


**ADVANCED GCE**  
**HISTORY**  
Historical Interpretations and Investigations

**F965**

**JANUARY AND JUNE 2010**



**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- You must submit one piece of work, up to 2000 words long, for the Interpretations task. Interpretations tasks are set by OCR.
- You must also submit one piece of work, up to 2000 words long, for the Investigation element. This may either be an approved OCR Investigation title or an adapted generic OCR question.
- Your answers must be submitted in the format specified in the *History Coursework Guidance* document.

**INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES**

- Each question carries **40** marks. The total number of marks available for the unit is **80**.
- You are reminded that before submitting your final answers you must refer to the relevant table of prohibited combinations of investigation and interpretation questions.
- For the interpretation questions, answers should be based on the arguments presented by these historians, any evidence they present and your own knowledge of the topic.

**Content**

<b>Topic</b>	<b>Page</b>
1. The Age of Justinian	2
2. The Reign of Charlemagne 768-814	11
3. Alfred the Great 871-899	18
4. The Reign of King John 1199 – 1215	25
5. The Wars of the Roses 1450-85	33
6. Philip II of Spain 1556-98	40
7. Elizabeth I 1558-1603	47
8. Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658	54
9. Peter the Great 1689-1725	61
10. Louis XIV 1661-1715	70
11. British India 1784-1857	78
12. Napoleon I, 1795-1815	86
13. Gladstone and Disraeli 1865-86	94
14. Bismarck and German Unification 1815-71	101
15. Russian Revolutions 1894-1924	108
16. America Between the Wars 1918 – 1941	115
17. The Causes of World War II 1918-41	123
18. The Cold War 1941-56	130
19. The War in Vietnam, 1955–1975	137
20. The Development of Rights of Women in Great Britain 1867-1918	145
21. Nazi Germany 1933-1945	152
22. Britain under Margaret Thatcher 1979-90	160

## 1. The Age of Justinian

### 1a. Justinian's religious policies.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Justinian's religious policies created far more problems than they solved.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Justinian's policies had some, if limited, success.

Justinian I was a Christian, orthodox, full of zeal for the purity of the faith, and waged a perpetual war against Paganism and heresy. The lower classes of the population were still Pagan in many places, as, for instance, in Peloponnesus and the interior of Asia Minor; and in the upper strata of society there was a widespread religious indifference. Justinian I compelled the latter to conform, at least externally, to Christianity; and with respect to the former he boasted of conversions by the thousands. He closed the philosophical schools of Athens in 529, and banished the teachers. They went to Persia; but, by the intercession of Chosroes, they were afterwards allowed to return. He treated the Christian heretics, the Montanists, Nestorians, Eutychians, and others less leniently; and the success of the Mohammedan invasion of Egypt and Syria half a century later is generally ascribed to the total disaffection of the population, which resulted from the ecclesiastical policy of Justinian. The inhabitants of Egypt, Syria, and parts of Asia Minor, were Monophysites, and rejected the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon (451) as tainted with Nestorianism. Between orthodoxy and Monophysitism a compromise was brought about by Zeno's *Henotikon* (482); but that document, which the bishops of the Eastern Church had been compelled to subscribe to, was absolutely rejected by the Western Church, and formally anathematized by Felix II. In order to heal the schism thus established between the Eastern and Western Church, Justinian repealed the *Henotikon* immediately after his accession. But then something had to be done with the Monophysites in order to prevent a schism within the Eastern Church. The Empress Theodora, who was a secret Monophysite, persuaded her husband that the true reason why the Monophysites refused to accept the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, was that the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Ibas, had not been condemned; and that the Monophysites considered non-condemnation as implying a positive confirmation. The Emperor then issued a decree condemning the above writings, and the condemnation was repeated by the fifth ecumenical Council of Constantinople (553). The Monophysites were satisfied; but what was won in the East was lost in the West by the outbreak of the Three Chapter controversy.

From: P. Schaff, *Justinian I*, published in 1894.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Justinian's religious policies created serious problems.

The rising national particularism of the provinces had taken shape in doctrinal divergencies. The true East (Egypt and Syria) declared for Monophysitism. Asia Minor and the Balkans held to the two Natures, and with them the whole West, led by the Papacy, agreed. Now Justinian was working under three political conditions. To keep his throne stable, he had to satisfy the anti-Monophysite heart of the Empire, Constantinople and Asia Minor. To maintain the extent of the Empire, he had to restore the concord of that heart with the chief members, Egypt and Syria. To recover the West, he must be anti-Monophysite. In the long run, the task was impossible. But, in the short term, Justinian naturally tried to abolish the existing grounds of quarrel within the church. His belief in his imperial authority over church and state, his Caesaro-papism, made him use the most absolutist procedure, and he tried the most varied solutions. To accept Monophysitism was against his personal convictions, would lose the West, and set the throne rocking in Constantinople. Syria and Egypt, then, must be converted. He tried persecution, he tried concession and toleration; all in vain. He persuaded a Council (the Fifth, at Constantinople) and dragooned Pope Vigilius, whom he made captive, into condemning three dead Nestorian theologians whose heresy was at the opposite pole to Monophysitism. Although the Papacy was temporarily subdued, the West was alienated. The national divisions were not to be ended.

From: C. W. Previte-Orton, *Outlines of Medieval History*, published in 1916.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Justinian actively pursued measures related to church reform and discipline.

Justinian was also very active in the religious field during these years. Numerous laws were issued on the election of bishops and on the discipline of the clergy with a view to eliminating simony and ensuring that fit and proper persons were appointed to clerical posts and that they did their duty and led seemly lives. The election of abbots and abbesses and the discipline of monks and nuns was also regulated by imperial legislation. As important a condition of God's favour was the elimination of paganism and heresy. In a series of laws of increasing severity the disabilities inflicted on pagans, Jews, Samaritans and heretics were increased. In general he maintained the traditional toleration accorded to the Jewish cult. Samaritans, on the other hand, were treated with the full rigour of the law. Monophysites are not expressly mentioned in any of the earlier penal laws. In dealing with this problem Justinian's policy was to try to find common ground. He issued in 533 an edict in which he set forth a version of the true faith which he hoped might be acceptable to both parties. Justinian became increasingly religious with advancing years. He continued to issue laws regulating minutely the internal affairs of the church. The penal laws against pagans, Jews, Samaritans and heretics were not relaxed, and there was a renewed drive against pagan practices in 562. Justinian also continued untiringly his efforts to reconcile the monophysites to the true faith. Eventually in 553 the emperor summoned a general council at Constantinople which duly ratified his edict on The Three Chapters (serious errors in the church). Justinian nevertheless persisted in his quest for a formula which would unite the church.

From: A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Justinian's religious policies were divisive and had little real success.

Justinian was to be a Christian Emperor, not a ruler of unbelievers and decreed the destruction of all pagan statues in the capital. Worse still, he accelerated the demotion of Jews in civil status and the reduction of their freedom to exercise their religion. Long before the cities of Western Europe, Constantinople had a ghetto. He was all the more confident of the rightness of asserting imperial authority in ecclesiastical affairs because he had a real taste for theological disputation. Such an attitude did nothing to renew the loyalty to the empire of the Nestorians and Monophysites. Harrying heretics only intensified separatist feelings in parts of the Egypt and Syria. His hopes of reuniting the western and eastern churches were to be thwarted in spite of his zeal. Doctrinal divergences became more important. A Roman pope visited Justinian who spoke of Rome as the 'source of priesthood', but in the end the two Christian communions were first to go their own ways and then violently to quarrel. Justinian's own view, that the emperor was supreme, even on matters of doctrine, fell victim to clerical intransigence on both sides.

From: J. M. Roberts, *A History of the World*, published in 1976.

### 1b. Justinian's military objectives.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Justinian's western reconquests were his chief preoccupation and goal.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Justinian's military ambitions were informed by his origins, his love of Roman tradition, and his faith.

Justinian had two major passions which overrode all other considerations. He was in the first place a Roman to the core. It was his boast that Latin was his native tongue. He was, by the standards of his time, well versed in Roman history and antiquities, and took pleasure in reviving such antique titles as praetor and quaestor in their primitive significance. His respect for Roman law was profound and inspired the great work of codification which he undertook. But above all he felt it to be his mission to restore the ancient glories of the empire by recovering the provinces of the West which the barbarians had usurped, and to rescue Rome itself from shameful servitude. His second passion was religion. He was an earnest Christian, and as such felt it was his duty to crush heresy and paganism and to impose the orthodox faith on his subjects. His secular and religious objectives were to his mind complementary. For, by securing the orthodoxy of his subjects he would gain God's favour in his wars, and by his reconquest of the West he would free the church from the rule of heretics.

From: A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, published in 1964.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Justinian's major aim was to restore the Roman Empire in the West.

Justinian's aims might be summed up as unity and *Roman-ness* – and resistance to change. Full of enthusiasm for the memories of Rome, he set himself, and achieved, the task of reviving their glory. The many-sided activity of the Emperor may be summed up in military triumphs, legal work, ecclesiastical policy and architectural activity. Dominating everything was the policy of restoring the old empire, great, powerful, united. The imperial power thus set itself to eliminate all dissidence and discord in relation to a standard set by the Christian empire. It saw itself as born from a tradition looking backwards rather than forwards. Cultural contacts were not interrupted, since they also had a political aspect. The reconquest of the West remained Justinian's over-riding historical, or rather cultural, aim. Justinian was to bequeath to the imperial tradition at Byzantium a model, a goal: restoration of the old unity through reconquest of the West. Summoned in the course of dynastic conflicts, in 533 he intervened in Africa, where his general, Belisarius, carried all before him; and in 535 he intervened in Italy, where the same general landed in Sicily, crossed the Straits of Messina, and entered Rome in 536 and Ravenna in 540. One of the most spectacular achievements of the reign was indeed the recovery of large stretches of land around the western Mediterranean. As a Christian Roman Emperor, Justinian considered it his divine duty to restore the Roman Empire to its old boundaries. We should avoid falling into the common error of belittling these achievements because of their unequal duration. The 'triumph' of Belisarius in the old Rome, the reappearance of 'Romans' as far north as the Po, does represent a return to the old Empire. However, although the historic memory of Byzantium remained fixed on the West, its present and future history was to be played out in the Balkans and along the eastern frontier.

From: E. Patlagen, *The Empire in its Glory*, published in 1989.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the eastern frontier was Justinian's first priority.

His power base was the eastern empire, from the Balkans to Mesopotamia, and it was his chief concern to defend it. He paid handsomely to secure the 'Endless Peace' of 533, and made the error of imagining that it was solid. Hence he was unprepared for Khusro's attack of 540. The result was a major blow to his prestige. Yet there can be no doubt that the security of the eastern frontier was Justinian's major concern. It absorbed the largest share of the defence budget, and the record of Justinian's building activity shows that it was in that sector that he was especially anxious to maintain his prestige. In the West, Justinian's policy was opportunistic, though behind it was the dream of renewing the empire. Justinian sent Belisarius to attack the Vandal kingdom of Africa because the time seemed ripe and the African Catholics urged him to act. But the expeditionary force that Belisarius led was meagre. Justinian was taking a very small risk. Once the Vandals had fallen, Theoderic's unfortunate daughter Amalasuintha offered him an opportunity in Italy. But when the Ostrogothic kingdom proved a difficult conquest, Justinian was prepared to cut his losses and negotiate a peace which would have left the Goths in control of Italy north of the Po. It was Belisarius who was determined to capture Ravenna and got his way with a combination of perfidy to the Goths and insubordination to his emperor. We need hardly be surprised that in the grim 540s, Justinian neglected Italy and starved it of troops. His top priority was not there.

From: J.A.S. Evans, *The Age of Justinian – The Circumstances of Imperial Power*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Justinian's primary concerns were with the eastern frontier and internal reform.

The years between Justinian's accession to the throne and the early 540s saw the most concerted period of active rulership the late Roman world had witnessed since the days of Diocletian. The attempted restoration of central imperial control over the religious, legal, fiscal, and administrative life of the empire went hand in hand with Justinian's dramatic, albeit perhaps primarily opportunistic, reconquest of Vandal Africa and the opening phases of the reassertion of direct imperial rule over Ostrogothic Italy. Justinian, and, above all, his *quaestor* Tribonian, did nevertheless seek to placate conservative opinion by presenting reform as restoration, a propagandistic effort most evident in the antiquarian prefaces attached to much of Justinian's provincial legislation. Indeed, given the relatively small sums spent on the wars of reconquest, it is tempting to regard Justinian's western forays as initially perhaps part of a prestige-garnering exercise on the part of the emperor, meant further to appeal to conservative opinion at home and to sweeten the pill of internal reform.

From: Peter Sarris, *Economy and Society in the Age of Justinian*, published in 2006.

### 1c. The military collapse of Justinian's empire.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that it was Justinian's fault that his empire was ruined.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the commitments with which Justinian landed the empire proved to be a drain on resources.

It is not easy to draw up a balance sheet of Justinian's reign. Territorially, he greatly increased the empire by the recovery of lands in the West and in North Africa. But it may be questioned whether the empire was not weakened rather than strengthened by these conquests. In the first place, it may be asked whether Justinian's aggressive wars in the West did not so exhaust the Eastern parts in finance and manpower as seriously to weaken the defence of the Danube and the Eastern Front. And secondly it may be asked whether the recovered provinces of the West were not rather a liability than an asset, requiring Eastern troops to garrison them and yielding insufficient revenue to pay for their defence. The wars of reconquest were undoubtedly long and exhausting. The diversion of the empire's resources in manpower and money to the West inevitably weakened the Danube and Eastern fronts. For the last decade of the reign there was peace but the condition of the reconquered provinces was far from happy. Financially the Western provinces can hardly have paid their way during the period; they certainly can have contributed nothing towards the general expenses of the empire. In manpower they were undoubtedly a drain on the resources of the Eastern parts. Italy was depopulated by the war and could furnish no recruits, and very few Ostrogoths took service under the empire. Africa made some contribution: not only were a substantial number of Vandals transported to the Eastern front, but Moors were also recruited for service overseas. But these cannot have compensated for the large number of Egyptian troops required for the garrison of Africa. The wars of reconquest had lasted longer than they need have done because Justinian had refused to expend the men and money needed to achieve a quick decision, and, as a result Italy, and to a lesser extent Africa, were so exhausted by the time that they were finally pacified that they could contribute little to the revenues of the empire. Though the Western wars cannot be said to have exhausted the empire, their net result was to saddle it with heavy military commitments without any countervailing increase in its resources.

From: A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, published in 1964.



**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the western reconquests inflicted particular harm on the Byzantine position in the Balkans but also that the revival of warfare with Persia was the emperor's chief concern and expense.

In his reaction to the revival of the menace of Persia, Justinian showed that he was no dreamer. The war in Italy was instantly relegated to a backwater. In coming years Justinian was prepared to spend more money on impressing the Persian ambassador in Constantinople than on all the armies in the reconquered western provinces. From the Black Sea to Damascus, the emperor's foresight was crystallized in stone. Justinian's fortifications along his eastern frontier are the most refined example of Roman architecture. They still stand in the desert as tangible reminders of the overriding priority of the Near East in the policies of the east Roman state. While the eastern provincials were sheltered from the consequences of Justinian's western commitments, his fellow countrymen in the Balkans felt the strain directly. The Balkan garrisons were stripped to provide levies for the western armies. The Danube frontier became permeable again. In the 540s Slavs raided deep into Roman territory. From 559 onwards Constantinople itself was frequently menaced by the revival of the great confederacies of Turkic nomads – heirs to the empire of Atilla: first the Bulgars, followed by the Avars. To regain the remote Latinity of Italy and Africa, Justinian weakened the living Latin core of the east Roman state in the Balkans. The Slav settlement of the Balkans was a direct consequence of Justinian's western ambitions.

From: Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Justinian's military policies had successes.

In fact his efforts to turn the clock back to the great days of the universal Roman Empire had astonishing initial success. A small expedition was launched against the Vandal kingdom of North Africa, the longest standing thorn in Constantinople's flesh, under the brilliant general Belisarius, and the people who had terrorized the Mediterranean in the fifth century were rapidly conquered. The emperor's whirlwind success was celebrated in the extravagant prologues attached to the massive Code of Roman Law which he issued in 529. Throughout the 530s, his military success continued with an invasion of Sicily and Italy, and by 540 the Ostrogoths had lost their main political centres of Rome and Ravenna. By his death in 565 Justinian appeared to have succeeded in restoring the glories of Rome. The Arian kingdoms of Africa and Italy had been returned to imperial rule, and even the Burgundian kingdom was taken over by Justinian's Frankish allies in the 530s. Only Visigothic Spain held out, and it was threatened by internal dissensions and a Byzantine salient around Cartagena. In other ways Justinian's reign marked a new beginning for the Roman Empire. His ideals of autocracy and Romano-Christian universalism became a programme to which all later Byzantine emperors subscribed. The upheavals of the fifth century had not destroyed the relatively uniform Roman life of the Mediterranean.

From: T. Brown, *The Transformation of the Roman Mediterranean*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation D:** The historian argues that the empire's problems after Justinian's reign were caused by events outside the emperor's control and by the failure of his domestic reform programme. He emphasises especially the financial impact of plague.

In 565 Justinian died. The memory of Justinian was to loom large in the minds of subsequent generations of emperors, just as the physical monuments built in Constantinople during his reign were long to dominate the medieval city. Nevertheless, in spite of the grandeur of Justinian's project, buffeted by plague, frustrated by deeply entrenched social and religious realities, a reign that had promised so much ultimately ended in failure. Justinian bequeathed to his successor, Justin II, an empire which, though larger, was nevertheless markedly fragile and fiscally unstable. This fiscal instability in particular was to do much to undermine the reigns of Justinian's successors and limit their ability to meet ever more pressing military needs. Justin II declared upon his accession to the throne that he 'found the treasury burdened with many debts and reduced to utter exhaustion'. The emperor was consequently unwilling or unable to continue the financial support by which the empire had secured the support of the Ghassanids in Arabia, as well, more recently, as the Avars in the Balkans.

From: Peter Sarris, in *The Oxford History of Byzantium*, published in 2002.

## The Age of Justinian Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
1.1 Assess the view that, far from creating religious unity, Justinian's policies created many tensions and divisions. <b>[40 marks]</b>	1a
1.2 How convincing is the view that Justinian's greatest military priority was the reconquest of the western parts of the old Roman Empire? <b>[40 marks]</b>	1b
1.3 Assess the view that Justinian's wars were motivated mainly by religious objectives. <b>[40 marks]</b>	1b
1.4 Assess the view that the Byzantine Empire became weak in the second half of Justinian's reign. <b>[40 marks]</b>	1c
1.5 How strong was Justinian's empire at his death? <b>[40 marks]</b>	1c
1.6 How successful were Justinian's domestic reforms? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
1.7 How important a figure was the Empress Theodora in the shaping of policy in Justinian's reign? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
1.8 How important was the building programme of Justinian? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
1.9 To what extent can Justinian be viewed simply as a conservative emperor? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
1.10 How useful is Procopius as a source of information on the reign of Justinian? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 2. The Reign of Charlemagne 768-814

### 2a. Charlemagne's Wars.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Charlemagne waged war mainly for strong religious reasons.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues professional warriors were very important in Charlemagne's armies and they needed plentiful material rewards.

