Teacher Resource Bank

# A Level Philosophy

# PHIL4: Philosophical Problems

## Exemplar Responses to the June 2010 Examination



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# AS Philosophy: PHIL4

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## Section A: Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

**01 Explain and illustrate Hume's Principles of Association and their purpose.** ***(15 marks)***

As a consequence of Hume's Copy Principle, he is challenged to find a way of explaining how ideas connect themselves in the mind. As a matter of fact, we are often presented with an idea immediately after experiencing a particular impression, and Hume's Principles of Association are his way of accounting for this.

The first principle is that of resemblance. This allows the mind to go from one idea (or impression) to an idea that resembles it. So, for example, if we see a portrait of a man, our minds are immediately taken to the idea of that man. Even though we have not had an impression of him, the portrait experience is sufficient for us to have the idea of the man himself. This is because the portrait resembles the man. In this way, Hume can account for the succession of ideas in the mind. Without resemblance, there would be no reason for this succession.

The second principle is that of contiguity. This allows the mind to go from one idea (or impression) to an idea of something close to it either in space or time. For example, if we think of the Nixon administration, we may immediately bring up the idea of the moon landing that occurred during its tenure. This is because the two ideas are of events in close proximity (or contiguity to use Hume's word). Or if we go to a house, our minds may be taken to the idea of the neighbouring house. Like the principle of resemblance, contiguity is the only way of explaining this particular type of succession of ideas.

The last principle is that of cause and effect. This allows the mind to go from one idea (or impression) to an idea of something that stands in a causal relationship to the first. For example, if we look at an open wound, we are 'scarcely able to forbear' thinking of the pain it causes. Without cause and effect, there would be no reason for associating these two ideas as opposed to, say, associating a wound with the idea of ice cream.

It is important to note that these principles of association are not just voluntary methods of connecting ideas. Rather, they automatically take the mind from one idea to another. In this way, Hume is able to explain why the mind's succession of idea is the way it is, rather than just a chaotic stream of unconnected thoughts. Such a possibility would be on the cards without the principles, since Hume conceives of ideas and impressions as distinct mental objects rather than part of a continuous indivisible flow. By way of the principle of association, Hume can therefore account for our psychological reality in a way consistent with his initial (and psychologically intuitive) Copy Principle. Together with the Copy Principle, the Principles of Association give a complete explanation of how ideas and impressions fit together in our minds, before he attempts to discuss matters such as eblief and knowledge.

> *The candidate accurately describes the three principles and correctly identifies their purpose. Each principle is explained and illustrated in detail demonstrating a clear grasp of the topic. The automatic operation of the principles is made apparent.*
> *Sophisticated, detailed and clear with appropriate examples.*

*The mark awarded was 14/15*

**02 'There must be more to the relation of cause and effect than the mere succession of objects and events.'**

**Assess whether Hume's account of causation is vulnerable to this criticism.** ***(45 marks)***

Hume's ideas on causation are inherently vulnerable to the charge that there is more to causation than simple succession of events due to the fact that he attempts a simple theory of cause and effect which is in essence a side part of his philosophy, and is a psychological understanding. He attempts to create an empiricist theory of how we know the world and the workings of the mind and from this must follow how we can get the idea of cause and effect if we do not experience it – as such he must attempt to solve the problem before it can take hold and destroy his work. So possibly one must allow Hume a certain amount of leeway in criticisms as he can be said to have had greater fish to fry and perhaps spent too little time devoted to cause and effect, resulting in an overly simplified theory.

Perhaps an immediate criticism of his theory of cause and effect is that there is far more than the simple 'A is followed by B, without A there is no B' that he puts forward. In science one does not say that A causes B, instead there is a chain of events and with the evolution of quantum science a far greater set of variables and random variables. A man who shoots his wife does not just shoot her due to her infidelity; instead there is often a long chain of events. There are the constant affairs, the constant nagging, the fact she turned of the TV as he was watching the World Cup, and the fact that he had a headache. So one simply cannot say 'A caused B' very often in life – it may be true in some simple things yet it is highly unlikely to be a satisfactory theory of causation for the majority of goings on. Yet Russell believes this is to be one of the strengths of Hume's theory. Science is far too complex to offer what we may call a folk theory of causation, instead there are numerous stages. Also most things have a major cause, in History one talks of the long-term, short-term and trigger events and often this trigger event is what ones sees as the primary cause; much as in science the addition of baking powder to the vinegar is the cause of the reaction, even if there are many stages. In our minds we simply do not see the many causes as causes, we see them as background causes and influences but to do this for every cause/effect events would be time consuming and practically impossible. So Hume's theory allows a simplification that allows a psychologically acceptable form of cause and effect to be followed.

The mere succession of events also creates another problem; simultaneous events are not accounted for. We know that the moon's change in gravitational pull depending on its position affects the tides, yet there is no way of showing that the moon is the cause and the tides the effect as the near-simultaneous occurrences prevent this from being observed. One may say that this is an unfair criticism of Hume as he was in a time before the science knew that the moon pulled the tides, this is perhaps a fair point and Hume may have had a reply had he survived, yet this does not solve the problem due to other examples. I close my eyes tightly and sneeze, which is the cause? Common sense dictates that I close my eyes when I am about to sneeze and the *qualia* backs that up, but it may be possible, in Hume's empirical account that it is actually the way I close my eyes that causes me to sneeze - one simply could not judge on this matter from an entirely empirical view without taking into account the *qualia* and one is not privy to the *qualia* of other people and so another person may well sneeze due to the closing of his eyes and not close his eyes due to needing to sneeze. So the simultaneous events create a problem for Hume that seems insurmountable. Yet science, an empirical study, may be the knight in shining armour. Hume's theory of causation seems to imply that the events need to be experienced directly and by the sense, but to say so is to impose a more modern theory, the verification principle, on Hume. Actually one may say that the scientific study of something may show that one causes the other as science can use slow motion cameras or the like in order to distinguish between events which seem to be simultaneous to 'the naked eye', and as science is empirical then one would be able to use science in order to justify the belief that one event precedes the other without being able to witness it with one's own senses. So one could retrospectively apply science in order to show cause and effect in instances where the human senses are not sensitive enough.

Distance causation also presents a problem for Hume, yet one that is easily overcome with a little thought, in both time and place. If one were to set off a radio wave that caused the explosives a mile away to explode one would not be able to observe both events and so would not be able to empirically say that one caused the other. An unfair criticism perhaps, as Hume was in the pre-radio era, but an apt one nonetheless. It seems obvious that the pressing of the button, to cause the radio waves to cause the explosion, was the cause, yet it is not obvious in Hume's theory. Also a cause over time is another problem. An asbestos worker develops lung cancer forty years later due to the exposure to the asbestos, is this also not a problem for Hume? The events are not in immediate succession, but this is not actually a problem. One may say that the asbestos worker who contracts cancer is one occurrence, yet to see many asbestos workers contract cancer allows one to establish a Humean causal link, so events taking a long time may still be said to be causes if there are enough occurrence of the event as there is no doubt they are successive events – albeit not immediately. Likewise, one cannot say that pressing the button caused the objects to explode, as they were so far away there may have been other causes, yet to see such events many times allows one to use Hume's theory of causation and believe that pressing of the button does cause the explosion as they are successive events, just at different places, and one could observe both places at the same time with video cameras or modern technology – so modern science not only threatens Hume's causation in this instance but also saves it.

The theory of causation also suffers from issues when it comes to events that succeed each other but are in no ways linked or caused by each other. One may take the examples of the days. Once every twenty four hours we observe that day turns to night, far more repetitious than Hume would believe necessary in order to prove causation, yet no one believes now that Day causes Night. Hume is not even saved by ignorance as in his era people knew that night was not caused by day and there was some knowledge of the workings of the solar system. Such a problem seems incredibly damaging to Hume, defenders could claim that day does cause night, and we are wrong in our workings of the solar system. This may well be correct, we do not have complete knowledge, yet this seems unlikely as night would then need to cause day and we would be stuck in a circular cause where one thing would cause itself, albeit through a different medium, and that absurdity is not acceptable to most philosophers. Hume philosophically defines causes as where one object follows another, and if the first were not to be then the second would not exist; perhaps this can save the day and night example. If day did not exist then we would not need to distinguish between the darkness that envelops the world as there would be a permanent night; yet this is a rather shaky defence as it is purely linguistic, of course, if there were no 'day' there would be no 'night', but what we term now as 'night' would still exist, it just linguistically would not need to be called so, and the problem of night being caused by day still remains. Perhaps one may have to concede that such an example is a flaw in Hume's theory, a black swan. Yet this black swan could be ignored were it not for the fact that the black swan is far more numerous than expected. There are many other examples, such as when the school bell rings I leave school – the bell itself does not cause me to leave, it just allows me to. So the fact remains that there must be something over and above the simple succession of events that creates the idea or causation.

Yet I can say without trouble that the bell does not 'cause' me to get up and leave school and I can say that night is not caused by day, so there must be a missing piece. It does seem unfair to criticise Hume by saying 'there must be more to the theory' and not offering any 'more' of any substance. Perhaps there is more to causation but one must look for the best possible theory if there are no better ones presented. Hume has shown how one cannot perceive cause and effect as otherwise one would not need repetitions to perceive it and one would know what caused what in the world and could in effect manipulate the causes so much so that anything would become possible. Also we cannot perceive how the will causes the body to move so how it seems absurd that one could not perceive an internal cause yet be able to perceive one externally. If we were able to identify all causes then we would see the exact cause for cancer, the exact cause for bad weather and would be able to find the exact causes to the cures to these, as such we cannot so it seems more plausible to say that Hume's empirical view of causation is far more acceptable than an innate view, or one where the 'Necessary connection' itself is sensible. It seems hard to say there are any better theories about cause and effect. Perhaps one must go by the theory of cause and effect put forward by Hume and admit that there are flaws. Perhaps there

is actually a kind of *qualia* that we can sense about cause and effect, not the cause and effect itself but some form of signal in our impressions that Hume has missed which allows us to distinguish between what is caused and what is not caused, but only after repetition. This would show why we do not believe that night causes day but do believe that drinking too much water causes the urge to urinate.

