

GCE 2004  
*June Series*



# Mark Scheme

## Philosophy

### *AS Unit 2 – Moral Philosophy or Philosophy of Religion (PLY2 )*

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1.

**Total for this question: 45 marks**

(a) Briefly explain what is meant by moral realism.

*(6 marks)*

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of moral realism, **either** through the cognitivist view that we can know moral facts, **or** through answers rooted in virtue theory. Answers in this band will probably recognise that the question is meta-ethical and focus on cognitive positions: intuitionism, moral facts are intuited through a moral ‘sense’; realism or descriptivism, moral facts exist in virtue of non-moral facts. However, accounts of the virtues, flourishing and the good for man are also clearly within the scope of the question. The essential point is that there is an ‘objective’ moral reality (even if there aren’t any moral objects) that we can know (intuit or sense) and which can be described. Reward good versions of utilitarianism and/or deontology at the bottom of this band if they attempt to link these positions to moral empiricism or moral absolutes (e.g. ‘x’ is moral because ‘x’ maximises happiness).

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and partial understanding, **either** by briefly asserting the existence of a realm of moral truths **or** by providing a confused explanation. Generalised accounts of ‘philosophers who hold this view’, in which the view itself is not clarified, should be placed in this band together with tangential accounts of normative theories which may touch on the question in places. Award 1 mark to candidates who assert that we have to be realistic when facing moral difficulties.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

(b) Explain and illustrate the is-ought (fact-value) gap.

*(15 marks)*

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the view that we can’t derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. It is likely that there will be references to Hume, but this isn’t essential for top band answers providing that there is a clear account of the problem itself, that factual statements do not entail moral conclusions and/or that moral conclusions cannot be legitimately inferred from factual statements. Some candidates may present this as one of the issues dividing non-cognitivism from cognitivism in ethics. Tangential responses, in which the gap ultimately disappears, could nevertheless be placed in this band for this assessment objective if precise knowledge and understanding of the fact-value gap is demonstrated.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding by offering a limited or confused account of the is-ought gap.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

Candidates may take the opportunity to construct their own illustrative examples. Beyond this, expect material selected for illustration **either** to draw from practical ethics in attempting to show that, whatever the facts, a range of moral choices are possible, **or** to discuss the role of choice in creating value generally, perhaps with reference to certain texts (e.g. Sartre) or the non-cognitivist position that moral judgements require an evaluative add-on from us. Some may illustrate the problem by showing that a valid argument would require that a first universal ought premise is established (in which case one is moving from ought to ought).

- 7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, a relevant illustration to provide a clear account of the is-ought gap.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, an illustration to provide a partial account, poorly focused or lacking detail and precision, of the is-ought gap. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and brief illustration.
- 1 – 3 Selects an illustrative example to provide a basic, sketchy and vague account of the is-ought gap, or an illustration is given but application is tangential (e.g. an illustration of how an alleged gap can in fact be bridged).
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

(c) Assess non-cognitivism.

(24 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of non-cognitivist ethics, **either** through providing an account of the general basis of non-cognitivism (there are no ‘queer’ moral objects, facts or truths that can be discovered, sensed or known, rather we are the source of value, moral judgements include a subjective element, an evaluative add-on from us) **or** through an account of non-cognitivist positions (emotivism and prescriptivism). This may involve developing points made in the previous section about the fact-value gap. Good accounts of *one* meta-ethical position (e.g. emotivism) should be placed at the bottom of this band.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of non-cognitivism, either offering a very limited outline or through a confused account.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

Support for the view could draw from:

- An extended discussion of the is-ought gap including, for example, debates in practical ethics to show that, whatever the facts, a range of moral choices are possible.
- Discussions of the role of choice in creating value more generally, perhaps with reference to certain texts (e.g. Sartre) or the role of sympathies and tastes in moral preferences (Hume).
- Accounts of why there are, allegedly, no moral facts (e.g. logical positivism) or the alleged failure of factual statements to guide action or explain moral weakness and/or accounts of the non-descriptive element of moral language (expressing, commending and prescribing).
- The view that there are no moral experts, that moral disputes remain unsettled etc.

Candidates are likely to consider positions which are critical of the view in which candidates could draw from:

- The realist position generally, that morality is ‘attached’ to facts connected to ‘wants that all men have’ and which contribute to human flourishing and the critique of non-cognitivism, for example that it fails to mark out a sphere of discourse as being moral discourse.
- Analogous examples concerning aesthetics.
- Specific attempts to deny the is-ought gap, e.g. Searle on promising, or to claim that moral statements are factual and are action-guiding.
- Specific criticisms of emotivism and/or prescriptivism.
- There may be some references to first order theories, utilitarianism, deontology, virtue theory and relevant ‘facts’ underpinning first principles.

