot be distinguished from secondary qualities, and this should be treated as a strength of idealism.
- Given empiricism, Locke's analysis of physical objects in terms of material substance is not as consistent as Berkeley's analysis of physical objects as collections of ideas. Belief in material substance as 'strange and repugnant'. The historical background of Locke may aid students' responses.
- By positing an eternal mind instead of a material substance Berkeley is being ontologically parsimonious. Instead, of reifying material substance, there are only minds and ideas.
- Idealism seems to solve the linking problem inherent in the Lockean (and Cartesian) account of perception. If a material substance is extended, and causes our ideas, which are non-extended mental items, then how do the two interact? If there are only minds and ideas this problem seems to dissipate.
- Idealism seems to solve the problem of scepticism about the external world. Realists assert that there is a mind-independent material substance, and that we are acquainted with this substance via our impressions/ideas/experiences/sensations. Traditional problems then arise as to how we can infer from the latter to the former. By denying the existence of material substance Berkeley seems to have nothing to be sceptical about.
- Idealism, although initially counter-intuitive, leaves everything as it is. Talk of physical objects is talk about actual and possible collections of ideas. Some students may note that this applies to science too. Science turns out to be an investigation into the fundamental nature of God's mind which we explore in the usual scientific way, i.e. testing hypotheses with observations.
- Berkeley needs an independent existence of God. But is this consistent with Berkeley's empiricism?
- Berkeley does not argue for God's existence in order to explain permanence of objects, but could we give some kind of abductive argument for God's existence here?
- Idealism without God leads to the problem of explaining unperceived objects. Do objects cease to exist without the perceiver (e.g. Russell's cat)? Similarly, if other people are only regarded as collections of ideas, then doesn't this lead to solipsism?
- Berkeley's nominalism as inconsistent with his assumption of the existence of a mind. Is there any warrant for thinking that minds are not just bundles of impressions? Expect references to Humean 'bundles'.
- Given the postulation of an Eternal Mind, there may be confusion in the use of the term 'idea'. This may lead to the observation that Berkeley fails to distinguish between the act and the object of apprehension. For example, is the immediate object of perception my sense-data, or is it God's? Is this possible? Can I see what God sees? Doesn't God see all?
- Berkeley and causation. Berkeley argues that it is not ideas but minds that do the causal work. Is this really simpler than the realist account? What makes my heart pump blood, my heart, or God's mind?

- Is it really ontologically parsimonious? Although there may be only minds and ideas, how many ideas are there? For example, is there God's 'all seeing idea', then God's idea that he allows us to see from a limited perspective, and then my idea? How exactly does it work?
- Some students may explore how effectively Berkeley can account for instances of illusion and hallucination. Incomplete ideas (families of ideas).
- The strengths of idealism do outweigh the weaknesses. Idealism presents us with an ontologically parsimonious account of the world and our knowledge of it. Belief in a mind-independent substance is strange and repugnant.
- Although the denial of material substance does not create any logical contradiction, the initial simplicity of idealism soon gives rise to increasing complexity. The realist presents us with a simpler, more systematic alternative.
- The strengths of idealism do not outweigh its weaknesses, but realism does not present any better an alternative.
- Berkeley cannot justify the existence of God any more than the realist can justify the existence of material substance. Berkeley's position thus collapses into solipsism. There may be references to Wittgenstein to support realism here.
- Or students may argue that solipsism/scepticism does not decide the debate, therefore we are left with the default position, which is realism. In other words, the burden of proof lies with Berkeley. As he fails, realism wins.
- There may be comparisons with representative realism to demonstrate that Idealism avoids the linking problem.
- Russell's point that Idealism limits what we know to the mental. Response: How limiting would that response be if the mind in question is that of God?
- There is a confusion in the use of 'idea'. An act of apprehension is mental, but this does not mean that the object apprehended is mental. The Desert Island Fantasy (confuses two senses of Robinson Crusoe).
- Berkeley's arguments against material substance apply equally to mental or spiritual substance.

Note: Students will not be rewarded for producing ad hominem arguments against Berkeley, such as 'He believed in God because he was a bishop, therefore idealism is false'.

Theme 2: Tolerance

Total for this theme: 45 marks

03 Explain and illustrate **two** reasons in favour of the view that society should be tolerant. *(15 marks)*

Tolerance is typically regarded as a virtue or ideal of a liberal, pluralist democratic society. It refers to the idea that to be tolerant requires people to coexist peacefully with others who have fundamentally different beliefs or values. Some students may refer to Rainer Forst's four different conceptions of tolerance. Students that make reference to Forst should be rewarded where this outline functions as a platform for enhancing the quality of the response. However, students that do not present an outline of the position should not be penalised. Expect references to Locke, Mill, Rawls.

