Version 1.0

General Certificate of Education
June 2010

Philosophy   PHIL1

Final

Mark Scheme

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 15 MARKS

Marking Scheme for part (a) questions

AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	
11–15 marks Answers in this level provide a clear and detailed explanation of the relevant issue and demonstrate a precise understanding of philosophical positions and arguments. Illustrations, if required, are appropriate, articulate and properly developed. Answers at the bottom of this level are accurate and focused but *either* too succinct *or* unbalanced: for example, *either* one point is well made and illustrated but a second point or illustration is less developed *or* important points and/or illustrations are accurate but briefly stated so that significance is not fully drawn out.	**Level 3**
6–10 marks Answers in this level may *either* briefly list a range of points *or* blur two or more points together *or* explanation is clear but unbalanced so that a point is well made but illustrative material is less convincing *or* illustrations are good but the point being illustrated is less clear and perhaps left implicit. OR If two points are required answers in this level may *either* clearly identify, explain and illustrate one relevant point so that a partial explanation is given *or* one point may be well made and well illustrated but the second is very briefly stated or unclear, unconvincing and/or not illustrated. OR The response is broadly accurate but prosaic, generalized and lacking detail and precision.	**Level 2**
0–5 marks Answers in this level *either* make one reasonable point with little development or without illustration *or* provide a basic, sketchy and vague account *or* a confused or tangential account which may only coincide with the concerns of the question in places.	**Level 1**

AS PHILOSOPHY

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS

Marking Scheme for part (b) questions

	AO1: Knowledge and Understanding	AO2: Interpretation, Analysis and Application	AO3: Assessment and Evaluation
Level 4	N/A	**15-18 marks** A clear and closely argued discussion incorporating a well-developed appreciation of some of the philosophical issues at stake by applying and analysing a range of points in some detail and with precision.	N/A
Level 3	**3 marks** A sound understanding of some issues raised by the question, identifying relevant ideas/evidence	**10–14 marks** Answers in this level are directed at the relevant issues but: *Either:* a narrow focus but the detail is pithy and organised intelligently. *Or:* Broad and accurate detail but analysis, while present, is undeveloped or not always convincing.	**7-9 marks** Answers at the top of this level provide a well thought out appreciation of some problematic issues raised by the specific demands of the question. Reasoning is employed to support the conclusion advanced. Lower in the band the critical discussion may lack penetration. Conclusions are supported but the reasoning is not sharp. The response is legible, employing technical language accurately and appropriately, with few, if any errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar. The response reads as a coherent and integrated whole.

GENERIC MARK SCHEME FOR QUESTIONS WITH A TOTAL OF 30 MARKS (cont)

Level 2	**2 marks** Answers are relevant but *either* fail to maintain a focus on the specific question *or* are partial responses, where ideas/examples lack detail.	**5–9 marks** Answers in this level provide some relevant material but: *Either:* points are asserted but not analysed. *Or:* the relevance of some points may be unclear although analysis is present.	**4-6 marks** Evaluation is not sustained, although it is present implicitly or explicitly. *Either:* alternative approaches are merely described, without explicit comparison or assessment. *Or:* relevant critical material is selected but the conclusion advanced does not seem to follow from the argument. The response is legible, employing some technical language accurately, with possibly some errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Level 1	**1 mark** Answers in this level demonstrate a basic grasp of aspects of relevant issues. Responses may be sketchy and vague; *or* confused *or* largely tangential although at least one point should coincide with the concerns of the question.	**1–4 marks** Answers in this level are sketchy, fragmentary responses *or* an isolated relevant point appears in an otherwise tangential or confused response.	**1-3 marks** Critical comments are vague and the reasoning sketchy. Lower in the band argumentation may be confused *or* a response to the question may be barely outlined without any critical discussion. Technical language may not be employed or used inappropriately. The response may not be legible, errors of spelling, punctuation and grammar may be intrusive.

Theme 1: Reason and experience

Total for this question: 45 marks

Theme: Reason and experience

01	Illustrating your answer, explain the difference between contingent and necessary truths. (15 marks)

Explanations should incorporate something like the following:
- A necessary proposition must be true: it expresses some kind of necessary relationship (e.g. a logical necessity) so that its opposite, or negation, implies a contradiction. The grounds of necessity might be expressed in different ways: a proposition is necessarily true solely because of its logical form; a proposition is necessarily true because it is analytic; a proposition is necessarily true because it is true in all possible worlds.
- A contingent proposition may be true or false: if it is true it need not have been true, it could have been otherwise. If a proposition is contingently true neither it nor its negation is necessarily the case: the proposition can be negated without contradiction. The opposite of a contingently true proposition is possible.

