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General Certificate of Education
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Philosophy PHIL1

Final

Mark Scheme

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AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

Marking Scheme for part (a) questions

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
11–15 marks Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate and properly developed. Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but *either* too succinct *or* unbalanced: *either* important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out *or* one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed	**Level 3**
6–10 marks Answers in this level may *either* list a range of points or blur two or more points together *or* explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is undeveloped or unconvincing *or* illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit. OR If two points are required answers in this level may *either* clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given *or* points may be well made but not illustrated. OR The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalized and lacking detail and precision.	**Level 2**
0–5 marks Answers in this level *either* make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration *or* provide a basic, sketchy and vague account *or* a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.	**Level 1**

NB Answers may demonstrate characteristics of more than one mark band, for example:

- *Points are clearly identified and explanation is detailed and precise (level 3) but only one point is illustrated (level 2). The response should be placed at the bottom end of level 3 (i.e. 11/12 marks).*
- *Two points are required but only one relevant point is clearly identified, explained and illustrated (level 2) and the second point and illustration is confused or tangential to the question asked (level 1). The response should be placed at the top end of level 2 (i.e. 9/10 marks).*

Marking Scheme for part (b) questions

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 4	**N/A**	**15-18 marks** A clear and closely argued discussion of the issue incorporating a well-developed appreciation focussed on some relevant philosophical issues by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.	**N/A**
Level 3	**3 marks** A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence	**10–14 marks** Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but: *Either:* a narrowly focussed response but detail is pithy and organised intelligently. *Or:* several issues are discussed but the application of points is less well-organised, the focus may drift or analysis may be less developed and unconvincing in places. Answers at the bottom of this band may be full but largely descriptive responses.	**7-9 marks** Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced. Lower in the band the critical discussion is not sharp and reasoning employed to support the conclusion is less well-developed. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.
Level 2	**2 marks** Answers are relevant but *either* fail to maintain a focus on the specific question *or* are partial responses, ideas/examples lack detail.	**5–9 marks** Answers in this level provide some relevant material but: *Either:* points are raised but not developed, analysis is limited and the answer lacks organisation. *Or:* the relevance of some points may be unclear.	**4-6 marks** Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present. *Either* alternative approaches are juxtaposed with little explicit comparison or assessment. *Or* a position is briefly stated but not adequately supported by the preceding

			discussion. Responses should be placed in this band according to the level of assessment and support offered. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 1	**1 mark** Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; *or* confused *or* largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.	**1–4 marks** Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses *or* an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential or confused response.	**1-3 marks** Critical comments are sketchy and fail to contribute to any explicitly reasoned conclusion *or* argumentation may be confused so that the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow. Lower in the band a view may be outlined without *any* critical discussion. Technical language may not be employed or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.

Theme 1: Reason and experience

Total for this question: 45 marks

Theme: Reason and experience

01	Explain and illustrate why there is a problem concerning the conclusions reached through inductive arguments. (15 marks)

Some background explanation may be given concerning:

- What an inductive argument is – typically inductive arguments draw an inference from particular instances to a general conclusion.
- This may be illustrated – expect references to swans or ravens but some may refer to Humean examples and/or to scientific experimentation.
- Some may locate induction within an empiricist epistemology.
- The problem should be clearly explained:

- An inference drawn from experience of particular instances supposes that the future will resemble the past – that future experiences of further instances will resemble past experiences of particular instances. However, it is possible that 'the course of nature will change' so that the past offers no guide to the future. It is not possible to demonstrate, from experience of past successes, that the future will resemble the past as this would involve circularity. Induction cannot be justified inductively.
- Some may state the problem in terms of inductive arguments licensing anything and everything – for example, when an individual can be described under two different 'classes' or 'sets' – so that not all regularities form a basis for prediction.
- Some may claim that the inferences drawn from inductive arguments are no more than probable: some may refer to our natural instinct to expect e.g. immersion in water to suffocate or to believe that immersion in water will suffocate. The point is, however, that *knowledge* of future events cannot be *demonstrated* through any process of *reasoning.*

Some may refer to a lack of certainty stemming from the fact that the conclusion of an inductive argument is not entailed in the premises of the argument – although it is supported by them – this should be treated as a mid-band response, low in the band if it is expressed simply as 'induction is not deduction and doesn't yield certainty'.