7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed analysis of philosophical debates concerning non-cognitivism.

4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused (for example on emotivism or prescriptivism) or lacking detail and precision, of non-cognitivism.

1 – 3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of non-cognitivism or some relevant points among many irrelevant points in a tangential approach to non-cognitivism.

0 No relevant philosophical points.

**Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)**

Candidates are likely to adopt one of two approaches:

- Non-cognitivism is seriously lacking. We can't value anything we like. Moral reasoning is constrained by moral facts or a moral reality external to us. If this is not so we are left with the difficulty of delineating the sphere of morality (as well as other difficulties). In virtue of the facts of the case, e.g. facts about flourishing, we can reach moral conclusions. Arguably, we can also be tutored in this and develop a moral sense. If this were not possible we could not speak of moral progress. There is an unbridgeable gap between is and ought.
- Morality is rooted in our desires and attitudes rather than being entailed by whatever the facts of the case are taken to be. There are experts in Physics, Geology, etc. but there are no moral experts. It is not possible to go from is to ought without an evaluative add-on from us. Morality is a matter of searching for principles that we can commit to or of expressing sympathies we have acquired. There is a gap between factual and moral statements.

7 – 9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments concerning non-cognitivism and advances a clear position.

4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning non-cognitivism, but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points/theoretical approaches, or asserted with limited supportive explanation. Good but narrowly based and partial discussions of, e.g. one non-cognitivist position should be placed in this band.

1 – 3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of some arguments concerning non-cognitivism in which a view is described, or points are listed or asserted without justification, or argument is confused.

0 No relevant philosophical insights.

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2.

**Total for this question: 45 marks**

(a) Briefly explain what preference utilitarianism involves.

*(6 marks)*

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of preference utilitarianism: in contrast to classical utilitarianism, which views happiness/pleasure or the absence of pain/suffering as the sole end, preference utilitarianism to an extent recognises other goods/virtues as contributing to overall well-being in so far as these may be desired and it is concerned with the maximisation of preferences (or preference satisfaction). Explanation may involve discussions of the perceived strengths of preference utilitarianism in relation to other utilitarian positions and/or illustrative examples although good explanations should earn full marks without this. Accurate but briefly stated definitions should be placed at the bottom of this band.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding of preference utilitarianism by providing a confused account possibly by giving an accurate account of utilitarianism which fails to clarify what is distinct about preference utilitarianism.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

(b) Explain and illustrate how deontological ethics differs from rule utilitarianism.

*(15 marks)*

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

The distinction involves:

- Deontology regards acts as right or wrong in themselves; moral action is performed out of a sense of duty; the motivation for the action is in accordance with a commitment to an absolute duty. The motivation or intention behind the act is important, a right act is one performed through duty and good will.
- Rule utilitarianism regards an act as right if it conforms to a rule which, if followed, has good consequences/maximises happiness; the consequences of following the rule are what matters, i.e. it is end-orientated. (This may involve a contrast with act utilitarianism).

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the difference between deontology and rule utilitarianism.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding e.g. description of one is sound but the other is inaccurate, explanation is partially correct but there are errors of understanding, e.g. it is claimed that there is no difference.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

Illustration of the difference may focus on any moral issue and involve the law and/or generally accepted moral guidelines concerning the issue; the difference may also be illustrated with reference to rights (e.g. of minorities); it would be possible to provide an illustration where a course of action *is agreed* (e.g. both would support promise keeping) *but for different reasons*. This should involve contrasting versions of the categorical imperative (universal law, recognising others as ends and/or the rights of individuals) with this more restricted version of utilitarianism (the consequences are, generally, good if a rule obtains/if agents follow a rule or if hedonistic calculations for each and every particular circumstance are avoided especially if issues concerning general welfare are involved and others are, at least potentially, affected).

- 7 – 9 Selects a relevant issue and applies this to provide a clear illustration of the difference between deontology and rule utilitarianism.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, points or examples to provide a partial illustration (e.g. focused more on explaining the difference and/or listing criticisms rather than illustration) or provides an illustration lacking detail and precision of the difference between deontology and rule utilitarianism. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and brief illustration.
- 1 – 3 Selects at least one point or example to provide a basic, sketchy and vague account of the difference between deontology and rule utilitarianism or a relevant illustration is given but application is tangential (e.g. deontology is indistinguishable from rule utilitarianism).
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

(c) Assess deontological ethics with reference to any **one** of:

euthanasia; or  
 abortion; or  
 animal rights.