It is likely that there will be some attempt to link contingent truths to empiricism, experience, a posteriori knowledge, synthetic statements and uncertainty: similarly, necessary truths may be linked to rationalism, reason or logic, a priori knowledge, analytic statements and certainty. While some of these linkages are contested candidates shouldn't be penalised if they are unaware of this.

Illustrations are likely to be brief, rather than developed, but should be employed to clarify the point being made. For example:
- Illustrations of necessary truths should clarify the definition of necessity provided. 'Either it will snow or it will not snow'; All A's are B; C is an A so C is a B etc. (necessarily true because of their logical form or because of the laws of logic). 'All bachelors are unmarried' (analytic). Versions of the ontological argument claiming that 'God exists' is true in all possible worlds (modal). There may be references to Hume's examples of relations of ideas (3 x 5, property and injustice)
- Illustrations of contingent truths may play around with some of the examples of necessity given, for example 'bachelors are less healthy than married men', or draw from the literature, for example Hume, or use current experience, for example 'I will fail this exam' to provide statements that can be negated without contradiction.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

02	'Without a predetermined conceptual scheme our sense experiences would be unintelligible'. Assess the implications of this for empiricism. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding
Candidates may see the focus of the question as empiricism – in which case a relevant knowledge base may be given in terms of the importance of experience as the source of ideas and non-trivial knowledge – or as conceptual schemes – in which case they're likely to provide an account of a structure or structures through which experience is organized. Either approach is OK.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Expect the following points of discussion:
- It may be claimed that, without a predetermined conceptual scheme, it is difficult to see how experience could get off the ground and/or be apprehended in an orderly fashion to begin with. Is the data we acquire through experience 'raw'?
- This may be linked to the view that our (universal) conceptual scheme is innate: it is required for and necessarily precedes (intelligible) experience. There will probably be references to Kant and to some, allegedly universal, Kantian categories (unity, causality, substance etc.) and/or to the notion that the mind is active in shaping experience.
- On the other hand, given that 'thoughts without content are empty', it might be claimed that this doesn't show that empiricism is wrong – merely that it is partial.
- It might be suggested that Hume's account of how we experience the world is too passive *or* that empiricists can provide a believable account of e.g. causation (so that experience shapes the mind rather than the other way round)
- The acquisition of a conceptual scheme could be regarded as being linguistically relative; acquired within and reflecting a specific set of cultural/social practices and values (Wittgenstein, Quine, Sapir-Whorf etc.).
- It might be argued that this latter approach is compatible with empiricism: the way we structure the world is culturally relative and reflects our experience within or exposure to a linguistic community. Alternatively, it might be argued that this approach also requires a conceptual apparatus to be in place prior to the acquisition of empirical knowledge.
- Some may argue that we acquire conceptual schemes through experience and ostension.

Assessment and Evaluation

It could be argued that:
- Kant's synthesis does undermine empiricism: experience is only possible because the mind actively categorises raw sense data; the notion of synthetic a priori knowledge undermines the classical empiricist claim that a priori knowledge does not inform us about the world.
- While it may be true that we have to actively impose something in order to make sense of the world, does it have to be the synthetic a priori? (Nietzsche's point that it isn't necessary to believe in the synthetic a priori).
- If conceptual schemes are held not to be universal but culturally relative it might be argued that as linguistic habits and concepts are learned through exposure to the host community then conceptual schemes do not undermine empiricism.
- Alternatively, even here there is pressure on the primacy of sense experience for the acquisition of ideas and knowledge. It might be suggested that the ways that something is conceptualised, the rules of a language game, discourse, paradigm etc., are what is important rather than private ideas drawn from sense experience. And if that is the case, what is left of empiricism?
- If true, the necessity of a conceptual scheme undermines empiricist foundationalism – there can be no appeal to 'the given' in knowledge claims about reality.