Hume does provide a more psychological definition of causation in Enquiry. He believes that the thought of one object conveys the mind to the thought of another object, and that is what the heart of causation is. Perhaps if one were to view Hume's theory psychologically then it becomes the best theory around. It is not perfect and has philosophical flaws and there are certain instances which refuse to work; but as Russell pointed out, his theory of causation allows a great amount of simplification to happen and allows the mind a pragmatic, even if not wholly true, theory of causation that allows for a simpler functioning whilst being generally correct. So Hume is massively vulnerable to criticism but is perhaps saved by the fact that he puts forward a fairly good theory that fits in with the qualitative view that most people hold – that one thing is the major cause and that in general we do not know cause and effect from just one repetition, so actually presents a rather acceptable theory of causation.

> *There is clearly a grasp of Hume's position but textual detail is lacking. Some of Hume's points are implicit. There was an interesting analysis and evaluation of issues relating to multiplicity and simultaneity. This was followed by analysis of distance causation and succession without causation. The discussion was well illustrated and related to Hume's position. The conclusion, however, was somewhat weak and vague.*
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> *Mark Awarded 35 7+9+19*

**03 Critically discuss Hume's attempt to solve the free will problem.** ***(45 marks)***

One should immediately explain how Hume attempts to reconcile the free will and determinism problem before examining it: Hume sees it as a mistake to oppose 'free' with 'caused'- the opposite of 'free' is 'constrained', while 'caused' should be opposed with 'uncaused'. Therefore, Hume redefines liberty as 'the power of acting or not acting in accordance with the determination of the will'- freedom is the absence of fast constraint. Furthermore, while Hume agrees that necessity applies to humans he argues convincingly that, far from undermining moral responsibility, this is a necessary condition for us regarding people responsible- the agent's desires, willings etc must be causally tied to his action or in what sense is he responsible? The aspects of Hume's compatibilism requiring critical examination are: his definition; necessity as compatible with moral responsibility; necessity as applicable to humans; and Hume's conception of cause and its consistency when applied to his compatibilism.

On Hume's definition it is enough if I feel my action is done freely, but this immediately raises problems; consider an addicted smoker who feels their choice to have a cigarette is a free one, or a kleptomaniac who feels no constraint when shoplifting- we are surely reluctant to say that they are acting freely even though Hume's definition forces us to do so. Perhaps we can help Hume's definition with reference to first and second order desires: I am free if I want to want to perform action X. This way we can distinguish between constraining internal causes and free ones- if the kleptomaniac wants to want to steal we should deem them to be free. But if we consider a man given an extra strong hypnotic drug secretly which made him dance around naked entirely out of character, and when asked if he wanted to want this he replied in the affirmative, it would seem the definition is still lacking. Therefore Hume fails to distinguish adequately between free and constrained causes, and his definition requires more.

Furthermore, we may insist that Hume's definition is still not compatible with moral responsibility. Yes, the definition allows that I would have done differently if I had chosen differently but not that I could in fact have chosen differently. The presence of genuine alternatives would seem a necessary condition for agency and Hume fails to account for this. However, her we have the first example of Hume's account failing not because of him but rather because of our over-demanding conception of agency that seems incoherent: Hume is right to argue that the agent needs to be tied to the action by a necessary

cause, but this is incompatible with the other necessary conditions for agency which demand a 'could have done differently' and yet that the action not be random. These mutually incompatible and yet necessary conditions inevitably hinder Hume's attempt to resolve the problem of free will.

Yet we can insist that the Humean account of necessity is still inadequate for the task he seeks to perform. Hume shows neatly that we in fact all already 'sign up' to necessity with regards to humans: the whole of history and the social sciences assume that, given certain motivations, certain actions are at least extremely likely. If I leave a purse full of money in a railway station I expect with a high (though precisely what?) degree of certainty that it will be gone the next day. Furthermore, as a matter of fact we do attribute surprising or unlikely actions not to a break in the uniformity but to an imperfect knowledge of the relevant causes- if my best friend suddenly punches me one day, I would not dismiss it as a breach in uniformity but look for a hidden motivation. However, Hume's account of necessity is still lacking: if the feeling of necessity emerges simply from regularity, then how does Hume explain that I simply do feel differently about my friend's choice of soup for lunch for the 1000$^{th}$ day running than I do about a brick breaking a window? In the latter case, I feel a greater degree of certainty though I have observed it with no more regularity. Hume can respond that this is down to a deeply held misconception about the metaphysical causal powers of objects that we resist in humans, but this fails to treat the feeling of necessity as an irrational process inevitably arising from constant conjunction. Therefore, Hume's account of cause fails to adequately show the futility of resisting necessity in relation to the human will.

Furthermore, his account of cause raises difficulties for the idea of moral responsibility. Hume argues plausibly as mentioned for the necessity of causal connection between agent and action. However, Hume's account of cause consisting merely in the regularity of constant conjunction fails to adequately provide this. If cause simply consists in regularity then in what way is the agent tied to their action? There is surely no way we could know of this connection, and even less be certain that we should hold them responsible for their given actions. Hume seems to at once use a conception of cause that is weak enough to resist the implication of constraint, and yet simultaneously one that is strong and necessary enough to ensure the agent can be held responsible for the action. Therefore, either Hume must sign up to a more metaphysical (and very empirical!) conception of cause, or must admit that we cannot hold somebody responsible ever, given the weak nature of cause understood as regularity.
Of course Hume is able to maintain, and does indeed imply, that responsibility is necessary on quasi-utilitarian grounds: praise and blame help to encourage certain actions and prevent others. If, for example, we treat a car thief as responsible for their actions and punish them accordingly we will help to deter others from stealing cars in the future. This may well be the case, but one must firstly admit that this is only a façade of responsibility, and secondly recognise that this reduces humans simply to receiving animal-like treatment. In the same way we give a dog a bone for its failure to urinate on the carpet without considering it generally responsible either way, so too praise and blame only act as a means to another end rather than something people genuinely merit. Therefore, resorting to a façade of responsibility is not tantamount to solving the free will problem, however defensible it may be.

In conclusion, Hume's attempt to solve the free will problem fails. In part this is made inevitable by the over-demanding conception of agency we judge to be intuitively plausible: avoiding randomness while preserving a causal link between agent and action, and still leaving room for the condition that we could have done differently seem incompatible and yet necessary conditions for free will and responsibility. However, Hume's definition itself is greatly lacking in failing to really distinguish between the type of causes that lead to certain actions. Furthermore, his conception of causal necessity fails to account for why we feel differently in relation to human action compared to natural events, and his definition of cause as regularity fails to provide his own necessary condition for responsibility, i.e. a causal link between agent and action. Therefore, while the pretence of responsibility may well be necessary for controlling actions, Hume does not give us legitimate reason to consider ourselves truly free and responsible.

*Textual detail is clearly present and used effectively. There could have been a little more detail on regularity at the start where the issue was being set up. The analysis was detailed and sustained relevance. Evaluative points were accurate and penetrating. Counter argument was also considered. The response read as a coherent and integrated whole.*

*9 + 11 +22/3 CUSP 42/3*
*Awarded 42*

**04 Outline Plato's simile of the large and powerful animal (beast) and two of its purposes**

***(45 marks)***

Plato uses his simile of the large and powerful animal to respond to Adeimantus' claim that philosophers in ancient Athens were not only deemed as useless but at worst were thought of as vicious, thus a danger to the rest of society.

Plato begins by asserting that there are two types of trainers (tamers) of animals. The first is the type of trainer, who acknowledging that the animal is out of control and power, aims to learn what pleasures the beast, essentially how the trainer can control the beast by giving it the food, comfort that will appease the beast. In this respect Plato claims that the trainer ponders at the whims of the beast. Thus while making the animal happy, will temporarily keep it under control, this first trainer is not in fact aware of what is in the best interest of the animal. What is in fact in the best interest of the animal may not be what contents the animal.

Additionally, Plato within his simile of the large and powerful animals, calls for those in dialogue with Socrates to imagine another animal trainer. This trainer studies the beast's nature, thus becomes knowledgeable to what is in fact in the best interest of the animal. This trainer does not just pander at the whims of this powerful and large best but learns about the type of food, and environment best suits the animal and that will lead to the animal's true development. This trainer, in contrast to the former animal trainer, has knowledge of what is in the animals best interest, thus is in a position to nurture the animal in a way that will enable it to fulfil its function as and animal and develop, even if the training it receives will not lead to its immediate bodily pleasure.

Furthermore, Plato used the simile of the large and powerful animal for a number of purposes. The first one was to respond to the claim made that philosophers are deemed as vicious. Plato demonstrates through this simile that without the appropriate training of those with philosophical nature may become vicious and corrupted with the best as their talents and good natured make them the prime attraction of the public. In a democracy the public will want to use these people for their own ends, thus will try to persuade them to come over to their corrupted side. Young philosophers will be flattered and feel proud and so one likely to be easily corrupted and become vicious like the beast. This is why Plato, through Socrates' speech in his dialogue with the other men, comes to the conclusion that philosophy should only be studied, when the soul is mature, to avoid the improper use of philosophy.

Additionally, and perhaps more pertinent to this discussion, Plato wanted to demonstrate that the sophist, who are of an unworthy and lesser nature to philosopher's imitate them and give them a bad name as vicious people. Like the first trainer who only learnt what pleased the animal and not what was in its best interest, sophist train young men to be politicians by encouraging them to use oratory to control the crowd and only tell the public what they want to hear. Plato is claiming that sophists are corrupted trainers and only pander at the whims of the wild and chaotic masses in a democracy. Sophist do not have knowledge of the Forms, thus do not know the nature of justice, cannot run the state effectively, only satisfy the public's immediate pleasure and like the first trainer, does not know what is genuinely in the public best interest, the public represent the wild, powerful and large animal.

However, Plato aims to suggest through this simile that the true philosopher rules, with the knowledge of the Form of the good, will be able to enact laws that are prudent and in the best interest of true people. Similarly to the second trainer of the beast the philosopher king understands the nature of justice (the trainer of the animal knows the nature of the animal, what is best for it), thus will be able to rule the ideal city state in the best way for everyone. He aims to demonstrate that true philosophers are the apt rulers not sophist or any other un-knowledgeable leader.