Anticipate the following:

- **Fallibility**. We do not always know the truth about morality, religion and, more generally, the 'good' life; to fail to be tolerant is to assume that one is infallible. Expect references to Mill - the opportunity to learn from one's mistakes/have a livelier impression of the truth.
- Some students may draw on Rawl's argument from reasonableness; a society that is tolerant recognises that there will be inevitable disagreement even between parties acting rationally and in good faith and, as such, should promote a policy of reasonable tolerance. Some students may connect this to the issue of pragmatism.
- **Pragmatism**. The threat posed by diverse life styles; coercion is ineffective; the threat posed by strife. Adopting an attitude of tolerance outweighs the consequences of being intolerant towards each other. Some of our deepest held beliefs, e.g. religious and moral beliefs, cannot be changed by force. Failure to tolerate others leads to civil disobedience.
- Some students may draw on the economic consequences of rejecting tolerance. For example, the persecution of the Huguenots led to the French losing a highly skilled and industrious pool of labour. Some students may illustrate speculatively, e.g. Not tolerating Hindus' and the consequences regarding the number of physicians in the UK.
- **The value of autonomy.** If we reject a policy of tolerance we reject the value of autonomy. This means we reject the very idea of 'self-rule'. But leading our lives in our own way, making our own choices and being able to engage in our own experiments in living is one of the core virtues of a liberal society. References to Mill and the harm principle.
- Some students may argue that autonomy is valuable in its own right. Some students may argue that autonomy has instrumental value for promoting happiness and that happiness is the *summum bonum*.
- **The value of diversity.** A tolerant society promotes diversity, or 'experiments in living'. These experiments in living, even if partially flawed, may contain an insight into a better lifestyle. For example, radical Puritan teaches us the pleasures or freedoms that can be obtained from hard-work, honesty and loyalty.
- Similarly, without diversity society may not make radical advances as it encourages conservatism and piecemeal reform, at the cost of promoting genius, flair and innovation. Without this context people cannot seek to improve their lives as they have little to draw inspiration from.
- Some students may argue that tolerance is intrinsically valuable. There may be references to Wolff. Tolerance is a virtue. Students could illustrate this in terms of virtue ethics. To fully understand the concept of tolerance entails that we understand that it is good; there may be comparisons with other virtues such as justice.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04 Assess the view that tolerance requires individuals to do or say nothing that may offend others.

(30 marks)

The question invites students to explore what kind of characteristics tolerant individuals possess and the implications this may have regarding the extent to which a tolerant individual should refrain from offending others. Students will probably highlight the difference between being tolerant on the one hand and being indifferent, indulgent and weak on the other hand. Some students may refer to Rainer Forst's three concepts of tolerance (objection, acceptance, rejection) and his four different conceptions of tolerance (permission, co-existence, respect and esteem). However, this question is not a request for a conceptual taxonomy of tolerance. As such, this conceptual analysis must be clearly applied to the question if it is to be treated as directly relevant.

Indicative content

- First, to be a tolerant individual typically entails that the individual in some way objects to some practices but *allows* them to continue. So being a tolerant individual entails that it is within the individual's power to stop, or at least curtail the practices that they object to. Second, a tolerant individual must not stop all the practices that they object to and have the power to prevent, for otherwise they are not being tolerant at all. Third, they must not allow all the practices that they object to and have the power to prevent. Tolerance implies a breaking point. If something has an indefinite amount of tolerance then it is not a matter of tolerance.
- This may be used as a platform to argue that to be a tolerant individual requires only that we leave other individuals alone to think and do as they please. In other words, by leaving others alone we fulfil the acceptance criterion, and if we are allowed to say and do as we please we fulfil the rejection criterion.
- Some students may note that if being tolerant entails that we must say or do nothing that may offend others then being tolerant entails that I must accept everything that I object to, hence creating a paradox.
- Some students may explore the difference between saying and doing. A tolerant individual is one that can say what they want, but cannot do as they want. There may be references to Mill's harm principle and the distinction between offence and harm.
- But does being tolerant really entail that I cannot do anything that offend others? What is the extent of 'do' here? Does it only refer to inflicting physical harm? If I graffiti "It's time for tolerance" along a wall that borders an Orange Street March am I being intolerant? This raises issues related to the putative paradox of the tolerance of the intolerance, which students may explore.
- Related to the above, for example, if the majority in a town are tolerant of a set of intolerant views held by a minority of Evangelical Christians, are they really being tolerant, or are they actually weak-willed? If it does make sense to say that they are being tolerant then what are the implications for the question? Does it mean that they the majority cannot *upset* the minority, or does it mean that they can upset the minority, but they cannot run them out of town?
- Alternatively, some students may explore the focus on 'nothing' in the question. Being tolerant may require that I refrain from saying and/or doing *some* things that may offend others. For example, perhaps being tolerant requires that I refrain from racist epithets against religious fundamentalists, but does not require that I refrain from calling them dogmatic, or deluded, or from lobbying against them.
- Some students may explore the different conceptions of tolerance, and map the question in terms of what kind of conception is under consideration. For example, under the permission conception some individuals, such as the homophobic may be classified as tolerant

individuals. In this instance clearly being tolerant does not entail that you do or say nothing that may offend others.