(24 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

Accounts of deontological ethics might be rooted in Kantian and/or Christian ethics. These approaches see certain acts as right or wrong in themselves; acts which are performed out of a sense of duty: what is dutiful may be decided through reason (universality, recognition of others as ends in themselves), or may be established by some ‘given’ moral standard (divine command); the motivation for the action is in accordance with a commitment to an absolute duty. The motivation or intention behind the act is important, a right act is one performed through duty and good will.

- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of deontological ethics. At the lower end of this band this will be limited in scope or depth.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of deontological ethics, e.g. discussions which drift into accounts of the ‘consequences’ of doing/not doing your duty.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.



**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

There should be a clear focus on, and understanding of, deontological ethics, its strengths and weaknesses, possibly with reference to the strengths and weaknesses of other first order theories in relation to **one** area of practical ethics.

The outline of deontology might include:

- The focus on the moral autonomy of the agent – we have a conception of ourselves as moral agents – and the concerns with what I ought to do. (What we do as individuals matters).
- The focus on reason, duty, a good will, having the right motives and intentions (regardless of inclinations and consequences), universality and the moral law.
- Examples of perfect and/or imperfect duties (suicide, promising, self-development, concern for others) **or** of Christian values.
- The view that deontological ethics have, as a matter of fact, informed actual ethical thinking/moral codes.

Critical material may discuss:

- The strict nature of deontological ethics, most moral agents can't meet the demands of deontologists.
- Is it too focused on reason (or command)? What place is there for emotion, sympathy, character? Don't these also have moral worth?
- Is it an inadequate guide to actual conduct, on what directions we should take? Does it help when the problem of what to do when duties conflict arises?
- Should we never consider consequences **or** what the consequences would be if maxims were universally observed?
- Is there a constraint on what can be universalised?

Some of these points may be implicit in references to what deontologists have said about a specific area of practical ethics.

- 7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed analysis of a deontological approach to an area of practical ethics.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of a deontological approach to an area of practical ethics. Answers in this band may accurately raise issues concerning deontology in a generalised way with limited references to an area of practical ethics.
- 1 – 3 Selects and applies some points to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of deontological ethics, or some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a tangential approach to deontological ethics (e.g. utilitarian concepts feature prominently or there are no references to an area of practical ethics).
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

**Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)**

Evaluation is likely to follow from, and be present in, points selected for discussion. Beyond this:

- Deontology may be contrasted with, and assessed against, other normative theories (utilitarianism and virtue theory).
  - This might lead to some general conclusions concerning deontology – dreary and uninspiring, abstract and formal, impractical, incoherent account of freedom, etc. or (more positively) to a defence of the roles of freedom, reason and rights in moral thinking.
- 7 – 9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments concerning deontological ethics and advances a clear position.
- 4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning deontological ethics, but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points/theoretical approaches or asserted with inadequate supportive explanation.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of at least one argument concerning deontology in which a view is described, or points are listed or asserted without justification, or argument is confused.
- 0 No relevant philosophical insights.

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**3.**

**Total for this question: 45 marks**

(a) Briefly explain **one** difficulty resulting from the claim that God is transcendent. (6 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **one** difficulty resulting from the claim that God is transcendent. This might include the view that a transcendent entity is unknowable through experience and that religious experience, whatever it is, is not experience of God; the view that it is difficult to conceive of and/or form a relationship with such a Being; the view that no reasoned inference from our experience of the world to God as a transcendent creator can be made and, therefore, certain arguments for the existence of God fail; the view that religious language is meaningless (speculative metaphysics), etc. At the lower end of the mark band expect an accurate identification of a difficulty with a brief or partial explanation of why it is a difficulty.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and partial understanding, either by identifying and very briefly describing a difficulty, or a difficulty is referred to but explanation is confused or tangential.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

(b) Outline and illustrate **one** philosophical explanation of how religious language is meaningful. (15 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

One philosophical explanation is likely to be drawn from:

- Language is meaningful in and through its recognisable uses/and or functions. The functions of sacred terms, signs and symbols (to inspire awe, express commitment, reaffirm value, define purposes and goals, etc.) are meaningful to those playing a religious language game and committed to a religious form of life.
- Religious language represents and expresses commitment to a set of cultural, moral and spiritual values. This also might be connected to aspects of faith (commitment, trust, etc.) and/or to religious experience, seeing ‘reality’ in a particular way, forms of life and language games.
- Religious language is meaningful because it can be verified (the notion of eschatological verification).

- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **one** philosophical explanation of how religious language is meaningful.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding by offering a limited or confused account of at least one aspect of how religious language is meaningful.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

### Selection and Application (9 marks)

Illustrations/examples of religious and/or, if language is interpreted broadly, of religious symbols likely to feature include familiar expressions from religious texts, prayers or hymns; expressions of faith/commitment/trust; descriptions of religious sentiment and feelings such as love, warmth, awe, dread; descriptions of the wonder of God's creation; explanations of religious and/or mystical experience and inspiration, etc.

- 7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, a relevant example which helps to provide a clear exposition of the qualities of religious language and a clear illustration of how it is meaningful.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, an example to provide a partial illustration, poorly focused on meaning, or lacking detail and precision, or an expression which helps to demonstrate the nature of religious language. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and brief illustration.
- 1 – 3 Selects an example, or raises issues to provide a basic, sketchy and vague account of the meaning of religious language, **or** an illustration is given but application with regard to religious language is spurious or tangential.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

|                                                                                                                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>(c) Assess whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God. <span style="float: right;"><i>(24 marks)</i></span></p> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

### Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

There should be some attempt to clarify the notion of religious experience:

- An experience caused by God.
- An experience possessing certain phenomenological properties.
- A life-changing experience, etc.

Religious experiences are typically seen as a non-inferential way of knowing God (although they may also be presented as a version of the teleological argument – God's existence explains certain features of our experience of the world).

- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the concept of religious experience.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of the concept of religious experience.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

Discussion could involve:

- Reference to philosophers who see religious experience as contributing to belief in God, e.g. Otto, James, Swinburne.
- Accounts of experience which illustrates the characteristics employed in distinguishing it as religious as opposed to non-religious experience. For example, aspects of the immediate and direct nature of religious experience (e.g. its felt quality, the feeling of awe, reverence, exhilaration, fascination, etc.) or of the impact of religious experience (e.g. visible signs of changed behaviour). There may be reference to biblical examples. This may involve (but should not dwell upon) miracles.
- (Possibly) the view that all experience is religious.

Or, more critically:

- Issues concerning credibility/testimony and/or whether the experience can be communicated to others, or demonstrate God's existence for others (who have not had the experience) and/or related difficulties of accounting for why some have experiences which are, allegedly, religious and some do not.
- The difficulties of distinguishing religious experiences from other experiences and, particularly, of demonstrating that the source of the experience was God.

- 7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed analysis of whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God.
- 1 – 3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God, **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a tangential approach to whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

**Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)**

Evaluation is likely to be present in issues selected for discussion, beyond this a range of positions might be argued:

- Language is meaningful to the extent that it employs concepts derived from experience and expresses propositions which can be confirmed through experience. Claims about religious experience may involve the former, but not the latter. To an extent, then, we might be inclined to disregard such claims as not meaningful. Also, isn't it more credible to see claims about religious experience as reflections of certain psychological factors, commitments, needs, forms of life?
  - On the other hand, is it appropriate to speak of 'demonstrating' God's existence? Can't we accept faith as a route to God and a path to experiencing the world in a religious way? Even from outside of a language game/form of life, we can understand claims about religious experience and we do have some evidence about the nature of religious experiences that some have (changed lives, etc.).
  - The alleged analogy between sense experience and religious experience.
- 7 – 9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation concerning whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God and advances a clear position.
- 4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning whether religious experiences demonstrate the existence of God, but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points/theoretical approaches or asserted with limited supportive explanation.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of some arguments concerning religious experience in which a view is described, or points are listed or asserted without justification, or argument is confused.
- 0 No relevant philosophical insights.

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4.

**Total for this question: 45 marks**

(a) Briefly explain the meaning of the word ‘miracle’.

(6 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the meaning of the word ‘miracle’. A number of definitions of a miracle might be offered: an event which does not accord with the laws of nature; an event that cannot be explained in terms of known laws; an event that is not an instance of any law at all, known or unknown; an event that is not preceded by conditions which, if repeated, are sufficient to cause the event to happen again. Whichever definition is used, it should be linked to an event which demonstrates divine intervention in the course of things. Definitions may be briefly illustrated by biblical and more modern examples (e.g. resurrection, weeping statues, etc.). Answers at the bottom of this band will be accurate but brief.