Lastly, this simile is also an attack on contemporary democracy, as politicians only seek to serve their self-interest to gain wealth and power. They used rhetoric and other worthless means (in Plato's view) to gain the popular vote, with out truly exacting laws in the interest of the people. Plato's purpose is to demonstrate that use the first trainer they only serve the immediate desires of the people and do not know what is the nature of justice or of any form and thus should not rule. In this democracy, Plato claims, rulers one corrupt and again ponder at the whims of the masses. His purpose is to degrade democracies and assert that only his utopia, with philosopher rulers (philosopher kings) can really serve the interest of the people, not democracy or any alternative form of government with corrupt rulers.

*The responses included some relevant detail but lacked some subtle detail regarding the simile. The response was wide-ranging and not always in accordance with the text. The issues were clearly grasped. Purposes could have been more precise and concise.*

*6+5/6* *CUSP 11/12*
*Awarded 11*

**05 'Claims to have knowledge of a world beyond sense-experience are doomed to fail.'**

**Discuss in relation to Plato's theory of Forms.** ***(45 marks)***

The knowledge of the forms distinguishes philosophers from sight-lovers and explains why philosophers should be rulers due to their clear sightedness. Sight lovers only have beliefs and only gain these beliefs through sense experiences, which realistically could be either true or false. It's very difficult for the sight lover to make clear sighted judgements because of their limited experience hence why the philosopher has the ability and experience to achieve a clear understanding of the forms and they do this through reason and don't rely on their senses. If you possess knowledge of the forms these then what you know must be true. As such, your grasp, is vulnerable. A person who possess knowledge grasps the truth about the forms and therefore understands 'what is and knows what is as it is' for how could a person 'know something that was not?' Knowledge is gained by using the intellect to reach beyond how things appear. For instance intellect takes it further than merely contemplating 'beautiful sounds and colours and shapes and that at which makes us of them' (sense experience) and allows us to grasp 'the essential nature of beauty itself'. If we know the essential nature of beauty itself we can understand why a particular object is beautiful and judge the extent to which it approximately to beauty itself. Knowledge affords us an understanding of why things appear as they do and a capacity to judge truly. It also lets us find its most 'ideal' 'perfect' form. Philosophers are clear sighted because they posses knowledge of form: 'when the mind's eye is fixed on objects illuminated by truth and neatly it understands and knows them, and it's possession of intelligence is evident.' Unlike the darkness typifying ignorance, a believer glimpses 'something' but what they know is more reflection or shadows of 'what form is' restricted to a world of mere appearances 'they would believe that the shadows…where the whole truth.' In other words restricted to sense impressions, which has its limitations. The intellect allows philosophers to grasp form. A form is 'what fully is' and is what a knower grasps. Being acquainted with the forms is like being awake, physical objects are reflections of the forms but the sight-lover is restricted to the senses confuses the 'resemblance with the reality it resembles and so is like a clearer knowledge of the forms involves grasping 'the internal and the BLANK' on board the ship, the navigator philosopher studies the perpetual order revealed by the configurations of 'the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds' mere sight lovers will be 'lost in

multiplicity and change'. On board the treacherous ship, the crew spy on each other in the struggle for power as successive fractions take control of the helm before being killed or thrown overboard by their rivals. A person with knowledge has a comprehensive understanding, grasping things as they really are: 'the breadth of vision to contemplate all truth and all reality….with a grace and sense of proportion that will naturally and casually lead it on to see the forms of each reality.' Knowledge nurtures a philosophic character removed from sensual appetites and focuses the philosopher's energies 'when the current of a man's desires flow towards the acquisition of knowledge …his pleasures will be things purely of the mind and physical pleasure will pass him by' Mere sight lovers and their passion seems out of the pleasure of the senses, without any sharply focused aim: 'they run around city and country Dionysia, never missing a feature as if they were under contract to listen to every performance.' Although we cannot be certain on the exact nature of Plato's theory of forms we can be fairly certain that the theory represents the first systematic account to explain the nature of the physical world in relation the mental world of ideas. As the first theory, however, we should accept Plato's ideas to be open to unfair amounts of criticism.

The first major difficulty of this: if the world of forms, as appreciated by thought and the world of objects, as perceived by the senses, are so very different then what exactly is the relationship between the two? There are various possibilities. There is no relationship. If this is so then what use is knowledge of the world of forms? Plato makes out that this knowledge is of some use; otherwise the philosophers would be genuinely useless. So we can probably dismiss this account. But if there is a relationship between two distinct worlds, then what is it? Objects participate/partake in forms. In this interpretation the objects of the world actually contain some of the forms and it is this that defines what the object is. In the same way perhaps as all wet objects are wet in virtue of having some water on them, all dogs are dogs in virtue of having some form of dogness. This is problematic though for if a pretty flower literally contains some of the form of beauty (and presumably some of the form of ugliness) then the form of beauty self is no longer a singular thing. There are lots of little forms of beauty in things. Plato however does not seem to imply this, as he frequently stresses how each form is singular and unique thing scattered throughout the world of objects. Also for some flowers the idea of an object partaking the form doesn't make much sense. One can imagine a pencil being a pencil in virtue of containing a certain amount of the form of pencilness however, consider a large pencil. In this case the pencil would have a certain amount of pencilness contained within it but would also have a certain amount of largeness too. However it is less easy to see what this might involve on the surface it seems the large pencil would just have more of the stuff needed to make a small pencil. It's hard to see how the form of largeness would be residing in the shape somehow, as this is the same for both the large and the small pencil and its also hard to see how it could be residing in the physical stuff as again this is the same for the large and the small. Quite how a large pencil physically partakes in the form of largeness is difficult to imagine. By looking at objects (using the senses) you group certain things together so you'd say the bigger pencil is just an enlarged version of the smaller pencil you can see this without reason but can't rely on reason to decide (which is the ideal as noted above) it must be left to the senses which results in opinion. The forms are like patterns for objects. In this view two different beautiful flowers are both beautiful in virtue of the fact that they resemble the blue print of beauty represented in the form of the beauty itself. Much of the language of the Republic suggests that this is how Plato conceived of the relationship between the forms and objects in the world. A further problem is whether all objects resemble their forms. The philosopher Wittgenstein suggests that we use certain terms to apply to the world in a way that doesn't allow for a simple definition. Consider the example of the world 'game'. There are many different games ranging from the Olympics to crosswords. If one tried to give a definition of a game there would always be certain games that fell outside the definition for example not all games involve competition or bats and balls. The relationship between all games in the world in a complex one and one that does not admit to simple explanation. The following analogy is often used to illustrate the point. Imagine a photograph of a large family. Certain members of the family will have features in common. Uncle Bob might have similar hair to Grandma Williams. However there will be no single feature that they all have in common. The people in the photo can be said to have a family resemblance. This idea can also be applied to certain general terms. Games may have some elements in common hence you could say they have a family resemblance. This presents a problem for the theory of the forms. It would imply that there cannot be a single form of a game that all games as this pattern will contain – a set of features. In

Plato's defence he might argue that if they don't resemble the form of a game then they really aren't a game at all. However, Wittgenstein and others might argue that this represents a misunderstanding of how the words work. It is up to humans how they use the word 'game'. It relies on what our senses tell us.

*There is a clear grasp of the issues together with textual engagement, though more detail could have been present in the analysis. Some detail is clearly present and some points are well explained. Examples are present. The evaluation is Level 4. Detail was present but there was not a completely secure grasp of Plato's position. There could have been more in terms of how Plato might have responded. The second critical point was well illustrated, though again, the anticipated response could have been further developed.*

*8/9 + 10 + 17/8* *CUSP 36/7*
*Awarded 37*

**06 Discuss the claim that Plato's rulers would administer perfect justice.** ***(45 marks)***

Plato believes in an ideal society we would be governed by philosopher rulers. He believes they are the only perfect people, suitably equipped to do the job, and run the state. This is because they are lovers of wisdom, and knowledge, and would only concern themselves with the Forms. The forms are the objects of pure knowledge in the intelligible realm of the world. They are absolute, immutable, constraint and always exist. The forms are the ultimate copies, the perfect objects of knowledge, from which all else is copied, resulting in ignorance and opinion. Only a philosopher can access the forms, so consequently they are the only people who know what true and perfect knowledge is. They know and understand the true form of justice, not an imperfect copy found in the world of experience, filled with opinion and ignorance. Whilst they have such a love and passion for such knowledge, and only concern themselves with it, they also have an excellent memory, so the knowledge, true knowledge, they possess is rarely forgotten therefore in the case of administering perfect justice, they would be perfectly suited. They would not only realise and fully understand the form of justice, but also fail to forget or misinterpret its true meaning.

Plato also claims philosopher rulers would not possess any desires for material or financial gain, and not act on any irrational desires. They would have the courage and virtue to give up building a family, and possess no need for unnecessary luxuries. This is because all they want to do is contemplate the forms without distractions and hindrances to their acquisition of knowledge. This means they would always act in a just way, and administer perfect justice because there would be no external reason for them not too, as they have nothing to gain. Also Plato argues that once they have seen and understood the form of justice they would be unable to act unjustly, as they know what true justice is, as he believes knowledge and virtue are synonymous.

However whether or not they would administer perfect justice is debatable. Plato uses the noble lie to distinguish three classes of human. He claims there are those which are suited to being produces in society, the ones with a high proportion of bronze and iron in their soul. They are predisposed to wanting materialistic desires, and are willing to work to do so, only ever concerning themselves with ignorance and opinion and being content with this. Then there are the auxiliaries those who protect the city and enforce law and order. They again are predisposed to such a life due to their silver in their soul. Then there are the guardians, philosopher rulers, who require nothing in terms of materialistic luxuries, and who possess all the correct faculties and attitudes of character that allow them to achieve and access knowledge of the forms.

Now in a society such as this is it reasonable to say the guardians will be content with their lifestyle? Also Plato believes the divisions in society are because of innate and intrinsic qualities in our soul, and so therefore we are compelled to fulfil certain duties and live specific lives. One cannot simply choose which of the three divisions they want, they are born into them. This means whether or not a person wants to be a philosopher ruler is not debatable. They must become one, they have no choice. This

could lead to disputes, as the individuals' freedom and autonomy is taken away. What would happen if they did not want to be a philosopher ruler? They would not administer perfect justice surely. As their would be understandable resent and discontent with their lifestyle, this would more than likely impact on their ability as a ruler and consequently their ability to administer perfect justice.