Theme: Why Should I be Governed?
Total for this question: 45 marks

03	Outline and illustrate **two** reasons why it may be in our interests to submit to political authority. (15 marks)

Two reasons why it may be in our interests to submit to political authority might be drawn from different versions of what life is like in a state of nature. For example:

- Hobbes' view that: the state of nature is completely lawless, without morality, without justice and without restrictions on liberty such that there is a 'war of every man against every man'. So two reasons could be drawn from the provision of laws/regulation of conduct; notions of right and wrong, duty and obligation; notions of fairness, just rewards and deserts, and the enforcement of such; security, protection and a longer and more pleasant, civilized existence.

- Locke's view that there is a law of nature in the state of nature that rational, equal and independent individuals' ought to respect. However, there are inconveniences including the lack of an authoritative interpretation of natural law, the lack of any impartial judges and the lack of any power to enforce the law. So two ways in which we might benefit could be drawn from the provision of authority, power and honest brokerage.

Other reasonable answers should also be rewarded, for example the view that we are social beings rather than isolated individuals and that our identities, roles, interests, duties and obligations can only fully develop within a political context; a similar point might be made through references to positive freedom.

Illustrative examples may involve civility, morality, justice, social order and cohesion, security etc. These may be drawn from fiction, such as literary or film visions of anti-utopias *or* from any area of life in which we might be said to benefit from political organisation e.g. recourse to the criminal justice system, welfare provision, the use of pooled resources to respond to emergencies etc.

No marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

04	We have consented to be governed so we are obliged to obey the government. Discuss. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

This will probably be seen as an opportunity to describe liberal justifications of political obligation *and* to develop various accounts of consent. However, some may eventually focus on whether we've consented at all, what we've consented to and whether our obligations are limited in any way.

The notion of consent is likely to be widely employed as is the idea of a social contract.
So, the legitimate political obligations of individuals are grounded in a voluntary act of consent; *or* legitimate political obligations are those that rational individuals would consent to were they to be placed in an 'original position'; *or* legitimate obligations arise from our tacit consent (we haven't left the country, we have participated in making decisions, we have benefited from state provision etc.)

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

It is possible that the question will provoke different types of discussion:

- There may be references to different accounts of the condition of mankind in a 'state of nature'. These may be employed to outline why we consent to be governed and/or to explain the nature and extent of our political obligations.
- It might be suggested that the notion of consent is a fiction or myth and/or that most citizens, if asked, would not be able to provide an account of what they've consented to and/or that individuals haven't consented to anything.
- There could be a developed critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of different versions of what constitutes consent: explicit consent, hypothetical consent, tacit consent.
- There could be a developed critical discussion of whether our political obligations are limited in some way: whether our obligation to obey sovereign power is virtually unconditional, limited only if our security is threatened or limited if government fails to protect or maintain the common good and/or individual rights.
- Maybe legitimate obligations are limited by the type of state that emerges: rational individuals would not consent to a dictatorship, tyranny or totalitarian state.
- Moral duties over-ride political obligations: acts of judgment are permanently necessary. There may be references to unjust laws *and/or* to governments deemed to be acting illegitimately e.g. by interfering in a private sphere of life, creating a nanny state etc.)
- Perhaps we can only be said to possess obligations if we have a guaranteed right of dissent. There may be references to civil disobedience, conscientious objection, a refusal to comply, direct action in pursuit of some goal etc.
- There may be references to people who can't consent or who haven't consented: foreign, temporary, residents; outsiders, the marginalized and/or malcontent; those who are diminished in some way etc.

Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation is possible. For example:
- It could be argued that the notion of consent is a fiction or myth, that most citizens, if asked, would not be able to provide an account of what they've consented to and/or that individuals haven't consented to anything.
- Some might question whether there is any such thing as a political obligation – e.g. it might be argued that the state is unnecessary or illegitimate and that we can't be obligated to it.
- It might be argued that views about the limits of our political obligations depend on how the original position is stated/the state of nature is described – thus, if Hobbes view is accepted, there are virtually no limits whereas, if Locke's view is accepted, our natural rights set the limits of our obligation.
- It could be argued that where the common good or general welfare or general will is not being promoted than we are not obligated to comply.
- Some might suggest that duties and obligations to the state are pre-contractual, rooted in our social being, and limited only by assessments of the decency or indecency of states regarding the quality of life provided.

Theme: Why Should I be Moral?

