

**ADVANCED GCE****HISTORY B**

Historical Controversies – British History

**F985**

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet

**OCR Supplied Materials:**

- 16 page Answer Booklet

**Other Materials Required:**

None

**3 May 2010 – 14 May 2010****Duration: 3 hours****INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Write your name clearly in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Use black ink.
- Read each question carefully and make sure that you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Answer **both sub-questions** from **one** Study Topic.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

**INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES**

- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **60**.
- This paper contains questions on the following 4 Study Topics:
  - The debate over the impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216
  - The debate over Britain's 17th-century crises, 1629–89
  - Different interpretations of British imperialism c.1850–c.1950
  - The debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure and argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Extract in the one Option you have studied.
- In answering these questions, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you understand and interpret the Extract as well as to inform your answers.
- **You may refer to your class notes and textbooks during the examination.**
- This document consists of **8** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

**1 The debate over the impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216**

*Read the following extract about the impact of the Norman Conquest and then answer the questions that follow.*

But in our view of William as an English statesman, the main feature of all is that spirit of formal legality of which we have so often spoken. Its direct effects, partly designed, partly undesigned, have affected our whole history to this day. It was his policy to disguise the fact of conquest, to cause all the spoils of conquest to be held, in outward form, according to the ancient law of England. The fiction became a fact, and the fact greatly helped in the process of fusion between Normans and English. The conquering race could not keep itself distinct from the conquered, and the form which the fusion took was for the conquerors to be lost in the greater mass of the conquered. William founded no new state, no new nation, no new constitution; he simply kept what he found, with such modifications as his position made needful. But without any formal change in the nature of English kingship, his position enabled him to clothe the crown with a practical power such as it had never held before, to make his rule, in short, a virtual despotism. These two facts determined the later course of English history, and they determined it to the lasting good of the English nation. The conservative instincts of William allowed our national life and our national institutions to live on unbroken through his conquest. The despotism of the crown made Normans and English one people. The old institutions lived on, to be clothed with a fresh life, to be modified as changed circumstances might make needful. The despotism of the Norman kings enabled the great revolution of the thirteenth century to take the forms which it took, at once conservative and progressive.

It has been remarked a thousand times that, while other nations have been driven to destroy and to rebuild the political fabric, in England we have never had to destroy and rebuild, but have found it enough to repair, to enlarge, and to improve. This characteristic of English history is mainly owing to the events of the eleventh century, and owing above all to the personal agency of William. As far as mortal man can guide the course of things when he is gone, the course of our national history since William's day has been the result of William's character and of William's acts. Well may we restore to him the surname that men gave him in his own day. He may worthily take his place as William the Great alongside of Alexander, Constantine and Charles. They may have wrought in some sort a greater work, because they had a wider stage to work it on. But no man ever wrought a greater and more abiding work on the stage that fortune gave him than he. Stranger and conqueror, his deeds won him a right to a place on the roll of English statesmen, and no man that came after him has won a right to a higher place.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretations, approaches and methods of this historian? Refer to the extract and your own knowledge to support your answer. [30]
- (b) When studying the Norman Conquest, some historians have focused on the importance of gender issues. Explain how this has contributed to our understanding of the impact of the Norman Conquest. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach? [30]

## 2 The debate over Britain's 17th-century crises, 1629–89

Read the following extract about Britain's 17th-century crises and then answer the questions that follow.

If we want to understand the Civil War, a glance at a map is far more important than the most elaborate analysis of members of Parliament. Support for Parliament came from the economically advanced south and east of England, the King's support from the economically backward areas of the north and west. In Yorkshire, Lancashire, and Sussex there was a clear division between Parliamentary industrial areas and Royalist agricultural areas. In Yorkshire the clothing town of Bradford summoned the countryside and forced Lord Fairfax to lead them into action against the King. In Staffordshire a group of 'Moorlanders' led by 'a person of low quality' bore the brunt of the early fighting for Parliament. Town oligarchies were royalist, and had to be overthrown before the Parliamentary sentiments of the majority of the citizens could express themselves. Many towns in the area controlled by the King long held out for Parliament: the defence of Gloucester, Hull and Plymouth frustrated the royal advance on London in 1643. But only Cathedral cities like Oxford and Chester were Royalist. Royalist strongholds were aristocratic houses like the Marquis of Winchester's Basing House. The ports were mostly for Parliament. So was the navy.

The very names 'Cavalier' (swashbuckling officer) and 'Roundhead' (crop-haired citizen) imply a social sneer: the upper classes wore their hair long. These social distinctions were very clear to contemporaries. The Earl of Clarendon said that 'Leeds, Halifax and Bradford, depending wholly upon the cloth industry naturally maligned the gentry', and were wholly at Parliament's disposal. In Wiltshire 'gentlemen of ancient families and estates' were 'for the most part well-affected to the King', whilst 'a people of inferior degree who, by successful farming, clothing and other thriving activities, had gotten very great fortunes were good friends to the Parliament'.

Preachings were made 'by tradesmen and illiterate people of the lowest rank'. Their discussions, not confined to purely religious subjects, attracted large audiences. To conservatives, it seemed that nothing was to remain sacred. Hyde defended the Church of England and bishops because he 'could not conceive how the government of the state could survive if the government of the church were altered'; the abolition of bishops was 'the removing of a landmark and the shaking of the very foundations of government'.