Plato comes back to this problem by claiming once a person realises the truth meaning of justice and has accessed the ultimate form of the good, then they would realise they must be a philosopher ruler, for the good of their people. He says that the knowledge of true justice would mean they would know the right way to act, and so conform. For Plato knowledge leads to virtuous behaviour.

On the other hand others argue that human nature is that we are prone to mistakes, and never infallible. Would we always administer perfect justice? Especially when we are being forced into a lifestyle we did not choose and may not even want. In the 'Republic' Socrates, Thrasymacus and Glaugon all discuss the ideas of human nature and whether it is acceptable and reasonable to always administer perfect justice as a ruler. Thrasymacus rejects the conventional view of morality, and claims that we would not act justly if we could get away with being immoral. Glaugon uses the myth of Gyges to illustrate his view that if we could get away with being unjust, yet still appearing to be just we would. He claims it would be against human nature, and we would deem any man an idiot or a fool if he had the opportunity but did not take it. He says that there is a man who possesses a ring which allows him to be invisible, and therefore carry out immoral and unjust deeds, yet still remaining to appear just. This leads him to very desirable consequences, and it shows that if we only appear just, it does not matter if we truly are. This has major implications for the nature of the human condition.

If Thrasymacus and Glaugon are right it means that perhaps the philosopher ruler may not administer perfect justice, as acting unjustly (if you can get away with it) is perhaps easier and has more favourable consequences and outcomes. Perhaps another element to this, which would seem to reiterate Thrasymacus' and Glaugon's views would be the ambiguous nature of the forms. If only a well educated and extensively trained philosopher can access them, then how do we (the majority) know if they are telling the truth? We are unable to discern the truth, and are therefore at the mercy of the justice of the rulers. We would not know if they were acting unjustly and lying. So theoretically they could get away with acting terribly unjustly in order to achieve their own goals, and we would be none the wiser. Therefore the administration of perfect justice seems highly unlikely.

Plato places great truth in the moral agency of the philosopher, and believes because they are a lover of wisdom and knowledge, they will only concern themselves with the forms, and once doing so, never fail but administer perfect justice. However perhaps he should take note of the famous saying, 'power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely.'

> *There was a sophisticated grasp of Plato's position with some textual detail. Examples could have been more prominent. The knowledge is virtue thesis could have been analysed in more detail and evaluated. Evaluation is on the cusp of Levels 4/5. Some of the issues raised are not fully exploited, e.g. the noble lie. Plato's response to a central criticism in terms of duty is not fully developed. Some detail was clearly present but there was scope for the further development of some points.*
>
> *8 + 8 + 19/20 CUSP 35/6*
>
> *Awarded 36*

**07 Outline and illustrate Mill's case for regarding democracy with suspicion.** ***(45 marks)***

Throughout On Liberty, JS Mill strongly argues for a democratic society. He believes that in order for society to progress each individual must have an important part in society and its direction. However,

Mill reiterates the inherent dangers within democracy and that we must approach democracy with great care if we are to utilise its importance.

Mill outlines the four stages of social development towards a democracy. The first stage consists of 'Rulers' and 'Ruled', the second stage a 'simple' democracy emerges and terms such as 'self government' are what takes place as the state enacts the will of the people. However, in stage three Mill suggests that 'terms such as 'self-government' do not express the true state of the case.' Mill argues that 'the majority, or those who succeed in marking themselves the majority' are the rulers as there will is 'the will of the majority', and therefore what emerges is 'the tyranny of the majority,' whereby the minority are the subject of tyranny.

Mill believed that this was our inherent danger of democracy. If society is to progress there must be restrictions on the majority and government through political rights. Mill decided that the tyranny of the majority is the effect of 'the magical' influence of 'custom' whereby because we are customised to a certain way of living, through our culture, we see it as first nature. For example, many members of our public believe that transvestism is wrong and should be banned.

The tyranny of the majority is Mill's most significant reason for treating democracy with suspicion. He decided that 'the tyranny of the majority is now recognised as a great political danger which requires society to be on its guard.' There are two forms of this, legal and social tyranny. 'Legal tyranny was, and still is, a vulgar tyranny held in dread as chiefly operating through the state and its law'. Mill reiterates that legal tyranny operates through lawful acts such as 'the banning of gay marriage in countries'.

However, Mill decides that social tyranny 'more formidable then other tyrannies as it operates through public opinion, leaving fewer means of escape as it penetrates into the finer details of life. Social tyranny, Mill argues, is worse than legal tyranny as it operates through public coercion 'leaving fewer means of escape'. This is the most inherent danger democracy can, unfortunately, provide and society must be on its guard to stop it at all costs. Liberty in stage three is recognised as 'protecting the minority against the will of the majority', through political and social restrictions, making 'interference of collective opinion on the individual' as restricted as possible.

Overall, Mills case for regarding democracy with suspicion is illustrated through the inherent. Danger of 'The tyranny of majority'. We must stop the minority being subject to tyranny in order to develop socially and individually towards true democracy. Mill's case is both strong, compelling and easy to witness the importance of it.

*There is a clear grasp of textual material, including the historical background provide by Mill. One point was neglected but detail is apparent and accurate. Relevance is sustained, though examples could have been unpacked. Textual material was applied appropriately.*

7 + 6 Awarded 13

**08 'There is no place for censorship in a free society as individuals must decide for themselves'**

**Examine the adequacy of Mill's arguments in support of freedom of expression*. (45 marks)***

John Stuart Mill discusses freedom of expression in chapter two of 'On Liberty'. His argument is well considered and compelling and he can adequately answer any criticisms. By playing devil's advocate it helps to show the strength in his argument and shows that he has considered key counter arguments. Mill is very successful in showing why we should support freedom of expression.

Mill begins by arguing that we must allow for freedom in our views expressed because any restricting of free speech is an 'assumption of infallibility'. He argues that we cannot be sure we are infallible as all beliefs could be exposed as fallible. For example we once thought that the world was flat and were

convinced that any views opposing this were false. However, this view was exposed as fallible in the end and so this is why Mill is arguing that we should not assume our beliefs be infallible.

Mill's infallibility argument can be criticised by someone suggesting that surely we can be sure that some views are true, such as the view 'racism is wrong' no one who holds the opposing view would have arguments adequate enough to change everyone's mind. Surely in modern days we can now say there is no question that racism is wrong?

Mill would return in saying that even in such a case we must not restrict peoples right to express their views on the subject. He would also say that by hearing the opposing view we can strengthen our own argument as it helps us to recognise counter arguments. He would also suggest that nothing bad can come from not restricting free speech as all it can do is expose the 'wrong' belief as naïve, unconsidered and discriminating Mill therefore answers criticisms for his infallibility argument and shows it as a compelling one.

Mill's second argument for free speech is that if we don't 'fully, frequently and fearlessly' discuss a belief then it becomes a 'dead dogma' or a 'shell' of a belief. This means we must always be debating issues and hear opposing views or we will forget why we hold the view we have. For example we now forget why the women's vote was ever rejected, it would be unheard of in our society today, we no longer discuss the issue and so it is now a 'dead dogma'.

Mill's 'dead dogma' argument could be criticised by asking if it is necessary for our society to have people hold these opposing views, no matter how vicious or discriminating they are just so that we can have someone to debate with?

Mill would argue no, we simply need someone to play devil's advocate so that we can recognise all counter arguments and keep our belief important in society. We must not forget a why we hold a view because then if meet someone one day who has the opposing view and lots of clever arguments then we could be persuaded. Mill answers the criticism for his dead dogma argument very well and teaches us how important it is that we keep discussing and debating our views so that they can be held as a living truth, not a dead dogma.

Mill's third argument for allowing freedom of expression is that it is very often that the 'answer can be found in a combination of truths'. He disagrees with the suggestion that one view is true and another false but suggests the answer is between the two. This is particularly clear when it comes to politics. Politics seems to work best when there are radicals at either end and they debate to find the best solution to the issue, normally deciding on somewhere in the middle.

However, this could be criticised by some such as a Roman Catholic who wants to argue that Christianity is more than just a 'half-truth'.

Mill would successfully overcome this criticism by saying that the bible is a guideline for Christianity and is not supposed to be taken so literally. He would rightly suggest that very important morals can be learned outside of the bible. The truth is very complex and so it is almost impossible for it to the found in one viewpoint. Someone may suggest that Mill's argument for free speech conflicts with his utilitarian background. In 'On Liberty' Mill says that 'if all mankind minus one were of one opinion and the other of the opposing view then mankind would have as much right silencing that one man as he would if he had the power to silence mankind.' This seems completely opposite to the view that a utilitarian may have and some see it as a great flaw in his argument.

However, Mill would respond by saying he is 'utilitarian in the larger sense' on the grounds that utility is the 'progression of man as human beings'. He does not deny that liberty and utility can conflict but says that it is important not to restrict free speech even if the majority holds the opposing view, this is because in order for society to progress and for us to progress as human beings we must make mistakes and we must hear opposing views that rival our own beliefs. This is why he would not silence

the one man because here it is important for him to learn from his mistaken view or for everyone else to learn from it.

Mill is very strong in responding to this criticism as it is arguably the most brutal criticism of 'On Liberty' and I think he answers it well.

The only criticism that I personally hold for Mill's argument of 'On Liberty' is that he does not recognise how hurtful words can be. He only recognises restrictions on free speech and does not consider offence to be a form of harm.

An example that I would see as harm that Mill would disagree with would be the recent scandal of the Portuguese policeman trying to publish his book 'Maddie: The Truth of Lie'. In this book he suggests that Madeline McCann's parents were the people behind her kidnap, despite having no evidence. I find this unfair and it would cause much offence, upset and I would argue 'harm' to the family.

Mill would disagree and say that it not enough to ban this policeman's free speech. He would argue that in the case of offence you must stay away from the person who offends you.

In conclusion it seems Mill has a very strong argument for freedom of expression and his argument is certainly compelling. The only part of his argument that I would disagree with is where he begins to bring in restrictions on freedom of expression. He says incitement is where he draws the line but I think he is naïve in thinking that words can't cause real, emotional damage.

