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**General Certificate of Education
January 2012**

Philosophy

PHIL1

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

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AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EXAMINERS

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The generic mark scheme must be used consistently across all questions. The question-specific mark scheme will indicate a variety of material and approaches that a candidate is likely to use. It is not, however, proscriptive. Alternative responses are possible and should be credited if appropriate.

It will be found that when applying the generic mark scheme, many responses will display features of different levels. Examiners must exercise their judgement. In locating the appropriate band, examiners must look to the best-fit or dominant descriptors. Marks should then be adjusted within that band according to the following criteria:

- understanding of philosophical positions
- accuracy and detail of arguments
- quality of illustrative material
- grasp of technical vocabulary where appropriate
- quality of written communication.

It must be noted that quality of written communication should only determine a level in cases where the meaning of a response is obscured. In most cases it will determine adjustments within a level.

It must also be emphasised that although the question-specific mark scheme is not proscriptive, examiners must familiarise themselves with its content. Examiners must recognise creditworthy material and the subject-specific mark scheme is an important tool for achieving this.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–4 marks The explanation will lack detail, or the detail may be narrow and/or only partially addresses the question. Blurring or conflation of issues may result in some lack of clarity. There may be significant omissions. At the bottom end of the level responses may be vague, unfocussed or fragmentary.	Level 1
5–9 marks At the top end of the level there will be a clear, detailed and precise understanding of the relevant philosophical issues. Lower down the level, responses will be accurate and focussed but may lack balance. At the bottom end there may be some blurring of distinctions, but one issue will be clearly explained.	Level 2

AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	
0 marks Nothing worthy of credit.	
1–3 marks Where two illustrations are required, one may be clear and precise but the second confused or absent. Alternatively, there may be a blurring of points and their relevance to the explanation is not apparent. At the lower end of the level, examples will lack detail and clarity and may fail to serve their purpose. If only one illustration is required it will be vague or only partially succeed in achieving its purpose.	Level 1
4–6 marks At the top end of the level, the illustration(s) or example(s) will be clear and have a precise bearing on the issues being explained. Relevance will be apparent. At the lower end of the level, one illustration may be treated precisely with another illustration treated briefly, with only a partial grasp in evidence.	Level 2

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

<p>0 marks</p> <p>Nothing worthy of credit.</p>	
<p>1–4 marks</p> <p>There may be an extremely basic awareness of one relevant point without development or analysis. The response may be tangential with an accidental reference to a relevant point. Errors of understanding are likely to be intrusive. At the very bottom of this level there will be no creditworthy material. Fragments of knowledge will feature in this level.</p> <p>Technical language is not employed or is employed inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar are intrusive.</p>	<p>Level 1</p>
<p>5–9 marks</p> <p>There may be a basic or philosophically unsophisticated grasp of some issues. Analysis may be predominantly simple and/or lack clarity in places. There may be errors of reasoning and understanding. Evaluation, if present, will lack penetration or be very narrowly confined. The response may lack overall purpose and may fail to directly address the relevant issues. At the lower end of the level, the response may be disjointed.</p> <p>Technical language is limited in its employment or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible and errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.</p>	<p>Level 2</p>
<p>10–15 marks</p> <p>Responses in this level may be short or of limited scope. There may be narrow focus on one aspect or a range of issues may be referred to with limited understanding or analysis. Evaluation may be replaced by assertion or counter-suggestion. Sporadic insights may be present but they would lack development. Some knowledge will be present but it is likely to either lack detail and precision, or will not be analysed or evaluated. This is likely to feature at the lower end of the level.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<p>Level 3</p>
<p>16–21 marks</p> <p>The response will explain and analyse some relevant material but positions might be juxtaposed rather than critically compared. Relevance will generally be sustained, though there may be occasional tangents at the lower end of the level. Knowledge of issues will be present but may lack depth and/or precision. Evaluative points are likely to be underdeveloped or applied to a limited range of material and may not be convincing. Examples are likely to be used descriptively rather than critically.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.</p>	<p>Level 4</p>