Tribute and plunder was the prized income of the Franks from warfare. Frankish armies enslaved Saxons and Slavs. The treasure of pagan temples was also a preferred object of plunder. Apart from treasure, the form of plunder most frequently referred to is arms and horses. Who benefited from this? The king kept fighting men in the palace without fixed positions or incomes, who lived from gifts of food and clothing, gold and silver, horses and arms. The Carolingians were not the only people to maintain such warbands. We can see gangs of warriors in action frequently in the annals of the Carolingian era. Rewards were expected – for the professional warrior. The question of how the Carolingians recruited their fighting men has generally been considered from the point of view of military obligation – it seems worthwhile considering incentive because plunder enabled Charlemagne to enlist these professional warriors to form his armies.

From: T. Reuter, *Plunder and Tribute in the Carolingian Empire*, published in 1985.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that there was a strong religious motivation to Charlemagne's Wars.

His achievements can be summed up simply: Charlemagne consolidated and refined the Christian Kingship of the Franks inherited from his father; he extended the authority implicit in that Kingship over all other Christian communities on the continent of Western Europe up to the boundary with the Byzantine empire in southern Italy; he further extended that authority by a policy of encouragement to missionary efforts and military strength over all Continental Germanic peoples, establishing a firm military frontier of marchlands with the Danes and the Slavonic peoples, and routing the Avars, forcing them to recoil to their lands in the middle Danube. At a great ceremony in Rome on Christmas Day 800, Pope Leo III crowned Charles as Emperor and Augustus, Emperor of the Romans. This must have seemed a fitting consummation to the work of a military leader who had brought under military and political control the Christian or newly Christianized Romanic and Germanic peoples of Western Europe. The process of consolidation of the Christian communities had started early in Charles' reign. Extension of Christian kingship depended essentially on what proved to be the most immediate political problem of Charles' reign, the conquest and conversion of the Saxons and Frisians. Early campaigns up to 780 were little more than punitive raids, but for the following 20 years, conquest was the objective. Forcible conversion brought Saxons and Frisians into the new empire.

From: H. R. Loyn, '*Charlemagne*', an article published in 1991.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there was a range of motives for Charlemagne's wars.

Nelson has argued that there was more to the military activity of Charlemagne's aristocracy than the plunder and tribute highlighted by Reuter in an important article. Or rather, that there was *less* of plunder and tribute than we might think. Surveying the Saxon wars which dragged on for so long, she has found only one reference in the annals to gold and silver being taken out of Saxony by the Franks and concludes that we ought to take seriously what our sources say. We should give full weight to religious and ideological factors as motivating forces for Charlemagne's aristocracy: 'glory – heroic and heavenly'. Perhaps Saxony did not yield much plunder but there may be some reference to the plundering of Saxon *villae* in the annals, and the capitularies certainly reveal merchant activity and the expectation that the fines of Carolingian justice will be paid; and Saxony certainly yielded human resources, including high-status hostages. Saxony was not a desert. If Reuter has underplayed the importance of ideological factors, Nelson's insights can be seen as adding to his model, rather than detracting from it. When Charlemagne captured the Lombard capital of Pavia in northern Italy in 774, he 'entered it with hymns and *laudes*, and the treasures of the kings which he found there he gave to his army'. Glory, pious thanks to a God who had favoured the righteous Franks, and the distribution of what must have been significant treasure all came together in the intoxicating cocktail of military victory. Treasure could have more than a merely material significance.

From: S. Airlie, *The Aristocracy: Captains and Kings*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Charlemagne's wars were inspired by several motives.

The circumstances of Charlemagne's successful conquests and annexation of territory, combined with intermittent political influence exerted on the borders of the realm, have generally been regarded as the process of a transformation of an aggressive military strategy into a concentration on defence in the latter years of Charlemagne's reign, with a concomitant claim that crushing the Avars in 790s was 'the last really large aggressive military operation conducted by the Carolingians'. It is an oversimplification to see these military activities as aggression succeeded by defence, especially if the priorities of the different annal writers, and the various attacks mounted against the northern and eastern Slavs in the first decade of the ninth century, are taken into account. The political manoeuvring and opportunism displayed in other respects indicate that the motives for Carolingian expansion and the settling of the borders involved more than aggression or defence, and there seems to me to be just as much of an effort to deal with insurgence and to settle borders earlier in Charlemagne's reign as later on. In the later 780s, moreover, a new and religious fervour is manifest in the annalists' account of Charlemagne's military activity, with the zeal to convert pagans or punish pagans for damage inflicted on Christian peoples providing extra motives for dealing with both Tassilo and the Avars. On one level, this coincidence of reforming legislation and aggressive military Christianity should not be exaggerated, for, as we have noted, the religious preoccupations of Charlemagne did not prevent his forming alliances with pagan Slavs as well as Muslims. On the other hand, the programme of religious reform and expansion of Christian culture was part of an overall strategy of Carolingian rule.

From: R. McKitterick, *Charlemagne*, published in 2008.

## 2b. The Coronation of 800.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the imperial coronation in 800 made no difference to the way in which Charlemagne ruled his empire.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the imperial title intensified Charlemagne's devotion to reforming and improving his lands.

Emperorship brought little or no increase in Charlemagne's material power. But that does not mean it was an empty distinction to him, without practical consequence. It is not that emperorship involved specific responsibilities distinct from kingship. There was no great change after 800. Rather, it inspired an intensification of the reforming theme already evident in the pre-imperial years. The goals of reform had not altered: order, justice, piety, peace, concord, each conceived in Christian terms. But they were sought more determinedly and more urgently. Such considerations explain the remarkable reform enterprise which Charlemagne launched on his return from Rome. In November 801 he summoned a synod to Aachen to look into the behaviour of the clerics. But the real starting point was another reforming assembly held at Aachen in March 802, following which pairs of *missi* were sent out throughout the entire realm to do justice in their allotted areas.

From: P. D. King, *Charlemagne*, published in 1986.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the coronation of 800 brought practical benefits to Charlemagne.

On Christmas Day, in St Peter's, Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne emperor of the Romans. Probably no event in medieval history has occasioned more scholarly comment, to less effect. Contemporary accounts of the event differ. We do not know if the coronation had been planned beforehand by Charlemagne, or whether it was a plot of Leo's to bind the king of the Franks closer to the Roman cause. Who were the 'Romans' of whom Charlemagne was to be the emperor, the inhabitants of Rome, or those of the papal states (Romagna)? Was it only afterwards that Charlemagne and his clerics began to think of it as a 'restoration of the Roman Empire', or was that inherent in his acclamation as *Augustus* in St Peter's? Is it relevant that even before the coronation the former head of the palace school at Aachen, Alcuin of York, had been talking in terms of Charlemagne's *imperium* or that Alcuin had written to Charlemagne reminding him that the Empress Irene's deposition in 797 of the legitimate emperor in Constantinople had upset the world order? The usefulness of the imperial coronation from Charlemagne's viewpoint may have been that it gave him, who ruled as king and duke over a wide variety of realms, a simple and awe-inspiring title, and one that all were free to interpret as they chose. It would be interesting to know more about how contemporaries regarded it, like Irish kings, who, according to Einhard, 'never addressed him as anything but their lord, and called themselves his slaves and subjects', or the Northumbrians, whose rightful king Charlemagne and the papal envoy were somehow able to restore to power. The emperor himself may have regarded the new title as a personal one; certainly when he drew up his will in 806 he divided his empire among his sons and made no provision at all for the survival of the imperial title. It was the subsequent death of two of his three sons which convinced him, and his son Louis the Pious, that God intended the empire to survive as a unity.

From: E. James, *The Northern World in the Dark Ages*, an essay published in 1992.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Charlemagne's attitude to his imperial title was casual.

The 'Division of the Empire' was issued at the royal palace at Thionville and is dated 6 February 806. In this, Charles formally recognised his three sons as partners in his empire while he continued to live, and as his heirs after his death. Louis received Aquitaine; most of Bavaria was added to Pippin's Italian kingdom; Charles, the eldest son, held the lion's share: Burgundy and the rest of Francia. It is not clear how the partnership in power between the brothers, referred to in the 'Division of the Empire', would have worked afterwards. What has aroused much comment is the fact that no mention is made in this document of the imperial office. Argument over this has included the suggestion that Charles viewed the imperial office as a personal rather than as a heritable title. Alternatively, he may have seen it as essentially different in kind and so not directly related to the territorial division being conducted in 806. Certainly in the end he did not allow the imperial title to lapse with his death. He summoned his son Louis to Aachen in 813 and there crowned him emperor with his own hands.

From: R. Collins, *Charlemagne*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the acquisition of the imperial title had religious and ideological significance.

It was in the aftermath of Leo's difficulties that Charlemagne was crowned emperor by the pope on Christmas Day in St Peter's basilica in Rome as part of the Christmas festivities. The descriptions of this ceremony that are extant indicate that it was a staged occasion, for the congregation was ready to shout the imperial acclamations, and Charles the Younger, Charlemagne's son, was crowned at the same time. There is no agreement, either in the contemporary sources or among modern scholars, as to whether the pope was the prime mover behind the imperial coronation or whether the Franks were, or what its contemporary significance was. The very fact of Charlemagne and the Franks intervening to reinstate a pope has been taken as a crucial indication of Charlemagne's essentially imperial role even before he was actually crowned, as well as an important confirmation of the legal strength of his judgment in the pope's favour after he was crowned. The coronation certainly represents both a spectacular culmination of the long association of the Pippinids with the popes and a decisive demonstration of the strength of the political support the pope could command. Charlemagne's status as ruler acquired an extra ideological dimension which both the Franks and the pope were swift to exploit in terms of theoretical authority and the precedents offered by earlier Roman Christian emperors. The indications in the Frankish sources, whatever the ideological capital gained from the comparisons with the Roman emperors, are that Charlemagne regarded the imperial title as peculiar to him.

From: R. McKitterick, *Charlemagne*, published in 2008.

## 2c. The Carolingian Renaissance.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Carolingian Renaissance was the product of Charlemagne's interest in learning for its own sake.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues for a very positive view of the cultural achievements of Charlemagne, but also that they were based on the work of earlier generations.

The end of the eighth century saw a remarkable advance in all branches of culture which has been described as the Carolingian Renaissance. Sovereigns took an active part in this movement, which was inspired and directed by the Church. There was indeed a kind of Renaissance under Charlemagne, for the whole of the seventh century and the first half of the eighth had been a period of almost complete barbarism in the Kingdom of the Franks. Of course, a few scattered centres of culture still existed and remained active. Without them and the tradition they preserved, and without the intellectual developments within them which we can occasionally trace, this Renaissance would have been impossible. The secrets of ancient culture were not discovered afresh; nor were literature and the arts reinvented all at once. A long period of preparation, in one or two monasteries where a few books had been treasured and an extremely small number of men devoted themselves to study, led up to the dazzling achievements of the reigns of Charlemagne and his son, Louis the Pious.

From: J. Boussard, *The Civilisation of Charlemagne*, published in 1968.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Charlemagne's interest in learning was linked to the needs of government.

Charlemagne's interest in schooling had a particular goal. He wanted the clergy to be educated well enough to teach the people. Charlemagne also appreciated the vital importance of literacy for improving the administration of his kingdom. For quite practical reasons, he needed to restore to the written word the role that it had played in the Roman Empire. The counts and the *missi dominici* had to be educated, or at least have men with them who could read the orders dispatched by the king and draft replies. Writing became an instrument of government. The programme outlined in the *Admonitio Generalis* ('General Exhortation') of 789 was scarcely original; it merely restated the traditional programme of studies taught in church schools since the sixth century. What was important was the aim to set up schools in every monastery and bishopric so instruction should be given to boys in reading, writing, singing, arithmetic and grammar. Later, Charlemagne even encouraged the bishops to establish rural schools in villages and hamlets, again following an idea of the sixth century.

From: P. Riché, *The Carolingians. A Family who Forged Europe*, published in 1983.



**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Charlemagne's promotion of educational revival had some practical motives.

From early in his reign Charlemagne and his clerical advisers were concerned to order the Frankish lands in accordance with God's will. The most urgent necessity was education, above all for the clergy. It was not only the clergy for whom German was the first language who needed to learn Latin; the spoken language of those living in Gaul had diverged so far from written Latin, along the path to French, that accurate comprehension of the Bible or the liturgy had become difficult. Charlemagne's *Admonitio generalis* of 789 stressed the importance of education for clergy and people, and urged the establishment of schools for both. The Anglo-Saxon and Irish clergy whom Charlemagne gathered around him, Alcuin at their head, were to be of great importance in this process. The movement for the basic education of the clergy had a number of useful by-products. Charlemagne was provided with an ever-growing number of literate clerics who could be used in his administration and, in the newly reformed Latin and the new more legible script, had a precise and international written language that could be used throughout his multilingual empire. This classical revival, the central part of what has earned the blanket term 'the Carolingian Renaissance', began at the royal court itself.

From: E. James '*The Northern World in the Dark Ages*', published in 1992.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Charlemagne's involvement in cultural activities had religious and political motives.

The capitularies and conciliar decrees, not least those of the Synod of Frankfurt in 794 or the reform councils of 813, make it clear that the king himself played a part in theological discussion and in the reform of the clergy, ecclesiastical organisation, and the liturgy. In whichever resplendent new palace it was temporarily based (at Frankfurt, Paderborn or Aachen) as the king moved on the royal itinerary round the kingdom, the central role of the court as a place where scholars could congregate is indicative of the crucial role of the ruler as a patron of culture. When we observe other powerful early medieval polities where the kings did not play such a role, our appreciation of the Carolingian rulers' achievements and intellectual energy is greatly enhanced. Charlemagne and his immediate successors expended their wealth and exploited their superior position in order to serve their intellectual interests, enrich their libraries and enhance their pleasure. Royal patronage was not random aesthetic pleasure, but an organised and determined assembly and deployment of resources to carry out the specific aims articulated in the royal capitularies. The court school, for example, created a new edition of the gospels and disseminated it to major monasteries within the kingdom. Rather than acting as an occasional benefactor, the Carolingian ruler sustained groups of artists, scribes and craftsmen over a long period of time in order to create artefacts for his particular objectives. His patronage was designed to promote his royal power as a Christian king and to consolidate the Christian faith by disseminating the key texts on which that faith was based.

From: R. McKitterick, '*The Carolingian Renaissance*', published in 2005.

### The reign of Charlemagne 768-814 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
2.1 Assess the view that Charlemagne's wars were motivated mainly by religious objectives. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a
2.2 To what extent was Charlemagne's empire on the defensive militarily in his later years? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a
2.3 Assess the view that Charlemagne's wars had a more negative than positive impact on his empire. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a
2.4 How great a military leader was Charlemagne? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a
2.5 Assess the view that the coronation of 800 made little difference to the ways in which Charlemagne ruled his lands. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2b
2.6 How far was Charlemagne's personal interest the main factor in his promotion of culture and learning? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2c
2.7 How united was Charlemagne's 'Empire' after 800? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
2.8 How important was the Church to the effective government of Charlemagne's empire? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
2.9 To what extent was Charlemagne's empire unified only by the force of his personality? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
2.10 Assess the view that the period 800-814 was one of dissolution and decay for Charlemagne's empire. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

### 3. Alfred the Great 871-899

#### 3a. Alfred's wars against the Vikings.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Alfred achieved only limited success in his wars against the Vikings.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the later war of 892-6 brought some important gains but that the Danes were not defeated.

The initiative had remained with the Danes throughout the war. A Danish movement was generally countered by an English concentration, and it is clear that there was never any serious danger of a collapse of the English defence such as had occurred in 878. But the English leaders were never able to bring a campaign to a decision which left the Danes unable to renew the attack. In all their operations the Danish armies had the advantage of a secure base in the territory won by early invaders in the north and east. The alliance between Alfred and Aethelred of Mercia was neutralized by the understanding which existed between the leaders of the Danish armies and the Danish rulers in East Anglia and Northumbria. Their entry into the war was a natural reaction against the ascendancy which belonged to Alfred after his capture of London. Historically it is important, because it opened a new period in which the Danish colonies in the north and east appear as the avowed enemies of the new state formed by the political association of Wessex and English Mercia. The kingdom of Wessex and the ealdormen of Mercia were still on the defensive when King Alfred died, on 26 October 899.

From: Sir Frank Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Alfred enjoyed real and substantial achievements against the Vikings.

If we ask why Alfred survived Guthrum's surprise attack in 878, when all his fellow kings had gone under, the short answer is that we don't know. But the significant point, perhaps, is that within months of humiliating defeat Alfred was able to rally sufficient forces to crush what was presumably a substantial and self-confident Danish army. If Alfred may have owed his initial survival to his family's efforts as much as his own, there is no doubt that what happened after 878 was all his own work; and it amounted to the most sustained programme of military, administrative, diplomatic and cultural change in the West since Charlemagne. Alfred's problems with the Danes were threefold: military, political and religious. The military problem is of course the most obvious. The *Chronicle's* long and confusingly detailed account of the 893 campaign against the third great army shows how the Danes could turn up wherever the West Saxon army was not. And yet, when the wars of 893-6 are compared with the desperate struggles of the 870s, a striking difference emerges. Whereas the Danes had earlier penetrated deep and repeatedly into Wessex, their successors of the 890s hardly got into Wessex at all. There is little doubt that the reason for this decisive contrast was the military reforms introduced by Alfred in the meanwhile: the navy, the army, and above all the *burh*.

From: P. Wormald, *The Ninth Century*, an essay published in 1991.

**Interpretation C:** This historian puts the important victory of 878 into the wider context of the requirements of protracted warfare.

Alfred's dramatic reversal of fortune – from the hide-out at Athelney to success at Edington – is so extreme that some modern writers have refused to take Alfred seriously, especially as our knowledge of what happened is based on the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* account which he sponsored. They have seen his report as an effective piece of dynastic propaganda. To an extent there is something to be said for this. In the years after Edington, Alfred's subjects would have to take on very heavy burdens in terms of taxation and personal service; building a fleet, a whole system of fortified *burhs*, a mounted expeditionary force and a general levy which mobilised in two shifts. However, the people needed to be informed that, in spite of the defeat of all the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms except Wessex, things could and would get better. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* account of the victory encouraged this attitude, and by being circulated to churches throughout the kingdom could convince as many as could be reached that Edington was a decisive victory; they would be assured that they had a future under the royal house of Wessex. Part of Alfred's purpose may have been to exaggerate his distress during the dark days of Athelney, in order to create an 'Alfred myth', as it were, but distress there certainly was, and Edington is not the only battle in the Dark Ages which abruptly and unexpectedly reversed the drift of a whole campaign.

From: M. Wood, *In Search of the Dark Ages*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Alfred's successes against the Vikings were significant, but not complete.