Illustrations are likely to be brief, rather than developed, but should be employed to clarify the point: these are likely to reverse any earlier examples given e.g. black swans, white ravens, bread that doesn't nourish, the sun failing to rise etc. Some may construct their own examples e.g. 'I have passed every exam I have taken so…' Some may refer to well-known examples in the literature, e.g. Russell's turkey, Goodman's 'grue'.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts or suggested solutions to the problem although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02	'At birth the mind is a tabula rasa'. Discuss	(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

The view of the mind as a tabula rasa (Gassendi) or as a piece of white paper devoid of any characters (Locke) should be well understood. Candidates are likely to spend some time 'translating' tabula rasa, e.g. the mind is pictured as a 'blank slate', or finding some alternative image that does the same work.

The view will probably be identified as an empiricist approach to the acquisition of ideas, beliefs and knowledge and linked to the view that knowledge, or at least non-trivial knowledge, is acquired through experience.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Expect points of discussion to draw from the following:

- There will almost certainly be references to Locke and possibly Hume.
- Developments of the view that there are no innate ideas and that all of our ideas derive from sensory experience and reflection on sensory experience.
- Locke's view that if a proposition is innate its component elements must be innate – but there are no such innate elements. While 'whatever is, is' looks like a proposition that is known independently of experience, and should be universally assented to, its component elements are so abstract that no child knows the truth of it. There may be criticisms of Plato's argument in the *Meno*. Similarly 'whatever is white all over is not black all over' is necessarily true but not innate because it requires ideas of white, black and difference.
- Examples of where sensory impairment and/or an inability to reflect deprive us (allegedly) of certain ideas and/or knowledge. Humean examples might feature.
- Examples of where the addition of sensory equipment would provide us with ideas, concepts, beliefs and knowledge, e.g. Condillac's statue.

- *Critique*

- However, do we not possess some concepts, capacities and knowledge prior to or independently of experience – do claims about e.g. God, the propositions of logic, identity, universals, morality, necessity etc. escape the empiricist framework? Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (e.g. a Euclidean straight line, God). Support for innate knowledge may refer to various psychological researches.
- The view can cope with the acquisition of complex ideas but is problematic in relation to general terms or universals.
- The conceptual scheme under which our experience of the world is subsumed is acquired via experience and something else. The active power of the mind in shaping our knowledge. There may be references to Leibniz's example of the block of marble containing the figure of Hercules and/or to Kant's account of the categories through which the mind organises experience into something intelligible and/or to Chomsky's universal grammar.
- At least some ideas, (e.g. a missing shade of blue) do not appear to derive from sense experience.
- Empirical justifications are not immune from scepticism. Some may develop a link between empiricist foundationalism and solipsism. There may be references to problems of meaning if words are deemed to be the names of private objects (although care should be taken to draw a valid point out of this.)

NB References to instinct should not be highly rewarded.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- The claim provides a clear account of the acquisition of ideas sets a limit on appropriate objects of knowledge and allows us to proceed without getting distracted by empty metaphysical speculation. It reflects our experience of learning, where knowledge is acquired through new experiences. At birth the mind is a tabula rasa.
- Some ideas, concepts, capacities etc are held prior to experience and some knowledge does not depend upon experience. If experience is 'given' this is testimony to the existence of certain (synthetic *a priori*) principles which govern our experience of the world. At birth the mind is not a tabula rasa.

Theme: Why Should I be Governed? **Total for this question: 45 marks**

03	Explain and illustrate two reasons that might justify dissent against the rule of law. (15 marks)

Two reasons for believing that dissent against the rule of law (or the State or the dictates of a sovereign body) is just are likely to be selected from:

- The law fails to connect to widely held moral and political values – dissent produces a better outcome than consent.
- The law violates natural moral law – which is 'above' actual law. We are moral agents first and subjects second: autonomy and individual conscience are more important than obedience.
- The law serves sectional interests and fails to promote the good of the social whole or the common good *or* fails to extend rights to certain groups.
- The law disrupts social unity, order and cohesion because it discriminates against certain groups and/or individuals *or* because it undermines tradition.
- The law emanates from a source which is not regarded as legitimate. (This may be implicit in accounts of Hobbes' or Locke's versions of the social contract).
- The law attempts to regulate an area of life which is not regarded as the legitimate concern of lawmakers – it violates the freedoms of individuals.
- The law is not applied fairly.