*The response displayed a detailed grasp of the issues. Textual detail was present. Mill's position and arguments are presented clearly and in some depth. Examples are present and well directed, though not fully developed or exploited. Evaluation was just Level 5. Anticipated counter- argument was present together with possible responses. Logical issues regarding infallibility were neglected.*

*9 + 9 + 20 Awarded 38*

**09 Assess whether Mill's Harm Principle is a successful device for achieving its purpose.**

***(45 marks)***

In order to remedy the negative effects of 'the tyranny of the majority', Mill evokes 'one very simple principle', that states that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of the civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others'. Authority then may only intervene to prevent harm. This creates a clear distinction between other and self regarding actions which allows for the protection of negative liberties. However it remains for many philosophers that 'harm' does not adequately assess the danger of the individual in causing damage, nor does it protect what is essential to our human wellbeing if this is true, as Mill is a utilitarian, then the principle fails its purpose.

Nonetheless Mill presents a strong case for purpose assuming that limited intervention achieving its purpose maximising in happiness for the greatest number, utility, which her regards as 'the ultimate appeal to all ethical questions'. He contends that given our natural rationality as progressiveness negative freedom is essential to creating happiness as 'human nature is not a machine to be built after a model…rather it is a tree that requires to grow and develop on all sides.' If we assume the individual can develop through position freedom then we assume that it is easier to fit a man with a life than a coat as this fails to recognise the diversity in modes of life We would not expect all varieties of plants to exist in the same physical environment contends Mill; nor should we, if we intend to appeal to ability, assume that man can exist following the same mode of life. This negative freedom, protected through the Harm

Principle, is instrumentally valuable in maximising wellbeing and happiness as ‘the only freedom that deserves the name is that of pursing our own good in our own way,’ thus the Harm Principle is justified according to Mill as it achieves it’s purpose, to protect the private sphere from legal or social coercion and allow for extensive negative liberties that maximise happiness.

However the shrewd philosopher is quick to point out the early problems within the principle, most notably, what constitutes harm? It appears that Mill literally means only when physical harm is caused have we a right to intervene, which seems thoroughly insubstantial given the fact that modern societies now recognise mental harm or indirect harm. Pornography serves as an apt example it causes a number of indirect harms, none of which Mill will be able to protect against, such as the degradation of women. Grey emphasises this point by asking whether moral harm counts? Failure to benefit someone or harm to institutions? ‘Harm is too ambiguous a term upon which to ban the limits of legitimate coercion. The failure to define it means that it fails to achieve its purpose in creating well-being.

However Mill devotes the entirety of Chapter 5 to a better understanding of harm in fact providing a comprehensive study. He recognises that harm to society can be prohibited through education for example or the prevention of those incapable of supporting children from marrying. Similarly he notes that only when rights-based interests are harmed may we incur penalties it would be ridiculous to say that if any of my interests were harmed society ought to intervene, Mill states this is merely inevitable, if I fail to get a job I want for example my interests are harmed. Even Searle’s response; that Mill states when there is a ‘liability’ to cause a ‘mischievous act’ intervention is allowed, further blurring the boundaries on to what constitutes harm, it remains that just because ‘On Liberty’ is incomplete doesn’t make it incoherent. The failure to define harm doesn’t mean that the Harm Principle cannot achieve its purpose, only that it is desirable for improvements.

Nonetheless many thinkers have argued against Mill’s notion that there any private actions, as Donne put ‘no man is an island.’ If this is correct then the Harm Principle immediately fails its purpose of creating extensive negative liberties as nearly every action is capable of public scrutiny. Drinking alcohol for example affects society as a whole whilst a politician’s private life can affect our trust in politics or national prestige; are there any truly self-affecting actions that the principle can defend this? Mill however notes that this assumes that every action is adverse to society: that is, even if every action were public it need not mean that the Harm Principle cannot defeat them because more commonly, according to Mill, public actions are beneficial to society. Indistinct public and private sphere are no worry. However Fitzjames Stephen notes that such a rebuttal misses the point as little in that private actions can be more harmful than public ones. They have an adverse affect on our moral character which is damaging to society, for him ‘the punishment of immorality is an end in itself.’ Thus the Harm Principle fails as it is the danger of private actions to our moral character, which consequently has an effect on public activity. Then pursuit of pornography for example might lead to repressive desublimation, when the situation, love, marriage, is ‘repressed.’

More so Stephen notes that if Mill admits that this ‘not in’ the maturity if their faculties, children or barbarians, are not applicable to the Harm Principle as are the legitimate subject of coercion, ought society not afford the same protection to mature people equally incapable of self-government?

This might pose a problem for Mill if he did not find immoral behaviour useful in warning the rest how not to live, ‘the inconvenience is one society can afford to have’ given that ‘ mankind are great gainers by suffering each to live in terms good themselves than compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.’ More so then punishment of immorality is never justified because when society, the tastes of the majority, does intervene, it does so wrongly. Socrates for example was executed for immorality, yet his views are now widely accepted in modern liberalism. The Harm Principle then remains successful as Mill appears justified in offering a clear specification as to where society can legitimately interfere.

However a powerful argument against Mill would recognise the assumption that he makes about human nature. For Mill to protect limited intervention which he states is essential to our improvement and wellbeing, he must be able to prove that we are rational and progressive and able to recognise what is

good and bad for ourselves. This is particularly debilitating as Mill's theory is empirical yet it fails a mass of evidence to suggest that man is none of them things, the conflicts of the 20th century for example. Rather Hume as Plato recognised as slaves to the passions, we are driven by advertisements irrationally to buy things we don't need for example, which suggests that we are not able to progress without compulsion to overcome our 'lower designs.' Stephen for example asks 'how far the freest discussion is likely to improve them (the idle, selfish, greedy, ignorant). The only practical means to them 'improvement is restraint or compulsion.' This is something that Nietzsche and Macuse recognise too in that given negative liberties through the Harm Principle man will not on them but 'follow the herd.' Stephen uses an analogy to a stagnant marsh; water shows that the Harm Principle fails to create wellbeing as it doesn't provide sufficient means of compulsion. Stagnant channels or hydraulics for it to do so for example.

Stephen's criticism is significant given that he has practical experience as a judge in India and England. Instead he advocates a conservative approach, stating that only within a framework of law and tradition can this individual develop and action wellbeing. Mill places far too much emphasis on freedom, which Burke states cannot be valued alone, we wouldn't praise an escaped prisoner for regaining his liberty for example. In fact the Harm Principle actually endangers our means to utility as it threatens custom which Devlin states is essential to society, so essential that, like government, it must be protected by law, an attack upon it, creates through negative freedoms and the Harm Principle is 'tantamount to treason' as it is the first stage in the disintegration of society. Thus we might illustrate quite aptly in Belgium.

Mill however appeals to man as a 'progressive being', negative liberties are essential to our improvement as there are as many centres of improvement as individuals. He states that Europe is only progressive for its plurality, China has stagnated in comparison as it is suppresses individuality through the protection of custom. The Harm Principle is actually instrumentally valuable as in the long run it creates progress. However, Greene challenges this in the screenplay for 'the Third Man' which points out that in 30 years under the Borgias, Italy saw the Renaissance, Da Vinci despite it being a time of fierce oppression. In comparison in 300 years in Switzerland they had brotherly love or democracy yet produced only the cuckoo clock. It remains that negative liberties are not essential to progress, Darwin and Galileo for example were the products of oppressive societies. This then might lead us to question, given the failure of Mill to provide empirical evidence to support his Harm Principle, whether liberty is indeed compatible with Mill's 'ultimate appeal', utility. Certainly SUPPAE reports on Nazi Germany showed that people felt happier when a sense of tradition was enforced through law, whilst similarly wartime Britain under the DORA act saw a great sense of community in our wellbeing. Indeed Plato states that we can only be guided to happiness through philosopher kings as most of us simply aren't able to recognise it whilst Durkheim was able to provide sufficient empirical evidence (unlike Mill) that shows that the provision of extensive negative liberties actually led to a loss of social restraints and tradition leading to a sense of hopelessness and suicidal tendencies. Rather than achieving wellbeing and happiness then the Harm Principle, through its provision of negative liberties, creates the opposite.

Indeed even if we value negative freedoms intrinsically it remains that the extra claim Mill adds, that it only applies to people in the maturity of their faculties, means that it is rather easy to manipulate in order to create positive liberties. Cowling goes further in attacking the Harm Principle as an attack as the common meaning right to live as he liked as it stated that there was a single doctrine stating that there was a single way to achieve happiness. Rather like Marxism all the Harm Principle is an attempt to do is replace the existing social ethic.

Conclusively then we appear justified in stating that given that the negative liberties the principle seems to protect do not in themselves secure Mill's goal, well-being our utility, then the principle fails. In fact given its ability even to value negative freedoms intrinsically it appears a worse principle to appear in order to secure freedom than liberal thinks such as Locke that appeal to natural rights. The Harm Principle then fails both logically and practically in achieving its purpose.

*This is a full response which satisfies the top level criteria for all assessment objectives. There is a in-depth textual knowledge, the analysis is clear and detailed. Mill's position, both on liberty and on utilitarianism is grasped well and the material is applied with direction and purpose. Detail is present throughout. The evaluation was accurate and penetrating. There was a considerable level of sophistication throughout. Counter arguments and examples were considered*.

10+ 10/4 23/4 Range 43-45
Awarded 43

**10 Explain and illustrate Descartes' methods of doubt and its purpose.**

***(45 marks)***

Descartes' method of doubt is to use doubt to attain certainty in his beliefs, and those that prove indisputable are the foundations for further beliefs.

Descartes thought that many of the beliefs he held were wrong, and that he had just accepted them as true, from his childhood. To remove doubt from his beliefs, he must doubt the belief, and if they prove indubitable, they are certain beliefs. He must even doubt those foundational beliefs, like 'believe what you perceive'. To doubt each belief one by one would be absurd, and so he doubts the foundations of his beliefs. If the foundational belief is certain, then those beliefs that stem from it are also true. Descartes' foundationalism is compared to the structure of a house, with the main foundations supporting all the other parts, without the foundations of knowledge, the other beliefs would crumble too.