As had been so often the case, Alfred achieved only a partial victory in 893. True, he had defended London's harvest and had forced the Danes to evacuate a stronghold that menaced the *burh*, but the careful language of the Chronicler cannot conceal the fact that the Viking army managed to escape. Nor had they been so discouraged as to abandon hopes of future gains. Stripped of camp followers, the Viking forces were more mobile and potentially more dangerous than before. But the political climate itself had changed. After three years of hard effort with little to show for it, what remained of the Viking army finally dispersed in the summer of 896. And if the West Saxons and Mercians suffered more in these years from natural than human causes, it was the result of Alfred's hard work and planning. Though Alfred had not won the heroic glory celebrated in vernacular poems, in a larger sense, the victories had been his. Hasteinn and the others had failed, not because the English commanders were cleverer or their men more resolute, but because of a complex and sophisticated military *system* that permitted the English to fight a multi-front war. The very geography of his last war attested to its effectiveness. In 871, 876 and 878 the Great Heathen Army had attacked and ravaged the heartland of Wessex. In 892-894, an even larger army, with allies in Northumbria and East Anglia, had to content itself with raiding along the frontiers of Wessex and Mercia. The dispersal of the Great Heathen Army had ended the threat to the kingdom but not all raiding.

From: R. Abels, *Alfred the Great*, published in 1998.

### 3b. The Role of Alfred's *burhs*.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Alfred planned his network of *burhs* more for political than military reasons.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues for the centrality of the military role of his *burhs*.

By building strong points in strategic positions on the coast and on his frontier with Mercia, it was possible to discourage attack from Danish occupied territories, to protect the inhabitants of the adjacent countryside and to provide bases from which armed forces could operate offensively against the invader as opportunity offered. The military utility of fortified strongholds had been demonstrated by the Franks both as defence against the Northmen and as a means of holding down newly conquered lands in Saxony. The Danes themselves understood the value of such fortifications; they fortified their shore bases, their first move on mounting their attacks on Wessex had been to establish an entrenched camp near Reading, and later in the seventies they availed themselves of the defences of Wareham, Exeter and Gloucester; when they settled, it was as armies around fortified centres. King Alfred recognised the value of such strongholds and ordered their construction, but such orders were unpopular because of the labour involved and were not always carried out. Alfred's appreciation was correct but its execution on a large scale was the work of his successor King Edward.

From: D. J. V. Fisher, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues for a highly planned policy of constructing *burhs* to serve a range of purposes.

It now seems clear that the *burhs* represented more than places of temporary refuge for the entire population of Wessex. Excavations at Winchester and elsewhere have shown that they share a common town-plan. At Winchester, this plan is demonstrably post-Roman, yet it is known to have been in existence by the late tenth century, and there is both documentary and archaeological evidence that it was already there c. 900. The similarity of plan between other *burhs* and that of Winchester, which can be dated to Alfred's time, seems to indicate that many *burhs* were also planned as places of permanent habitation and trade. Laws of tenth-century kings demand that trade should take place in towns, and there is an interesting parallel in arrangements made by the German king, Henry the Fowler. We might as well imagine that similar arrangements were made in Alfred's England, and it is not improbable that Henry's policy was copied from them. In late Saxon England, many such *burhs* became mints, and their inhabitants paid a profitable rent for the burgages to the king; the *burhs* were in fact a key factor in the wealth and power of English kings, and it is not impossible that they were designed as such from the outset. Refuge was thereby provided for the persons and movable property of all West Saxons, together with a serious disincentive to Danish settlement in the area. And many *burhs* were planned not merely for defence, but also for settlement and commerce. There is no more impressive testimony to the power and efficiency of Anglo-Saxon government in general, and of the greatest of Anglo-Saxon kings in particular.

From: P. Wormald, *The Ninth Century*, an essay published in 1991.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the *burhs* had important economic, commercial and governmental roles.

That Alfred promoted commerce in his *burhs* is not surprising. To survive, these towns had to be economically viable. Alfred was also aware of the profits that he and his ealdormen could derive from urban markets and mints, and of the patronage that they could distribute in the form of privileges and exemptions from taxes and tolls. Alfred's economic pragmatism even led him to abandon the practice of periodic recoinage in the late 880s, at a time when his power to control his coinage was at its height. By abandoning the policy of renewal of the currency, Alfred encouraged the acceptance of Viking-struck imitations of his various coin types. This, in turn, facilitated trade across Watling Street. What is certain is that he was instrumental in creating the preconditions for the emergence of an English market economy in the following century. Alfred's *burhs* became centres of industry and commerce because he planned that they should be. Behind the safety of ramparts and walls, craftsmen and merchants could go about their business under the watchful eyes of a 'port-reeve', creating wealth for themselves and for their king. *Burhs* and coins testify to Alfred's achievements as king no less than his military and political accomplishments. All these were consequences of Alfred's ability to govern effectively and of his skill at binding his subjects to his will. Whether Alfred intended it or not, he had begun a process that was to result in a unified kingdom of England ruled by an effective, if demanding, central authority.

From: R. Abels, *King Alfred the Great*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues for a key military purpose for the *burhs*, but puts such into a wider context.

At the heart of royal security was the network of some thirty proto-urban 'burhs', fortified centres evenly located throughout Alfred's kingdom: no territory lay beyond a day's march. The scheme was probably informed by many precedents. Organizational mechanisms drew intensively on West Saxon common burdens. The fullest picture emerges from the Burghal Hidage, seemingly written in the latter part of Edward's reign, though probably based on earlier information. The burhs were not only protective, but supplied permanently manned bases from which sorties could be mounted against local threat. Resistance of this sort forced invaders northwestwards in 893; Viking armies never penetrated far within Alfred's defended kingdom. The burghal network was complemented by efforts to reorganize army mobilization, the *fyrð*. The *Chronicle* adds by way of explanation that 'the king had divided his *fyrð* into two, so that always half its men were at home, half on service, except for those men who were to guard the burhs'. The most likely implication is that while each burh would be garrisoned on a continuous basis, only half of all other men liable for military service would be required on campaign at any one time, the other half being allowed to remain 'at home', in a system of periodic rotation. Such mechanisms met agrarian as well as military needs. Alfred's reforms extended across all three common burdens; fulfilment hinged on the co-operation of aristocratic landholders, under co-ordinated local direction. For Asser, the entire process led back to Alfred's nautical helmsmanship, guiding the ship of his kingdom 'through the many seething whirlpools of this present life'.

From: D. Pratt, *The Political Thought of King Alfred the Great*, published in 2007.

### 3c. The 'Alfredian Renaissance'.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the cultural developments in Alfred's reign were aimed mainly at improving the literacy of the people.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians argue that religion, learning and military dangers were all linked.

Alfred's practical measures for the defence of Wessex undertaken in the 880s would protect the kingdom from the threat of further Viking attack; but if his military reforms can be regarded as prevention, there is reason to regard his programme for the revival of religion and learning as the intended cure. In one of his own writings, Alfred looked back to the seventh century as a Golden Age when religion and learning flourished, and when kings 'not only maintained their peace, morality and authority at home but also extended their territory outside'. It was clearly felt, however, that the Church had fallen into serious decay during the ninth century, and although some laid the blame on the Viking invasions, others attributed the decline to general failings on the part of the English themselves. The quality of learning in England had also declined, to such an extent that there were not many men capable of understanding Latin north of the Humber, and very few south of the Humber; at the time of Alfred's accession there was not a single one south of the Thames (that is, in Wessex itself). Alfred seems to have regarded the Viking invasions as a form of divine punishment for the decline, and his endeavours to revive religion and learning can thus be seen as an attempt on his part to strike at the heart of the problem and thereby to ensure peace and prosperity in the future.

From: M. Lapidge and S. Keynes, *Alfred the Great*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the 'Alfredian Renaissance' had a heavy scholarly as well as religious content.

Alfred recruited the Frankish scholar Grimbald from Flanders and John the Old Saxon from eastern Francia to join Asser and the Mercian scholars at his court in the 880s. This 'court school', which was perhaps a conscious imitation of the band of European scholars brought together by Charlemagne, belatedly brought the Carolingian Renaissance to Wessex. To begin with, the Renaissance seems to have been a personal one for Alfred himself, but in the following decade Alfred sought to broaden its effect by making clear to his bishops and secular nobles that new standards of literacy and Christian knowledge were expected of them. Alfred also made available through his own translations and those of his scholarly advisers some of the books which he had found useful in his own personal odyssey and considered 'most necessary for all men to know'. Like Charlemagne, Alfred seems to have believed that many of his problems as king would be solved if his subjects developed a similar consciousness of doing their Christian duty. For according to the way these matters had been interpreted during the Carolingian Renaissance the subjects owed the same kind of obedience to their king that God demanded from the king himself. Alfred's duty was to stand firm against the pagan Vikings; that of his subjects was to assist him by obeying his orders.

From: B. Yorke, *Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the 'Alfredian Renaissance' had both religious and political purposes.

The religious problem posed by the Danes is in many ways the least expected to modern eyes, but was central for Alfred himself. In his preface to the *Pastoral Rule*, he wrote: 'Remember what temporal punishments came upon us when we neither loved wisdom ourselves nor allowed it to others'. If the relevance of a revival of learning to the defeat of the Danes is scarcely obvious to us, except in so far as literacy might contribute to administrative efficiency, its relevance for Alfred was that, without God's help, no amount of fleets, divided armies or *burhs* would do any good at all; and God's help could only be won by learning to read and understand his word. Alfred had Carolingian example to tell him of his duties as king. The preface to the *Pastoral Rule* is the central document of Alfred's Renaissance. In the first place, it lists the main scholars he recruited to help him: Archbishop Plegmund of Canterbury (890-914), Bishop Asser from St David's, Grimbold from Rheims, and John from continental Saxony. Grimbold and John revived the Carolingian connections of Alfred's father. Grimbold, finally, may well have brought much more. It is not impossible that Grimbold helped to inspire the compilation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, and influenced Alfred's law code in various ways. Alfred's court of scholars was scarcely as impressive as Charlemagne's, but it probably represented a fair cross-section of the learned resources of late ninth-century Europe.

From: P. Wormald, '*The Ninth Century*', an essay published in 1991.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Alfred had several objectives in promoting the revival of learning, and drew on a range of help.

What Alfred hoped to gain by educating his people is expressed most fully in his preface to his first translation, the *Pastoral Care* of Pope Gregory the Great. But that golden age of wisdom and prosperity had long passed. Learning had decayed so thoroughly, Alfred lamented, that few men south of the Humber, and probably north of it as well, could understand the meaning of the divine services they recited or even translate a letter from Latin into English. Alfred did not blame the Vikings for the decay of learning. On the contrary, the Vikings were the consequence of its neglect. They were God's scourge sent to remind those who were only 'Christians in name' where true wealth was really stored. Everyone would have access to the translations and profit from the wisdom contained in them. Those who were to be advanced to holy orders, of course, would continue their study, receiving instruction in Latin. If all this were done, Alfred believed, wisdom would flourish throughout the kingdom and the peace and prosperity of the old days would return. Alfred undoubtedly exaggerated for dramatic effect the abysmal condition of learning in southern England, as he did the decay of ecclesiastical institutions in his letter to Archbishop Fulk. Nor was Alfred completely consistent in his Preface to the *Pastoral Care*. Alfred boasted that he was surrounded by learned bishops, and one wonders where they had been educated if not in monastic or episcopal schools. The presence of Plegmund, Waerferth and the other Mercians in Alfred's court gives proof of the persistence of a tradition of learning north of the Thames.

From: R. Abels, *King Alfred*, published in 1998.



### Alfred the Great 871-899 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
3.1 How far do you agree with the view that Alfred's victory against the Vikings in 878 was the most important factor in his eventual success as a ruler?  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3a
3.2 Assess the view that the main factor in Alfred's successes against the Vikings was his personal leadership.  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3a
3.3 Assess the importance of Alfred's military and naval reforms in the successes against the Vikings in the years 892-6.  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3a
3.4 How successful was Alfred's government of Wessex?  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3b
3.5 Assess the view that the most significant achievement of Alfred's reign was the cultural and educational revival he inspired.  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3c
3.6 Assess the view that Alfred's educational and cultural activities amounted to a renaissance.  <b>[40 marks]</b>	3c
3.7 How far do you agree that assessing Alfred's successes is made the harder by the conscious propaganda of both Asser and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle?  <b>[40 marks]</b>	
3.8 Assess the view that there was limited unity in the areas of Anglo-Saxon England ruled over by Alfred.  <b>[40 marks]</b>	
3.9 How 'great' were the achievements of Alfred in ruling over Wessex?  <b>[40 marks]</b>	
3.10 How strong was Wessex at the death of Alfred in 899?  <b>[40 marks]</b>	

#### 4. The Reign of King John 1199 – 1215

##### 4a. John's relations with his barons.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that John was most to blame for the poor relations with his barons.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that John was an able king forced to tackle an extreme situation and confronted by barons who were both untrustworthy and often the authors of their own troubles.

The loss of Normandy in 1204 marked a break, a change in the problem facing John. Although there were some important administrative innovations before then, it was not until 1207 and subsequent years that his whole energy was concentrated on the exploitation of his kingdom. His subjects also took time to adjust to the fact that the King was in a new situation and needed money. Frequently they engaged in transactions with the King which seemed to assume the continuance of the relatively easy-going atmosphere of the early years. Some failed to grasp that the King might become more severe in his demands, especially in his demands for the payment of large sums for privileges. Some continued to gamble heavily in buying and selling wardships, marriages and offices. Many got themselves into increasing financial difficulties as a result; some suffered the penalties of losing their lands and imprisonment. The final crisis of 1215 was produced not only by John's skilful financial exploitation, but also by the eagerness with which some plunged into debt and so suffered financial subjection to the King.

From: J. C. Holt, *The Northerners*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that John's problems with his barons were the result of his personality and the Angevin system of government.

One of the most common accusations made by historians against King John is his inability to manage his magnates. John recruited only a handful of great men for his household, and mutual mistrust characterized his relations with his barons. If John could not get along with the leading loyalist barons, his troubles with others should be no surprise. While his suspicious character contributed to troubles with his great men and individual grievances roused some barons to rebellion, the Angevin revolution in government generated a broad baronial reaction. By the second decade of the thirteenth century, Angevin habits of arbitrary government were building a sense of community among the baronage. A truism of textbooks is that king and baronage were natural enemies, and they often depict the barons as reactionaries retarding progress toward construction of a strong nation-state. Nowadays, scholars are more likely to see some community of interest between king and baronage in exploiting the kingdom and its resources, protecting their property from foreign threats, and seeing that the people rendered their payments and services. Nonetheless, baronial rebellions had punctuated the reigns of earlier English monarchs, although the rebels had rarely co-operated, fighting because of personal wrongs, not on account of political issues. Not even in the great rebellion of 1173-74 had they presented a united front against Henry II, and neither would they against John in 1215-16. By the early thirteenth century, however, the baronage was beginning to think of itself as a corporate body with collective rights and responsibilities. John would face by early 1215 a *conjunctio* or sworn band of barons, bound together not simply by private complaints but by broad opposition to his rule based on principle.

From: R. V. Turner, *King John*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that John's personal actions created major problems with his barons, yet they also contributed to the tensions.

In dealings with English nobles, John was no less malevolent. Even the loyalist earls of Chester and Pembroke were harried and threatened for no better reason than that they were powerful. More notoriously, John's former favourite, William de Briouze, was ruined and exiled, his wife and son starved to death in prison. Such violence fostered an atmosphere of fear. At every turn he exploited wardship, relief, and his sovereignty as king to discipline his nobles. A favoured technique was to force barons to become royal debtors. Again, the Briouze family provides a most dramatic example, Matilda de Briouze being compelled to offer the huge sum of 50,000 marks for the king's grace. Geoffrey de Mandeville forced to offer 20,000 marks for John's ex-wife and the earldom of Gloucester. Other avenues of extortion were explored. The venality of Angevin justice and administration, exactly matching its pretensions, could be turned to the king's advantage. William Mowbray was encouraged to offer a bribe of 2,000 marks to the king to obtain a favourable outcome in a land suit. It is unsurprising that the sale of justice, judgement without trial and the cost of reliefs and wardships appeared prominently in *Magna Carta*. John's unpopularity went further. His style of rule and his personality repelled affection and loyalty. Less tractable was the mounting irritation of sections of the baronage. In 1212, there was a plot to assassinate the king. It is significant of what John had to face that one of the ring leaders, Robert FitzWalter, had surrendered the vital town of Vaudreuil to the French in 1204. John's enemies were champions of no liberty except their own. In 1215, FitzWalter trumpeted himself as 'Marshal of the Army of God', yet personal vendetta and grievance not constitutional, still less religious, principle lay at the heart of opposition to John. Robert's fellow traitor of Vaudreuil, Saer de Quincy, was another to rebel in 1215. John was confronted by men exasperated but no less duplicitous and self-seeking than he. John's failure was to woo enough interests and individuals to his side. One problem was that his interests and those of his leading barons diverged so much.

From: C. J. Tyerman, *'King John'*, an essay published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that John created the conditions for serious unrest, especially in the North of England.

Resentment against John's style of government was particularly strong in the north. The financial burdens born by northerners like William de Mowbray and Nicholas de Stuteville created wide circles of antagonism. The north was also the home of some of John's most ruthless agents: Brian de Lisle (whose origins are totally obscure) took over at Knaresborough; Philip Mark (from Touraine) became sheriff of Nottingham. Then in 1214 another Tourangeau, Peter de Mauley (rumoured to be Arthur's murderer), was established at Doncaster through marriage. Of course, such tensions were not unique to the north, but they seemed more novel since the northern counties had only gradually, from Henry II's reign onwards, felt the full force of royal government. John indeed came north in every year of his reign bar four – far more frequently than any of his predecessors. The face he showed was minatory. The leading part played by 'the Northerners' in the ultimate rebellion was the result. On John's return in October 1214, 'the Northerners', as they are called in many sources, emerged as a distinct body, leading the resistance. They included, at this early stage, Eustace de Vesci, William de Mowbray and Roger de Montbegon (another baron heavily in debt to the crown), who had all refused to go on the 1214 campaign. There had been, therefore, a decisive change in objectives since the plot to murder the king in 1212. The aim now was not to eliminate him but to bind him to conditions.

From: D. Carpenter, *The Struggle for Mastery: Britain 1066-1284*, published in 2003.

#### 4b. The loss of Normandy.

Using these passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that John's loss of Normandy was the result of his mistakes and weaknesses.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that John was very different to his predecessor, King Richard I (1189-99) and faced a lack of support in Normandy for a number of reasons.

It is difficult to see how John could have averted disaster. Not even the ablest commander can hold a disaffected province indefinitely against a determined invader. With all available resources at full strength, he was never able to bring a strong force to bear against the French army, save only for the failed night attack to relieve Château Gaillard. Philip had luck and the hearts of the Normans. King Richard himself could not have beaten that combination. But if Richard had lived for another five years, there would have been one notable difference in the course of the campaign: the king himself would have been on the heights above Château Gaillard as dawn broke, to give the signal for the combined attack on the French camp; however ready the Normans were to surrender, Philip would not have been able to march to Caen without fear of sudden assault by Richard and his household cavalry and, even when all else had gone, Richard would have been urging the citizens of Rouen to arms, and parrying the first assault with blows from his great sword. King John, however, stayed in England biting his nails. The real reason for John's helplessness before Philip's attack was treachery. Treachery ran through Normandy like an epidemic at the end of 1202. John, in fact, was deserted by the duchy's natural defenders, its barons. Local resistance to Philip played no effective part in the campaign and the only castles to hold out resolutely were ones commanded by English castellans. The roots of the Norman reluctance to defend go back before John's reign. Loyalty to the Angevin house had sagged badly in King Richard's day. In fact, the Normans had already become weary of Angevin rule before King Henry II died in 1189.