Sir John Hotham changed sides to the King in 1642. He explained why he did so: 'the people of the whole kingdom will presently rise in mighty numbers and set up for themselves to the utter ruin of all the nobility and gentry'.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your own knowledge to explain your answer. [30]
- (b) Some historians have focused on short term factors such as the role of individuals and accidental events in their study of Britain's seventeenth-century crises. Explain how this has contributed to our understanding of the seventeenth-century crises. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? [30]

### 3 Different interpretations of British imperialism c.1850–c.1950

*Read the following extract about British imperialism and then answer the questions that follow.*

At the centre of late-Victorian imperialism in Africa lies an apparent paradox. The main streams of British trade, investment and migration continued to leave British tropical Africa practically untouched; and yet it was tropical Africa that was now bundled into the empire. The late-Victorians seemed to be concentrating their imperial effort in the continent of least importance to their prosperity.

It cannot be taken for granted that positive impulses from European society or the European economy were alone in starting up imperial rivalries. The collapse of African governments under the strain of previous Western influences may have played a part. Hence, crises in Africa, no less than imperial ambitions and international rivalries in Europe, have to be taken into account. Allowance has also to be made for the diversity of interest and circumstance in the different regions of Africa. It seems unlikely that the motives in regions as different as Egypt, the Niger and South Africa can be fitted easily into a single, simple formula of 'imperialism'.

A first task in analyzing the late-Victorians' share in the partition is to understand the motives of the ministers who directed it. Policy-making was a reading of the long-run national interest which stayed much the same from government to government. This is not to say that they were fully aware of the forces at work. Their recorded assumptions did not always bring out fully their unconscious assumptions. What is more, there are many things too well understood between colleagues to be written down. There is no denying limitations to the study of how and why policy was decided.

Did new, sustained or compelling impulses towards African empire arise in British politics or business during the 1880s? The businessman saw no greater future there, except in the south. The evidence seems unconvincing. The late-Victorians seem to have been no keener to rule and develop Africa than their fathers. Their territorial claims were not made for the sake of African empire or commerce as such. They were little more than by-products of an enforced search for better security in the Mediterranean and the East. It was national safety that moved the ruling elite.

Why could the late-Victorians after 1880 no longer rely upon influence to protect traditional interests? What forced the late-Victorians into imperial solutions? The answer is to be found in the nationalist crises in Africa itself. From start to finish the partition of tropical Africa was driven by persistent crisis in Egypt. By 1882 the Egyptian government had cracked. It was the internal nationalist reaction against a decaying government which switched European rivalries into Africa. Britain's overriding purpose in Africa was security in Egypt, the Mediterranean and the Orient.

Because it went far ahead of commercial expansion and imperial ambition, because its aims were essentially defensive and strategic, the movement into Africa remained superficial. That British governments before 1900 did very little to pacify, administer and develop their spheres of influence shows the weaknesses of any commercial and imperial motives for claiming them. The partition preceded the invasion of tropical Africa by the trader, the planter and the official. It was the extension of territorial claims which in time required commercial expansion.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your own knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) Some historians have focused on the issue of gender in their study of British Imperialism. Explain how this has contributed to our understanding of British Imperialism. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

#### 4 The debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s

*Read the following extract about appeasement and then answer the questions that follow.*

Chamberlain saw no gains for Britain in another war, and despite the pious assumptions of British historians, it is by no means clear that the results of the Second World War justified the sacrifices it involved. The old balance between fascist and communist powers on the continent was tipped decidedly in favour of the latter, whilst the economic and diplomatic foundations of the British Empire received a mortal blow. The world was handed over to a struggle between America and Russia.

The Chiefs of Staff reported in November 1937 that ‘we could not hope to confront satisfactorily Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously’ and that, with little prospect of help from other Powers, it was vitally important for diplomacy to ‘reduce the number of our potential enemies’. Chamberlain’s course in foreign policy was designed to meet these various demands. Better relations with either Italy or Germany would enable him to reduce the crippling burden of armaments spending – nothing else would.

The refusal of Chamberlain to commit himself to guarantee the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia, containing as it did the seed of the policy which blossomed at Munich, has incurred the censure of historians. One historian convicts the Prime Minister of blindness to the ‘simple and obvious truth about German intentions’ since ‘it does not seem to have occurred to him that the German grievances in the Sudetenland were simply a pretext’. Chamberlain was not blind to the possibility that Hitler might be aiming at something wider than self-determination for the Sudetens, but that seemed insufficient reason to refuse this demand. Nor had Chamberlain abandoned the Czechs; they had not asked for British help and he had not offered it. Those who persist in believing that Chamberlain was an obstinate, old gentleman who knew nothing about Europe or diplomacy ignore a few truths. His policy was not a ‘personal’ policy but one which took note of economic and political considerations. None of these things suggested that a British guarantee to Czechoslovakia would be a useful way of deterring Hitler (it might, in passing, be noted that if Hitler was really determined on war, there is no reason to suppose that he would have been deterred).

The British rearmament programme would not peak until 1939–40, and even then it would not equip the country for a war on the Continent. Nor could Britain have relied upon much help. Although the French had an alliance with the Czechs, they had no plans to help them. As for the Russians, the British Military Attache in Moscow reported that the recent purges in the Red Army had ‘had a disastrous effect’ on its ‘morale and efficiency’.

It has been pointed out that the German Chiefs of Staff were as pessimistic about their capacity to wage a successful war as their British counterparts, and that the balance of forces was not as unfavourable as the British thought. This is true, but it ignores not only all the reasons already outlined for not gambling on the chance of war in 1938, but also the fact that Chamberlain, unlike Hitler, objected to gambling with human lives. It was by no means as apparent to contemporary diplomats as it seems to be to modern historians that peace was a doomed cause.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your own knowledge to explain your answer. [30]
- (b) In their work on appeasement some historians have focused on Hitler and his aims. Explain how this has contributed to our understanding of British appeasement. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? [30]





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