<p>22–25 marks</p> <p>Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and explained but there may be some imprecision. Examples will be deployed effectively but their implications may not be made fully apparent. Evaluation must be present but may lack philosophical impact, or it may be penetrating over a limited range of material. Knowledge and understanding of the issues will be apparent but not always fully exploited.</p> <p>The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.</p>	<p>Level 5</p>
<p>26–30 marks</p> <p>Relevant philosophical issues will be analysed and positions clearly and precisely explained. The analysis and use of examples will proceed from a secure knowledge base. Evaluation must be present and will show sophistication and direct engagement of the issues. The relation between argument and conclusion will be clear.</p> <p>The response is written in a fluent and sophisticated style with minimal, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response will read as a coherent whole.</p>	<p>Level 6</p>

Theme: Reason and experience**Total for this question: 45 marks**

01	Outline and illustrate the view that certainty is confined to introspection and the tautological.	(15 marks)
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Explanations should incorporate something like the following:

Answers should cover both ‘introspection’ and ‘the tautological’. Unpacking ‘certainty in this content’.

Introspection *may* be approached via empiricist or rationalist foundationalism (or both). The central point is that, allegedly, one has privileged access to and a special authority about the content of one’s mind (sense experiences, impressions, ideas, sense data etc.) so that one can be certain that something is present to an attentive mind, or certain that one is a subject of experience, without being certain about the cause of this experience. The most likely source of illustrative material is, perhaps, Descartes’ and various formulations of *the cogito* – e.g. ‘I am, I exist is necessarily true whenever it is...conceived in my mind’. However, classical empiricist views should also be rewarded e.g. Locke’s account of ideas as ‘whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks...(what) everyone is conscious of in himself’.

The tautological is likely to be unpacked in terms of analytic truths, statements that are true by definition or true in virtue of the meaning of words; statements in which predicates are ‘contained within’ subjects; statements that can’t be denied without contradiction. This is easier to illustrate: ‘eggs is eggs’, ‘a square is not a circle’, ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’, ‘where there is no property there is no injustice’, ‘15 is half of 30’ etc.

The view in question may be stated as the view that introspection and the tautological are all that is immune from doubt: outside of introspection and the tautological all else is no more than probability.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02	Assess the view that we have no innate knowledge.	(30 marks)
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This is likely to be seen as the view that there is nothing in the mind that isn’t first in the senses, that at birth the mind is a tabula rasa, a piece of white paper devoid of any characters (Locke). Candidates are likely to devote some space to an account of how the mind comes to be ‘furnished’ through experience which provides ‘all the materials of reason and knowledge’, drawing from Locke (sensation and reflection) and/or Hume (impressions and ideas).

Given that the innate knowledge thesis requires innate ideas it is reasonable to focus initially on empiricist accounts of the acquisition of ideas although candidates should not lose sight of the question – the key point should be that innate knowledge requires there to be innate ideas and no idea is innate. Rather all of our ideas derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience

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Expect the following points of discussion:

On behalf of the view in question:

- Locke’s arguments include the view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but there are no such innate elements. Nobody is born

knowing that $3+4 = 7$ because this requires five ideas to be in the mind. Similarly, universal assent does not imply innateness because it doesn't exist: 'whatever is, is' is unknown to children and idiots. Neither is innate knowledge dormant until discovered by reason – one doesn't discover what is already known and reason is present long before the laws of logic are appreciated or formulated in the mind.

- Other propositions which may be held to be innate, such as 'the square on the hypotenuse...' for example, are in fact drawn out, or deduced, through reason and are demonstrated or proven. There may be criticisms of Plato's argument in the *Meno*.
- Examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of knowledge might also be given.

Against the view in question:

- An appeal to innateness supports the existence of propositional knowledge without an experiential grounding. There might be references to God, the propositions of logic, identity, morality, causation, infinity etc.
- Some may refer specifically to Platonic Forms and/or to an innate conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed (Kant). There may also be references to Leibniz's principles of reason e.g. nothing can come from nothing.
- Some psychological/neurological support for the innate knowledge thesis might be offered; depth perception, facial recognition, genetic dispositions etc. Better responses may also suggest that these are purely natural or instinctual reactions rather than innate knowledge.

Candidates may discuss the status of Locke's ideas of reflection or his references to powers of the mind or to the agreement and disagreement of ideas (which include identity, diversity, relation, causation and real existence)? If the idea of God is referred to there is not only a different opinion concerning whether the idea is innate but, even if it is, isn't something else required for knowledge? There may be innate capacities, depth grammar for example, but is this innate knowledge? Similarly, schema might be innate but, without experience, concepts are 'empty'. Some merit will also be present in discussions of whether e.g. depth perception is knowledge or instinct, a purely natural or instinctual reaction.