- Students may repeat this process with all of Forst's conceptions. Indeed, it is possible to present objections to some conceptions.
- For example, under the permission conception being a tolerant individual may not even entail the weaker commitment that we leave other individuals alone to think and do as they please. Homosexuals can only think and do what they please qua homosexual acts, but they may not be able to do other things concomitant with being in such a relationship, such as getting married. Is this really tolerance?
- To be a tolerant individual requires us to do or say nothing that may offend others. Although we may fail on this count, as different people are offended by such a varied array of words and deeds, it is necessary to make such a commitment if we are to be correctly identified as a tolerant individual. Such an argument is likely to take place within the boundaries of the respect or esteem conception of tolerance. For example, under the esteem conception alternative religious, moral and political views are taken to be ethically attractive and held with good reasons, even though different from one's own. Under such a view it may be argued that if we do not try to avoid offending people with such a view then we can hardly be said to esteem their view.
- To be a tolerant individual requires us to do nothing that may offend others, but it does not censor what we say. Tolerance is grounded in such things as the recognition of one's fallibility and a belief that free speech will allow society to flourish and develop. As such we can draw a line between saying and doing. We can still be tolerant if we say things that may offend people, but not when we do things that may offend people.
- To be a tolerant individual requires us to avoid doing and/or saying *some* things that may offend others. This may be related to deeper philosophical reasons for being tolerant, such as the view that we can be confident that we have knowledge of some moral facts, though not all moral facts. For example, if we adopt Mill's utilitarianism then we can be confident that a law that prohibits Muslim prayer will cause more pain than pleasure, but we cannot be so confident that a law that prohibits the Hijab in schools will have the same result.
- Some students may make the above point but link it into different arguments for toleration, such as Locke's argument from strife, or Rawls' on reasonable disagreement. For example, perhaps we can be consistently tolerant if we do/say some things that offend others, but do not cause strife.
- To be a tolerant individual does not require us to do or say nothing that may offend others, it requires only that we leave other individuals alone to think and do as they please. Students that come to this conclusion should think about what it means to be committed to allowing others 'to think and do as they please' and could try to delineate between this view and the position advanced in the essay title.
- Some students may explore the different conceptions of tolerance and map the implications for the question in terms of this kind of analysis. This will likely lead to a subjunctive conclusion of the form 'If the conception of tolerance under consideration is permission then… However if it is co-existence then…' Such analysis, providing it is cogent and answers the question, should be considered as a position advanced and duly rewarded.
- If tolerance is a virtue, it may clash with other virtues. We may have a duty to object to some practices and speak out against them.

Theme 3: The value of art

Total for this theme: 45 marks

05 Explain and illustrate **two** criticisms of the view that art is supposed to represent reality. *(15 marks)*

The idea that art is supposed to represent reality is associated with the thought that the central reason why we value art is because it informs us. We value art to the extent that it is able to perform this function. As such, it should be distinguished from the view that the main reason we value art is because of its formal qualities, or as a vehicle for the revelation of the artist's feeling or emotions, or for having some kind of emotional function for the audience. Students that briefly outline the position should be rewarded where this outline functions as a platform for enhancing the quality of the response. However, students that do not present an outline of the position should not be penalised.

Anticipate the following responses

- The focus on art as standing for reality loses sight of the fact that we value art for the vision, creativity and originality conveyed by the artist. The fact that we value this more than a piece of art's ability to convey truth is exemplified by the fact that we do not eulogise forgers or their forgeries.
- Similarly, the fact that some art stands for reality is not sufficient for us to value it as art, even if it is illuminating, visionary, epiphanic, etc. There are examples of things in the world that can do this which are not considered art. For example, a newspaper article, or a television documentary may stand for or represent reality.
- Is art valued only because it represents reality? Are all arts equally concerned with representing? For example, does Newman's *Covenant* or Pollock's *1A* stand for, represent or imitate anything? Aren't some pieces valued for their formal and/or expressive qualities?
- Even if art informs us, is that why we value it as art? For example, for Tolstoy art serves a social function that bonds together the artist and the audience in a common understanding or experience. For Croce art is a medium for expressing our need to impose orderliness on the world, resulting in the production of aesthetic pleasure.
- Does art have to have a point at all? Maybe all art is utterly pointless, and that is part of what makes it art.
- Is art *especially* informative? Although Dali's visual depictions of the surreal may be a good intellectual tool for better grasping Freudian accounts of the unconscious, would it not be just as informative, if not more so, to *read Freud*? If so, then it suggests that we value Dali's art for reasons other than the fact that it represents reality.
- Plato: Sophists may use art to lead us away from truth as it has the power to excite strong emotions. On the Platonic view, if we are guided by emotion rather than reason we cannot be led to the truth.
- Or the Platonic view that art is two steps removed from reality.

