



ASSESSMENT and
QUALIFICATIONS
ALLIANCE

Mark scheme

June 2003

GCE

Philosophy

Unit PLY1

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AS PHILOSOPHY UNIT 1

Candidates must answer one question.

1

Total for this question: 45 marks

- (a) *Briefly explain what is meant by global (or total) scepticism.* (6 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the term ‘global scepticism’. Explanation could be rooted in any of the following: we do not have any knowledge because the knowledge we have falls short of absolute certainty; nothing satisfies the criteria of justification in a knowledge claim; we cannot demonstrate that sensory evidence corresponds to reality.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic or partial knowledge and understanding by explaining scepticism, rather than global scepticism, or by a partial or confused explanation of global scepticism. Answers which link systematic doubt to foundationalism should be placed in this band as should answers consisting of brief but accurate definitions.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

- (b) *Explain and illustrate the rationalist view that some concepts are **not** drawn from experience.* (15 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of the view that we have some concepts that are *not* drawn from experience. Candidates might outline rationalism generally, as the view that reason is the source of at least some of our concepts or as the view that some concepts precede and structure experience or as the view that some concepts are innate. Any one of these approaches is sufficient for full marks if it is well explained and/or associated with an account of a particular rationalist approach such as that of Plato, Descartes or Kant.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding probably through offering a confused account. Tangential responses, focusing more generally on knowledge but displaying an understanding of rationalism, should be rewarded in this band.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Illustrations of at least one concept or aspect of our conceptual framework which, arguably, does not derive from experience should be provided. This might include the ability to grasp universals, of self or of God, moral intuition, causation, eventless time or any other reasonable example.

- 7-9 Selects, or constructs, at least one relevant point or example and applies this to provide a clear illustration of the view that we have some concepts that are *not* drawn from experience.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, at least one point or example to provide a partial illustration, lacking detail and precision, of the view that we have some concepts that are *not* drawn from experience. At the bottom of this band illustration may be implicitly about concepts in the context of an explicit focus on knowledge, argument and truth. Responses in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and brief illustration.

- 1-3 Selects at least one illustrative point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague account of the view that we have some concepts that are *not* drawn from experience (e.g. it is not clear that the example provided is of a concept) **or** a relevant example is used but application to the question is tangential.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

(c) *Assess empiricism.*

(24 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

Empiricism should be described, probably as the view that sense experience is the source of our knowledge and conceptual framework or as the view that sense experience is the source of important rather than trivial knowledge. Genuine, or important, knowledge claims describe that which can be verified or falsified through sense experience. Meaningful talk is expressed in experiential terms. Some may refer to the radical empiricist view that all knowledge, including analytical propositions, is rooted in experience and/or that no knowledge is genuinely a priori. References may be made to contingency, synthetic propositions and a posteriori knowledge and/or to Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell, Ayer etc. Good answers may give an account of empiricism generally or focus on one empiricist approach.

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of empiricism.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding of empiricism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Depending on the approach taken, some of the following, or equivalent, points will be raised:

- Empiricists tend to be sceptical about the validity of knowledge claims not defined in experiential terms – for example claims about ethics, religion, universals and so on – and sceptical about the role of reason, intellect and intuition in gaining knowledge.
- Issues concerning what is revealed directly and non-inferentially in sense experience and what can be inferred from it. This may lead to a discussion of perception and some theories of perception.
- Problems concerning the justification of inferential knowledge, e.g. the problem of induction, whether justification requires non-empirical assumptions to be made and whether, without these, empiricism leads to scepticism.
- The paradox of empiricism – are empiricist claims empirically based?

- 7-9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of philosophical arguments about empiricism.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, either narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of philosophical arguments about empiricism.
- 1-3 Selects and applies some relevant points to provide a basic, sketchy and vague, explanation of philosophical arguments about empiricism **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a tangential approach to philosophical arguments about empiricism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

A range of argumentation is possible:

- Evaluative points may feature in the treatment of various issues and points selected for discussion without any additional ‘summing-up’.
- It could be argued that experience is clearly important in the generation of knowledge *but* that it is less clear how experience justifies knowledge. This may be linked to a discussion of the limitations of knowledge and scepticism.
- It could be argued that an adequate account of our conceptual framework cannot be given in purely experiential terms and/or that general principles which are not derived empirically underpin our experience.

7-9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments concerning empiricism and advances a clear position.

4-6 Evaluation is present within an exposition of arguments concerning empiricism but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points/theoretical approaches or asserted with limited supportive explanation.

1-3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning empiricism in which a view is merely described, or points are listed or asserted without justification, or the argument is confused.