Illustrations, or a single illustration covering two reasons, might draw from specific laws or acts which have drawn dissent e.g. the poll tax, the ban on hunting, interference in parenting, smoking bans, discriminating against fathers, the use of speed cameras, European legislation etc. *or* be fictional examples of a law which *would draw dissent* were it enacted. Some may employ historical examples. Illustrations don't have to be from the UK.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts denying that dissent is justifiable although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04	'In the absence of an explicit act of consent the idea of a social contract is a fiction.' Assess whether it is a useful fiction. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Acts of explicit consent are rare in political life – some that do occur, e.g. schoolchildren pledging allegiance to the flag, are not undertaken by informed or qualified participants – and there is no evidence that 'the greatest part of the nation' have ever explicitly consented to political rule. Consequently, the idea that our political obligations to the state are founded on a social contract seems spurious. So, the issue is how to preserve a generally liberal theory of political obligation through consent in the absence of explicit consent. The concepts of hypothetical consent and tacit consent have been offered as solutions. The question concerns whether these manoeuvres work to preserve a concept that is useful.
(*Generalised responses on the strengths and weaknesses of different versions of contractual theories should not be placed in the top mark-band for any assessment objective).*

Interpretation, Analysis, Application
Expect accounts that it is a useful fiction to draw from the following:

- Hypothetical consent typically refers to the idea of a social contract that would be formed by imaginary, yet rational, individuals negotiating with one another in an artificial context – such as a state of nature or an original position.

- Tacit consent typically refers to the idea that a social contract is implicit through our engagement in certain acts: e.g. accepting benefits, staying in the country, participating in political practices such as voting etc.
- Both are ways of thinking about why, and to what extent, rational individuals submit to political authority and both also emphasise that political authority is a human invention – and it may be useful to see authority in this way. The idea of a social contract is, then, a device for revealing how systems that have been created by humans are rational creations that work for all of us
- On some accounts (e.g. Hobbes) the contract works for all of us because it is based upon what we as rational beings *actually* want, desire or prefer so that rational action is action that gives us what we want. What we want are peaceful, co-operative conditions that allow us to pursue and further other interests. There may be references to human nature, self-interest and/or to a state of nature that lies beneath civil society.
- On other accounts (e.g. Kant, Rawls) the idea of a social contract works to determine certain principles and policies that rational individuals *should* accept as being just. What is just and what is moral can be rationally determined – there may be references to a 'kingdom of ends' or to what we would commit to given 'a veil of ignorance'

- *Critical points (questioning whether this is a useful fiction):*
- 'A hypothetical contract…is no contract at all' (Dworkin).
- There are difficulties determining what counts as tacit consent and how far consenting tacitly obliges us. Are we obliged if we accept benefits we haven't asked for? Can we be called up for military service if we've attended primary school?
- Tacit consent may not involve putting much in to political society (there may be references to 'free-riding').
- Is it rational for everyone to uphold the contract? Suppose they can get away with not upholding their side of the contract (Gyges)? Suppose they feel restrained by convention (Nietzsche)?
- Is self-interest the basis of our obligations to others? Do we have no obligations to those who can't make a contract (citizens of other states, animals, those who are mentally impaired etc.)?
- There is no neutral, morally pure, 'Archimedean Point' from which we can decide what rational individuals would consent to.

NB Some points apply to some versions of the contract and not others.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- The concept is useful: the insistence that the authority of the state, and of a legal system, is the creation of the people who constitute the state forces rational reflection about what we have created and what we could create. The individual is at the heart of political theorising. Consent carries with it a guaranteed moral right of dissent.
- The concept is not useful: explicit consent has not been given and nothing else will do to secure the legitimacy and authority of the state that liberal thinkers want. Notions of hypothetical and tacit consent are unconvincing. We were born into obedience and the sources of power and authority can't be found in the consent of individuals. Some may offer an alternative account – anarchist, socialist or conservative.

Theme: Why Should I be Moral?

Total for this question: 45 marks

05	Explain and illustrate two objections to the view that if we understand what is good and acquire the virtues, we will flourish and be happy. (15 marks)

The view in question will be recognised as virtue ethics in which the focus is on dispositions, moral education, developing moral character and questions concerning how we should live/how we should be. The central issue is how this connects to a rewarding life: how being 'good' will make us happy. Some may provide a translation of what 'happiness' is in this context (but should avoid evaluation).