Several illustrations have been embedded in the points above, but students may draw on any relevant examples from the artistic canon. Examples drawn from popular culture are also relevant and should be rewarded providing they make a point of sufficient intellectual rigour. For example, it may be argued that the popularity of the *Saw* films can be explained in terms of its providing a cathartic outlet for satisfying what would otherwise be socially unacceptable macabre thoughts, or for exploring the extent to which ones emotional responses to the macabre are shared with the rest of our cultural group, not because they stand for reality.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

06 'The main reason that we value art is because it expresses the mood or feelings of the artist.' Discuss.

(30 marks)

This claim relates to aesthetic expressivism. We value art primarily with reference to its ability to express the emotions of the artist. This can be seen by the way in which we describe and appraise art using an affective vocabulary, e.g. 'moving', 'powerful', 'poignant', etc. This idea may be distinguished from the view that we value art as a medium which represents or imitates reality and the view that we value art qua art, or because of its formal qualities. Expect links to classical views on catharsis and the Romanticism of 18th century Europe. Intellectual references may feature: Aristotle, Tolstoy, Croce, Collingwood. Artistic references: Shelley, Byron, Beethoven, Goethe, Wagner, etc. References to modern art, such as Hirst and Emin may also feature. Students can also be rewarded for appropriate references to popular culture.

Indicative content

- The primary function of art is to express the feeling of the artist. The artist is distinguished from the artisan. Humanity as seen as a unique, free, spiritual being, not a mechanistic being; Romanticism versus Enlightenment. The artist as the mediator of this truth about humanity; the artist as the tortured soul; the artist as the individual using art to express these feelings. Students may recognise that the artwork may also represent emotions, but that this is secondary to its expressive qualities.
- But how are we to judge the extent to which we should value art as such? Should we judge it on the basis of the reaction it evokes in the audience? But what if some audiences have different emotional responses to the artist? This problem invites students to explore a range of issues…
- Some students may take the artist's emotions as a criterion for audience evaluation and argue that audience responses can be said to be right or wrong in response to this. This may lead to an argument that we value art to the extent that it produces the right emotions in the majority of the people, or at least in the right kind of people (e.g. the art critic, the aesthetically sensitive, not the brute)
- Alternatively it may be argued that although we value art because of its expressive qualities, it is not primarily because it expresses the mood or feeling of the artist, but because it has some kind of emotional function for the audience. For example, it may have cathartic qualities. Art purges/cleanses us emotionally; whether the artist felt cleansed through the production of the art work is irrelevant. There may be references to the intentional fallacy.
- Some students may explore the cogency of saying that artwork can actually express anything directly. Can psychological ascriptions normally attributed to persons apply to works of art? Are such descriptions merely metaphorical? Is it really the *play* that is poignant, or is it rather that *we* are gripped by poignancy when we watch the play? There may be references to the pathetic fallacy.
- Doesn't a focus on the artist detract attention from the artwork itself, and its unique 'artistic qualities'? Considerations of the popular artist who died young: Lennon, Hendrix, Marley, Cobain. Do we partly think of their works as great because we project on to them an overly Romantic view of the artist? If McCartney had died young would we have thought his songs superior to Lennon's?
- The above view may be contrasted with artists that are living, prolific and wealthy, or with life-style choices of the artist. For example, would Jack Vettriano have been more esteemed if he had died young? Would *Catcher in the Rye* be as revered if J.D. Salinger had not been a recluse?
- Some students may explore what exactly it is that the art is meant to be expressing. Can it be any emotion? Does it have to be a certain kind of emotion? It may be argued that it is difficult to see how it could be any emotion. Is a child having a tantrum through a

megaphone producing art? Merely expressing your emotions via some sort of medium does not seem to be sufficient to call something art, let alone art we can value.