0 No relevant philosophical insights.

2

Total for this question: 45 marks

- (a) *Identify **two** differences between naïve realism and representative realism.* (6 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **two** differences between naïve and representative realism: naïve realism is the view of ‘the man in the street’, whereas representative realism is a philosophical position; naïve realists claim that we perceive objects directly and/or there are no subjective intermediaries, whereas representative realists claim that we perceive objects indirectly and/or that we are directly aware of subjective intermediaries; naïve realists claim that objects really do have the properties they are perceived to have (under normal perceptual conditions) whereas representative realists claim that the secondary qualities of objects are powers rather than properties of the object; naïve realists claim that the senses are generally reliable whereas representative realists attempt to accommodate unreliability. At the lower end of the mark-band explanations of one difference may lack clarity or two differences may be blurred together.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge or partial understanding by giving an accurate account of one difference or by giving a confused account of two differences.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

- (b) *Explain and illustrate **one** criticism of naïve realism.* (15 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of **one** criticism of naïve realism. For example, naïve realism does not withstand sceptical arguments concerning perception such as illusion, dreams, deception and/or refuses to acknowledge a genuine philosophical problem concerning the indistinguishability of non-veridical and veridical perceptions; the view that physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is false and objects do not have the properties they are perceived to have; the view that the same object appears differently to different perceivers and under different conditions and the associated problem of privileging one appearance over another. At the lower end of the mark-band explanations are likely to include more than one criticism and possibly list criticisms.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge and partial understanding by offering a confused account of one criticism of naïve realism or an account of a criticism which is not clearly a criticism of naïve realism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

The criticism could be illustrated through reference to the ways in which different perceivers, or beings with different perceptual faculties, experience the same object; through reference to various illusory or hallucinatory experiences and/or through appropriate references to subjective intermediaries (such as the *bent* stick in water); through reference to Descartes’ malicious demon and/or contemporary versions of the argument; through reference to the properties of objects that science informs us about.

- 7-9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points or examples and applies these to provide a clear and precise illustration of **one** criticism of naïve realism.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, an example to provide a partial illustration lacking detail and precision of **one** criticism of naïve realism or uses an example or examples as a basis for listing critical points about naïve realism. Answers in this band may be characterised by detailed exposition and brief illustration.
- 1-3 Selects at least one example or point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague illustration of **one** criticism of naïve realism **or** a relevant example is given but application is tangential to naïve realism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

(c) *Assess representative realism.*

(24 marks)

Knowledge and Understanding (6 marks)

- 4-6 Demonstrates precise knowledge and understanding of representative realism: the view that we gain knowledge of reality indirectly; reality, an external realm of physical objects, is the cause of our perceptual experience but what we are directly aware of in perception is a representation (sensation, sense-experience, impression, idea); in non-veridical experience what we are directly aware of is a misrepresentation; physical objects exist behind a veil of perception; the primary-secondary quality distinction.
- 1-3 Demonstrates basic knowledge of limited aspects of representative realism or partial understanding of representative realism through a confusing or general account of the problems of perception.
- 0 No relevant philosophical knowledge and understanding.

Selection and Application (9 marks)

Candidates are likely to select and apply some of the following or equivalent points:

- Representative realism is compatible with the existence of illusory or deceptive experience – with the view that in such cases what we directly perceive cannot be an object.
- It is compatible with what science tells us about the ‘real’ nature of physical objects – that they are constituted by separated particles with the primary properties of mass, charge, etc. – which isn’t how we perceive them.
- It is compatible with the way we process information – the analogy with media representation.

Critical points are likely to focus on:

- Scepticism. How do we know that objects resemble our representations of them? How do we know there is anything there at all?
- Are the analogous arguments (e.g. the operator in the telephone exchange) used to illustrate representative realism coherent? Are they self-defeating?

- 7-9 Selects, or constructs, relevant points and examples and applies these to provide a clear detailed analysis of philosophical arguments about representative realism.
- 4-6 Selects, or constructs, some relevant points and examples to provide a partial analysis, narrowly focused or lacking detail and precision, of philosophical arguments about representative realism.
- 1-3 Selects and applies at least one relevant point to provide a basic, sketchy and vague , analysis of philosophical arguments about representative realism **or** some relevant points feature among many irrelevant points in a tangential approach to philosophical arguments about representative realism.
- 0 No relevant philosophical points.

Interpretation and Evaluation (9 marks)

A range of argumentation is possible:

- What we are directly aware of in perception is a representation *and* the hypothesis of an external world causing these representations is the best explanation.
- What we are directly aware of in perception is an external world. The fact that we know objects only through their appearances does not necessitate the view that we are aware of something other than the objects themselves. (A direct realist response.)
- What we are aware of in perception is an idea (sensation, sense-experience, impression, etc.) – end of story. (An idealist or phenomenalist response.)

- 7-9 Demonstrates a critical appreciation of arguments concerning representative realism and advances a clear position.
- 4-6 Evaluation is present within a clear exposition of arguments about representative realism but is either implicit in a juxtaposition of points/theoretical approaches or asserted with limited supportive explanation.
- 1-3 Demonstrates a simple and basic appreciation of arguments concerning representative realism in which a view is merely described, points may be listed or asserted without justification, or the argument is confused.
- 0 No relevant philosophical insights.