Total for this question: 45 marks

05	Outline and illustrate the view that virtue is its own reward.
	(15 marks)

It is likely that candidates will provide an outline of virtue ethics prior to providing an outline of the view in question (and some may not get around to this at all). The view itself may be stated:

- Generally: for example, in terms of moral action being internally rather than externally rewarding. This should be further developed in terms of the link between moral action and/or virtuous characteristics and personal well-being, fulfilment (or fulfilling one's function), flourishing, happiness, self-interest and the good of the society. Some may refer to eudaimonia.
- Specifically: for example, via Plato's or Aristotle's versions of virtue ethics in which case there should be an emphasis on the role of reason in relation to spirit and desire (Plato) or in relation to excellence of character and practical wisdom etc. (Aristotle). Some may contrast the two, e.g. in terms of how the virtues are acquired.
- Some may refer to more recent versions of virtue ethics, e.g. MacIntyre. A rewarding life is gained via immersion in a culturally valued practice which allows one to develop excellences and provides meaning and value to one's personal narrative.

Illustrations are likely to be drawn from the literature and involve e.g. charioteers, analogies with harpists or plants, culturally valued practices such as medicine etc. Candidates should be rewarded for using appropriate examples of their own.

Accounts, and examples, of why it doesn't pay to be moral should be regarded as tangential unless they are dealt with critically – e.g. risk-takers may find external rewards in the form of wealth but they are not genuinely 'happy' in the sense in which virtue ethics regards happiness.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

06	'Self-interest must be disregarded when deciding which actions are morally right'.
	Assess this view. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

This view may be described as a deontological theory and is likely to be elaborated in terms of Kantian ethics. Expect certain themes to be emphasised, including the significance of duty; the establishment of maxims, principles or laws which apply universally; the importance of reason and autonomy; motive, intention and the good will; various formulations of the categorical imperative (universal law, respect for persons and the kingdom of ends). The crucial point is that any other motive for deciding which actions are right – such as self-interest or motives that might be linked to self-interest – cannot be a moral motive: moral motives are rational, impartial and universally binding.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

It is possible that the question will provoke different types of discussion. The view may be critically developed in relation to other theories so that:

- Illustrative examples may be selected to show how deontological thinking applies to issues in practical ethics, for example suicide or euthanasia, and such thinking compared to or contrasted with egoism, social contract theories and virtue ethics.
- Discussion might develop through a description of Kant's distinctions between duties to self and duties to others and between perfect and imperfect duties (again examples such as suicide, falsely promising, developing talents and helping others might feature). Some may detect a degree of self-interest in some of these examples; it might be argued that other theories are equally or more convincing on these issues.
- Other examples, such as the shop-keeper, might be used to bring out a contrast between duty and self-interest or inclination. Kant's claim that there is a difference between a moral motive and a non-moral one might be considered in terms of consequences or in terms of how any difference could be detected.
- Some may explore alternative views to show that self-interest should not be disregarded and/or that it is not opposed to morality.

A range of critical points might be offered from the outset, for example:

- Is universalisability a sufficient test for what might count, or what can't count as a moral maxim?
- Could there be a tension between the autonomous rational will and the causally determined lower self?
- Is Kantian ethics too formal and/or abstract to be useful as a guide to action?
- Is this too rigid and insensitive to feelings or circumstances?
- The problem of conflicting duties or grounds of obligation – whether all moral dilemmas could be resolved.
- Whether self-interest, in the form of personal attachments or sympathies, has no moral value.
- The idea that good intentions can produce morally bad consequences (and vice versa).

Assessment and Evaluation

A range of argumentation is possible. For example:

- It might be argued that this approach provides an important contribution to our moral thinking or connects with many aspects of our moral experience. For example, reason and autonomy may connect to respect for persons, concepts of rights and/or to the idea that we do think that it is always wrong to… or never right to…. We do consider intentions when we blame or praise someone; similarly, the law treats motive and intention seriously. We do feel that moral motivations act as a constraint on self-interest and that self-interested actions are non-moral (and that some are immoral).
- Alternatively, it could also be argued that this is counter-intuitive in many ways – for example, it is too strict, too demanding, too unemotional etc.; or that this is too vague or formal to be of much help e.g. we know that we should treat others as ends but how exactly do we do this, aren't completely different actions consistent with this aim? Is morality constituted by impartiality and moral heroism (overcoming self-interested inclinations) – are moral individuals or moral communities impartial or impersonal?