- This may lead on to a discussion of art as valued because it expresses some other qualities, such as moral truths (Tolstoy). But isn't such a view overly narrow? Wouldn't this rule out calling works that promote abhorrent moral or political views 'art'? But surely Wagner's operas are art, even if they represent morally repugnant views. Surely a snuff film is still a work of art, even if its content is moral reprehensible. This conflates moral value with aesthetic value.
- Alternatively this may lead to a discussion of art as valued because it expresses a distinct artistic way of knowing. Art is valued as a clarification of emotion. The completion of the work reveals the latent emotion as it is created. When the audience engages in the artwork the artist is hoping that, through imagination, they will be able to share in this self-realising experience. (Collingwood)
- Some students may refer to Croce. When the artist channels their emotions appropriately and gets it 'just right' a feeling of aesthetic pleasure follows. To be differentiated from formalism where we are appreciating line, colour per se. Instead these are a function of a feeling. For example, the *Haywain* may make us feel nostalgic, though not nostalgic about anything in particular. Instead it clarifies for us what it is to have these feelings.
- It may be objected that not all art expresses emotion. Hirst's shark in formaldehyde, for example, expresses an idea, which he calls 'The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living'.
- Some students may also raise objections from the point of view of other theories. For example, Bell criticises expressivism by remarking that 'to use art as a means to the emotions of life is to use a telescope for reading the news.'
- Ultimately, art should be valued to the extent that it expresses the mood or feelings of the artist, even though it has other functions, such as representation and/or its formal qualities. The better the artwork achieves this task, either in terms of the amount of people it touches, or the kind of people it touches, the greater the value of the art.
- It is not a mood or feeling of the artist that is of paramount importance. The intentional fallacy. The artist can intend to convey one kind of emotion, but, in fact powerfully convey another. Although the artist may not be praised for such an achievement, the artwork itself should still be valued for its ability to perform such a function.
- The question hinges on how the artwork achieves such an aim. If the artist has a pre-conceived emotion which he then channels through the medium of art then the art work merely represents, rather than expresses his emotions. For it to be a genuine expression the activity of creating the art work itself must be a revelation of this emotion. Students may argue that this is sufficient to value it as art, or go on to argue that the work must also function as a medium for conveying this revelatory event to a wider audience.
- A piece of art should not be valued to the extent that it expresses the mood or feelings of the artist. Art cannot express emotions literally, and whilst metaphors are legitimate modes of representation, it is difficult to see how we can *experience* things metaphorically. We don't, for example, *literally* see someone as a rat when described as such. This may lead students to argue that expressivism collapses into representative theory.
- A piece of art should not be valued to the extent that it expresses the mood or feelings of the artist. To take such an attitude overemphasises the character of the artist and draws us into evaluating certain pieces of art more highly than they ought to (and vice versa). The focus, instead, should be representation, form, or its ability to emotionally connect with the audience.
- Art may have nothing to do with emotion. Sculpture, for example, may be admired for its 'cold' mathematical precision.

Theme 4: God and the world

Total for this theme: 45 marks

07 Explain and illustrate the claim that religious belief is nothing more than a reflection of the feelings, attitudes and commitments of the believer.

(15 marks)

The view that religious belief is a reflection of the feelings, attitudes and commitments of the religious is typically associated with the idea that such beliefs can only make sense from within a particular form of life. It refers to the idea that there is such a thing as a religious point of view and that to understand this point of view one has to be part of the language-game/culture that is constitutive of this form of life. Students are likely to draw a distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing-as' and/or 'believing-in/believing-that'. There may be references to Hick, Wittgenstein, Phillips, Malcolm, Winch.

- References to Wittgenstein and language-games. The distinction between surface grammar and deep grammar. To understand a particular aspect of language one must be acquainted with its use, not merely its correspondence to reality. Meaning is usage.
- As such, unless one is an 'insider', i.e. within the religious point of view, religious belief cannot make sense.
- Religious belief is seen as a way of living, or a way of assessing life. There may be references to Phillips arguments about the meaningfulness of prayer. To understand religious language involves adopting a certain attitude towards life. Without the attitude, religious concepts make no sense.
- Hick on seeing-as. We don't infer God's existence from our experiences. God's existence is directly experienced just as a book or a fork is directly experienced, once we have the concepts of *BOOK* and *FORK*.
- Some students may take the religious point of view from a realist perspective. This will involve taking the idea of a religious point of view as a 'hypothesis' that competes with other hypothesis, such as the scientific point of view.
- There may be references to Winch. God's reality is independent of what any person thinks, but the reality in question can only be seen in the context of religion in which the concept of God is used. The idea of having a 'check against reality' is not confined to scientific language.
- 'Reality' is given in the concepts we use. There is no reality independent of all conceptual schemes.
- Adopting the religious point of view determines your experience, e.g. experiencing certain actions as 'sinful'.
- Religious point of view is a commitment that does not arise out of being convinced by an argument.
- Flew's parable may be used to indicate the non-factual nature of religious belief and/or Wisdom's version to show that the religious point of view can involve genuine disagreements that are not factual (the example of the picture where you can agree on the facts but disagree on evaluation, or the deeper problem of abortion where the religious point of view can itself determine what counts as a fact). There may also be reference to Hare's 'Bliks' or to Braithwaite and religion being regarded as a story.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08 'Evil is the result of free human action.' Assess whether this is a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. *(30 marks)*

The question invites students to consider whether evil is the result of the fact humans are free. Appeals to free human action have a long history in attempting to square the existence of evil with the existence of an all loving and all powerful God. God's giving humans freedom (or free will) is constitutive of his omni-benevolence, but once this has been granted it allows for the possibility of wrong-doing. Students may make a distinction between moral and natural evil and their relation to one another and try to evaluate whether human freedom can be used as an explanation for either. Expect references to Augustine, Plantinga, Swinburne.