1 – 3 Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding of the meaning of the word ‘miracle’, either through offering a partial definition (e.g. an unusual event) without reference to divine intervention, or by accurately describing a miracle (e.g. water to wine) without explaining the meaning of the term. At the bottom of this band answers will be extremely vague.

0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

(b) Outline and illustrate **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God.

(15 marks)

**Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)**

It is likely that a teleological argument will be briefly outlined, e.g. as an *a posteriori* argument drawing from features of the world and particularly evidence of design to the purpose, goal or end of an intelligent designer. Criticisms are likely to be drawn from:

- Problems concerning the nature of the evidence – how much order, regularity, beauty, etc. is there in the world and/or what about disorder, chaos, ugliness, etc.
- Even if there is order, regularity and beauty in the universe, what inference does this license? An inference to God, many gods, trainee gods, etc.
- Whether cosmic design provides evidence for the existence of the God of classical theism.

- Whether it is correct to infer design from evidence of order or Hume’s point that, given the ‘entirely singular’ nature of the effect, “I do not see that we could form any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause”.
  - The use of weak analogies to support the argument from design.
- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God, e.g. a range of criticisms are all briefly listed so that *one* isn’t developed or is blurred into another.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

### Selection and Application (9 marks)

Depending on the criticism selected, illustrations might provide an account of various imperfections; outline weak analogies; explain inferences to a team of designers and/or imperfect designers; explain where inferences may be legitimately made and where they may not; outline the attributes of an intelligent designer and how this departs from those qualities typically attributed to God, etc.

- 7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, a relevant example and clearly illustrates **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God.
- 4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, an example or examples to provide a partial account, lacking detail and precision, of **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God. Answers in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition rather than illustration. At the bottom of this band more than one criticism may be explained/illustrated.
- 1 – 3 Selects at least one point or example to provide a basic sketchy and vague account of **one** criticism of the teleological argument for the existence of God, **or** a relevant illustration is given but application is tangential.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

|                                                               |                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| (c) Assess the ontological argument for the existence of God. | <i>(24 marks)</i> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|

### Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

The ontological argument for the existence of God is an attempt to establish His existence without recourse to empirical evidence from a purely formal consideration of the concept of God. It is an attempt to establish that God is a necessary being, that the concept of God is necessarily instantiated. It is an *a priori* argument.

- 4 – 6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the ontological argument.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of the ontological argument.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.



**Selection and Application (9 marks)**

Outlines of the argument and supporting arguments, as presented by Descartes or Anselm, will probably be provided. It should be clear how God's existence is supposed to follow from a consideration of His nature ('a being than which none greater can be conceived', 'a supremely perfect being', etc.).

It is likely that some critical points will be selected for discussion. These might be drawn from:

- Existence is not a perfection, property, predicate.
- Necessity does not apply to existence.
- It is not possible to build bridges from the conceptual to the real.
- It has absurd consequences (the overload objection).
- It is inappropriate to use logic to demonstrate the existence of God. His existence is revealed experientially and our experiences of God do not include experiences of His logical necessity.

7 – 9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear, detailed analysis of the ontological argument.

4 – 6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of the ontological argument.

1 – 3 Selects and applies some points to provide a basic, sketchy and vague explanation of the ontological argument **or** some relevant points feature among irrelevant points in a tangential approach to the ontological argument.

0 No relevant philosophical points.

**Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)**

Evaluation is likely to be present through the (critical) points selected for discussion, i.e. these will be presented as an evaluation of the quality of the argument (and may lead candidates to reject the argument). Beyond this:

- There may be an attempt to assess some of the criticisms. For example, is it logically improper to use exists as a predicate? Does the argument have absurd consequences? It might be difficult to prove which supremely perfect being exists, but there can only be one and the argument does not overload the world. Is it difficult to prove which supremely perfect being exists? Is 'Super Pegasus' supremely perfect or limited by its physical form rather than possessing infinite forms?
- Objections about using logical reasoning confuse a point about the existence of God with a point about proving the existence of God.
- Some may argue that the argument appears to have a valid form.

- 7 – 9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of the ontological argument and advances a clear position.
- 4 – 6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of the ontological argument and various criticisms, but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points or asserted with inadequate supportive explanation.
- 1 – 3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of the ontological argument by offering an account in which a view is described, or points are listed or asserted without justification, or argument is confused.
- 0 No relevant philosophical insights.