Theme: The Idea of God

Total for this question: 45 marks

07	Briefly explain **two** contrasting accounts of how we obtain the idea of God.
	(15 marks)

This is a relatively straightforward and open question – consequently top-band answers should be detailed and precise. Two accounts are likely to be drawn from:

- Descartes: the idea of God is innate. The trademark argument.
- Hume: religion originates in our feelings and is a human response to fear, dread, terror or other desires and appetites. A similar point, focusing on a range of fears, could be attributed to Russell.
- Hume's anthropomorphism: our idea of God is formed by 'reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit …qualities of goodness and wisdom'.
- Feuerbach also sees our idea of God as the projection of the sum of man's qualities, so that "poor man possesses a rich God". (NB. While this account might be similar to Hume in some respects it can be contrasted in other respects.)
- Freud: belief in God represents the desire for a father figure, protection, security etc. The belief is viewed as delusional and regressive.
- Dawkins: belief in God is a useless by-product of useful evolutionary processes – specifically the advantage afforded by trusting and obeying adults.
- Durkheim: the idea of God, or Gods, is a symbolic representation of the collective conscience – our need for and experience of social integration and moral regulation.
- Marx: religion is 'the heart of a heartless world' – our idea of God is derived from dreaming of 'a superman in the fantastic reality of the heavens' to appease misery, distress and hardship in this world. Religion is 'the opium of the people'.

It should be clear in top-band answers how the accounts given are contrasting: this might be done via (fairly uninformative) claims that e.g. one is 'psychological' whereas another is 'sociological' or 'biological; or by distinguishing between faith and atheism, idealism and materialism, reason and experience etc.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

08	Assess whether the ontological argument demonstrates the existence of God.
	(30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Candidates should outline at least one version of the ontological argument – most responses will probably be based on Anselm. Beyond this some may develop an account of how ontological arguments for the existence of God work: e.g. they are a priori arguments which attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence; from a purely formal consideration of the concept of God it is claimed that we can establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated; existence is part of the definition or concept of God: to define or conceive of God is to define or conceive of a Being whose existence is necessary. These points may be largely implicit in a description of one or more ontological arguments.

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

Some accounts may apply various versions of the ontological argument to demonstrate how they prove the existence of God. Thus:

- Anselm: God is a being than which none greater can be conceived; it is greater to exist both in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone; the greatest conceivable being exists both in reality and in the understanding; God exists.
- Descartes: God is the supremely perfect being; a supremely perfect being possesses or contains all perfections; existence is a perfection; God exists.
- Plantinga: there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness; so, there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
- Malcolm: if God does not exist His existence is logically impossible; if God does exist His existence is logically necessary; God's existence is, logically, either impossible or necessary; His existence is impossible only if the concept of God is absurd or contradictory; it is neither, so God's existence is necessary. This may be phrased in terms of aseity rather than logical necessity.

In these, generally descriptive, responses analysis may be implicit in the fact that different philosophers construct the argument differently. Other responses may outline one version of the argument before raising a number of, generally familiar, critical points.

- We can imagine the perfect island (or perfect anything else) and ontological arguments seem to bring these into existence.
- The argument has absurd consequences (the overload objection).
- The argument bridges a gap between the conceptual and the real but this is invalid, it is not possible to define something into existence. Conceptually there may be necessary links between subjects and their predicates but this doesn't imply that such a subject exists.
- Necessity does not apply to existence.
- Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate. Existence doesn't function like a predicate, it doesn't describe the subject; the application of a predicate already assumes there is a subject to which it belongs.
- It is inappropriate to use logic to demonstrate the existence of God - His existence is revealed experientially and our experiences of God do not include experiences of His logical necessity.

The best answers may also indicate possible responses to some criticisms.

Assessment and Evaluation

Evaluation is likely to follow from the (critical) points selected for discussion:

- Some may reject the idea that God's existence can be proven in this way. But do objections about logical reasoning confuse a point about the existence of God with a point about proving the existence of God.
- Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between the idea of God produced by the ontological argument and the idea of God in religious traditions.
- It may be claimed that an ontological argument proves that if there is such a Being as God then His existence is necessary and/or that the argument demonstrates that a perfect being does exist but not which perfect being it is.
- Some may argue that (a version of) the ontological argument appears to have a valid form and/or, from a non-realist view, that the argument works. God is a concept that we must have.