Indicative content

- A statement as to how the problem is generated.
- Augustine's theory of the Fall; Adam and Eve disobeyed God and brought about metaphysical imbalance, causing humans to be pitted against nature. Students may use this to explain the cause of both moral and natural evil.
- But can we accept this as a literal account? If not then what are the ramifications for theodicy as a metaphor? Is all evil, moral and natural, the result of human beings general disregard for God's decrees? Is it caused by atheists and weak-willed theists?
- Even if the Fall were true, does this solve the evidential problem of evil? It does not seem fair to punish future generations for the actions of their distant ancestors.
- Given the great value of free will it is better that God create a world in which agents possess free will, even though they may misuse it, and do what is wrong, than that God create a world where agents lack free will.
- Following on from the above point it may be argued that given that he created free will, this is an infringement on his omnipotence or omniscience. Or is it? There may be discussions about what actually counts as being omnipotent (e.g. Plantinga, Swinburne)
- The above may be unpacked in terms of a resolution to Flew's formulation of the logical problem. Flew and Mackie argues that free will and moral perfection are compatible. As such, God could have given them to us.
- The fact that free will is valuable does not entail that one should never intervene in the exercise of free will, or that it is a good thing for people to have the power to inflict great harm upon others.
- What about natural evils such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and other weather conditions, and a wide variety of diseases? Such evils certainly do not appear to result from morally wrong actions.
- Why didn't God create a world where we would be tempted to do evil, but then provide us with a strong sense of conscience to prevent us? Reply may be that this is not genuine freedom, but only the illusion of freedom. (e.g. Mackie). There may be reference to a temptation that is always overridden.
- Link appeals to freedom to soul-making: the evils that the world contains can be seen to be justified as an environment in which people, through their free choices, can undergo spiritual growth that will ultimately fit them for communion with God (e.g. Irenaeus, Hick).
- Natural disasters offer us the opportunity to freely engage in charitable acts. Reply: Can we justify all natural disasters on these grounds? How does an isolated disaster allow others to have this opportunity? Presupposes knowledge of the disaster.
- But is this link between theodicies satisfactory? Considerations of the evidential problem of evil may feature. Replies to the effect that the terrible suffering that many people undergo at the end of their lives, or during war, is to be viewed as suffering that has been ordained by God for the spiritual health of the individual in question (e.g. Eleonore Stump). How can it be said that this kind of suffering is the result of free choice?

- Some students may note that freedom, when combined with reasonable epistemic culpability, can absolve God from responsibility for natural disasters. People that live at the foot of an active volcano should know better. By choosing to live there they incur the moral liability. Reply: first settlers may not be epistemically culpable.
- Some responses may focus on the fact that we need causal regularity and stability, and so laws of nature create the necessary conditions for us to be good. (Tennant, Vardy) It is difficult to appeal to a link between freedom and moral responsibility against a backdrop of metaphysical chaos. Once these necessary conditions have been created natural evil can occur.
- The appeal to freedom may be linked into the view this world is the best of all possible worlds. For example, in Swinburne's version there are four possible worlds and the one there is birth, death, the possibility of infinite improvement and the possibility of damaging the world to some extent is the best possible world.
- Some students may notice that a degree of freedom is needed in order to make sense of the idea of meaningful improvement; being all loving/good requires that God trusts us and that this entails that God creates a world with parameters for us to learn genuine responsibility rather than create a 'toy world'.
- Possible reply: Why did it have to occur like this? Or: the need for metaphysical stability does not preclude any intervention. Surely intervention in Japan would have led to a better world? If God takes out the top layer of evil, then the second layer becomes the worst.
- Evil is the result of free human action. The existence of evil and God is consistent because God gave us free will, which entails the possibility of evil. But the price is worth it. For example, God created us with free will so we could 'love'. The price of the existence of love could be evil. To limit our free will is to create a 'toy world'.
- Evil is not the result of free human action. Just because free will is valuable it does not entail that it should be unlimited. For example, should we not, if we could, intervene to prevent someone from committing rape or murder? Similarly God could have given individuals free will, but not have the power to torture and murder others. Some evil is the result of free human action, but not all evil. Humans are to blame for moral evil, but not for natural evil. Natural evil cannot be satisfactorily causally linked to human choice.
- Free human action cannot be the explanation of evil in the world because it creates a contradiction with one of God's other attributes. For example, it limits God's omniscience because he cannot know what we will choose to do. Alternatively, it limits his omnipotence because he cannot intervene without encroaching on his own benevolence. Some students may argue to the contrary by showing that either or both of these attributes are consistent with his omnibenevolent gift of freedom.
- There may be links to other theodicies. Freedom and regularity in the laws of nature are both a good. Hence divine intervention in the production of any evil, moral or natural, would itself be wrong. Or: The existence of evil cannot be explained in this way as God created the world. Why didn't God create a world which had the same laws of nature as our world, but which was devoid of non-human carnivores, or where the tsunami did not happen?
- The existence of evil and God is consistent because evil is there as a vale of soul making. One who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created in a state either of innocence or of virtue. But you cannot meaningfully master something without freedom to make errors. Or: This argument from soul making cannot explain why there is some suffering that continues or dissipates independently of my free choices; freedom does not explain this kind of evil.
- The means/end problem. The suffering of others is a means to the moral growth of others. This involves treating some people as a means. The selection of those who suffer also appears to be completely random.
- Objections to Tennant type responses, e.g. the double standards problem or the need for an act of faith regarding the laws of nature we have as containing the fewest possible harms.
- Critical analysis of Flew's account of a free action. It omits the possibility of acting differently in the same circumstances and therefore fails.