Relevant objections might focus on:

- Some versions of virtue ethics maintain that knowing 'the good' is sufficient to bring about good actions – if this were so how would we explain wickedness? Illustrations may focus on those who knowingly do or, perhaps, desire to do wrong acts.
- Some versions of virtue ethics maintain that we have a function and that a good life involves excelling in some way relevant to our function – but if there is no human nature and no purpose to be fulfilled what is our motivation to act? If it is subjective then it is difficult to see how we could provide an absolute account of what is good. Moral decision making may be experienced in anguish (e.g. Sartrean examples).
- Whether a lack of virtue/surfeit of vice leads to ruination – illustrative examples might be given of wicked people who've led happy lives (so that 'a good life' doesn't appear to be a necessary condition of happiness).
- Whether the possession of virtue/lack of vice, or leading a good life, is sufficient for happiness – illustrative examples might include the regard in which the 'moral saint' is held (some qualities suggested by virtue theorists e.g. pride, ambition are no longer desirable) *and/or* (more importantly) the misery experienced by some of the saintly. Excellence in a particular field may be reached at some social cost.
- Does it pay to be virtuous or is virtue its own reward? The former, with an apparent emphasis on self-interest, doesn't look especially like moral motivation: the latter is dubious. Happiness depends, in part, on circumstances external to the individual.
- It may be difficult for some to develop moral character: it might be suggested that virtue (to the extent that it involves belonging to 'the good and the great') is an effect of a rewarding life rather than a cause.
- Whether it is more virtuous to overcome temptation/vice or to not experience it at all and, if the latter, whether this is more 'agreeable' than individuals with a 'dark side' or a diverse society incorporating some 'rogues'. Which makes us happier?

No marks are available for evaluative accounts based on what constitutes flourishing although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

06	**'**The only genuinely moral motivation for performing an action is that it is the right action.' Discuss. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Most will recognise this as Kantian ethics. Certain themes, incorporating some of the following, may be emphasised: the significance of duty; the establishment of maxims, principles or laws which apply universally; the importance of reason and autonomy; motive, intention and the good

will; overcoming self-interest; various formulations of the categorical imperative (universal law, respect for persons and the kingdom of ends).

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following, or equivalent, points should be raised:

- Some points may be selected to show the contrast between duty and desire or inclination and/or to develop the link between moral agency and moral motivation. The only thing that is good in itself is a good will; we are accountable for what we will, what we freely assent to, not for our physical or psychological constitution or temperament.
- Some points may be selected to show which actions may count as right actions and why. This might include an account of duties to self and duties to others; perfect and imperfect duties; the examples of suicide, falsely promising, developing talents and helping others; explanations of why certain actions aren't universalisable.

Critical discussion

- Whether Kantian ethics is too formal and/or abstract to be useful as a guide to action – there is a limited account of which actions are right.
- Whether it is too rigid and insensitive to feelings, circumstances or interests – whether emotions or personal attachments should be disregarded in moral decision making or, perhaps, whether they can be disregarded. Kant's own example (the would-be axe-murderer) may be used against him.
- Whether a moral community could be founded on reason, autonomy and good intentions alone. Do we not also need certain conventions? Shouldn't we also feel for others? (There may be contrasts with versions of the social contract based on interests and/or with virtue ethics, although this should not develop into lengthy juxtapositions of several theories).
- When two actions seem equally right how do we choose between them? The problem of conflicting duties or grounds of obligation. This may be illustrated with an example e.g. Sartre's student.
- Whether inclinations or desires have no moral value – including altruistic inclinations and desires.
- Whether we could tell whether someone was acting out of a sense of duty or out of inclination. (Again, this might be applied to an example frequently used in support of Kant – the honest shopkeeper).
- The problem that good intentions can produce bad consequences (and vice versa).
- The development of moral thinking may be seen as *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:

- This is an important contribution to moral thinking and/or that it connects to many aspects of our moral experience. For example, respect for persons may be connected to the concept of rights and/or to the idea that we do think that it is always wrong to… or never right to…; we do consider intentions when we blame or praise someone, the law treats motive and intention seriously (for example, when distinguishing between murder and manslaughter); morality is a constraint on emotion, inclination and desire etc. More importantly, perhaps, 'because it is right' is an answer to the question 'why should I perform this action?'
- It could also be argued that the approach is too strict, demanding and unemotional to be consistently applied (we do consider circumstances, consequences and attachments before acting); or that it is too vague or formal to be of much practical use (e.g. we know that we should treat others as ends but how exactly do we do this, aren't completely different actions consistent with this aim?)