To overcome doubt in his beliefs, Descartes has three waves of doubt that must be overcome to achieve certainty. Firstly, there is the problem of the senses deceiving us, for example, a stick in water appears bent to the perceiver, yet it is still straight. These sensory illusions show that our sense experience cannot be trusted. Descartes doesn't try to doubt all sense experience, but shows that we cannot know when or not we are being deceived. The analogy of the mushroom helps to illustrate his point: you know that either the red or the green mushrooms are deadly, and so you have good reason not to eat either. Compared to sense experience, you do not know if you are being deceived or not, so it is better to distrust all sense experience. This seems a little extreme. Perhaps it would be better to say that we should not trust sense experience unless we have reasonable evidence to show it is true, as we normally do.

The second wave of doubt is that of dreaming. Descartes says that we cannot know whether we are awake or sleeping, as sometimes we have dreams indistinguishable from reality. As we can never know our state of consciousness, I may not really know if I am really sitting here writing: I may be dreaming the experience. This shows that all sense experience can be doubted, we may just be dreaming it all. However, Descartes says that only a *posteriori* knowledge can be doubted, as maths and logic still has truth, whether we dream it or not.

The third and final wave of doubt is that of the evil demon deceiving all of our experience. This idea can be compared to the brain in a vat theory, where all of our experiences came from a computer, and in reality, we are just brains getting sensations of experiences programmed into the brain. This shows that everything can be doubted, as nothing can be certain, even maths, as the evil demon may always make us think the wrong answer. An objection to the evil demon theory is that it is an empty illusion he creates, as it is so close to reality, we cannot tell the difference, and so it a pointless deception. We could only know the things we are deceived about, and so that is how we live.

Descartes, later in his Meditations, overcomes these waves of doubt with the idea of God, and clear and distinct ideal. Even if the senses problem and dreaming problem is overcome, the evil demon

presents a further problem. However, Descartes says that God wouldn't deceive us with the demon and that he has given us the capacity to correct error. If we have a clear and distinct idea of something, then it must be true, as had wouldn't deceive.

The method of doubt uses doubt to reach certainty in beliefs. The purpose is to have certain beliefs on which to base further ones. However, with the introduction of God, the method of doubts seems to be an example of just going through the motions of an argument, without ever really doubting your initial belief.

*There is a clear grasp of the material. However, some detail was lacking, the textual link between the first two stages of the method. The Cogito was also neglected. The examples were used well, though slightly lacking in detail. The response also contained some evaluative points. There are not required as evaluation is not one of the assessment objectives on the 15 mark questions.*

*5 + 6 Awarded 11*

**11 'Descartes fails to establish that mind and body are two separate and distinct substances.' Assess whether this criticism can be justified.**

***(45 marks)***

Descartes first introduces his dualism in Meditation II with his wax analogy. Descartes wanted to show that we know our mind better than our body and senses. Descartes used a piece of wax to illustrate this idea because he believed people thought they knew the wax better than they knew the mysterious 'I'. So Descartes comments on the sensory information of the wax, its scent, texture and the way it makes a sound when you tap it. However once Descartes puts it in the fire the scent of the wax changes and it no longer makes a sound when you tap it. On paper one might conclude that it is not the same wax. However, Descartes point is we know it to be the same wax because of our intellect. A judging mind, and that alone, is needed to understand it is the same wax. This is Descartes first point of distinction between the mind and body. A further example Descartes uses in Meditation II is how we know that there are men beneath the hats and scarves we see from the window through our intellect/mind. However our senses alone could not tell us this. From his wax analogy Descartes goes onto claim that he knows clearly and distinctly that his body is extended and his mind is not.

A brief sum up is necessary at this point to enable me to continue. By Meditation VI, where Descartes lays down his dualism, he has established the clear and distinct mind in Meditation III from his cogito in Meditation II. The cogito, originally a deductive argument – 'cogito ergosum' 'I think therefore I am' in the Discourse four years earlier was changed to 'I am, I exist' in Meditation II. Now an indubitable truth and not a dubitable deductive argument with a missing premise (everything that thinks exists). From Descartes' cogito he came to the C+D rule, his rule for truth.

Descartes, in Meditations VI, believes that he clearly and distinctly sees himself as a thinking thing. His essence is to think. His body he believes is not essential to him. How could one entity be both essential and inessential? Descartes also sees clearly and distinctly with the help of the wax analogy that his body is extended while his mind is not. Again how can the mind and body be one entity?

'Cartesian dualism (the idea the mind and body are completely distinct) is introduced in Meditation VI. After the argument from the clear and distinct rule. Descartes reminds us of the argument from doubt. As we have seen, Descartes first point of certainty that he exists as a thinking thing. Even if he is doubting or even being deceived by the demon he is still thinking. To doubt is a mode of thought further showing his mind is indisputable. His body, as well as his senses etc, feel the full attack of the demon. His senses and body are not indubitable they do not survive his metrological doubt. At this stage Descartes has now shown that his mind and body are distinct from the argument from doubt. This

shows his dualism to be thinking because one entity cannot be disputable and indisputable. The idea is absurd.

Next Descartes strengthens his argument with the argument from divisibility. Descartes sees clearly and distinctly that his mind is indivisible whereas his body is not. His body can be chopped up for example.

Finally Descartes appeals to God's power to ensure all that he sees clearly and distinctly to be true. God is omnipotent and can make all clear and distinct truths clear and distinct.

Further arguments to support Cartesian dualism and the idea that mind and body are in fact two separate and distinct substances are the marks of the mental. A positive of Cartesian dualism is how it takes the irreducible substance consciousness seriously. Theories of mind like materialism for example see mind and body as one and reduce consciousness entirely down to brain cells. However, where does this leave qualia? The subjective feel of experience? How can it possibly be reduced? Descartes does not attempt to reduce it. He gives consciousness its own non-physical status.

Furthermore, the private nature of the mind is not reduced like on Behaviourism, for example, where all desires etc are reduced to simply subsequential behaviour. Nagel's example of one's private taste of chocolate suggests that the mind is not publicly observable like the body. Materialism attempts to say that it is but Descartes recognised the private nature of the mind. The surgeon cannot lick my brain and know the way I taste chocolate.

Moreover, reports of near-death experiences show that the mind/soul rises from the body momentarily. All these examples support Cartesian dualism and the mind and body as distinct.

However, a big problem for Descartes is the issue of interaction. How can the non-physical mind causally relate to the physical body? Descartes talks of how the mind is not like a pilot in a ship. The mind intermingle in the body. If the ship was damaged the pilot would not feel anything and we know that when we injure ourselves we feel it. Descartes believes the mind intermingled throughout the body particularly the pineal gland.

However, how can the mind intermingle and be located in pineal glad in the brain. It is like a folder in my locker and scattered all around the school. Also, intermingling and the pineal glad are both location theories, and yet the mind is supported to be non-physical. How can the non-physical be located?

There are further criticisms from the argument from doubt. Surely it is ignorance to say that just because we can doubt the body means it is inessential to us. The masked man fallacy: I know who my father is, I don't know who the masked man is, the masked man is not my father. A huge issue with the clear and distinct argument is The Cartesian Circle. We need the clear and distinct rule in order to establish God. But we need God in return to establish the clear and distinct rule. All the while, without God guarantee is the clear and distinct rule the demon could be deceiving us. So the point is, Descartes says he can be clear and certain that the body is extended and the mind is not as a basis for his dualism. And yet, how does he know the demon is not deceiving him? Descartes believes that once we concentrate on some thing clear and distinct it is compelling and we know it to be C + D. However, we cannot continue to concentrate on the clear and distinct truth because that is absurd. As soon as we break concentration the demon is the one to deceive us.

Descartes also relies too much on God for his basis in dualism. With his trademark argument and ontological, he had based both on the 'clear and distinct' idea of God as supremely perfect. Yet again the Cartesian Circle is looming. The demon can only be checked with God and God needs to be in place to guarantee C + D. All the while we could be being deceived by the demon. Descartes said he wanted to build his knowledge on solid foundations but there are so many flaws with his argument.

The biggest of all, previously mentioned appears to be his incapability to deal with the issue of interaction. Descartes had to admit to Princess Elizabeth in a letter that he could not define the union. Malebranche and Leibniz both attempt to put forward theories of dualism without the issue of interaction. Malebranche puts forward Occasionalism where one wills their mind to pick up a glass of water and God bridge the gaps or 'occasions' them to pick up water. Leibnis put forward 'Parallelism' which is where mind and body run like two clocks in parallel to each other and act accordingly.

While these two accounts appear to solve the issue of interaction we are left with no free will and the issue of God causing evil in the world. On top of this, we have the variously flawed argument for God's existence (i.e. Ontological Design argument and the trademark argument).

Wittgenstein hits at the heart of Descartes first line of certainty (his cogito – I am; I exist). Wittgenstein talks of the impossibilities of a private language because a public setting is required. Applying this term 'beetle' to a closed matchbox is meaningless without a language provided by society. Wittgenstein's point is we cannot start from the private nature of the mind i.e. 'I am, I exist.' It is self-refuting.

In conclusion, Descartes' attempts to distinguish mind and body were brave but rested on his own unstable foundations. His reliance on God for the clear and distinct rule is always in attack of the demon. Finally, even if Descartes could be said to have given a comprehensive view of the distinction between mind and body, he was defeated by the problem of interaction. He could not account for how the mind (works?).

> *Textual knowledge was clearly present but could have been more focused, e.g. there was too much on the wax example and the Cartesian Circle at the expense of a detailed treatment of Descartes' arguments for Dualism. The evaluation was clearly wide-ranging but lacked detail and development of particular arguments. Indivisibility was not really addressed and one of Descartes arguments was omitted.*
>
> *8+8+17* *Awarded 33*

**12 Assess Descartes' argument for the existence of God.** ***(45 marks)***

God plays a fundamental role in Descartes meditations. Descartes is in search for indubitable knowledge. Descartes believes indubitable knowledge is clear and distinct ideas, known through reason. Descartes first clear and distinct idea is the cogito found in Meditation 2, where he establishes the existence of himself. As Descartes is searching for more truths like the cogito, he needs to first verify the indubitability of clear and distinct ideas. Descartes uses the existence of God to show that as it is part of God's nature to be all-good, he would not deceive Descartes into believing that clear and distinct ideas were true when they are not as this would be contradictory to God's nature. Therefore without God, it would seem all other beliefs which he based on the principle that "all that I very clearly and distinctly apprehend (conceive) is true" cannot be said to be indubitable as without God, these truths can still doubted, as Descartes said in the first meditation, an evil demon could be deceiving him into believing a priori truths. Without God Descartes has failed to establish his existence in the Cogito and the existence of the external world in meditations 6. But many believe Descartes has failed to do this, which is very possible as Descartes' 2 arguments for God's existence is open to much criticism.