Theme 5: Free will and determinism

Total for this theme: 45 marks

09	Explain and illustrate how determinism might undermine rationality.	*(15 marks)*

Anticipate the following suggestions:

Determinism is the view that a determinate set of conditions can only produce one possible outcome given fixed laws of nature. As such, determinism undermines rationality in one of the following ways:

- There is a distinction between reasons and causes. Determinism threatens to collapse this distinction. For example, determinism undermines the idea of charging someone with being practically irrational. To say that X has a reason to A implies that if X knows that X has a reason to A but does not do A, then we can (pro tanto) blame X for being practically irrational. But the charge of being practically irrational presupposes that X could have done otherwise. But if determinism is true then X could not have done otherwise.
- Determinism undermines the idea that there is a limit to that to which we apply the notion of rationality. If we collapse the distinction between reasons and causes, but do not eliminate talk of reasons, then all talk about causes can be replaced with talk about reasons. Counter-intuitively: 'the cause of the avalanche was the thunder' implies that the thunder acted irrationally, or that the thunder was *really* to blame for the avalanche.
- Some students may note, with Aquinas and Haldane, that if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. Hence even my belief in determinism cannot be rational.
- Similar kinds of argument can be made to show that there is no distinction between a valid and an invalid argument. 'Valid' and 'invalid' are normative, not causal terms.
- There is a distinction between action and bodily movement. For example, the dilation of the pupil or a knee-jerk reflex is a bodily movement, but it is not an action. If determinism is true then this distinction collapses. Similarly, some actions are passive (deciding to stand dead still), whilst bodily movements must, by definition, contain movement.
- Actions are deliberate. An action issues from a particular kind of cause, *vis* a reason that an agent possesses, or an intention. Actions are typically thought to be the result of a cognitive process on the part of the agent that terminates in an act of the will freely choosing. Determinism is incompatible with the idea of a genuinely free will. As such, 'actions' are no more free/deliberate/intentional than 'bodily movements'.
- Some students may note that this does not undermine the existence of rationality, but it does render rational thought epiphenomenal, and hence denies the existence of an action.
- Some students may refer to both distinctions. This should not be treated as blurring if the links between reasons/actions and causes/bodily movements are reasonably made.
- Freudian accounts may undermine rationality. There are psychological causes unknown to us. Reasons are really causes issuing from our primordial drives/instincts. Nietzsche may also feature.
- Moral action based on respect got rational/moral principles (e.g. Kant's categorical imperative) is ruled out by determinism. Reason needs to be autonomous.
- If there is only one possibility, this may undermine our phenomenological intuitions, e.g. remorse, anguish.

Illustrations: Some examples of how a student may illustrate the distinctions have been embedded in the points above. Some students may refer to moral examples and link this to the ideas of praise, blame, punishment and reward. This should be rewarded providing it retains focus on rationality.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

10 'If determinism is true, then we don't have free will.' Discuss. *(30 marks)*

Students should note that the quotation in the question supports incompatibilism in the freewill/determinism debate. The question invites an exploration of what is entailed in a commitment to determinism, and so expect distinctions between 'hard' and 'soft' determinism. It also invites students to consider what is meant by 'free will', and so expect references to the negative/positive distinction. References to numerous thinkers could be made, but anticipate: Spinoza, d'Holbach, Laplace, Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Honderich.