It could be argued that:

- There are no innate ideas hence there is no innate knowledge.
- Even 'weaker' formulations of the innate knowledge thesis seem to require a correspondent knowledge base given in experience, even if only to 'draw out' that which is already latent within.
- We can find examples of innate ideas and reflection concerning these innate ideas does constitute innate knowledge – how far this extends may be questioned. We can also find examples of ideas that are not gained through experience e.g. a missing shade of blue.
- A Kantian synthesis of empiricist and rationalist principles is necessary for knowledge.
- It might also be suggested that there isn't very much to synthesise – Locke and Kant don't seem to be poles apart on existence and unity for example – so that Locke's idea of unity that is 'suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within' is similar Kant's idea of discrete entities separate from other entities.
- Similarly, Hume's position that no idea is innate (because all ideas are copies of impressions).
- It might be claimed that the innate knowledge thesis isn't especially convincing, or isn't especially far-reaching, but that we do have either innate concepts or innate capacities without which it would be impossible to gain knowledge. (There may be some explicit references to nativism). It might be claimed that innate ideas/knowledge is a default position, explaining what can't be explained in other ways.

Theme: Why should I be governed?**Total for this question: 45 marks**

03 Outline and illustrate **one** criticism of the view that legitimate government requires popular approval. (15 marks)

Candidates might begin by identifying 'legitimate government' with authority and/or with the right to exercise power. This may be contrasted with power which is not held to be legitimate – power which is *de facto* rather than *de jure*. The right to exercise power is typically linked to consent so that *one* criticism might be drawn from:

- Voting – and the idea that a government might be legitimately elected on the basis of a minority vote.
- Theories of consent which might be held to fall short of popular approval. For example, the view that explicit consent has never been given *or* if it has been given in the past it can't be assumed to still apply *or* the view that tacit consent doesn't seem to require popular approval *or* the view that hypothetical consent doesn't necessarily imply popular approval of what we actually have.
- The claim that a government might be legitimate if it is operating in our best interests and the view that popular approval cannot be equated with this – e.g. critiques of democracy as voiced by Plato or Mill.
- The claim that a sovereign body might be legitimate if power is gained through legitimate succession and/or accords to traditional or constitutional processes.

There is a danger that lengthy exposition may take the place of illustration. Illustrations could include, for example, a legitimate government might rightfully resist implementing the popular opinion that we should bring back hanging or that we should reduce welfare benefits *or* the fact that I've benefited from the state education system or driven on a public road doesn't imply that I approve of the government or that I approve of being governed at all. References to the percentage of people who vote are also acceptable as brief illustrations.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04 Assess the claim that only non-violent protests against the State are justifiable. (30 marks)

There are different ways into this question:

- One possible approach is to regard the State as having the (rightful) power to regulate the behaviour of citizens, groups, institutions etc. within its territory: given this, the State can claim a monopoly on the use of force or legitimate violence. If this approach is taken (or incorporated) the question might provoke a discussion of when this claim should no longer be recognised.
- A different approach might be to recognise that there may be legitimate grounds for protesting against certain actions of the State: this might lead to a discussion of civil disobedience which might be defined as unlawful conduct designed to change a law (or laws) without rejecting the rule of law generally. Consequently, such unlawful conduct is typically non-violent, non-revolutionary and the group or groups involved are willing to accept punishment for infringements of the law.

It is possible that the question will provoke different types of discussion:

- The claim that the State should not have, or should lose, its monopoly on the use of force might be linked to views concerning the legitimacy of government generally or to

the legitimacy of particular governments. Thus, there may be a refusal to accept that the State should have a role in regulating behaviour (anarchism); or that a government that fails to protect citizens or fails to uphold the rights of citizens is no longer legitimate (Hobbes, Locke). Less theoretical versions of this type of approach may reject a distinction between force and violence through references to e.g. rogue states, or fascist states in which violence is directed at a minority, or even all states if their legitimacy is held to mask the 'iron fist' behind the 'velvet glove'.