Descartes tries to establish the existence of God first in meditations 3 than again in meditations 5. Descartes first begins his argument for God by introducing two principles. The first is that ideas can have varying degrees of 'objective' reality depending on the 'perfectness' of the idea in the first place. Descartes uses the example of a goat and angel in meditations 3 – his idea of an angel is more 'perfect' than that of a goat therefore the angel has more 'objective' reality. A substance has more 'objective' reality than a mode as a mode relies on a substance for its existence. The second principle is the causal principle that states that "the cause must have at least as much reality in its efficient and total cause as in its effect". i.e the cause of an idea must be equal to the idea itself.

With these two principles in mind, Descartes argues that he has an Idea of God, that which is a supremely perfect being, but Descartes cannot be the cause of such as idea has he is not 'perfect' enough, does not possess enough 'objective' reality to cause such an idea. Therefore, the only thing with enough 'objective' reality to cause the Idea is God, therefore God exists as Descartes has the Idea that must have come from him. This is Descartes' Trademark argument.

But this argument is open to criticism. Firstly, Descartes causal principle, which he assumes to be true, may not be. Are there not multiple instances where the cause of something has been smaller than its effect? For example, we can light a bonfire with a single match. Furthermore, a butterfly can flap its wings which set of a multitude of events that lead to an avalanche. If Descartes' causal principle fails, it is very likely that our Idea of God could come from something as small as ourselves which would mean that the principles which Descartes has based his argument on are weak, therefore, making the argument weak.

Furthermore, philosopher Hume criticised Descartes trademark argument by saying firstly, it is not possible to discover the cause of something just by looking at the effect. I cannot look at a broken window and learn the cause of it. I must experience empirically the cause of the effect. Secondly, Hume argues that our ideas actually come from our sensory experience. Our idea of a supremely perfect being comes from out sensory experience of the finite, imperfect things, not from God as Descartes argues. If we are to accept these criticisms, then Descartes has yet to establish the existence of God in his meditations.

Descartes' second attempt to prove God's existence is in meditations 5, through the ontological argument. Firstly, Descartes introduces the idea that through examining our ideas using our reason, we can derive further truths. Descartes uses the example of his idea of a triangle through thinking, he can derive the truth that triangles have 3 sides and all its internal angles add up to $180^{O}$. Descartes then applies this method to his Idea of God. When he considers God's essence, he cannot distinguish existence from God's essence (all powerful and knowing etc). Using the imagery of a valley and a mountain, how you cannot have one without the other, you cannot have god without existence.

With this in mind, Descartes sets out an argument for God that comes naturally from the premise. Firstly, Descartes has an Idea of God, a supremely perfect being. This being must then possess all the perfections and existence is a perfection therefore God exists. This is Descartes second attempt but this argument too, is open to criticisms which may lead to Descartes completely failing to establish the existence of God.

Firstly, a common criticism of the ontological argument is made by Kant who argues that Descartes has made the mistake of believing existence is a predicate to possess when it is not. To say a flower is yellow is to describe it, how it appears but to say something exists tells us nothing about the thing, therefore cannot be a predicate. Furthermore, if you can possess existence then you can possess non-existence but if you do not exist, you cannot have or lack anything. Therefore, existence is not a predicate and Kant believes this has failed.

In addition, Gassendi criticised Descartes by saying that you could will anything into existence even the perfect island. But in Descartes defence, a perfect island has no intrinsic maximum. But the Idea of God does have defining limits therefore Gassendi's criticism does not work to weaken Descartes' arguments.

But there are other criticisms that weaken Descartes argument. Firstly, Descartes believes he has established the ability to derive essence from thought alone in meditations 2. But is has been criticised to be a subjective approach to essence, Descartes is simply describing how the essence of something appears to him. We can use this criticism and apply it to the way Descartes discovers Gods essence in meditations 5. Descartes may just be simply describing how Gods essence appears to him, not actually

discovering it. Surely we need an objective approach to essence. If Descartes has failed to discover true essence then it would seem that Descartes has again failed to establish the existence of God.

Furthermore, a criticism of both arguments for God is the cartesian circle which states that Descartes has presupposed what he set out to prove. Descartes believes he has established God's existence through clear and distinct ideas but he uses God to verify the truth of his clear and distinct ideas. Until Descartes can prove the truth of his clear and distinct ideas without the existence of God, his quest for indubitable knowledge is not over and until he can successfully establish the existence of God without relying on clear and distinct ideas, his findings in the meditations cannot be regarded as indubitable. It would seem Descartes has not done this and his argument is extremely weak.

In conclusion, Descartes believes he has established the existence of God in the meditations but the principles of which he has based his arguments are open to too much criticism to be able to say that Descartes has been successful in his endeavour. Unfortunately this failure to establish God, therefore verify his clear and distinct ideas results in him not successfully establishing the existence of himself in meditations 2 and the existence of the external world in meditations 6.

*Q 12 There is a clear grasp of the text with some appropriate detail. The main arguments are analysed and evaluated. Some strong evaluative points were supported by examples. Some evaluative points lacked detail and development. Responses were not considered/anticipated. The point about non-existence could have been clearer as could the reference to Gaunilo's island. The candidate might have considered whether the issue of the Cartesian circle is so damaging to Descartes' ontological argument given that the argument can be and has been formulated without reference to clear and distinct ideas.*

*8 + 8 + 18 (17) Cusp 33/34 Awarded 34*

**13 Outline Nietzsche's account of the sceptic, the critic and the new philosopher (15 marks)**

The 'sceptic' and the 'critic' are both particular types of people discussed by Nietzsche and, perhaps most importantly, 'masks' which will be used by the New Philosophers.

Nietzsche identifies two forms of scepticism. One, which he derides, is the sort practiced by 'modern men' – these sceptics undertake scholarly inquiry but , on account of a defect Nietzsche calls 'bad nerves' will never affirm or deny anything – they perpetually postpone judgement under the pretence of 'objectivity.'

The second sort of sceptic is exemplified in 'Beyond Good and Evil' by Frederick the Great of Prussia - this sceptic possesses a strong will, and a military severity which leads them to doubt everything that can be doubted. The New Philosophers will incorporate this type of scepticism, says Nietzsche, but they will not just doubt, they will also create new values.

Nietzsche describes a critic as someone secure in their own knowledge, who is attempting to both define what can be known and 'press knowledge into formulas.' Nietzsche respects this as 'worthy task' and picks out certain philosophers, most notably Kant (the Chinaman of Konigsberg) who he believes to have been 'great critics'. Again the New Philosopher will use criticism – especially in having a firm faith in their own knowledge, but will go <u>beyond</u> it, seeking to create new values rather than simply describe or examine old ones.

This is because New Philosophers are, according to Nietzsche 'commanders and legislators' and many other things besides simply critics and sceptics, they will also for example be experimenters, artists and great leaders of men. Perhaps the fundamental aspect of the New Philosophers is the way in which, while fulfilling all these roles they will recognise and align themselves with the 'will to power', since in Nietzsche's opinion this is the one thing which gives value to life. So in short the New Philosophers will use the masks of the good sceptic to 'take a knife to the breast of the values of their age', but most importantly go beyond scepticism and criticism when they create new values for themselves.

*Q 13 Relevant subject matter has been clearly addressed. Examples are provided. Detail is present, though some subtle detail is omitted. There has clearly been some engagement with the text. Distinctions are clear and apparent. The relationship could have been more explicit.*

*7 + 6 Awarded 13.*

**14 'Nietzsche's position on religious belief relies on the identification of motives and effects rather than reasons and argument.'**

**Assess whether Nietzsche's account of religious belief is vulnerable to this criticism.**
**(45 marks)**

Nietzsche famously states that all previous philosophers were victim of a "hereditary defect" - they attempted to posit metaphysical, transcendent truths instead of basing their philosophy upon a historical investigation and psychological exploration. Unlike other philosophers, he did not appeal to a "higher form" of reason, nor did he claim to have deduced truth from rational argument. It is true, therefore, of his account of religious belief that he is concerned more with the effects and motives of believers rather than reason and argument. Whether this is completely the case is debateable; Nietzsche's powers of argument are perhaps also important in the formation of his philosophy, and he cannot easily be branded as "irrational". But perhaps more significantly, one can question whether this can even be used as a successful criticism in the first place.

Nietzsche's account of religious belief says of the Christian faith; "since the beginning, it has meant sacrifice, sacrifice of freedom, pride and spiritual self confidence, and has meant subjugation and self-denigration, self-mutilation." This view can be said to apply to religious belief in general. It is indeed the case that we find Nietzsche engaging with the effects of religious belief. He stated that religious belief allowed people to find meaning in their suffering, but that this did not lead to an end to suffering, merely false hope in eschatological salvation from the pain and turmoil of the physical world. But one might ask why Nietzsche does not attempt to construct an argument to refute the existence of the afterlife, or indeed God Himself. How can he criticise religious belief without first disproving the beliefs themselves? Nietzsche, however, already believed that God was "dead" – there was or soon would be no societal place for Him. He referenced the ascetic ideal to explain how the will to truth" no matter what the cost" had led to atheism. If we agree with this, then an attempt to falsify religious belief would be largely unnecessary. The exploration into motives and effects had already led Nietzsche to the conclusion that God was societally irrelevant, and could then criticize religious belief on a greater scale. We can say, therefore, that arguments and reasons for the existence of God would be superfluous to Nietzsche's philosophy, and that the lack of them cannot then be cited as a criticism.