Theme: The Idea of God

Total for this question: 45 marks

07	Explain two criticisms of the view that God is supremely good, the source of moral laws and moral goodness. (15 marks)

The focus is on one attribute of God, His benevolence; although depending on the points selected other attributes may also be referred to. Criticisms are likely to be drawn from:

- It is the will of God that is supremely good: but then there is an issue concerning how we are to determine what God's will is. Biblical readings can be said to support contradictory views; the commandments can't be used to unravel what to do in many awkward situations (for example, the Catholic Church's position on euthanasia might be seen as less than clear).
- It is God's work, His creation (for example man), that is good: God is the source of the Natural Law governing the universe so that what is good is determined by its' purpose/function. However, what is 'natural' is contestable; arguably it is dubious that there is any such thing as human nature; even if there is it can be accounted for in other ways (evolutionary biology) and there still remains a problem of linking this to morality (is-ought).
- The logical or evidential problem of evil.
- Whether everything that God commands is moral because God commands it or whether God commands only that which is moral. The consequences of either view. (The Euthyphro Dilemma aimed at Divine Command Ethics).
- Are there any moral laws? If there are can they serve as moral guidelines – e.g. what exactly does 'love thy neighbour' entail?
- Morality is characterised by disagreement rather than by acceptance of and devotion to a set of practices.

No marks are available for evaluative accounts of how to resolve difficulties – such as the problem of evil – although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08	'A consideration of the idea of God should lead us to conclude that He exists.' Discuss. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Candidates should outline at least one version of the ontological argument – most responses will probably be based on Anselm. Beyond this there should be an account of how ontological arguments for the existence of God work: e.g. they are *a priori* arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence; from a purely formal consideration of the concept of God it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated; existence is part of the definition or concept of God: *the essential point is that to conceive of God is to conceive of a Being whose existence is necessary and a focused discussion will question whether the existence of God follows from the conception of God*.

Candidates might focus on the trademark argument and provide an account of how an idea of God is caused. This approach is a legitimate way to address the question.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some may apply various versions of the ontological argument to demonstrate the relationship between a conception of God and the existence of God. Thus:

- Anselm: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived; it is greater to exist both in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone; the greatest conceivable being exists both in reality and in the understanding; God exists.
- Descartes: God is the supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being possesses or contains all perfections; existence is a perfection; God exists.
- Plantinga: there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness; so, there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
- Malcolm: if God does not exist His existence is logically impossible; if God does exist His existence is logically necessary; God's existence is, logically, either impossible or necessary; His existence is impossible only if the concept of God is absurd or contradictory; it is neither, so God's existence is necessary. This may be phrased in terms of aseity rather than logical necessity.

One version of the argument will suffice and critical responses might address a number of, generally familiar, critical points.

- Can we conceive of God (the greatest possible being or being with all perfections)?
- We can conceive of the perfect island (or perfect anything else) and ontological arguments seem to bring these into existence.
- The argument has absurd consequences (the overload objection).
- The argument bridges a gap between the conceptual and the real but this is invalid, it is not possible to define something into existence. Conceptually there may be necessary links between subjects and their predicates but this doesn't imply that such a subject exists.
- Necessity does not apply to existence.
- Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate. Existence doesn't function like a predicate, it doesn't describe the subject; the application of a predicate already assumes there is a subject to which it belongs.
- It is inappropriate to use logic to demonstrate the existence of God - His existence is revealed experientially and our experiences of God do not include experiences of His logical necessity.

The best answers may also indicate possible responses to some criticisms.

Assessment and Evaluation

Evaluation is likely to follow from the (critical) points selected for discussion:

- Some may reject the idea that God's existence can be proven in this way. But do objections about logical reasoning confuse a point about the existence of God with a point about proving the existence of God.
- Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between the idea of God produced by the ontological argument and the idea of God in religious traditions.
- It may be claimed that an ontological argument proves that if there is such a Being as God then His existence is necessary and/or that the argument demonstrates that a perfect being does exist but not which perfect being it is.
- Some may argue that (a version of) the ontological argument appears to have a valid form and/or, from a non-realist view, that the argument works. God is a concept that we must have.

- Some will conclude that the properties that things possess in one sphere (e.g. our imagination, fiction, religious texts) have no bearing on reality. The ontological argument is 'a charming joke'.
- Some may provide an account of how we are able to consider the idea of God and conclude that we have the ability to augment ideas (gained from impressions) without limit.