From: W. L Warren, *King John*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the relative resources of the Kings of England and France help to explain the events of 1204.

By 1202-3 the revenues of the French king amounted roughly to the equivalent of £73,000. The English total for that year is very speculative, but may have been no more than £30,000. By that time, the English Exchequer was involved in hand-to-mouth measures exporting revenues and treasures urgently to Normandy. In Normandy itself, these monies were totally committed to fortification and to the payment of troops. Angevin revenues failed to match the extraordinary advance in Capetian resources that is revealed in the French 'budget' of 1202-03. One of the causes of Philip Augustus' success in 1204 was good finances. Equally, one of the reasons for the Angevin failure in 1204 was that their resources were inadequate to the task.

From: J. C. Holt, '*The End of the Anglo-Norman Realm*', an article published in 1975.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that finance was not the root cause of John's failure in 1204.

In 1202-03, Philip's recorded revenue came to roughly £72,000. In 1202-03, recorded revenue in England together with estimated revenue for Ireland and from other sources, when added together, might mean that we arrive at a total sum between £63,000 and £77,000. These calculations, however, leave out of account the revenues of Anjou and Aquitaine. There is not much doubt that the overall resources of the Angevin empire were a good deal greater than those of Philip Augustus. John and Philip made roughly similar amounts of cash available for military operations on the Norman frontier during the summer of 1203. John's problem was that he was unable to mobilise the huge resources of his empire and bring them to bear in the armed struggle against Philip Augustus. By 1202, he had driven all the most powerful nobles of Poitou and Anjou to rebellion. The rebels did Philip's fighting for him.

From: J. Gillingham, *The Angevin Empire*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that there was a range of reasons why Normandy was lost in 1204 – not all John's fault.

John's mistrust of the Normans made him more and more rely on foreign mercenaries for a fighting force; and their employment created another vicious circle, heightening his barons' mistrust. Not only did he rely upon them as military commanders, but he began to appoint them to posts in the Norman administration. Their brutality, rapacity, and destructiveness alarmed many of the Angevin king's subjects and turned them toward acceptance of French rule, if that promised peace and order. The expense of maintaining mercenary armies points to John's ever harsher financial demands that doubtless added to the Normans' disillusionment. Several scholars stress the strain that military expenditures were placing on England and Normandy after 1194, contrasting the Angevins' precarious finances with the Capetians' growing wealth. The Barnwell chronicler, one of the more balanced contemporaries treating King John's reign, believed the loss of Normandy to have been inevitable. While some modern scholars disagree, arguing for military and political contingencies, others argue that Normandy was not John's to lose, that its absorption by the French monarchy was simply part of an inevitable separation from England. In the opinion of a scholar writing in Normandy today, 'The old equilibrium between England and Normandy had reversed itself completely, in favour of England.' Native Normans saw most of the benefits from belonging to an Anglo-Norman realm going to their by-now distant English cousins. Family and tenurial ties no longer bound the Norman and English nobility together, since no more than two dozen English earls and barons any longer had significant lands in Normandy and fewer major Norman lords held large estates in England. Certainly the Norman bishops were drawn towards Paris, not only because they concluded that French rule alone could end the constant warfare but also on account of the attraction of the schools and spiritual centres. Norman towns, however, profiting from trade with England and Aquitaine and from privileges of self-government, proved loyal to John almost to the end. If Normandy and England were drifting apart, it is plausible to see the entire Plantagenet holdings on the point of collapse. The Angevin monarchs supplied no sense of unity, no shared culture to bind their English, Norman, Angevin and Gascon subjects together. They could not compete with the myth of French national unity under the royal crown that the Capetians and their propagandists were constructing.

From: R. V. Turner, *King John*, published in 1994.

#### **4c. The quarrel with the Papacy.**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that John took a popular and sustainable position against an over-ambitious Pope.

**[40 marks]**

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that both sides had real interests and good precedents for their positions in the dispute over the Canterbury election.

The diocese of Norwich had been given to the Keeper of the Royal Seal, John de Gray. John was a man of worldly interests – a competent captain and efficient civil servant. There was no man in England whom King John trusted so completely as he did John de Gray. Yet John de Gray seems to have made a reasonably acceptable bishop and to have been well liked by the clergy of his diocese. Now there can be no question that Langton, chosen by the pope in 1206, was a far more worthy candidate for high ecclesiastical office than the worldly bishop of Norwich, and it seems probable that Innocent knew of no reason why Stephen should be particularly objectionable to King John. But it was politically impossible for the King of England to allow an outside authority to control the choice of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Whatever its status in canon law, the royal assent was a practical necessity. Innocent had acted throughout the affair in perfect accord with the rules of canon law, but in doing so he raised an issue that constituted a vital threat to the political authority of the King of England. An Archbishop of Canterbury had been chosen without John's consent.

From: S. Painter, *The Reign of King John*, published in 1949.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Pope Innocent's quarrel with John was motivated by a desire to strengthen papal control.

Innocent wanted to defend the liberty of the Church against the longstanding claims of kings. He fought the hardest and most momentous struggle for the liberty of appointment to ecclesiastical office in England, where nothing had changed in the practice of elections being held 'according to the ancient customs of the realm': the king's candidate was 'elected' at the court by the representatives of the cathedral chapter. Innocent did not intend to break off the traditional friendly relations with the English kings by unleashing a struggle of principle against the 'ancient custom'. He hoped to abolish it gradually by supporting the wish for liberty of election by cathedral chapters. Innocent may have proposed Langton as a compromise: Stephen was English, his parents lived in England and John had applauded his promotion to cardinal.

From: H. Tillmann, *Pope Innocent III*, published in 1954.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that John enjoyed good support for a long time in his quarrel with the Pope, who underestimated domestic support for the King.

The king's excommunication failed to make much impact on England. Because the Church's overuse of the ban as a political weapon was making it less frightening to the faithful, John experienced little concern. Doubtless, Innocent III hoped that the king's excommunication would arouse acts by the already restless English baronage that might persuade him to surrender; but at a great council the barons ratified King John's stand that a papal guarantee for royal rights must be a part of any settlement. At the least, the pope expected excommunication to drive John's servants away, making it difficult for him to govern. More bishops went into exile, and some royal clerks, fearful of being placed under the ban, felt obliged to leave his service. If anything, the interdict and excommunication strengthened King John's political position by separating two powerful groups in his realm – Church and baronage – capable of mounting political opposition to his increasingly arbitrary acts, if they should make common cause. The Canterbury chronicler wrote, 'It was as if he alone were mighty upon earth, and he neither feared God nor regarded man.' Innocent III never anticipated that John could hold out for so long. He had miscalculated, perhaps misled by the king's willingness throughout the interdict to negotiate. Possibly he failed to realize how much the king's enjoyment of the flow of the Church's wealth into his treasury dampened his enthusiasm for peace. By 1213 seven vacant bishoprics and seventeen abbacies were providing valuable injections of money.

From: R. V. Turner, *King John*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the quarrel stemmed from entrenched positions taken by Pope and King.

A strange situation confronted Innocent III in 1205. A delegation from Canterbury arrived in Rome to report that the sub-prior of the monks of Christ Church, Canterbury, had been duly elected archbishop of Canterbury following the death of the incumbent, but another delegation soon told a different story. An election had taken place, but contrary to the law the chapter had not first sought permission from King John to have an election, because the members knew that he preferred a candidate whom they did not want. So John had threatened them into a new election. They had succumbed and chosen the king's friend, the bishop of Norwich, to be the new archbishop. It was now the pope's duty to confirm that second election. Innocent was unmoved. The illegality of the first election was undoubted; so was that of the second. The liberty of the Church demanded free elections. King John's threats were contrary to the canon law and his coronation oath. Moreover, papal permission was required to transfer a bishop, in this case the bishop of Norwich, to a different see. A bishop was wedded to his diocese, and only the pope, as vicar of Christ, could dissolve the bond between them. Innocent, therefore, quashed both elections and, exercising his rightful powers under the canon law, took the appointment into his own hands. An Englishman at the papal curia, Stephen Langton, a scholar and theologian who was a student at Paris when Innocent III had been there, was picked out for the job and sent to England. None of the explanations for the pope's behaviour seemed to matter to John who regarded the appointment of Langton as a deliberate affront and, in the aftermath of his loss of Normandy, an unnecessary humiliation at a very trying time. In retaliation he refused to admit Langton to the realm, seized the possessions of the archbishopric of Canterbury, and exiled those bishops and other churchmen who publicly raised their voices in opposition. Innocent III responded as he had responded to Philip Augustus's defiance: he placed England under interdict. The suspension of ecclesiastical services would endure from 1208 to 1214. Negotiations were continuous during this period, but Innocent began to lose patience. In 1211 the situation began to change. Many of John's own barons had personal grievances against what they believed was his arbitrary rule. There was also the interdict. It may have been getting under their skin; it certainly offered them the pretence of rebelling against an unholy king. Add to this the hints Innocent was giving that he might sanction a French invasion of England and the situation looked grim for John. In the end, John capitulated. A brilliant political move, his modern apologists insist. Less brilliant was the intransigence that had got him in the predicament in the first place.

From: W. C. Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages*, published in 2001.



### The Reign of King John 1199-1215 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
4.1 Assess the view that the civil war of 1215-16 was more the result of baronial actions than John's own actions. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a
4.2 Assess the view that John's personality was the main factor in the breakdown of his relations with the barons. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a
4.3 Assess the view that the main cause of the struggle between John and his barons was the failure of his grand plans of 1214. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a
4.4 How far do you agree with the view that superior French resources were the main factor in the loss of Normandy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4b
4.5 Assess the view that the conflict between John and Pope Innocent III was a conflict more about personalities than high principles. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4c
4.6 How far do you agree with the view that the protracted nature of the conflict between King John and Innocent III shows how much support John had in England? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4c
4.7 How able a ruler was King John in domestic policy areas? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
4.8 How far do you agree with the view that John's ability as an administrator was not matched by his ability as a military and political leader? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
4.9 How far can <i>Magna Carta</i> be seen as a commentary on feudal practices? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
4.10 How accurate is the representation of John by the monastic chroniclers? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 5. The Wars of the Roses 1450-85

### 5a. The causes of the Wars of the Roses.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses is best explained by the weak kingship of Henry VI.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian suggests that Henry VI's failings should be seen in the context of longer term problems.

It is at least clear that the wars began in the reign of Henry VI. But should their origins be sought even earlier than that? In 1422, when Henry came to the throne, were the signs of trouble already there? In particular, had Bolingbroke's usurpation of the crown in 1399 cast a shadow long enough to darken the early years of Henry's reign? This is what many Tudor writers and some modern historians would have us believe. On the other hand, there were contemporary and late fifteenth-century observers who believed that the start of the trouble lay not in 1399 but in the 1450s. For Jean de Waurin it all began with the defeat of the English in the Hundred Years' War and the consequent recriminations between the dukes of York and Somerset. At the heart of Philippe de Commines' analysis lay the clash of factions at court, also in the 1450s, and for this he blamed the characters of the king and queen – an imbecile king and a queen who took sides instead of mediating between them.

From: John Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses: Peace and Conflict in Fifteenth-century England*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation B:** This historian presents the debate concerning the balance between overmighty subjects and an undermighty ruler in causing civil war.

Henry VI's advisers were blamed not only for the collapse of English hopes in France and for the incompetence and partiality of their rule at home, but for the exclusion of the lords of the king's blood and other 'true' servants from his counsels. Had the war any other origins? The 'family settlement' of Edward III? Is it suggested that a king could reasonably have made no provision commensurate with their birth for his younger sons? Or merely that Edward ought not to have had any? Having them, he treated them as his ancestors had treated theirs. Responsibility for the civil war has long been blamed on the problem of overmighty subjects. But in fact only an undermighty ruler had anything to fear from overmighty subjects; and if he were undermighty his personal lack of fitness was the cause, not the weakness of his office and its resources. Henry VI's head was too small for his father's crown, but it was long before anyone was prepared to dispute his right to it. In the mid-fifteenth century many of the nobility were descended from the third Edward, more still from the first. That in itself was not a source of danger to the king – unless he was himself totally unsuited to his task. Only then did the question of the succession arise.

From: K.B. MacFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century: The Wars of the Roses*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian presents a case for the Wars of the Roses being the outcome of noble feuding.

The awareness of declining landed incomes probably gave a sharper edge to the competition between nobles for royal patronage and lucrative marriages. It also seems likely that Richard, Duke of York, was experiencing a degree of financial difficulty. If York's expenditure was rising, due to his burgeoning retainer wage bill, then 'poverty may, after all have been the spur to political gangsterism'. In these circumstances the failure of the crown to pay the huge sums York was owed from the war assumes a striking importance, particularly when his rival Somerset was repaid for his services in spite of his record in France. Whenever he succeeded in imposing himself on the government, York invariably voted himself sums of money for his services. The rivalry between York and Somerset was only one of many which characterise the middle years of the fifteenth century. They burst into violence in various parts of the country, the most infamous being that between the Nevilles and the Percies in the north. Law and order in these areas collapsed. There is a great deal of truth in the oft-quoted comment that the Wars of the Roses were 'the outcome of an escalation of private feuds'.

From: David R. Cook, *Lancastrians and Yorkists: The Wars of the Roses*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that social stability and the avoidance of civil strife in the fifteenth century depended upon a good working relationship between the king and his nobles.

What was most important was that the king should maintain a good working relationship with the nobility, something which could demand disciplinary measures as well as reassurance and reward. If that relationship failed then everything else failed. The magnates lost confidence in the king and in each other; there was no trust at the top of the ruling hierarchy and this mistrust was transmitted down to the gentry who ceased to believe in the ability of either king or nobles to keep order. As in all societies, once that vital confidence in the forces of order had been lost, order itself was lost, for there would be a premium on being the first to strike against an enemy. At times of acute disturbance and division, as in 1381 (the Peasants' Revolt) and 1450 (Cade's Rebellion), even the lower orders in towns and countryside began to question the power of authority. To repeat, this was a form of government essentially founded on private power and private relationships; in the king, the two met in a single figure who embodied the pinnacle of both the private and the public. However devolved local government had become, and however peripheral new work on the law seems to make the king's part, it was all premised on the existence of an effective active monarch.

From: Christine Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution of England, c1347-1509*, published in 1997

**5b. The breach between Edward IV and Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick.**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the breach between Edward IV and Warwick was entirely the result of the Earl's uncontrolled ambition.

**[40 marks]**

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the responsibility for the clash between Edward IV and Warwick should rest firmly with the Earl.

It would be false to suppose that by a series of calculated insults Edward deliberately drove Warwick into a position from which rebellion was the only honourable escape. In spite of his already massive gains from the Yorkist victory, Richard Neville continued to bask in the golden sun of royal patronage. Nor was royal goodwill confined to an attempt to pacify Warwick's ill-humour through a series of profitable favours. In spite of the earl's truculent opposition to his foreign policy, and accumulating evidence of his dissidence, Edward still wished to allow Warwick an honourable, if not a dominant, place in government. The earl was offered a series of opportunities to share in the work of the council. In general, the king showed remarkable patience with his angry and overbearing cousin. Eventually this forbearance became an almost culpable failure to believe him guilty of treason. The breach with Edward was essentially of Warwick's own making, and was the product of his inability to accept anything less than domination over the king.

From: Charles Ross, *Edward IV*, published in 1974.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that at the root of the breach between Edward IV and Warwick was the King's marriage.

By 1468 Warwick was a very discontented man. Whether or not he had been a kingmaker who put Edward on the throne in 1461, it is clear that this is how he saw himself and that, in consequence, he believed that English policy should be Warwick's policy. A man who saw the world in these unrealistic terms was only too susceptible to flattery, and this made him easy game for a diplomat as wily as King Louis XI. Thus Warwick became an advocate of a French alliance and chose to remain so even when Edward IV began to show unmistakable signs of a preference for Burgundy. But the earl's unyielding attitude to foreign policy was little more than an expression of the extent to which he was out of sympathy with prevailing trends at court. For it must be admitted that Warwick had reason to feel aggrieved. At the heart of the problem was the King's extraordinary marriage. Very early in the morning of 1 May 1464 Edward had slipped away from his entourage and married Elizabeth Woodville.

From: John Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses: Conflict in Fifteenth-century England*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues the case for the inevitability of conflict between an increasingly confident King and a powerful noble.

The years 1465-6 are the high point of the first reign. Edward had been learning on the job and had made some mistakes but he had done remarkably well. It is significant that at this time he was able to settle a number of long-running noble disputes. The King was showing himself to be rather more than Warwick's tool, for example, in his intervention in Warwickshire and in the strategy in the north, designed, even though it failed, to make the Nevilles share power there. He showed his independence famously in the marriage to Elizabeth Woodville in 1464, completed secretly and hastily before he went north on campaign, which cocked a snook at Warwick's plans to have him marry a French princess. Even as Warwick came triumphantly south with the captive Henry VI in 1465, he must have wondered how long it would be before Edward was ready to jettison him, or at least to curtail his power severely. There was an inevitability about the collision of these two if Edward was to be in full command of his kingdom, just as there had been between Henry IV and the Percies. In each case, a great noble, in most unusual circumstances, had helped a usurper ascend the throne. In each case, once the usurper began to turn himself into a proper king, he would cease to be reliant on his 'kingmaker' and the latter's power could only wane.

From: Christine Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England c1437-1509*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that, although he was in awe of Warwick, Edward IV undermined the Earl's foreign policy.

The extent to which Edward IV was in awe of Warwick is revealed by the manner of his secret marriage to Elizabeth Woodville in 1 May 1464. As a widow and the daughter of a lesser English peer, she would not have been considered entirely the appropriate choice for a king. It can only be the case that he married Elizabeth, in the face of convention and in preference to the expected diplomatic match, because he was in love. Matters were made worse by the king's deception. He knew that his marriage was the most important counter he possessed in international diplomacy. Since the autumn of 1463, as England and France grew closer, the idea for a marriage between Edward and Louis XI's sister, Bona of Savoy, had gathered pace. At the negotiations in London in April 1464 between Warwick and Louis' ambassador, the idea seems to have been advanced further. Warwick despatched a letter to Louis which encouraged him to think that Edward was willing and further negotiations between the two kingdoms were scheduled to continue at St. Omer in May. The fact that Edward made his marriage to Elizabeth in secret and did not announce it until the end of September, reveals that he knew he would face the disapproval of Warwick, as well as other councillors. It was the manner of the marriage as much as its fact, which shows Edward's lack of confidence and judgement.

From: A.J. Pollard, *Late Medieval England 1399-1509*, published in 2000.

### 5c. Richard of Gloucester's usurpation of the crown in 1483

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the actions of Richard of Gloucester in 1483 are best explained by his concern to preserve his own position.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Gloucester enjoyed a favourable reputation and enjoyed widespread support until he was believed to have murdered his nephews.