Indicative content

- Determinism defined as 'hard' determinism; physical determinism. Determinism defined as the belief that a determinate set of conditions can only produce one possible outcome given fixed laws of nature. There may be references to Laplace's demon or d'Holbach.
- Hard determinism is not true, but indeterminism does not allow for the right kind of metaphysical 'wiggle' room. At best it allows for randomness at the level of probability; indeterminism is not enough to establish that we have free will (e.g. Popper).
- But is hard determinism true? It may be objected that the conception of causation adopted by the hard determinist is mere metaphysical speculation.
- This may lead to a Humean 'soft' deterministic account of causation. We are not warranted in thinking of causation as yielding any metaphysical necessary connexion; causation as constant conjunction.
- Students may then apply a Humean analysis of causation to the quotation to show that if determinism is true then it does not entail a rejection of free will. This is likely to involve an analysis of free will in terms of 'negative' freedom, or voluntariness.
- Hume's analysis of liberty is inadequate; no reference to being able to act differently in the same circumstances. We need 'could' not 'would' have done otherwise.
- There may be references to other characterisations of compatibilism, such as Hobbes, Mill or the logical positivists. Freedom as getting what you desire.
- Freedom as contrasted with coercion/constraint. Will this work? The man who wants to get married at his own shot gun wedding, for example.
- What is meant by voluntariness? Hume's idea of free will does not square with our intuitions on moral praise and blame. He cannot distinguish between the kleptomaniac and the thief.
- There may be references to the idea of freedom of origination (Descartes, Sartre), and a defence of this view *contra* freedom as voluntariness.
- Appeals to second-order desire (e.g. Frankfurt). But how does this show that compatibilism is true?
- Can Honderich salvage the thesis with reference to strict liability? Or does it fail? E.g. Isn't his concept parasitic on genuine cases of responsibility?
- Some responses may focus on whether there is more to necessity than regularity. Is there any satisfactory distinction to be drawn between correlation and cause on Hume's account? Can we really just reanalyse our concept of causal necessity in this way? There may be references to Kant.
- Some students may focus on other compatibilists that do not take up Hume's conception of causation, instead sticking with the idea of causal necessity, but still sharing the Humean view of freedom as voluntariness. The likely candidate is Hobbes.
- Some students may explore a compatibilist view that rejects freedom as voluntariness but insist that a freedom of origination does not necessarily mean that determinism is false. Expect references to Kant in this instance. We impose causal necessity on the phenomenal world, but the noumenal self is free and morally responsible.
- Some responses may explore different versions of determinism such as psychological or socio-economic determinism. But how 'deterministic' are such accounts? Do they establish nomic law like connections, or are they really 'statistical laws'? If the latter doesn't this

establish that hereditary and environmental factors at best influence rather than determine our actions?

- Implications for this view for free will. Is this kind of determinism compatible with freedom as voluntariness? Is it compatible with freedom as origination?
- If determinism is true, then we don't have free will. The only philosophically robust sense of determinism is the account given by the likes of Laplace and d'Holbach. It involves the idea of universal causation and causal necessity. But to make sense of being free means that we genuinely could have done otherwise if the causes are the same, not that we would have done otherwise if we chose differently. Therefore incompatibilism is true.
- If determinism is true then we do still have free will. The idea of causal necessity refers to nothing more than the fact that certain sense-impressions are constantly conjoined. But there is no contradiction in ascribing free will to the constant conjunctions of agents providing voluntary action is defined in terms of the type of cause from which it issues; if I chose to act differently then I would have acted differently. Moreover, these choices I make could be constant and regular, hence determined. (Hume)
- If determinism is true then we do still have free will. Some students may flesh this out by describing voluntary action as causally determined and yet distinguishable from psychologically or physically constrained action. The opposite of caused is uncaused, the opposite of free is coerced. Determinism is thus compatible with free will, as causation is irrelevant (e.g. Hume, Hobbes, Ayer).
- If determinism is true then we do still have free will as the concepts apply to different worlds. The phenomenal world is determined, but to make sense of the idea of moral responsibility we postulate that the noumenal self is free; but freedom here does not mean *not* determined, but determined by the laws of rationality. A being that is not rational is not free; they are slaves to the passions. (Kant)
- Some students may conclude that psychological and/or socio-economic determinism are compatible with both freedom in terms of voluntariness and origination, though such responses that only focus on this should be treated as narrow.
- Some students may attempt to argue that we do have free will, so determinism is false. Although an exploration of this view is not strictly entailed in the question, it should be rewarded providing the student uses the material to make a robust distinction between the libertarian and the determinist. This will probably involve a reference to freedom in positive or metaphysical terms. Also expect commentary to the effect that free will requires a gap in universal causality and that the mind occupies a special place outside of the natural order.
- There may be a discussion of whether determinism is a clearly defined hypothesis, e.g. what does it exclude or what would count against it?

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	**15**	**30**	**45**