Theme: Persons

Total for this question: 45 marks

09	Explain and illustrate the view that being a person is a matter of degree.	(15 marks)

The view that being a person is a matter of degree may be contrasted with being human – which may be presented as a matter of kind or type: the latter may be seen as essentially 'biological' one either is or is not a member of the human race or of the species human, whereas there are, or may be, complex and simple persons, diminished persons, ex-persons and potential persons. Any one of these points may be developed and illustrated or a number of points may be briefly developed and briefly illustrated.

It is likely that there will be an account of some proposed characteristics of personhood.

- Self-awareness, continued self-awareness through time.
- Self control or self creation: autonomy and responsibility.
- The ability to reason and reflect.
- The possession of higher-order reflective skills (desires about desires etc.)
- Sociability.
- Communication and language skills.

Other relevant points should be rewarded if they are used in relation to the question**.**
Expect explanations to focus on:

- Potential and ex-persons: a foetus is human, as is someone in a vegetative state but either 'not yet' or 'not still' a person.
- Diminution refers to a lessening (rather than a complete loss) of personhood, so that in certain important respects one becomes less complex, weakened or reduced in some way. Again, the point is that diminished persons are (biologically) no less human than they were before.
- Some animals and/or some machines may be seen as sufficiently complex in certain relevant respects to be on the scale of personhood.
- Some may borrow from 'reason and experience' to argue that through experience, or through education, we do become more complex.

Illustration may blur with explanation if candidates make a point through describing e.g. the impact of dementia, amnesia, brain damage, physical decline etc. Specific illustrations (whether real or fictional) of the point or points raised should be rewarded more highly.

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts denying there are degrees of personhood although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

10	**'**Assess whether some machines could be persons.	(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

There is potential for an overlap with (09) question here insofar as the concept of a person could *either* be distinguished from that of a human through e.g. notions of potential persons, ex-persons, multiple personalities etc. *or* defined in terms of attributes required like: self-awareness (through time), self-creation, reason and reflection, a social being, a language user etc. So, it may be legitimate to re-state some points previously stated in (09): the obvious candidates for this are certain characteristics of personhood and the extent to which they do or do not apply to 'intelligent' computational machines, robots, cyborgs or androids.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some of the following, or equivalent, points could feature in discussions:

- If the possession of attributes identified is a matter of *degree* then do *or could* some artificial systems possess sufficient degrees of complexity with regard to the relevant attributes to be on the scale of personhood?

An optimistic response may cite evidence of machines/artificial systems possessing:

- Reasoning and rationality.
- Language or communication skills.
- The ability to learn through the artificial equivalent of human senses.
- The ability to form judgements about 'experiences'.
- The potential for consciousness, self-awareness and emotion to 'emerge' in functionally equivalent systems.
- The possibility of identities, sociability, roles within a network emerging.
- The possibility that a machine will pass the Turing Test.
- Progress achieved in the last 40-50 years and the possibility of further developments.

There may be some attempt to link this to a philosophical theory (functionalism perhaps) or to a philosopher (e.g. Putnam, Turing). Some may draw from their knowledge of what e.g. robots can already do and some may look to science fiction to consider future possibilities.

More pessimistic approaches are likely to focus on:

- Programming, autonomy and doubts concerning self-creation.
- Some may refer to the soul.
- Some may argue that no machine has passed a Turing Test.
- There may be references to subjectivity – qualia, whether there is anything which it is like to be a machine (computer, robot, android).
- There may be references to intentionality – whether replicating the structure and function of human systems is all there is to intelligence, whether instantiating a programme is 'about' anything.
- Whether we could develop empathy or sentiment in relation to machines.

If any references to philosophers are made expect to see e.g. Dennett or Searle.

Some may focus more generally – for example, could there be a test for consciousness and personhood? Could it ever be decided at what point of complexity personhood is attained?

Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation, following points selected for discussion, is possible:

- Humans are persons no machines are persons.
- Some humans are not persons but no machines are persons.
- No machine is sufficiently complex at present to be on the scale of personhood but we can't rule this out given the successes in AI already and given the possibility of further successes. This might be supported by thought experiments – e.g. Bladerunner scenarios.

- No developments so far, and no future developments, will alter our ordinary way of thinking about persons – we will not accept an artificial system as a person no matter how complex it is.
- There may be discussions of ‘speciesism’.
- Some may argue that further empirical research is necessary before a position can be established.

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (a) question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (b) question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	15	3	18
AO2	0	18	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	**15**	**30**	**45**