Edward IV's successor was a boy of twelve. His youth seemed to open up a depressing prospect of a minority during which the new-found strength of the monarchy would be dissipated in quarrels between the boy's maternal relatives, the Woodvilles and Greys, and his paternal uncle Richard, Duke of Gloucester. Most Englishmen, were however, heartily tired of weak government and civil war; and this helps to account for Richard's easy triumph. He had always (in marked contrast to Clarence) been faithful to his brother, and he was known to be a good soldier and a capable administrator. Later Tudor propaganda represented him as a monster from birth who had not only killed Henry VI and his son in cold blood, but was responsible for the death of his own brother, Clarence, in 1478. The men of 1483, however, knew nothing of this, and accounted him an upright and pious prince. He therefore aroused no suspicion, but rather gained support, when he struck at the unpopular Woodvilles and Greys, and had himself made Protector. Even when he shut up the king and his younger brother in the Tower, and had them and their sisters declared bastards, thus making himself the legitimate heir to the Crown, there was no opposition. This was partly because men were cowed, but also because they dreaded a renewal of civil war, and a grown and capable man seemed likely to give the realm firmer government than a child could do. But when to secure his position the new king probably had his two young nephews murdered in the Tower there was, except in the north, a general revulsion of feeling against him.

From: A.R. Myers, *England in the Late Middle Ages*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Gloucester's seizure of power was unprecedented and shocked contemporary opinion.

The usurpation of the Crown by Richard Duke of Gloucester is a mystery. It will always remain so: Richard's motives for depriving Edward V of the throne are hidden from us and it is unlikely that new evidence (if forthcoming) will be conclusive. There are good reasons for sharp disagreement. The reasons are these: on the one hand, the usurpation is politics at their most extreme; on the other, contemporary comment is confused by such extremes. Both these points require elaboration. English kings had been disposed of before 1483, in the case of Edward II in a fairly extreme fashion. Edward II, Richard II and Henry VI, however, were fully grown men who had, over many years, shown what dangerously incompetent kings they were. Their removal was by a political community which could take no more of their disruptive behaviour. Richard of Gloucester replaced his twelve-year-old nephew before Edward had had a chance to show what sort of king he would make. Moreover, Richard also killed his nephews. Also usurpation and murder were achieved in a breathlessly short time – no more than three (or perhaps four) months. People were taken aback then; they still are today.

From: Colin Richmond, *1483: The Year of Decision (or Taking the Throne)* in ed. John Gillingham *Richard III: A Medieval Kingship*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation C:** This historian explores Gloucester's motives in 1483 including his fears for his own safety.

On 25 June, and again on the 26<sup>th</sup>, some sort of noble assembly, led by Buckingham, begged Gloucester to take the throne, and on the second occasion he graciously assented. Everyone was taken by surprise by Richard and it is this that led to the Tudor tradition that his previous loyalty was deep deceit by a man who was biding his time. But, if that was indeed what he was doing throughout his brother's reign, it was a very misconceived plan since the premature death of Edward IV could not possibly have been foreseen. There are two rather more logical ways of looking at the usurpation; either it was the ruthless act of a man who saw his opportunity and took it, or it was an act of panic. In favour of the first explanation is the fact that Richard had spent much of his life as a soldier and had certainly shown ruthlessness before. Against this is that his whole behaviour at this juncture seems so out of character. Nobles in close proximity to the throne whose ambition went to their heads usually showed instability of temperament at an early stage. If Richard was really ambitious enough to want to seize the throne he would have been super-human to have concealed so powerful an emotion from everyone until 1483. It may be more fruitful to explore the implications of this sudden change of character. The ultra-loyal underling who owed everything to the older brother he had served for his entire adult life, deposed the brother's sons. We must return to the shortage of time. Once the coup at Stony Stratford had occurred, as long as the Woodvilles were alive, and as soon as Edward V came into his majority, Richard was exposed to the Woodvilles' revenge and also to the possible destruction of his landed estate.

From: Christine Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c1437-1509*, published in 1997

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Richard of Gloucester was acting out of fear of the Woodvilles.

Edward IV's immediate successor was his 12-year-old son, who reigned until June as Edward V. In a battle for survival, Richard found himself, after years of loyalty to his brother, facing a desperate struggle against the ambitions of the Woodville family, elevated to greatness by Edward IV's irresponsible marriage to Elizabeth Woodville. Indeed, his defenders cite a Woodville attempt to usurp Richard from his rightful place (according to the terms of Edward IV's will) as regent as the fundamental cause of his determination to shatter the Woodville aspirations and, ultimately, to remove Elizabeth Woodville's son, the uncrowned Edward V, from the scene altogether. Initially, at least, Richard could count on the support of those courtiers who considered themselves undermined by the Woodvilles' meteoric rise. Most importantly, he had the backing of William, Lord Hastings, and Henry Stafford, duke of Buckingham, the greatest magnate among the old nobility. Three weeks after his father's death, his uncle Richard of Gloucester took Edward V into his custody, and made himself protector for the duration of the boy king's minority. Meanwhile, Richard supporter, Henry Stafford, duke of Buckingham, challenged the legitimacy of Edward V's reign by claiming that Edward IV was already contracted to marry Lady Eleanor Butler when he married Elizabeth Woodville. Richard and his faction doubtless feared the consequences of the Woodville revenge in the event of Edward V coming of age and reinstating his mother's family. Furthermore, Richard's supporters wished for rewards that only a king could grant.

From: Andrew Pickering, *Lancastrians to Tudors*, published in 2000

### The Wars of the Roses 1450-85 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
5.1 Assess the view that the Wars of the Roses came about as a result of 'an escalation of private feuds'. <b>[40 marks]</b>	5a
5.2 How important was failure in the war against France in causing the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5a
5.3 How valid is the judgement that the most important factor in the rift between Edward IV and Warwick was disagreement over foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5b
5.4 Assess the accuracy of the view that Richard of Gloucester's usurpation of power in 1483 is best explained by his fear of the Woodvilles. <b>[40 marks]</b>	5c
5.5 How convincing is the evidence that Richard III was responsible for the murder of the Princes in the Tower? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5c
5.6 Assess the importance of the part played by France and Burgundy in the instability of England in the period 1470 to 1471. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.7 Assess the view that Edward IV's personal qualities lost him the throne in 1470 but enabled him to regain it in 1471. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.8 How far do you agree that In gaining the throne in 1461, Edward IV owed everything to the power and influence of the Earl of Warwick? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.9 To what extent was the English monarchy weakened by the Wars of the Roses? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.10 How seriously did the Wars of the Roses affect economic and social life in England? <b>[40 marks]</b>	



## 6. Philip II of Spain 1556-98

### 6a. The Revolt of the Netherlands

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that religion was the main cause of the revolt of the Netherlands in 1572.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Spanish Inquisition was the principal cause of the Dutch Revolt.

The great cause of the revolt which, within a few years, was to break forth throughout the Netherlands, was the Inquisition. It is almost puerile to look further or deeper, when such a source of convulsion lies at the very outset of any investigation. During the war against France in 1556-9 there had been an occasional pause in the religious persecution. Philip had now returned to Spain, having arranged, with great precision, a comprehensive scheme for exterminating that religious belief which was already accepted by a very large portion of his Netherlands subjects. From afar there rose upon the provinces the prophetic vision of a coming evil still more terrible than any which had yet oppressed them. As across the bright plains of Sicily, when the sun is rising, the vast pyramidal shadow of Mount Etna is definitely and visibly projected, so, in the morning hour of Philip's reign, the shadow of the inquisition was cast from afar across those warm and smiling provinces – a spectre menacing fiercer flames and wider desolation than those which mere physical agencies could ever achieve.

From: John Motley, *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, published in 1856.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the arrival of Alva in the Netherlands was a major cause of revolt.

At first, since Alva's governing consisted entirely of the organization and execution of a reign of terror, the Blood Council was in effect the highest organ of government. The Duke was not only its president, but his signature was required to make decisions valid, and the opinion of a minority sufficed. Neither by law nor equity was Alva guided in planning his policy, but solely by the interest of the State which, as he and Philip saw it, demanded that men should be intimidated. Morning and night, therefore, he laboured, with Berlaymont, Noicarmes, and Viglius in the Council, drafting the sentences of the emigrant lords, whose estates were seized as well as those of the late Marquess of Bergen; drawing up rules to create new categories of culprits; studying the reports of the commissaries sent out into the provinces. In the meantime Egmont and Hoorne were examined. As to the prisoners of a lesser rank, if it was thought that they were able to implicate the magnates, they were lifted on to and off the rack for months. On one day in March 1568 five hundred new arrests were made all over the Netherlands. It was not long before the executions began, and in the meantime it was Alva's chief concern to stop the emigrations, which started afresh after every act of terror, and obtain the forfeiture of the victims' possessions, notwithstanding the privileges, and at the expense of their creditors.

From: Pieter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555-1609*, published in 1932.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Calvinist activity in the Netherlands in 1566 precipitated a crisis.

On the political front the Beggars began wearing liveries of grey and badges and medals showing a beggar's scrip, and they even began to trim their beards in a common style. On the religious front the government noted with alarm the influx of many of those outlawed for heresy; before long these exiles began to organise open-air Calvinist services, similar to the ones which had been legalised in France by the Edict of January 1562. There were services in Hainaut in May, in Brabant from early June. The first public service in Zeeland took place on 30 June, the first in Holland on 14 July. Within two months, therefore, organized Calvinist worship had spread throughout the western Netherlands and, with the lengthening summer evenings and the widespread unemployment which left many men and women with nothing better to do, it was not long before the clandestine Calvinist preachers were drawing crowds of hundreds and then of thousands to their open-air services beside the woods and hedges of the countryside outside the city walls. These sites were normally selected

with a careful regard for legal niceties. It was safest to meet on land outside the jurisdiction of a town (and its law officers) and so conventicles were held for preference on the lands of a sympathetic nobleman, where the government officials could not go, or in a rural area where the local police force did not possess the means of dispersing the faithful and therefore dared not try. Even beneath the walls of some towns of the south, however, the Protestants were in no danger. At Tournai the local militia refused as early as 12 July to act against the open-air services 'seeing that some of their relatives and friends might be there'.

From: Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, published in 1977.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Philip pursued a policy of Hispanicisation towards the Netherlands.

Philip continued his father's policy of persecuting heresy, and many Calvinists fled abroad to England, France or Germany. In his approach to government, however, Philip was less inclined than his father to compromise with traditional ruling groups in the Netherlands. He never made any attempt to speak Dutch or French, and he maintained a Spanish haughtiness which offended the grandees. They were particularly annoyed by the way he did not involve them in the business of government but instead relied on a small corps of trusted Spanish officials. He also tried to dominate the States-General without paying much heed to the privileges and interests of the deputies. It was as if Philip wanted to Hispanicise the Netherlands. It is certainly true that Philip, like his father, believed that Spain, and especially Castile, was the centre of the Habsburg monarchy. It was of critical importance to him to keep Castile law-abiding and peaceful, for it was his chief source of men and money. In 1558 leading Spanish nobles, already exempt from taxation, precipitated a crisis of authority as they tried to wrest further privileges from their absentee king. There was a revolt in Aragon and indications that heresy might be developing in some cities. As soon as peace was signed with France, Philip made plans to sail home. He left Brussels on 5 July 1559, never to return.

From: Peter Limm, *The Dutch Revolt 1559-1648*, published in 1989.

## 6b. Foreign Affairs

Using these passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the main aim of Philip II's foreign policy was to defend the interests of Spain rather than to pursue imperialist or religiously-motivated objectives.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Philip II's policy towards France was influenced by a number of motives.

Philip II had never really reconciled himself to the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis with France. The Huguenot attack on his communications in Europe and America, fear of the spread of Calvinism into his own dominions, French intervention on behalf of the rebels in the Netherlands, each item increased his distrust and his vigilance. In France, however, he had an asset which he had never had in England – civil war. Until 1589, therefore, his weapons were diplomacy and subversion; as long as France was internally divided, her kings hard pressed to maintain themselves against the Guises and the Huguenots, she could be no real danger to Spain; it was sufficient for Philip to support and subsidize the Catholic forces, as he had done on the eve of the Armada. After the defeat of the Armada, however, Henry III summoned up courage to challenge the domination of the League; in December 1588 he had the Duke of Guise and his brother the Cardinal of Lorraine assassinated. His action only stirred the League to greater efforts and plunged France deeper into civil war. Paris and other League towns took up arms. Philip too was determined to exclude 'the Béarnais' [Henry of Navarre] from the throne of France. If France were united under a Protestant sovereign she could be a real danger to the Spanish Netherlands; Farnese would be isolated between the Dutch and the French, and Italy might be open to invasion. But his ambitions went beyond mere defence of his own possessions; he now had the opportunity to claim the throne of France as son-in-law of Henry II and with it to increase his empire.

From: John Lynch, *Spain 1516-1598*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Philip II's foreign policy was consistently defensive until the acquisition of Portugal.

Philip's prime aim was to defend his dominions and not to give offence. His intention to preserve and secure his lands, people and faith by peaceful diplomacy was noted by Suriano, the Venetian ambassador, when he claimed in 1559 that Philip did not intend 'to wage war so that he can add to his kingdoms but to wage peace so that he can keep the lands he has'. If aggression was required, then it must be a 'just' war; this would not only enhance his reputation but also secure papal support. Philip's enemies, of course, perceived him as an out-and-out aggressor. Historians are inclined to take an intermediate position. They acknowledge that Philip may have regarded attack as the best form of defence, but they also recognise that acts of apparent provocation occurred in the second half of his reign, and they identify his acquisition of Portugal as a turning-point in his foreign policy.

From: Geoffrey Woodward, *Philip II*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Philip II's aim in foreign affairs in the early 1580s was peace rather than the pursuit of militant Catholic policies.

By now [1583] two different perspectives were to be found in government. The king continued to extend his confidence to Granvelle, but he showed impatience with the cardinal's habit of citing continually what the emperor would have done in such and such a situation. For the cardinal, the enemy was still France. The group of councillors headed by him and Idiáquez felt that war with France was 'the most efficacious and direct solution to the affairs of Flanders'. It was the only way to cut short the military intervention that the duke of Anjou had been carrying out since 1578 on behalf of the rebellious States General. In order to obtain an alternative outlook on policy the king in 1583 recalled from Italy Juan de Zúñiga, younger brother of Requesens, who till then served with distinction in Rome and in the viceroyalty of Naples. Zúñiga's outlook, in contrast to that of Granvelle, tended to be more orientated to the Mediterranean. The king agreed with him that the war in the north should end as soon as possible. Philip has often been presented as the knight-errant of militant Catholicism in these years, but his priority was always peace. He never ceased to express his concern for religion, yet in practice his policy decisions were more realistic. No imperialist fever reigned at the king's court. England was for him a political more than a religious problem. The struggle for security and peace in the north looked beyond England to a different prize: the Atlantic, and America.

From: Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Spanish religious interests always overrode political considerations in shaping Philip II's foreign policy.

Philip's Grand Strategy increasingly reflected the traditional foreign policy goals of Spain. First and most obvious among these lay the absolute conviction that the interests of the Iberian peninsula must take precedence over all others. Second among Spain's traditional strategic goals came a determination to defend the Catholic Church against all enemies, both inside and outside Europe. This committed Philip – who inherited the title 'king of Jerusalem' from Ferdinand of Aragon – to 'use our forces and power against the infidel', turning back the Muslim tide in the Mediterranean and protecting (if not extending) the remaining Christian outposts of the East. In 1559, although he made a favourable peace with France, Philip bungled negotiations with the Ottoman Turks for a truce, and for the next eighteen years he placed the defence of the Mediterranean above all other foreign obligations. Philip, like his father before him, also opposed Protestantism as strenuously and unequivocally as he opposed Islam. On several occasions Philip declared himself ready to sacrifice all his dominions, if necessary, rather than imperil the integrity of the Catholic faith. Behind these uncompromising assertions that religious principle should always prevail over political calculation lay a distinctive political philosophy which might be termed 'messianic imperialism'. At its simplest level, it meant that Philip felt that he possessed a direct mandate to uphold the Catholic faith at almost all times and in almost all places.

From: Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, published in 1998.

## 6c. The Spanish Church

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Spanish Inquisition had a major impact on the people of Spain in Philip II's reign.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Inquisition brought about a state of anxiety and distrust in Spanish society.

Of all the obnoxious features of the Inquisition, however, perhaps the most obnoxious was its natural tendency to generate a climate of mistrust and mutual suspicion peculiarly propitious for the informer and the spy. There were some 20,000 familiars scattered through Spain, ever on the alert for manifestations of unorthodoxy; and their activities were supplemented by the unpleasant device known as the Edict of Faith, by which inquisitors would visit a district at regular intervals and would have a list of heretical and obnoxious practices read to the assembled population. The reading would be followed by an exhortation to the hearers to denounce any such practices as had come to their knowledge, with severe penalties being threatened to those who kept silent. Since victims of the Inquisition were never informed of the identity of their accusers, the Edict of Faith presented an ideal opportunity for the settlement of private scores, and encouraged informing as a matter of course. In this climate of fear and suspicion, vigorous debate was checked and a new constraint made itself felt. Even if the Holy Office did not interfere directly with most secular works, the effects of its activities could not be confined exclusively to the theological sphere, which was technically its sole concern. Authors, even of non-theological works, would naturally tend to exercise a kind of self-censorship, if only to keep their writings free of anything that might mislead the ignorant and the uneducated, and furnish an additional weapon to enemies of the Faith.

From: John Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the impact of the Inquisition on the daily lives of Spaniards has been exaggerated.

Both defenders and opponents of the Inquisition have accepted without question the image of an omniscient, omnipotent tribunal whose fingers reached into every corner of the land. The extravagant rhetoric on both sides had been one of the major obstacles to understanding. For the Inquisition to have been so powerful as suggested, the fifty or so inquisitors in Spain would need to have had an extensive bureaucracy, a reliable system of informers, regular income and the cooperation of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities. At no time did it have any of these. From what we have seen of the often flimsy network of familiars and commissaries, the financial difficulties of the inquisitors and the perennial conflicts with all the other jurisdictions (especially in the fuero realms), we can conclude that the real impact of the Inquisition was, after the first crisis decades, so marginal to the daily lives of Spaniards that over broad areas of Spain – principally in the rural districts – it was little more than an irrelevance. In Catalonia, beyond the major cities a town might see an inquisitor maybe once every ten years, or even once in a century; many never saw one in their entire history. Central Castile excepted, this picture is probably valid for much of Spain. The people supported the tribunal, on this showing, not because it weighed on them heavily and oppressed them, but for precisely the opposite reason: it was seldom seen, and even less often heard.

From: Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the Spanish Inquisition was an important agent of the state.