But, we might respond, is it correct to criticise an argument because of its origins? Can Nietzsche really construct a negative account of religious belief based merely upon its motives? It could be said that to do so would be to commit a genetic fallacy. This is indeed a strong criticism - can Nietzsche refute religion because of its origins? One could, however, compose a reply in his defence, and argue that Nietzsche does in fact also utilise other philosophical methods for his critique of religion. Nietzsche refutes the idea that humans have a free will (ss 12) and that we can know ourselves through introspection (ss 16-19). He does so by his discussion of the "bewitchment of language", attacking the

subject-predicate structure of grammar and the meaning of the sentence “I think”. This is key to his account of religion – religious dogma claims that we are free agents who can be blamed for their actions and who can better themselves through moral thought. Nietzsche rejects this, and we can therefore argue that he does – at least in part – provide reasons other than motives and effects for this account of religious belief.

It is, however, undeniable that at least the main thrust of Nietzsche’s account comes from identification of motives and effects. Religion, he states, was bred from “ressentiment” towards the aristocracy. But can we criticise Nietzsche for this? Could we view this focus on motives and effects as a strength of Nietzsche’s account? It stops him, perhaps, from philosophizing in the very way he criticises: attempting to find an objective truth through reason. Instead, his philosophy can be seen as a “morphology”, “evolutionary theory” or “genealogy”. Nietzsche may well have admitted the truth of the criticism, but refuted that it is actually a “criticism” at all!

Yet Nietzsche would not yet have protected himself from further development of this criticism. What is the reason, we might ask, that his perspective is better than that of a religious person? If Nietzsche has not rational argument for the validity of his claims, then why might he not merely be projecting his own views in the same manner as past philosophers? He does not disprove religious belief, so why is his interpretation better than that of a religious believer? Nietzsche did, however, state that some perspectives are in fact “less distorting” than others. Nietzsche realizes, at least, that his perspective is a perspective, and this gives it strength. Religious belief, on the other hand, claims to be objectively and universally true, for everyone.

There is one more element to this criticism that must be considered. Nietzsche does not give reasons or arguments that prove that religious belief is always insincere, and that it can never be caused by something other than “ressentiment” and a desire for suffering to have meaning. We might imagine that it would be possible for someone to have sincere religious beliefs, that were not motivated in the manner outlined by Nietzsche. This, in the absence of other arguments, would be a problem for Nietzsche’s account of religion. It is difficult to construct a counter-criticism in this case. It does seem that the burden of proof is upon Nietzsche to argue that insincere religious belief is the only kind possible, but he has not done so.

We must, however return to the fundamental fact it is difficult to criticise Nietzsche for a lack of “reason and argument” when he would have viewed this as a strength. Nietzsche is not attempting to persuade everyone round to his point of view, so why should he include argument? Furthermore, his reliance upon motives and effects of religion allow him to escape the paradox of perspectivism: If he claimed his views had discovered through “reason” this would be the ultimate hypocrisy. In conclusion, we can say that Nietzsche’s account of religious belief is indeed largely vulnerable to this “criticism” but that it puts him in a position of strength over religion and past philosophers alike.

> *Q 14 There is a clear grasp of the issues raised in the text, though textual detail was lacking in places. The interpretation and analysis showed some sophistication. Evaluation was clearly present and there were anticipated responses. There could have been greater philosophical depth in some of the arguments. The issue of truth and perspectives could have raised logical issues in more detail. The interpretation of Nietzsche’s position was clear and well developed. More could have been made of the issue of sacrifice and further textual support could have been enlisted.*
>
> *8/9 + 8/9 + 18 Cusp 34/35 Awarded 35*

**15 Critically discuss Nietzsche's idea that his new morality would be beyond good and evil.**
(45 marks)

In discussing the notion of 'beyond good and evil' it is first and foremost important to mention even Nietzsche believe this to be an ambiguous and elusive description. To illustrate this, it may be taken in two ways (at least). Firstly, it may mean outside our concepts of good and evil - and moral worth altogether, and secondly it may just mean what is referred to as 'good' and 'evil' by the majority of people in modern societies; is mistaken; instead 'good' and 'evil' should refer to new and unfamiliar values.

We can understand Nietzsche's conception of a 'New morality' best by looking at his account of the History of Morality. This describes moral progress in terms of an increase in both self knowledge and understanding of the origin of our actions. The future moral period Nietzsche endorses; the 'Extra Moral' is contrasted to the previous two the previous eras; the 'Pre-Moral' and 'Moral'. In those previous eras the value of an action was interpreted either solely through consequences or conscious intention, and Nietzsche asserts people had no or incomplete self-knowledge in these periods. This assertion may however be backed up by the types of moralities the people of the prehistoric and current epochs lived by, and is thus not entirely unfounded. The Extra Moral period by contrast is a more sophisticated attempt at self-knowledge, as people start to perceive the value of an action in terms of unconscious and non-intentional drives.

Arguably an initial advantage for this account of Nietzsche's is that the Extra Moral valuing of an action has been long prominent in psychology: Freudian theories interpret actions as indices of unconscious drives.

However, this method of valuation is not prominent in society as a whole, where conscious intention tends to be equated to moral value: we not blame people for events out of their control, and punish them more for wilful wrong doing. For example, cheating in an exam might be punishable in the Moral period as it constituted deliberate deception, however in the Extra Moral, we must examine the motivation behind the action i.e. why the cheater felt the need to cheat. It might be explained in terms of unreasonable parental pressure leading to a deep-seated fear of failure, or else perhaps natural laziness. We then must accord values according to these drives.

Despite the similarity of Extra-Moral and Freudian ideas, Nietzsche's history of morality is often criticised for its sweeping generalisations and a lack of evidence provided to justify the generalisations. Even when there is evidence it has been noted as both occasionally inaccurate and lacking detail. The 'verification' of the Extra-moral period is a psychological account, therefore it cannot alleviate any of the criticisms levelled at Nietzsche's purely historical claims.

A response to this is that the 'History of Morality' documents a progression (or change) in ideas rather than recounting concrete historical facts. The former is exactly what Hegel does in 'Phenomenology of the Spirit.' Hence we can excuse Nietzsche's historical inaccuracy; as his examples accord with broad divisions in the history of moral thought.

Nevertheless, some may still not be satisfied, and given Nietzsche's criticisms of the prejudices philosophers are susceptible to: (by imposing their own personal morality in their interpretation of the world) it does not seem unreasonable to demand he consider counter-examples to his own; which he notably fails to do.

In addition, Nietzsche's account is teleological, in that it relies on the sophistication of self-knowledge, which enables gradual approach to a 'new morality'. This is in opposition to his overall anti-teleological stance, and this is difficult to reconcile with his other claims, such as those about truth.

A further criticism, is that the 'new morality' of the Extra Moral era strips us of our ability to make moral evaluations: and the notion of being able to determine the value of an action - whether it is blame or praiseworthy - is most of the basis of moral philosophy. It is hard to see how we could be considered responsible for 'unconscious' and 'non-intentional' drives, the very words suggest that it is beyond our control! It is with this criticism we may return to the original distinction: if we cannot make moral evaluations, the Extra moral period would indeed take us outside of the concepts of 'good' and 'evil' altogether.

However, Nietzsche's concept of the Will to Power may be a suggested route to determine which of our drives have a more or less value. He holds the Will to Power as the single principle by which everything can be accorded value, therefore, the more a drive expresses it (a tendency to dominate and exercise strength and gain advantage over something else) the more positive value we accord that drive. In this way we can see 'beyond good and evil' when applied to values; means that the Will to Power becomes the new standard of measurement, rather than traditional notions of what is 'right' and 'wrong'.

Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether the Will to Power could differentiate valuable from worthless drives: Nietzsche describes it as 'life itself' and often implies it is the explanations for the existence or occurrence of everything: hence it is a fact of life, and being factual, we cannot apply it to value things.

On the other hand, one could argue this is a misinterpretation of Nietzsche and 'life itself' merely shows the drive is utterly life affirming, and drives could therefore be distinguished and valued according to how life-affirming they are.

However, in Nietzsche's other account of morality he refers instead to a Master and Slave morality, held by those with a dominance in 'Noble' values, and a dominance in 'Herd' values, respectively. It is in this case much harder to see where a 'new morality' might emerge, because Nietzsche openly criticises the Slave morality, while endorsing that of the Master. The noble caste created the concept 'good' by describing their actions thus (according to Nietzsche) whereas the Herd, with their Slave morality feared the Nobles, and thus prohibited all their values: referred to as a revaluation of values'.

Nietzsche argues that slave morality - contrary to that of the masters - is negative, because its commandments are prohibitions 'don't do x' and it is reactionary: For Slave morality; 'good' is a secondary concept which is derived from 'not bad'. However, the Herd denies that their morality emerged through 'Ressentiment': hostility due feelings of powerlessness or inferiority, therefore Nietzsche argues it is dishonest. The Herd also deny charitable or altruistic actions are really expressions of the will to power – because the gratitude engendered from those helped us a strength gained that outweighs the personal expense in performing a charitable action - thus their morality is, unlike that of the Nobles, inherently deceptive.

Nietzsche gives these reasons for despising slave morality, and endorsing the more honest, and affirmative master morality. And Nietzsche speaks highly of figures he perceives as embodying Noble values – and thus master morality, - for example Napoleon; so it is clear he endorses Master morality.

However master morality would not be a 'new morality' like that which Nietzsche prophesised of his Historical account of morality; therefore, there is an inconsistency in his professed views on morality. We might make an attempt to respond and reconcile the different ideas by explaining that the Herd instinct is inherited best, therefore current morality is almost purely Herd morality. In this way, if Master morality were to gain dominance it would certainly seem to be a 'new morality'.

To conclude, there are many positions for and against the idea Nietzsche's 'new morality' would or would or would not be 'beyond good and evil. In my opinion, these views are mostly due to huge ambiguities in his writings; his literary style and use of irony make hugely different interpretations of his philosophy possible. The best we can do is to interpret his claims in terms of his whole work in order to avoid inconsistencies, and to back up our interpretations with textual evidence; thus allowing different

views to identify what is Nietzsche's writing caused them to disagree, and hence possibly allow views to be somewhat reconciled, or more firmly refuted.

*Q 15 There is a secure and detailed knowledge of textual issues. The issues are analysed in a sophisticated manner. Evaluative points were well integrated within appropriate areas of the response. There is a very clear grasp of the issues with anticipated responses. The critical discussion could have been lifted slightly by more development or sharper philosophical insights.*

*10 + 11 + 22/3 cusp 42/3 Awarded 45*