- If the above approach is taken there may be discussions of the means necessary to remove a sovereign body – and, particularly, of whether violence is a justifiable means.
- Alternatively, if the focus is on civil disobedience, there may be some elaboration of the grounds of protest. This is most likely to involve a brief discussion of unjust laws: examples will probably be provided – e.g. civil rights campaigns, refusals to pay the poll-tax etc. There may be references to specific individuals – Thoreau, Gandhi etc. There may also be some elaboration of specific grounds for disobedience: where a law does not uphold individual rights or where rights are not extended to certain groups; where a law fails to treat individuals equally; where actual law does not coincide with natural law and where individuals feel the law to be unjust and/or that they have a higher duty than to obey the law; where the State exceeds its role; where the body exercising power is deemed to be illegitimate.
- Again, this approach needs to be coupled with a discussion of the means necessary to achieve goals – the fact that Gandhi's peaceful protest against British rule in India was successful does not in itself mean that violent protests attempting to achieve the same end (e.g. as in Northern Ireland) are unjustifiable. There may be references to direct action (which may involve some level of violence) and to the social and moral grounds that lead some to engage in direct action. There may also be references to terrorism as the paradigm case of political violence.

Higher-level responses will subject different approaches to critical scrutiny rather than merely describe the views of e.g. Locke or Rawls. In particular, what is and what is not justifiable should be analysed in terms of social, moral or political goals.

A range of argumentation is possible. For example:

- Some may refer to a right of dissent and link this to why rational individuals accept political obligations generally – this might also be linked to the idea that the consensus is strengthened through dissent and disobedience but only if these involve rational non-violent means of protesting. Civil disobedience is justified when a law infringes the liberty and equal rights of citizens (or of a group), when lawful attempts to redress this have failed, when there is a reasonable chance of winning hearts and minds and when disobedience does not extend to so many as to threaten a crisis of legitimacy.
- In certain situations non-violent disobedience may be less likely to succeed than more forceful direct action, e.g. if government is not being pressured by the majority, if it is insensitive to public opinion and particularly to minority opinion, if a lawgiver is not recognised as legitimate or if a lawgiver recognises no duty of care to certain groups.
- Violent protest is justified when the State's violence is widespread and/or not seen as legitimate force. There may be references to moral grounds and conscience.
- No form of protest is ever justified: this view might be taken on the grounds that illegal actions undermine the rule of law generally and/or on the grounds that it is hypocritical to enjoy the benefits afforded by political organization and, at the same time, to object to aspects of that organization.
- Is it possible to generalise to an acceptable principle concerning the use or non-use of violence?

Theme: Why Should I be Moral?**Total for this question: 45 marks**

05 Outline and illustrate **two** criticisms of the view that self interest is irrelevant to morality. (15 marks)

The view will probably be recognised as a deontological theory and may be briefly elaborated in terms of Kantian ethics: e.g. the significance of duty; the establishment of maxims, principles or laws which apply universally; the importance of reason, autonomy, motive, intention and the good will; various formulations of the categorical imperative. However, relevant points might be drawn from alternative theories e.g. Plato's account of morality.

Criticisms may be drawn from:

- Whether the recognition of moral duties is sufficient to motivate us to perform them – if it were how can we account for moral weakness or wickedness?
- Could there be a tension between the autonomous rational will and the causally determined lower self?
- Whether Kantian ethics is too formal and/or abstract to be useful as a guide to action: we know that we should respect persons as ends in themselves but can we determine what this means in practice without some reference to interests?
- Is self-interest irrelevant in imperfect duties (developing talents, helping others)?
- This is too rigid and insensitive to feelings or circumstances: adherence to moral imperatives (always...never...) may seem absurd in some situations.
- The problem of conflicting duties or grounds of obligation – whether all moral dilemmas could be resolved without some reference to interests.
- Whether our interests, personal attachments, preferences and sympathies, have no moral value.
- Good intentions might produce morally bad consequences – including those that adversely affect self interest.
- The view, associated with virtue ethics, that acting well/doing the right thing is both moral and in our interests.
- Rational egoism and the idea that altruism, or moral action, ultimately is in our interests.

Outlines of opposing views (virtue ethics, contractual theories) showing how self-interest is relevant to morality which do not address the question directly should not be placed in the top mark band.

It shouldn't be difficult to illustrate points, at least briefly, but care should be taken to relate illustrations to the question and to the point being made. For example, mad axe murderers may feature but the point being illustrated (rigidity or conflicting duties) should be clear as should relevance to self-interest.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

06 Assess the view that morality is a conventional agreement for our mutual advantage. (30 marks)

This should be recognised as the contractual view of morality and one or more versions of the contractual approach should be briefly described. The general idea is that there is no rift between enlightened or rational self-interest and moral values. Being self-interested isn't the same as being selfish: people who are openly selfish are often disliked and mistrusted. If this is so then moral behaviour, including an altruistic concern for or sympathy towards others, may be

the best course of action. It surely isn't accidental that phrases like 'honesty is the best policy' persist. So, perhaps morality is 'the best policy' and maximises our self-interest in the long run.