The self-perception of religious and secular leaders in the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe has been all too faithfully absorbed and propagated by many later scholars, who appear to have little affection for the Christian faith. These writers thus tend to share with so many Catholic and Protestant reformers of the period the view that much of the population was at best only semi-Christian, especially in rural areas but also among the masses who had migrated to the towns as a result of the economic and social upheavals of the sixteenth century. The terms of the debate, such as 'Christian', 'Protestant', 'religion' and 'superstition', are rarely defined afresh, so that the inquisitors' own definitions and categories are normally accepted at face value. For the tribunals of Habsburg Spain, the world was basically a wicked place, in which God's faithful, who were uniquely to be found in the Catholic Church that was in obedience to the bishops of Rome, were constantly under attack by diabolical foes, both within and without. At the same time, the Spanish Crown was not only in the toils of battle against Protestant Christians and Muslims, but was also concerned, like other early modern European governments, to police the thoughts and behaviour of its population. In this task, the Inquisition cooperated with a will, pursuing not only religious dissenters but also those accused of offences such as male homosexuality, bestiality and bigamy.

From: John Edwards, *The Spanish Inquisition*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that during Philip II's reign, the Spanish Inquisition became more concerned with upholding morality than with persecuting heretics.

The work that the Inquisition did can be analysed in detail, and the realities separated from the myths. The remarkable research of professors Henningsen and Contreras [*The Inquisition in Early Modern Europe. Studies on Sources and Methods*] has demonstrated that in the period 1560-1614 the Inquisition dealt with 27,910 cases. The old enemies had been well and truly defeated; only 6.2 per cent of these processes were concerned with allegations of Judaic behaviour and 8 per cent involved accusations of Lutheran sympathies or behaviour. The two largest categories now were 'Mahommedanism' (31.9 per cent) and those offences defined together as 'Propositions', a term which conveniently incorporated the whole gamut of questionable theological ideas (29.3 per cent). The first of these reflected the continued existence of the Morisco communities of southern and eastern Spain while the second – which covered everything from blasphemy to sacerdotal misbehaviour - increasingly provided the basis for the Inquisition's work among Christians. Under Philip and his son the Holy Office became the policeman of the nation's morals rather than the persecutor of Jews and their sympathisers (which had been its original justification). Executions in this period numbered 637, with a further 545 people being burned in effigy - a total of 4.3 per cent of the cases, or an average of eleven burnings a year. Cases of 'major' heresy were therefore comparatively rare, and the Inquisition concerned itself now with the daily lives of Old Christians – with their ignorance of Church doctrine (which increasingly came to be seen as an offence in itself) and with their blasphemy and sexual misconduct.

From: Patrick Williams, *Philip II*, published in 2001.

### Philip II of Spain 1556-98 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions
6.1 Assess the view that the Dutch rebels challenged Philip II's rule primarily in defence of their liberties. <b>[40 marks]</b>	6a
6.2 To what extent was the acquisition of Portugal the main turning point in Philip II's foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6b
6.3 How far was the upholding of Spanish prestige the main aim of Philip II's foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6b
6.4 How far did the reign of Philip II strengthen the Spanish Church? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6c
6.5 To what extent did Philip II's policy towards the Papacy fulfil his obligation as 'The Most Catholic King'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6c
6.6 Assess the view that Philip II's rule of mainland Spain was characterised more by indecision than determination. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.7 How far did the administrative problems faced by Philip II stem from his own character? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.8 Assess the view that Philip II was mainly responsible for the failure to defeat the Revolt of the Netherlands. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.9 How effectively did Philip II administer mainland Spain? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.10. Assess the strength of Spain's finances in the reign of Philip II. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 7. Elizabeth I 1558-1603

### 7a. Elizabeth I and Marriage

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Elizabeth I did not marry because she had no desire to do so.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that foreign policy issues, but also perhaps personal ones, led Elizabeth to appear willing to marry Alencon.

The Duke of Alencon, bankrupt and unglamorous, seemed poorly equipped to be either the liberator of the Netherlands or the lover of Elizabeth. But there could be no doubt that he represented a dangerous link between these Spanish provinces and France. That link must somehow be snapped or weakened, or the French duke diverted from his appointed task.

To achieve this Elizabeth resorted cold-bloodedly to that outrageous diplomatic technique which had served her so well in the past. She reopened marriage negotiations with France.

At least that is how we would interpret these activities if we judged them simply in terms of her past performance. But this time, whatever diplomatic purposes the courtship was meant to serve, there entered into it some other, disconcertingly human, element never present during the official courtships of the last two decades. Simier, the French representative in London, as well as a good number of Englishmen, considered that she had at last fallen in love. Many of her subjects, in alarm, believed that the whole Netherlands business would dwindle into insignificance as compared with the grave crisis which such a marriage would precipitate. It was openly said that she was going to repeat the blunders of her sister Mary by bringing an unpopular foreigner to the throne.

From: Joel Hurstfield, *Elizabeth I and the Unity of England*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes Elizabeth did not intend to marry.

Elizabeth probably intended to remain single. In 1563, she told an imperial envoy that 'If I am to disclose to you what I should prefer if I follow the inclination of my nature, it is this: beggar woman and single, far rather than queen and married!' Three years later she told the Spanish ambassador that if she could find an acceptable way of settling the succession without marriage, she would certainly stay single. Of course, the Queen played politics when she said she would not marry as much as when she said she would, but her reluctance was widely known. The French ambassador reported in 1569 that the English nobles were generally convinced that the Queen would not marry. The marriage issue was kept open but as a political weapon to entice suitors and to tame claimants to the throne. The threat that Elizabeth might marry and produce a child was a way to make Mary, Queen of Scots behave herself - in so far as Mary could. Elizabeth told a Scottish emissary in 1564 that 'I am resolved never to marry, if I be not thereto necessitated by the queen my sister's harsh behaviour towards me'. Melville alleged he had replied, 'Your Majesty thinks that if you were married you would be but queen of England but now you are both king and queen!' There was probably something in this. Elizabeth did get used to keeping her own counsel and exercising power alone; she loved to be the centre of attention.

From: Christopher Haigh, *Elizabeth I*, published in 1988.



**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Elizabeth gave out mixed messages about her desire to marry.

As the marriage negotiations with foreign powers proceeded through the 1560s, the letters of Elizabeth's ministers continued to express increasing exasperation with her prevarications. At a masque in July 1564 Elizabeth told the Spanish Ambassador of her predilection for black and white, saying 'These are my colours', a profession borne out by the many portraits in which she wears black and white; since black signified constancy and white virginity, their combination signified eternal virginity, and Elizabeth was thus giving a strong signal of her inclination to remain perpetually unmarried. However in a written reply to a petition by the 1563 Parliament regarding the succession, the Queen told them that they were mistaken if they thought her vowed to celibacy, 'For though I can think it best for a private woman, yet do I strive with myself to think it not meet for a Prince. And if I can bend my liking to your need, I will not resist such a mind'. Again, at the 1566 Parliament, she declared: 'And therefore I say again, I will marry as soon as I can conveniently, if God take not him away whom I mind to marry, or myself, or else some other great let happen'.

From: Helen Hackett, *Virgin Mother, Maiden Queen*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests that Elizabeth seriously considered marriage to Archduke Charles.

In 1563 Elizabeth decided to choose a man of royal blood from abroad as her consort. By this time, however, all her previous foreign suitors had melted away and it was left to Cecil and his agents to seek out a suitable candidate. Cecil's eye fell on Archduke Charles of Austria, the son of the Holy Roman Emperor and first cousin to Philip II. Charles was thought a good match in terms of age, royal lineage and the alliance he would bring with the whole Habsburg clan in Europe, an alliance which would enhance England's commercial interests and act as a protective mantle against France and Scotland. His main disadvantage – his Catholic religion – was not thought to be an insuperable barrier; Cecil argued that there would be no danger to English Protestantism as long as the archduke and his retainers did not practise their religion openly in England. Elizabeth, too, could see the advantages of marrying a Habsburg prince, but she had little enthusiasm for the project. Apart from other considerations she had heard that Charles was deformed and ugly. Yet despite her reservations, Elizabeth announced – indeed for the first time in her life – that 'she was now resolved to marry' and gave as her reason 'the insistent pressure that was brought to bear on her by the Estates of her realm'. It took until 1565 for the Austrians to respond positively to Cecil's proposal to send a diplomat to England to negotiate the match. In 1559 they had wasted time in promoting a match between Elizabeth and Charles and they now needed to be convinced of the queen's sincerity. When an Austrian envoy eventually arrived at court, Elizabeth showed she was serious about marriage by delegating responsibility for negotiating a matrimonial treaty to her inner council, comprising Cecil, Norfolk and Dudley. They could not, however reach an agreement on several central issues, the most important of which concerned religion.

From: Susan Doran, *Queen Elizabeth I*, published in 1995.

## 7b. The Roman Catholics

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Roman Catholics were a serious threat to Elizabeth I and the church she had established.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Catholics were seen as enemies to the true religion expressed in the Elizabethan church.

It is important to remember that many of those who helped to make Elizabethan religious policy were determined to destroy Catholicism, not merely because they considered it politically dangerous, but because they thought that it was an evil and abominable religion. Not everyone was prepared to go as far as Cartwright who firmly believed that those who corrupted the people ought to be put to death, but the fierce hostility to Catholic teaching found among many politicians, churchmen, Members of Parliament and country gentlemen is not purely political in origin. For many of them Rome stood for anti-Christ. Roman Catholicism must be stamped out since it led men to damnation. Its priests must be driven from the country, or put to death if they persisted in staying, and the practice of it must be made difficult or impossible for the laity. Only thus could true religion flourish in England. The fierce Protestantism which was found in many places, not least in Parliament itself, was not absent even from the minds of statesmen who were guided primarily by political considerations. The Queen might not be unduly concerned about the theological issues, but many of her ministers saw the Papists, not simply as politically dangerous, but as a threat to men's chances of eternal salvation. Insofar as the government considered the priests a potential danger politically, it could legitimately have placed them under restraint and prevented them from spreading religious views which might well lead to political danger for the country. Insofar as it saw them teaching religious error, it might, with equal justice have tried to prevent them from doing so. As it was, it persecuted them both for political and for religious reasons and it executed nearly two hundred of them, but for propaganda reasons at home and abroad it deliberately represented the victims as traitors and claimed that it put them to death not for their religion but for their politics.

From: Patrick McGrath, *Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I*, published in 1967.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that Catholic plots were a problem for Elizabeth.

The growing political tension in Europe in the early 1580s again brought Mary, Queen of Scots to the centre of domestic and European politics. After the scare over Ireland in 1579-80, danger now threatened from Scotland between 1581 and 1583 when Esme Stuart, a relative of the Duke of Guise found favour with James VI. Various 'enterprises' against England involving Scotland and the Guises were planned. William Allen, Robert Parsons and William Holt, another Jesuit were all deeply involved and Holt hailed such an enterprise as a preparation for a religious war against England and the liberation of Mary, Queen of Scots. Among the conspirators was an English Catholic, Francis Throckmorton who was arrested by Walsingham in November 1583. Throckmorton revealed that the proposed invasion by French Catholic forces was to come through Sussex and that Spain and the papacy had agreed to finance the scheme. All that remained to set off the enterprise was to rouse the English Catholics.

From: Alan Dures, *English Catholicism, 1558-1642*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers that the Roman Catholic missionaries were unsuccessful.

The task of the missionary priests was to sustain and strengthen existing Catholic loyalties, but this they were unable to do for two broad reasons. First, from the earliest years of the mission there was a geographical maldistribution of clerical resources. After their training at Douai, Rheims or Rome, most priests came into England through ports such as Dover and Rye, and they tended to concentrate in the south-east, where Catholics were fewer and the prospects less good. In 1580, half of the missionaries were working in Essex, London and the Thames valley, where only a fifth of recusants lived; the north which had 40 per cent of detected recusants (and many more undetected) had attracted only a fifth of the priests. The second reason for the relative failure of the Catholic mission was that scarce priestly resources were devoted disproportionately to the spiritual needs of the gentry. Since many of the Jesuits and seminary priests came from the gentry or were patronised by them, it is easy to see why this happened, while there were sound justifications for it in both practice and policy. The high risk of arrest in the well-governed parts of southern England and in scare periods, such as the years following the Armada, may have forced some priests to seek shelter in the houses of prominent Catholics. Above all, the focus on the gentry was quite deliberate, for both political and pastoral reasons: Catholic gentlemen would provide backing for any future restoration of the old religion, and it was hoped that the influence of Catholic landlords would keep their servants and tenants loyal to the Catholic faith.

From: Christopher Haigh, *The Reign of Queen Elizabeth*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that there was a real threat from Roman Catholic missionaries to Elizabeth's government.

There was a growing realisation by the government that, even with its network of informers and spies, it could do no more than hinder the efforts of the priests. They had done their work too well. They had first of all succeeded in inspiring the English Catholic community with a spiritual fervour which ensured the continued recruitment of young men who would risk their lives for the faith. Ninety-eight of the Douay seminaries would be put to death by 1603, but that was less than a quarter of the 438 who were sent to England during these years. Secondly they had transformed the demoralized remnant of the lay adherents of the old faith into a strong, disciplined, well-organized community capable of withstanding persecution and confident of its survival. Beyond these positive checks on the government's initiatives created by the Catholics there was a negative check, resulting from the lukewarm co-operation of the Protestant gentry. The enforcement of the recusancy laws required the zealous activity of the local magistrates in reporting delinquents and presenting them in the courts. In fact they fell far short of expectations. The Council, through its informants, compiled lists of recusants which were then sent to the appropriate county officials. Such a list of December 1582 contained 1939 recusants in 22 counties. Yet only 55 appeared as paying fines during the next five years. In four years the fines from eighteen counties and two cities brought in the meagre total of £6356. This pattern repeated itself over time and across the country.

From: Wallace MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I*, published in 1993.

### 7c. The House of Commons

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the House of Commons was able to challenge Elizabeth's control successfully.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that there was a threat to Elizabeth's control but she acted decisively to combat it.

In February 1587, after the problem of Mary, Queen of Scots was out of the way, Anthony Cope, one of a little Puritan group, introduced a bill to destroy the whole ecclesiastical organisation of the State at one fell swoop, and erect a Presbyterian order in its place. Never had such a revolutionary proposal been made in Parliament before. The Speaker reminded the House of the Queen's veto on debate or action in church matters, but they took no notice. In consequence the Queen sent for the Speaker and sequestered the bill. Thereupon Peter Wentworth rose to put a series of questions on the nature and extent of Parliamentary privilege. He was for joining issue with the Crown on a fundamental problem, which if solved in his own far-reaching and quite unhistorical sense, would soon have disarmed the monarchy and made the will of Parliament supreme in the State. Fortunately Elizabeth had got wind of the meetings of Wentworth and his little group – meetings which in those days constituted a serious misdemeanour. She promptly shut all five of them up in the Tower. At her command, some of her councillors in the House of Commons made a ruthless exposition of the effects of the Puritan proposals. A mixture of coercion and reason shattered the Puritan cause in Parliament, and in doing so, shattered it for Elizabeth's life time.

From: John Neale, *Elizabeth I*, published in 1934.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that Elizabeth's financial difficulties at the end of her reign caused her some problems with the House of Commons.

Many members of the House of Commons, when it came to raising funds for the war with Spain, seemed to believe that the battles could be fought to a large extent at the private charge of the Queen. To her growing needs, a mere five years after the Armada, they responded with tight lips and purses. But they saw that, if national security was deeply involved, other important issues were also at stake. In issues of the prerogative the House of Commons had always been blocked. But in taxation the initiative lay with them. Here was a method by which they might perhaps breach the prerogative and gain a voice in 'matters of state'. They tried to make their grants conditional grants, that is, on condition that government took account of their political views. In 1597 after vehement discussion the result was a compromise. The Queen got her taxation, though less warmly and less speedily than her necessities required. She had been forced to do what she had resisted doing all her life. She had to seek large parliamentary grants: and since these were inadequate, to exploit more intensively non-parliamentary sources: the feudal dues, monopolies and the rest. This led to a growing volume of parliamentary criticism which came from those who met her urgent needs with such minimal taxation. Parliament continued to display all the outward show of devotion but it became, in effect, doggedly hostile to her fiscal aims; and it tried, with some success, to seize the initiative in the field of economic policy. It remained for the great parliamentary debate of 1601 to show what could happen.

From: Joel Hurstfield, *Elizabeth I and the Unity of England*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Elizabeth I wanted to restrict the topics for debate, but was not always successful in doing so.

Since the Queen's notion of 'matters of state' was largely her own invention, the list of topics from which she tried to bar the Commons sheds some light on her own interests. Economic questions, in which she was not particularly interested, she classified as a 'matter concerning the commonwealth', and major measures originated from private members. On the other hand, religion, foreign policy, marriage and the succession and the royal administration she classified as 'matters of state'. On the whole her attempt to exclude the Commons from these subjects was a failure. She was most successful with marriage and the succession, which was so obviously a personal matter that even Councillors in private handled it with caution. After a major quarrel in 1566, the House only once, in 1576, petitioned the Queen to marry, and when Peter Wentworth tried to raise the issue of the succession in 1593, he was discouraged by some of the most active of his fellow members. On foreign policy the Queen also achieved moderate success. The Queen's two conspicuous failures were over religion and the royal administration. Religion aroused strong feelings and members could always reply to a prohibition by saying that they ought to obey God rather than man. On questions concerning royal administration, the Commons may often have known more than the Queen.

From: Conrad Russell, *The Crisis of Parliaments*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that in the matter of Mary, Queen of Scots Elizabeth got her way, at least in 1572.

Parliament was summoned in March 1572 to devise laws for the safety of the Queen. The Lord Keeper Bacon opened Parliament by declaring that 'God of his merciful providence had detected great treasons and notable conspiracies to Her Majesty's person and to the whole state of the realm'. 'Some present remedy' was urgently needed. Bacon almost certainly spoke for a majority of the Council but the problem of Mary was not easily resolved. Two bills were drawn up: the first for the attainder of Mary as a traitor; the second, possibly favoured by the privy councillors, for debarring her from the succession. Elizabeth insisted that only the second be considered. Both houses responded with a petition that Mary be brought to trial. Nicholas St Leger complained that the Queen, 'lulled in sleep and wrapped in the mantle of her own safety', was unwilling that Parliament should deal with 'the monstrous and huge dragon and mass of the earth, the Queen of Scots'. Finally, Parliament, with the misgivings of many, agreed to the second, less drastic, bill. To their surprise the Queen refused her consent, explaining unconvincingly that she was not vetoing the bill but merely postponing it until the prorogued Parliament met in November. In the event it did not assemble again until 1576. The session was a disappointment. Cecil, created Lord Burghley in 1571, commented sadly: 'all that we laboured for and had with full consent brought to fashion, I mean a law to make the Scottish Queen unable and unworthy to wear the crown, was by Her Majesty neither assented to or rejected'.

From: Penry Williams, *The Later Tudors: England 1547-1603*, published in 1995.

## Elizabeth I, 1558 – 1603 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
7.1 How far was Elizabeth's failure to marry the result of the attitude of her Council? <b>[40 marks]</b>	7a.
7.2 Assess the view that the survival of Roman Catholicism in England depended on the role of the gentry. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7a.
7.3 Assess the view that Peter and Paul Wentworth had no chance of achieving a Puritan programme and free speech in the House of Commons. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7c.
7.4 Assess the view that Elizabeth I agreed with her House of Commons more often than she disagreed. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7c.
7.5 Assess the view that William Cecil, later Lord Burghley, was the main influence in decision making in Elizabeth's government. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.6 How successfully was Elizabeth I's image promoted through art and literature? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.7 Assess the view that the Elizabethan Court was a centre of corruption and intrigue and little else. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.8 How far were the Puritans able to alter the Elizabethan Church? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.9 Assess the main influences which determined the Elizabethan Church Settlement in 1559. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.10 Assess the seriousness of the external Roman Catholic threat to Elizabeth's throne. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 8. Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658

### 8a. Cromwell's military role in the Civil War.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the importance of Cromwell's military role in the Civil War has been exaggerated.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the battle of Marston Moor was won largely by Cromwell's cavalry.