Theme: Persons

Total for this question: 45 marks

> **09** Explain and illustrate **two** possible reasons for distinguishing the concept of a person from that of a human being. (15 marks)

There may be some background discussion of whether 'human' is a purely biological concept whereas 'person' has social, psychological, moral and legal connotations; this may lead some to claim that 'human' is a matter of kind whereas 'person' may be a matter of degree. This should be accepted as one reason.

Beyond this, reasons are likely to be drawn from the claim that there is not a 1:1 relationship between human and person. So we could have:
- 1:0 – some human beings may not be persons.
- 0:1 – some persons may not be human beings.
- 1:2 – some humans may be more than one person.
- 2:1 – some persons may be more than one human.

Other reasonable points may be accepted. For example, similar points might be implicit in accounts of the characteristics of personhood.

Depending on the reasons given expect illustrative examples to focus on:
- Scales of complexity/simplicity or diminution if describing degrees of personhood (illustrated through, e.g. brain damage, amnesia etc.)
- Ex-persons and potential persons (illustrated through e.g. dementia, comas, neonates etc.)
- Animals and machines (illustrated through some characteristics of personhood that may be attributed).
- Multiple personality disorder or disassociative identity disorder (illustrated through case studies). A similar point could be made via issues concerning identity through time.
- The idea that the same identity could be shared by different individuals – either through time or through severe social engineering/conditioning.

Some care may need to be taken to avoid making the same point twice.

No marks are available for evaluation although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.

> **10** 'It is more appropriate to speak of our survival through time rather than our identity through time.' Discuss. (30 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding

Some candidates may provide relevant background: that is, this view is a reaction to claims that a person is the same person at T1 and T2 if they are psychologically or physically continuous throughout T1…T2. Thus, the view in question might be seen as a claim that there are too many difficulties involved in demonstrating that identity is continuous through time and that survival through time is all we have (in different degrees) and all we need. There will probably be references to Parfit and there may also be references to Locke (and the importance of psychological connectedness).

Interpretation, Analysis, Application

It is likely that some references and/or criticisms will be directed at alternative views. For example:

- Whether psychological continuity through time is a necessary condition of identity; whether it is a sufficient condition of identity; whether this view involves us in circularity or contradiction.
- Whether physical continuity is a necessary condition of identity; whether physical continuity is a sufficient condition of identity; whether the continued existence of the whole body or whole brain is required for identity.
- These points might be supported by a wide range of familiar examples.
- The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity may be raised to question how much qualitative change is possible for a person to remain, numerically, 'the same'. (A similar point could be developed from a distinction between same man and same person).

These issues could lead to some support for the view in question. However, it may also be claimed from the onset that 'survival' through time is a more useful concept than 'continuity' and identity through time – or that we don't have identity through time. An ensuing discussion might then focus on:

- Questions concerning identity/sameness may not have a determinate answer – there are degrees of sameness and/or change that make such questions difficult to answer.
- Whether sameness (or identity) matters to us – whether we want to be the same after going to university as we were before – or whether survival (or connectedness) matters more.
- Again these points might be illustrated.
- Critical discussion may focus on how we characterize *what it is* that survives through time? Must this be psychological?
- Whether there are moral complications of seeing ourselves as a succession of selves (obligations to future selves, responsibility for the actions of past selves etc.)
- If this view is a response to puzzle cases then the intelligibility of such cases might be questioned.

Assessment and Evaluation

Argumentation, following points selected for discussion, might either be for or against the view in question:

- For: survival through time is a more appropriate concept than psychological continuity and identity – or bodily continuity and identity – as there are too many problems with these views. Survival is more appropriate because it is what we in fact have, gives us what we need and resolves puzzle cases as well as being applicable to real life experiences of change and future technological possibilities.
- Against: can we do without a continuous 'I' (whether a convenient fiction or a reality)? What would the socio-economic, political, legal, moral etc. implications be if we replace identity with survival? Expect a focus on morality here: particularly praise, blame and moral responsibility. Can a meaningful answer be given to the question of what survives through time – or to how connectedness is achieved?

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE GRID

AS Assessment Objective	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (a) question	Marks allocated by Assessment Objective part (b) question	Total Marks by Assessment Objective
AO1	15	3	18
AO2	0	18	18
AO3	0	9	9
Total	15	30	45