Some elaboration, and defence, of the view may be given:

- Hobbes is likely to feature: expect bleak accounts of life in a state of nature so that it is rational for an enlightened egoist to want to escape it and rational to expect others to want to do the same.
- Others provide less bleak accounts of life in the state of nature (Locke, Rousseau) but nevertheless find positive reasons for making contractual arrangements with our fellows.
- Examples from game theory such as the prisoner's dilemma may also be employed to suggest that mutual co-operation is advantageous.

Critical points are likely to draw from:

- We haven't *actually* made a conventional agreement with others and/or even if we argue *hypothetically* this may not generate the conventions that *actually* exist.
- Is this really what morality amounts to? Is it the case that morality can be described purely in terms of self-interest and mutual advantage? (Do all contract theories do this?)
- Can morality be the product of a contract? Don't we need moral principles in order to make a contract? What we (would be prepared to) contract to must be the product of some pre-existing beliefs and values about what constitutes a worthwhile life.
- Some positions (e.g. Locke) suggest that a conventional agreement is made to secure moral principles (e.g. rights) which, therefore, cannot be the product of a contract.
- Others (e.g. Rousseau) might be said to licence 'tyranny'. Given differences in the contractual approach (concerning why we make a contract and/or what we contract to) this approach leaves the question of what is moral open.
- Do outsiders, or those who cannot express consent (such as the very young, those that lack rational faculties, future generations, animals etc.) have no moral rights?
- Where contractual agreements are made between the powerful and the powerless resulting moral principles are unlikely to enshrine a universal morality. There might be references to Plato, Marx (morality favouring a powerful minority) or to the view that some versions of contract theory (Hobbes) do not secure the rights of minorities.
- Does the fact – if it were a fact – that we've agreed mean that we ought to honour our agreement? What if we can get away with not doing so?

Alternative views of what constitutes morality might be referred to but candidates should avoid turning this into an unfocused response – so that it reads like an answer to a more general question such as 'how does self-interest feature in different theories of moral motivation?'

A range of argumentation is possible. For example:

- Some are likely to question whether self-interest or mutual advantage is a genuinely *moral* motivation for action.
- This might lead to an argument for an alternative approach. If it is accepted that self-interest could be a moral motivation then some might argue that e.g. virtue ethics provides a more convincing account of this. If it is rejected then some might argue that our moral sentiments are, in some sense, natural (e.g. Hume, Evolutionary Biology) or functional (leading to the survival of society).
- Some might question whether moral principles are captured in the idea of a relativistic convention. This might be extended to a critique of cultural or moral relativism. We do criticise other societies (and our own society at a different time) on moral grounds: we do argue that some things (e.g. slavery) are morally wrong rather than simply accept that, by convention, they are morally right for that society.
- This might lead some to defend a view of morality that is divorced from self-interest.
- It might be argued that self-interest is compatible with an (impartial) regard for justice and fairness – some might see Rawls as achieving this.

Theme: The Idea of God

Total for this question: 45 marks

07 Outline the view that God is eternal and explain **one** difficulty with this view. (15 marks)

The view may be briefly elaborated as a claim that God exists outside of time; some may suggest that God exists independently of time and/or in a timeless realm. It is quite likely that some reasons for holding the view may also be given: for example, that it is either unthinkable or unacceptable to see God as a Being that is subject to constraints like ‘not yet’ or ‘no longer’; similarly, that in order for God to be the creator of the universe, of space and time, God must exist outside of space and time. The view is typically coupled with views that God simultaneously knows about, and acts at, all moments in time. This may also be linked to transcendence.