The battle of Marston Moor was a dramatic struggle. On paper, Cromwell's side had all the advantages, superiority of numbers (27,000 against 17,000), higher ground, the initiative, and the opportunity for surprise. But it lacked a coordinated command. The Royalists, on the other hand, had only one commander in Prince Rupert, and had the advantage of being attacked in their prepared positions behind a ditch defended by cannon. The battle did not begin until early evening, after the Royalists had given up expectation of being attacked that day. Cromwell was in charge of the cavalry on the left, and after a temporary check overthrew the opposing Royalists. Prince Rupert, discarding the advantage of his unified command, had taken control on this wing and, when he was defeated there, was too late in resuming command to save the day. Yet elsewhere the battle had gone well for his side. In the centre the Scottish infantry had suffered considerable losses, and on the right the Yorkshire cavalry had been repulsed. After his own victory, however, Cromwell rallied his cavalry, and led them across the battlefield to the aid of his right wing. This was the crucial move with the hall-mark of genius upon it. Not only did he reverse the fortunes of the day there, but subsequently he went tirelessly to the help of the infantry, inflicting crippling losses upon Newcastle's stubborn foot soldiers. Thus the battle was won largely by a comparatively small group of highly trained cavalry – the men Cromwell had raised in the eastern counties. Cromwell's talents shine clearly across the years. For only an officer of extraordinary character could have kept such control over his men and over the battle when all three of his commanding generals had given it up for lost. From that moment Cromwell himself was recognised as an outstanding soldier, an amateur who had made good.

From: Maurice Ashley, *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution*, published in 1958

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the qualities shown by Cromwell on the battlefield also brought him to political prominence.

That he was a man of action can scarcely be doubted: one might go further and say that it was as a man of action that Cromwell's most sublime moments were reached. It was the decisive quickness of his military judgements, the brilliant rapid concentration of his mind in battle, which brought him the well-deserved rise to fame, which in turn enhanced his position in the political world, and finally elevated him to the highest counsels of the country. As a politician, and later still in enjoyment of the supreme power, this same capacity for decision – which looked more like impulse in the life of peacetime – brought about the dissolution of the Rump, carried him on to the Protectoral throne, and held off assaults on his position by the quick avoiding actions he took to various assorted Parliaments.

From: Antonia Fraser, *Cromwell: Our Chief of Men*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Cromwell's military greatness lay in his achievements as a cavalry commander.

There are features of Cromwell's image as a soldier presented at the time and since that are well-substantiated by evidence from 1643, and which (if not all of them are unique) are at least unusual among officers of both sides in the Civil War. First, Cromwell had a very close relationship with the men under his command. This was based on a combination of tight military discipline with frequent displays of concern for their well-being. Second, contemporaries agreed that from his earliest military engagements Cromwell exercised an unusually high degree of discipline on, as well as off, the battlefield. Unlike many other cavalry commanders, Cromwell took his cavalry into battle in a close tight formation, and having broken through the enemy's ranks, did not allow his men to chase those in flight for plunder, but instead regrouped his forces into a tight formation to attack the enemy still on the battlefield from the rear. Third, as he recruited more men in 1643 (within a year after the outbreak of war the men under his command had risen from one troop to ten troops of about eighty men each) he 'raised such men as had the fear of God before them, And made some conscience of what they did'. On 16 June 1645 with the New Model Army threatened by Rupert's army – victorious after its sack of Leicester, on 1 May, the Commons approved Fairfax's petition for Cromwell's appointment to the post of his second-in-command as Lieutenant General of Horse, which had remained vacant since the establishment of the army. Four days later the New Model Army won a crushing victory over Rupert at Naseby and a month later an equally decisive victory at Langport, the last major battle of the war. In both these battles, as at Marston Moor, the role of Cromwell's disciplined cavalry was decisive, reinforcing the view that Cromwell's main strength as a soldier during the Civil War was as a cavalry commander, rather than as a general in overall command of the movement of armies on and off the battlefield.

From: Barry Coward, *Profiles in Power: Oliver Cromwell*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that in the course of the civil wars Cromwell revealed several unique characteristics as a general.

Cromwell's uncompromising and aggressive nature as a soldier is one of the most prominent features of his style of warfare. On the surface at least, this may appear to be unusual for the times. Although trained to be heroic soldiers, many of Cromwell's contemporary generals in the seventeenth century were also habitually locked into fruitless wars of manoeuvre, and it was often the successful siege and seizure of territory, rather than the battle, that showed their true artistry. Cromwell was different in this respect. In fact the rather atypical Cromwellian aggression in war made him a hasty and distinctive, if sometimes unsubtle, soldier in the field. Although Cromwell never really reached the heights of a master of the strategic manoeuvre (he was no Napoleon), he did become a very sound and capable tactician. He was the first to admit that 'I must acknowledge myself guilty of oversights [as] they can rarely be avoided in military matters'. His later campaigns in Ireland and Scotland and that in England in 1651 – the real measure of his generalship alongside the Preston campaign of 1648 – were based on sound planning, intelligence and sharp manoeuvres. Above all, in the field, Oliver Cromwell was a general who tried to dominate the enemies he faced, and the men he commanded, by sheer force of will; he seems to have been instinctively aware that, in war, moral forces can far outweigh the physical. It is arguable that it is this element that gives Cromwell his distinctiveness in his era. In his day, he became the moral commander *par excellence*, dependent on his own self-assurance and religious certainty to bring him through the chaos of the conflicts of that period.

From: Alan Marshall, *Oliver Cromwell, Soldier*, published 2004.



## 8b. Cromwell's political and social attitudes

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Cromwell believed in a conservative rather than a radical solution to the problems raised by the English Civil War.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the apparent contradictions in Cromwell's beliefs and actions are a reflection of the paradoxes of the English Revolution.

Ever since the death of Oliver Cromwell 300 years ago his reputation has been the subject of controversy. The royalist view of him was expressed by Clarendon: 'a brave bad man', an ambitious hypocrite. The interpretation was supported by many former Parliamentarians: Edmund Ludlow regarded Cromwell as the lost leader who jettisoned his early radical ideas on rising to power himself. There can be such varying interpretations of Oliver's character, motives and place in history because his character and actions bristle with paradoxes. First is the paradox that the revolutionary of the 'forties became the conservative dictator of the 'fifties. Another paradox is to be found in his attitude towards those unrepresented in Parliament. Promotion in his Army went by merit, regardless of social or political considerations. 'I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman and is nothing else.' Yet he opposed the Leveller demand for manhood suffrage. The break with the Levellers was a decisive moment in Oliver's career. Till then the Revolution had moved steadily to the left. Henceforth, unevenly at first, a reverse trend set in which ended only with the Restoration. A halt at some stage has to be called: the more conservative revolutionaries break with their radical supporters. Hence the accusations of self-seeking and treachery showered on him by the radicals who felt he had deceived them.

From: Christopher Hill, *Oliver Cromwell 1658-1659*, published in 1958.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Cromwell was playing a complex political role in the crucial events of summer 1647.

On 2 June 1647 the regiments came together at Newmarket in a general rendezvous, which they had indicated they would have with or without their officers. There they resolved that if it became necessary they would resist parliament. On 3 June Cornet Joyce went to Holdenby House and took the King into his charge. Once in control he wrote – it is no surprise – to Lieut.-General Oliver Cromwell in London to know what further to do. This letter is so sharp, curt, and matter of fact that it is difficult to believe that the recipient cannot have been already briefed for what was happening. Cromwell quickly got out of London and joined Fairfax at Kentford Heath near Newmarket. There, on 4 June, the army drew up what they called 'an humble representation' in which they demanded to be informed of the names of those members of parliament who had pressed the resolution branding their petitioners enemies of the State. The newly-constituted general council of the army, consisting of the general officers and two officers and two privates from each regiment (i.e. an assembly dominated by officers), worked out a programme which included reform of the franchise and the redistribution of the seats. The busy hand and working brain of Oliver Cromwell has been discerned in all this talk and movement. There can be no question he was deeply involved – but it is an open question how far he was controlling events and how far being swept along by them. Here was a political warfare just as sharp, perhaps as unpredictable, as fighting in the field. He had to find some way through and bring his side – which was it? – to victory.

From: Ivan Roots, *The Great Rebellion, 1642-1660*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Cromwell finally lost patience with the radical stance of the Levellers and was determined to crush them.

Certainly, by March 1649, Cromwell's patience was exhausted. He was indifferent to personal criticism, but was acutely aware of the problems facing the Commonwealth and could not allow the Levellers to divide the army against itself. One last effort was made to persuade Lilburne to take a post under the administration and when this was refused the government struck. The Rump carried a resolution that the authors of *The Second Part of England's New Chains* were guilty of high treason for attempting to breed mutiny in the army and should be punished accordingly. In the early hours of the day following, four strong detachments of troops, each numbering between one and two hundred men, clattered through the deserted streets to arrest Lilburne, Overton, Walwyn and Thomas Prince. Late in the afternoon the four men were called individually before the Council of State. After each had made two abortive appearances before the Council, the Levellers were put in an anteroom while their case was debated. Lilburne decided to eavesdrop at the keyhole and – according to his later account – caught Cromwell in aggressive mood. Thumping his fist on the table Cromwell stormed: 'I tell you, sir, you have no other way to deal with these men, but to break them in pieces; if you do not break them, they will break you'.

From: Howard Shaw, *The Levellers*, published in 1968.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Cromwell played a leading role in the execution of the King and the creation of the English Republic.

Many of Cromwell's actions during the next few weeks [at the end of 1648 and beginning of 1649] which saw the trial and execution of the King, the abolition of monarchy and the House of Lords, and the establishment of the English Republic are seen through the distorting evidence of witnesses in treason trials in 1660 who were desperately trying to steer the blame for what had happened away from themselves and onto Cromwell. It therefore needs to be emphasised that Cromwell was not the only leader of the English Revolution, but was one among a small group of men who together pushed it through. Yet later reports perhaps do accurately reflect his impulsive and decisive support for it, once he had thrown off the indecision of the previous weeks, 'I tell you [Algernon Sydney wrote in 1660, reporting Cromwell's reactions to his own legal objections to bringing the King to trial] 'we will cut off his [the King's] head with the crown on it'. What drove Cromwell to take this drastic step was 'necessity'.

From: Barry Coward, *Profiles in Power: Oliver Cromwell*, published in 1991.

### **8c. Cromwell's refusal of the offer of the crown made by the Humble Petition and Advice.**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Cromwell declined to accept the crown mainly because of opposition from the Army.

**[40 marks]**

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Cromwell's dependence upon the loyalty of the army was the decisive factor in his refusing the crown.

A crisis blew up early in May 1657 when it leaked out that a group of Independent ministers and officers was circulating a joint petition to be presented to parliament urging the abandonment of the kingship campaign. There was loose talk, too, of a revival of the army councils of the late sixties, complete with rank-and-file agitators. Religion, army loyalty, army discipline combined together to bring Cromwell to that firm and final decision to which he had been working and from which he had been hanging back. Did denial come because Cromwell was afraid of Lambert, Desborough and a few other generals? It is doubtful. Cromwell knew now what he was uncertain of in February, that the great matter of kingship drew together all threads in the army. To accept the crown would be to test whether those threads of solidarity would be cast around his neck to throttle him. Cromwell could take a calculated risk but this time the gamble was too desperate. If it failed, all that had been gained would be lost. Faced with a naked choice between unarmed civilians and soldiers with swords drawn, Cromwell was bound to choose the latter - out of comradeship and political realism equally.

From: Ivan Roots *The Great Rebellion 1642-1660* published in 1966.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that acceptance of the crown would have gone against the principle of a career open to talent.

Several questions were involved in the offer of the crown: a repudiation of the Instrument of Government, on which alone the title of Protector was based; a return to the forms of the old constitution, rejecting revolutionary illegality; a reassertion of the hereditary principle; an unambiguous declaration of the succession thus removing the uncertainties of a situation in which stability depended on Oliver's life. There might be objections on as many grounds. Republicans naturally disliked monarchy, and democrats the hereditary principle; kingship seemed to many a denial of the Good Old Cause for which they had fought. The end of revolutionary illegality, and the establishment of a hereditary succession, would put paid to personal ambitions which a general (John Lambert, for example) might have to succeed Oliver. The conflict between the hereditary and the elective principle went very deep, and related to the whole programme of the career open to the talents of which Oliver had been in a sense the spokesman. In the last analysis it was the lower-class upstart officers, headed by Pride and some of Oliver's oldest comrades-in-arms, who organised the Army to force Cromwell to refuse the crown. Pride was reported as saying that if Oliver accepted kingship he would shoot him in the head at the first opportunity he had.

From: Christopher Hill *God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* published in 1970

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Cromwell refused the crown for family and personal reasons.

Cromwell's reasons for refusing the kingship have been exhaustively canvassed without much result. He kept his own counsel, then and later. Counter-pressure from the army was undoubtedly a factor; his own personal scruples were another. It was not a step he could justify by his usual appeal to the will of Providence and it would be a hypocritical rejection of his whole previous career. He knew that neither of his sons, Richard or Henry was competent to succeed him, he was also aware that the restoration of the legitimate monarchy was likely in the long run, and he must look to the safety of his family (as it was, his widow and his surviving children were not seriously molested by Charles II's government, which would not have been the case had he founded a rival dynasty). In the end, the Commons were persuaded to drop their demand that he declare himself king; instead he was granted the right to name his successor, and the right to nominate to 'The Other House', as the new second chamber was rather lamely called.

From: J.P. Kenyon *Stuart England* published in 1985.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that, in Cromwell's view, acceptance of the crown would have been in opposition to divine providence.

Why did Cromwell reject the chance to become King Oliver? It is difficult to believe that, given his bravado performance in out-facing hostile army officers on 27 February 1657 and at other times in his career, fear of the army was a prime consideration. His first reaction on the day he was presented with the Humble Petition and Advice, 3 March 1657, provides a clue to a more compelling reason. 'If these considerations fall upon a person or persons that God has no pleasure in', he said, 'that perhaps may be the end of this work'. Cromwell's fear that he was someone whom 'God has no pleasure in' had been heightened by the failure of the Western Design. Would not his fears become realised if he restored the monarchy that had been abolished with God's blessing in 1649? Would not acceptance of the kingship be interpreted as the sin of pride, ambition and self-advancement? Would not the result be 'God's rebuke' and the end of the hoped-for godly reformation? This is the providential reason for his rejection of the crown, which he explained in 13 April to a delegation of MPs. 'Truly the providence of God has laid this title aside, providentially. God hath not only dealt with the persons and the family, but he hath blasted the title. I would not seek to set up that that providence hath destroyed and laid in the dust'.

From: Barry Coward *The Stuart Age: England 1603-1714* third edition published in 2003.

## Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
8.1 How far do you agree that in spite of his lack of military experience, Cromwell quickly established himself as an outstanding general? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8a
8.2 Assess the accuracy of the view that Cromwell's rise to political power is explained entirely by his military success. <b>[40 marks]</b>	8a
8.3 With what justification may Cromwell be regarded as a radical in the period 1640-49? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8b
8.4 Assess the view that by crushing the Levellers in 1649 Cromwell brought an end to the English Revolution. <b>[40 marks]</b>	8b
8.5 How far do you agree that Cromwell was offered the crown in 1657 mainly because of the need to avoid a military dictatorship? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8c
8.6 Assess the view that Cromwell refused the crown in 1657 because he believed that to accept would be against God's will. <b>[40 marks]</b>	8c
8.7 How well does Cromwell deserve his reputation as a champion of religious toleration? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.8 Assess the view that Cromwell's principal aim as Lord Protector was to carry out a programme of 'Godly Reformation'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.9 How accurate is the view that as Lord Protector Cromwell relied entirely on the army? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.10 How far do you agree that Cromwell failed in his attempt to govern in partnership with the Parliaments of the Protectorate? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 9. Peter the Great 1689-1725

### 9a. Peter the Great's domestic reforms

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Peter's domestic policies were revolutionary.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Peter completely transformed the administration of the Church.

The Patriarchate of Moscow had been founded with the full approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This independent Church authority had proved invaluable during the Time of Troubles in restoring Russia's political independence. A Patriarch was father of the first Romanov sovereign, and another Patriarch, Nikon, was for some time the counsellor of Tsar Alexis. It was the Patriarch Joachim who had insisted in 1682 on the accession of Peter himself. Peter was a religious man; he enjoyed singing in the church choir; in his last illness he had a small church improvised in his cottage. But the Church was full of his opponents. The reactionary Raskolniks were of course among his bitterest antagonists; but even among the liberal churchmen, such as Stephen Yavorsky, who boldly preached against his system of *Fiscals* as demoralising to the whole population, few were in sympathy with his drastic changes. When still hardly more than a boy, Peter had been unable to prevent the election as Patriarch of the reactionary Adrian, who denounced the shaving of the beard as heresy. When Adrian died (1700) Peter declared that the choice of a successor was so important that it must be deferred for full consideration. No appointment was ever made; and in 1721 he issued an ordinance by which the government of the Church was put into commission. It was to be governed in future by a Holy Synod, composed of the principal hierarchs; the Synod, like the Senate, bore the title of regent; it replaced the Patriarch. As the Senate, during the Tsar's absence or minority, was to have the regency of the State, so was the Synod to act permanently in affairs of the Church. To the Synod Peter attached an office held by a layman, that of *Ober-Procuror*, whom Peter himself described as the 'Tsar's eye' – he was there to see that the Synod did nothing displeasing to the sovereign. Thus began the secularisation of the Church authority, which was to have fatal results later.

From: Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the nature of reforms as well as the pace of change transformed Russia.

Peter's role was that of a catalyst, speeding up policies already slowly under way. However, he acted with such vigour and energy that his actions certainly seemed revolutionary to those who were subjected to them. This impression was enhanced by the fact that much reform was concerned with outward appearance. The abolition of the beard and long dress was undoubted proof of revolution to those who cherished them as symbols of piety or pledges of salvation, and regarded Peter as the Antichrist for doing away with them. It was, then, the pace, the volume and external aspects of reform that were revolutionary; so much so, in fact, as perhaps to constitute, after all, a real break in historical continuity. Change came so thick and fast that it marked a qualitative as well as quantitative wrench from the past; it was 'transformation' rather than 'reform'. Peter's methods, too, were revolutionary in the eyes of the vast body of the nation, whose yearning for traditional ways was reinforced by his utter ruthlessness. How far they were justified in feeling the costs of his policies to be more than could reasonably be borne, is bound to depend on personal standpoints. Soviet historians contend that the strain, though great, was within the nation's capacity. A classic nineteenth-century historian, S. M. Solov'yov, on the other hand, points out that few nations, if any, have ever been called upon to make such tremendous sacrifices in such a short space of time.