This view is potentially problematic for other qualities attributed to Him and **one** difficulty is likely to be drawn from:

- If God sees an event as it occurs in e.g. September 2000 and another event as it occurs in e.g. June 2005 and if all divine seeings are simultaneous then September 2000 is the same month as June 2005. This doesn’t seem to be especially coherent.
- If God sees all events simultaneously then He already knows what I will be doing tomorrow evening. There may be some difficulty in reconciling this with the view that I am free to choose what I will be doing tomorrow evening. (There may be references to omniscience).
- It is difficult to see how a Being that transcends His creation, that is not in time or physical, can act within it, create and sustain it or reveal Himself through intervention. (There may be references to transcendence.)
- If God is timeless then is He capable of changing? If He is not capable of changing then does this limit Him in some way? This may be linked to God being typically viewed (e.g. in Judaism and Christianity) as benevolent and caring – a personal God who believers can relate to and who is responsive to their communicated needs/prayer. (This may be related to immutability)
- Similarly, it might be suggested that it is difficult to conceive of and form a personal relationship with a transcendent Being.
- Candidates may point to a difficulty in understanding what is meant by ‘eternal’ – infinite temporal duration, or timelessness. They are incompatible. Some traditional religious discourse implies the former, the more philosophical account does not.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08 Assess the claim that God necessarily exists. (30 marks)

Candidates should outline at least one version of the ontological argument – most responses will probably be based on Anselm. Beyond this some may develop an account of how ontological arguments for the existence of God work: e.g. they are a priori arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence; from a purely formal consideration of the concept of God it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated; existence is part of the definition or concept of God; to define or conceive of God is to define or conceive of a Being whose

existence is necessary; some may draw from the cosmological argument, the existence of contingent beings requires a necessary being as their existential ground.

More detailed developments of one or more versions of the ontological argument should be credited. Thus:

- Anselm: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived; it is greater to exist both in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone; the greatest conceivable being exists both in reality and in the understanding; God exists.
- Descartes: God is the supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being possesses or contains all perfections; existence is a perfection; God exists.
- Plantinga: there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness; an entity that possesses maximal greatness must exist in all possible worlds; God necessarily exists in all possible worlds.
- Malcolm: if God does not exist His existence is logically impossible; if God does exist His existence is logically necessary; God's existence is, logically, either impossible or necessary; His existence is impossible only if the concept of God is absurd or contradictory; it is neither, so God's existence is necessary.

Critical responses might address a number of, generally familiar, critical points.

- There could be criticisms of specific arguments: the definite descriptions criticism of Anselm ('the' unsurpassable being assumes such a being); Malcolm's argument requires logical necessity to succeed but he substitutes aseity for logical necessity.
 - We can conceive of the perfect island (or perfect anything else) and ontological arguments seem to bring these into existence.
 - The argument has absurd consequences (the overload objection).
 - The argument bridges a gap between the conceptual and the real but this is invalid. Conceptually there may be necessary links between subjects and their predicates but this doesn't imply that such a subject exists. There may be references to Schopenhauer.
 - Necessity does not apply to existence.
 - Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate. Existence doesn't function like a real or descriptive predicate, it doesn't describe the subject.
 - There is nothing in the world corresponding to our description of God – the concept is not instantiated. There may be references to Russell and propositional functions.
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- Some may reject the idea that God's existence can be proven in this way. But do objections about logical reasoning confuse a point about the existence of God with a point about proving the existence of God.
 - The idea of God in the ontological argument is an abstract formal concept, as distinct from the living God of religious tradition.
 - It may be claimed that an ontological argument proves that if there is such a Being as God then His existence is necessary.
 - It may be denied that 'God has necessary existence' entails 'necessarily, God exists'.
 - Some may argue that (a version of) the ontological argument appears to have a valid form and/or, from a non-realist view, that the argument works. The idea of an existing God is a concept that we must have.
 - Some will conclude that the properties that things possess in one sphere (e.g. our imagination or understanding, fiction, religious texts) have no bearing on reality. The ontological argument is 'a charming joke' (an attempt to define God into existence)

Theme: Persons**Total for this question: 45 marks**

09	Explain and illustrate what is meant by the claim that some persons may be diminished.	(15 marks)
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There will probably be some references to the view that ‘personhood’ is, arguably, a matter of degree (rather than kind) and/or to the view that it is not a purely biological concept. Diminution refers to a lessening (rather than a complete loss) of personhood, so that in certain important respects one becomes less complex or reduced in some way.

Explanations may involve an account of some proposed characteristics of personhood. So that one becomes diminished if there is a reduction in or loss of:

- Self-awareness and/or the ability to consider oneself as the same self at different times.
- Self creation: a decline in autonomy or a decline in one’s ability to reason, reflect and choose.
- Sociability: one is less able to identify, understand and/or relate to others.
- Communication: language skills are lost.

If this approach is taken then illustrations may draw from some of the illnesses referred to below. Alternatively, explanations may focus on illnesses or disorders effecting a gradual or sudden loss or change of identity (rather than a total loss of personhood). For example:

- Dementia.
- Amnesia.
- Brain damage.
- Psychiatric disorders following traumatic events.

If so then a separate illustration may be given. This may be fictional (e.g. The Notebook for dementia, Memento for amnesia).

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

10	‘Our identity as persons through time is given by psychological continuity.’ Assess this claim.	(30 marks)
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The claim may be elaborated as the view that a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if their mind (or mental history or memory) is continuous throughout T1...T2 and, possibly from a third-person perspective, if their personality traits (or characteristics) are similar through time. There may be references to Locke’s distinction between ‘same man’ and ‘same person’ and to his illustration of this (the soul of a prince entering the body of a cobbler). There should be some elaboration of his view that personal identity is determined by memory or the unity of conscious experience: ‘consciousness alone makes self’. Essentially, personal identity is given by thinking of oneself as being “the same thinking thing in different times and places”.

Some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

- An argument or illustration to show that psychological criteria of identity seem to matter more than physical criteria – versions of ‘Brownson’ might be given to illustrate this point (Brown’s brain in Robinson’s body, the recognition of Brown’s wife and family).

- A distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. Brown has a new body and, physically, is qualitatively different; psychologically, Brown may be a little disturbed by being in a new body, so psychologically different. However, numerically, Brownson is the same person as Brown.
- The question may be raised of how much qualitative change is possible for someone to remain, numerically, 'the same'. Brown might recognise Brown's wife but does Brown's wife recognise Brown? Wouldn't this have an impact on psychological continuity?
- The intelligibility of 'puzzle cases' might be questioned. A person may be an embodied consciousness but is it possible to 'empty' a body of consciousness and 'place' it in another body?
- Is psychological continuity through time a necessary condition of identity? There may be references to cases where psychological continuity isn't present yet we still wish to attribute identity. Reid's General might be employed as an example (as might other real or fictional examples of breaks in a chain of memories). Some may point to the contradiction involved in Locke's view ($A=B$, $B=C$ but A doesn't equal C).
- Is psychological continuity through time a sufficient condition of identity? There may be references to cases where psychological continuity is present but we refuse to, or cannot, attribute identity. Some might refer to versions of Parfit's adaptation of Brownson (Ned, Jed and Zed or Larry, Barry and Gary etc.) or to fictional examples of cloning. Hick's example may feature.
- Whether this view involves us in circularity. My identity is assumed in the claim that I remember that it was me who did 'x'. (Butler's objection).
- Whether a succession of different persons could inhabit the same body or whether the same consciousness could inhabit two bodies etc. Psychological continuity is not simply about memory.
- The claim that psychological continuity depends on the brain and is, in fact, physical continuity. But does it depend on the whole brain? Also, is it the brain that is important or what is 'in' it?
- The significance of physicality for identity.
- Whether 'connectedness' and 'survival' through time is a more useful concept than 'continuity' and identity through time – the view that we don't have identity through time.
- But how do we characterize *what it is* that survives through time? Must this be psychological?
- Identity, 'I' or self, are, somehow, false ideas.
- The claim that personal identity is 'what it is' and cannot be reduced to anything else.

A range of argumentation, following points selected for discussion, is possible:

- Psychological continuity is important for personal identity: this might be described as a 'standard' philosophical view. It may be backed-up by references to problem cases concerning alternative criteria such as bodily continuity e.g. cloning; brain damage, division and transplants; amnesia; personality change etc. These suggest that what matters is psychological.
- The body is more significant to our identities than most have been prepared to admit. (There may be some reference to Williams).
- We can't establish what it is that makes for identity through time – perhaps we don't have identity through time. (Would we want to be psychologically identical through time?)
- Survival through time is of more significance than identity – connectedness and survival are all we have and all we need (although this may lead to some difficult moral questions).

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 15 mark question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective 30 mark question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	9	9	18
AO2	6	12	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45

Converting marks into UMS marks

Convert raw marks into marks on the Uniform Mark Scale (UMS) by using the link below.

UMS conversion calculator: www.aqa.org.uk/umsconversion