From: M. Lentin, *Russia in the Eighteenth Century*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Peter's military reforms were not an innovation.

Peter was at war for a total of over 28 years between 1695 and 1723. It is hardly surprising that military matters should have dominated his reign and his thinking. His unusual interest at an early age in the art of war made life in the German suburb an apt preparation. A powerful army and navy were essential for defence, particularly after 1703, when the strategically exposed St Petersburg needed protecting. Except for a brief spell, never before had the army reached 100,000, nor had there been a navy of any significance. The sheer magnitude of Peter's military and naval expansion had massive repercussions on Russia's economy and her industrial and social infrastructure. Indeed, warfare absorbed most of the revenue – 75 per cent by 1701 and as much as 80 per cent in 1710, only reducing to 67 per cent by 1725. The burden was borne entirely by the Russian people, with no foreign loans. To withstand the immediate threat from Sweden and Turkey, rapid escalation of military might was essential. Such urgency suited Peter's stormy, impetuous personality. Nevertheless, there was nothing entirely new in the nature of Peter's reforms. Ivan III, Ivan IV and Alexis had all sought to assimilate foreign technology and military expertise. Even recruitment of foreign troops was no novelty.

From: William Marshall, *Peter the Great*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Peter set out to end Muscovite customs.

Perhaps most unsettling for the Russian élite was Peter's Law on Single Inheritance, issued on 23 March 1714, which outlawed the ancient custom of partible inheritance (dividing landed estates among all sons), stipulating that 'immovable property' (real estate) was to be left to one heir only, normally the first-born son, but a parent could nominate someone else if the eldest son was deemed unworthy. In the absence of sons, daughters could inherit. 'Moveable' property – money, goods, livestock – could still be divided among all the children. The main aim of the measure was to avoid the wasteful fragmentation of estates (said to put an added burden on the peasants) and there was also the hope that those who did not inherit would rely on state service for their living. The futility of resistance to various unwelcome developments was underlined by Zotov's wedding, at which the cream of Russian society donned fancy dress and played joke instruments at the tsar's bidding. Peter's subjects were left in no doubt that there would be no return to 'ancient barbaric customs', such as Muscovite arranged marriages, permanent residence in Moscow and division of property among all the heirs. Instead, the tsar was free to devise new barbaric customs of his own.

From: Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great*, published in 2002.



## 9b. Peter the Great and the Russian economy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Peter's economic policies were largely unsuccessful.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Peter took a personal interest in the development of Russia's canals and industry.

The works for the Volga-Don canal had to be abandoned because of the great natural difficulties but toward the end of his reign Peter was successful in giving an excellent start to the canal system of Russia, a task in which he himself took the most intimate part. He sent scientific commissions to study the resources of different areas, and at the end of his reign explorers sent by him investigated the far corners of the empire, as far as the Bering Strait. He was peculiarly careful of the uses to which the by-products could be put; measures of his dealt with the exploitation of peat and potash. Peter was the founder of Russian industry. He conceived it as a national need and pushed it forward with all the authority and initiative of the state. For a given state need, for instance, army cloth or – even more essential – the exploitation of metals, he would form off-hand a ready-made company composed of men of all classes, Russians or foreigners, would grant them a subsidy, give them a government loan, exempt them for so many years from taxation and supply them with free labour by the simple expedient of making them absolute masters of all the peasants in a given area. The peasants were not consulted in the matter, and were left at the unfettered disposal of their new employers. For the employers themselves this was state service which they were not allowed to escape or to question.

From: Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that progress in Russian commerce was hindered by governmental edicts.

Commerce is a delicate mechanism, and state decrees are not usually the best way to make it work. In Peter's case, it was not simply the element of compulsion that detracted from the success of his efforts – he himself was not always sure what he wanted. When his attention wandered or he was distracted, those below him, uncertain as to his desires, did nothing and all activity stopped. Peter's methods were strictly empirical. He tried this or that, ordering and countermanding, seeking a system that worked, sometimes without thoroughly understanding what was needed or the nature of the obstacles confronting him. His constant changes in direction, his minute regulations leaving no scope for local adjustment, confused and drained initiative from Russian merchants and manufacturers. Once, when the Dutch ambassador was pressing for Russian approval of a new commercial treaty and had been frustrated by repeated delays, he was told by Osterman [an able Russian diplomat], 'Between ourselves, I will tell you the truth. We have not a single man who understands commercial affairs at all'. There were occasions when enterprises foundered simply because Peter was not present to give instructions. His temper could be so fierce and unpredictable that, in the absence of specific orders, people were unwilling to take initiative and simply did nothing. In Novgorod, for example, a large number of leather saddles and harnesses had been stored for the army. The local authorities knew that they were there, but because no order to distribute them had come down from above, they were left until 'eventually, mouldy and rotten, they had to be dug up with spades'.

From: Robert Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and World*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there were few advances in Russian agriculture during Peter's rule.

Peter showed more interest in agricultural development than has generally been acknowledged. He promoted the cultivation of marginal lands in Siberia, the Volga region and parts of the Ukraine, and also imported Spanish and Silesian breeds to improve the quality of Russian sheep. He secured an overall increase in certain types of produce, including cereals, grapes, hemp, tobacco, flax and wool. His efforts were, however, less obviously successful in agriculture than in industry. His reforming edicts were fragmentary and were not part of an overall coherent policy. He was also confronted by massive resistance to change from a large illiterate peasantry and a nobility which saw no need to change an existing system based on freely available serf labour. Hence traditional methods were still widely used, including the old three-field system with its narrow and isolated strips which were subject to periodic redistribution. The agrarian revolution which, in the late eighteenth century, brought innovations to Britain and western Europe largely bypassed Russia: here the wooden plough was widely used up to the time of the Russian Revolution – and beyond.

From: Stephen Lee, *Peter the Great*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Peter's economic policy was a mixture of success and failure.

Peter's impact on the Russian economy is controversial. The jury is still out on the question of whether he accelerated or slowed the development of capitalism in Russia. On the face of it, he produced success stories – the two dozen or so factories in operation when Peter came to the throne grew to almost 200 by his death. He did not accumulate a foreign debt. Russia was self-sufficient in some areas of arms and textile manufacture and poised to become the world's leading producer of pig iron by the 1740s. The opening of new sea and river routes, the acquisition of ports, the development of a merchant marine – all should have fostered wealth-creating trade. However, private enterprise remained weak, little capital was accumulated, much trade was in the hands of foreigners, as were insurance and banking, and towns were underdeveloped. There was no 'great leap forward'. Peter's economy operated in a traditional framework: war or defence created its momentum; autocracy and serfdom allowed Peter to cope with military demands. It boiled down to making the most of Russia's 'backwardness' by applying absolute power to extract service, labour and taxes from all parts of the population, with the bulk coming from the 90 per cent who were peasants. The state played a disproportionate role in industrial growth and continued to do so for the rest of the tsarist era.

From: Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great*, published in 2002.

### 9c. Peter the Great and his opposition

Using these passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that opposition in Russia posed no serious threat to Peter the Great's rule.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Peter was responsible for much of the opposition in the course of his reign.

At least some of the opposition to Peter I derived from obvious structural, inevitable, or accidental causes. These would include the displacement, as in the palace revolution of 1689, of certain grandees and their kinsfolk, clients, and friends, who then plotted to regain, while it seemed possible, their lost power and privileges; the incompetence or depredations of particular officials; the hostility of the official church towards nonconformists, a policy initiated before Peter's time; or the burdens of serfdom, an institution about which Peter did, and perhaps could have done, essentially nothing. But it is also apparent that much of the opposition which surfaced during Peter's reign was directed against policies that were either initiated by him and his government or in some way intensified or expanded by them. Among the causes of this more specific opposition may be mentioned the unprecedented exactions of all kinds occasioned by Peter's continual wars and building projects; the official and sometimes forcible promotion of such practices as smoking tobacco, shaving the beard, and calculating the year from the birth of Christ (instead of from the creation of the world), all hitherto proscribed by custom or by law; the official preference granted foreigners, almost uniformly scornful of Russians and their ways. The evidence also reveals that still more of the opposition which manifested itself during the Petrine period was directed against Peter himself. It was aroused not only by the factors just mentioned, but by Peter's own 'unseemly' words and deeds: by his smoking and drinking; but his often shabby, unregal, or un-Russian dress; by his frequent indulgence in extravagant jokes and pranks; by his flouting of the sacred rites; by his divorce from Tsarevich Alexis's mother.

From: James Cracraft, *Peter the Great Transforms Russia*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Peter faced little opposition from the nobles and gentry.

At the top as at the bottom of Russian society Peter imposed new burdens and affronted old prejudices. The conscripted peasant, torn from his village and family to endure a lifetime of military service or to sicken and too often die in the swamps of St Petersburg, had his parallel in the landowner forced into permanent state service and thus condemned to allow his estates to deteriorate through lack of personal supervision and his relatives to go for years without a sight of him. The deep-rooted hostility of the ordinary Russian to all imported novelties found some echo in the resentment with which members of noble Muscovite families saw the tsar bestow important posts on foreigners, or on Russians of humble birth. But from the nobility and gentry, groups with a long tradition of state service which the tsar merely formalised and intensified, much less was to be feared than from infuriated and desperate peasants. Evidence of serious aristocratic resistance to Peter's reforms is in fact very slight. The unprecedented decision to send young nobles and gentry abroad in 1696 for naval training aroused only grumbling and ineffective complaints; and though members of two important families, the Sokovnins and the Pushkins, were involved in the Zickler conspiracy of 1697, this reflected their personal feelings rather than any general attitude of the Russian nobility. Though Peter's innovations might sometimes affront ruling-class sensibilities, they also opened much wider opportunities to able young members of that class than had ever existed before. In the enlarged and modernized army, in the new navy, in diplomacy, in the expanded and at least to some extent rationalized administrative machine, young men could now carve out careers in unprecedented numbers.

From: M. S. Anderson, *Peter the Great*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation C:** This historian suggests that Peter faced frequent opposition from the Russian peasantry.

Besides the revolts in Astrakhan and on the Don [in 1705-10], there were others on a smaller scale during the reign of Peter I, such as those in industrial enterprises and among tribesmen. Into the first category fell the rising of workers at the Voronezh shipyards in 1698, of peasants recruited for work in the industrial enterprises at Olonets, 1705-10 and 1715, and of other peasants who besieged Kungur in the Urals in 1703 and had to be suppressed with the help of artillery. At the beginning of the 1720s, in Smolensk, Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod provinces, along the Oka and the Volga rivers, bands of runaway serfs, workers and soldier-recruits were in action, often attacking landlords on their estates. In 1722 there was trouble in the Siberian town of Tara, and, in the same year, the laik Cossacks rose against the threat of arduous army service and because of the search among them for runaways. Into the tribal category came the Bashkir rising of 1705-11, again caused by demands for army recruits and, in this case, for horses too. Another outbreak of tribal violence occurred in Kamchatka in 1707-11. From one end of the Empire to the other, then, popular dissatisfaction flared up throughout Peter's reign. His death was widely welcomed, as was well illustrated in a popular woodcut of the time entitled 'The mice bury the cat'.

From: Paul Dukes, *The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613-1801*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the *streltsy* presented a serious challenge to Peter's rule in 1698.

The *streltsy*'s successful bids for power in 1676 and 1682, the failed attempt in 1689 and an abortive plot in February 1697 led by Ivan Zickler, were menacing enough, but all these pale into insignificance before the serious *streltsy* revolt of 1698 when Peter was absent in the West. So threatening was it that he cut short his visit to Vienna and dashed back home. Besides the conservatives' grievances, the *streltsy* especially resented the mid-century rise to importance of the 'new formation' regiments. This was intensified by the fact that the *streltsy* had recently been posted far away from Moscow and had been given the most dangerous part in the defence of Azov, resulting in many casualties. Mercifully for Peter, the disorganised *streltsy* march on Moscow, which began in June 1698, was easily put down by Shein and Gordon 40 kilometres west of the city. The result was that 130 of the rebels were hanged and 2,000 exiled.

From: William Marshall, *Peter the Great*, published in 1996.

### Peter the Great 1689-1725 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions
9.1 How far do you agree with the view that Peter the Great's religious policies represented a decisive break with the past? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9a
9.2 To what extent can it be argued that Peter the Great transformed the economy of Russia? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9b
9.3 How widespread was the opposition in Russia to Peter the Great's reforms in government and administration? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c
9.4 Assess the view that the Russian nobility was mainly responsible for the opposition to Peter the Great. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c
9.5 How far do you agree that Russia had already been 'westernised' at the accession of Peter the Great in 1696? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.6 Assess the importance of Peter the Great's military and naval reforms in strengthening Russia. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.7 Assess the view that Peter the Great's foreign policy was essentially defensive. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.8 Assess the view that Peter failed to establish a sound educational system in Russia. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.9 Assess the view that Peter the Great's foreign policies were an over-reaction to external dangers. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.10 Assess the claim that Peter I can be described as 'Great' more for what he attempted than for what he achieved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 10. Louis XIV 1661-1715

### 10a. Louis XIV and absolutism

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Louis XIV's power as King of France was absolute in theory but limited in practice.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Louis XIV extended his authority in the course of his reign.

Louis inherited absolute power, and Bossuet, in defining it, was recording widely accepted theories. Francis I was the first King of France to be given the title of 'Majesty', and the device of the Sun King was, amongst others, widely used in the century before the birth of Louis XIV. Sovereign power, it was believed, should be indivisible and shared with no other persons or corporations; it should be controlled by no other human agency. The circumstances which favoured the growth of that power have been analysed often enough. The theories of the Renaissance and the reception of the code of Justinian favoured the development of an emphasis upon the unchecked right of the Prince, and it is doubtful whether, in any European country, an organized society could have been created without the destruction of local rights, whether of seigneurs or of corporations. The recent study of the movement of prices has established a tendency for prices to fall after 1650, and it seems likely that this tendency encouraged the progress of state interference and stimulation, and therefore the development both of bureaucracy and of absolutism. Military as well as economic history contributed to the same development, since the decay of those medieval institutions which might have maintained, as in England, a measure of control over the levying of taxes was accelerated by the determination of the crown to finance the almost continuous wars after 1635. The absolute state was accepted because, in conditions of warfare, extraordinary measures are always accepted and, as wars succeed one another, cease to be extraordinary.

From: H. G. Judge, *Louis XIV*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that religious groups in France presented Louis XIV with serious problems.

Louis XIV's absolutism was to some extent qualified in church affairs. The Gallican Church, for all its protestations of loyalty and its exaltation of the monarchy as a divinely appointed institution, was nonetheless more devoted to maintaining its privileged status than to serving the king. This meant that it would support Louis without reserve in any conflict with the Huguenots, or with the pope for that matter, since it was jealous of interference from Rome, but it was reluctant to assist him in disciplining its own members. There was indeed a ten-year struggle between Louis and the papacy to resolve a conflict of jurisdiction and of revenue, but the outstanding feature of the reign was the persecution of the Huguenots. This was pursued by Louis less for doctrinal than for political reasons. The Edict of Nantes had been one of the greatest concessions wrung from the crown by force, and Louis was resolved that what had once been granted out of weakness should be reversed from strength. His theory of the state allowed no room for dissent, and the Huguenots, as a separate community within the kingdom, were a blatant example of irreconcilable non-conformity. So, too, were the Jansenists in Louis's eyes, for they were exposed to him by the Jesuits as Calvinistic Frondeurs. In this matter the support of other clergy made it impossible to attack Port-Royal outright. His initial attempt to dislodge them in 1661 had failed by 1668, and an uneasy truce prevailed until the end of the reign.

From: David Maland, *Culture and Society in Seventeenth-Century France*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Louis faced considerable opposition and resistance to his domestic policies.

The image of the absolute monarch did not correspond to the reality. Royal power was not all-pervasive and the obedience of the people not easily obtained. Although there were no major uprisings after the Breton revolt of 1675 it should not be imagined that violence ceased. Mutinies, attacks on the soldiers, tax farmers, inspectors of cloth and grain hoarders remained features, albeit momentarily less significant, of French life. In 1689 the sailors of Hendaye on the Spanish frontier rioted against the imposition of the naval levies, declaring that they would serve in their own manner without recruitment. Troops were required to restore order. That the need for coercive measures was in a sense an indication of government weakness is suggested by Colbert's repeated admonition of those officials who used them too readily. Yet in 1680 there were no less than 162 agents making forcible tax collections in the *généralité* of Bordeaux. In addition the government had to contend with persistent and ingenious forms of non-cooperation. Some municipalities for instance impeded the operation of naval levies by abusing their role as suppliers of essential provisions. Opposition to both monopoly companies and privileged manufacturers was also widespread; the resentment felt by the *bonnetiers* of Paris towards the silk stocking gild established in 1672 was such that they obtained a decree from the *parlement* empowering them to inspect the shops of the silk stocking workers, despite a royal council decision to the contrary. This episode also illustrates the way in which the *parlements* continued to use their legal powers to obstruct the royal will. When the *parlement* of Aix ordered an intendant of the galleys to release a convicted deserter it required direct intervention by the royal council to get the judgement withdrawn. As these examples indicate, much of the absolutist flavour of government activity was actually the consequence of its constant struggle to prevent the subversion of agreed policies.

From: David Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Louis XIV exercised limited authority over his French troops and royal armies.

Louis XIV's monopoly of military power was far from complete. Urban militias, commanded by municipal officials, existed till the French Revolution. Attempts to seize the artillery of interior towns and re-deploy it to frontier defence were firmly resisted. Prising armaments away from inland châteaux was an uphill struggle throughout the century. Nor was the army as reliable a weapon for imposing royal policies on the country by force as historians of 'absolutism' imagine. Noble captains were reluctant to turn their troops on fellow nobles and deployment for the maintenance of internal order would have been interpreted by their troops as an open invitation to loot the realm. Soldiers displayed less enthusiasm for coercing taxpayers than for ambushing tax collectors. The failure of Louis XIV's army to perform its 'absolutist' role is scarcely surprising. The prototype for all subsequent professional standing armies was that of the Dutch: between 1600 and 1700 its size quintupled. A device pioneered by a republic is a dubious hallmark of 'absolutism'.

From: Nicholas Henshall, *The Myth of Absolutism*, published in 1992.



### 10b. Colbert and the French economy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Colbert was largely to blame for the limited success of his economic policies.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that in spite of improvements in finance and commerce, the French economy suffered because Colbert took little interest in agriculture.

Colbert relied on his commercial and industrial policy to expand the French economy and so increase the revenue without over-burdening the people. Although he achieved much, there was no significant general expansion. It was an uphill task because the economy began to decline. The inflow of precious metals into Europe from Spanish America was drying up. Prices and incomes in France were beginning to fall, and the most Colbert could do by his methods was to counteract this long-term process. He neglected the creation of new credit by banks, which in Holland and later in England gave a new stimulus to the economy. He had little regard for agriculture as a whole – forestry and industrial crops were his main concern – and French prosperity depended mainly on agricultural output. Naturally a wealthy country, with the finest cornfields in Europe, France was economically backward, still medieval in many ways. No book on agriculture appeared in France in the seventeenth century after that of Olivier de Serres.

From: W. E. Brown, *The First Bourbon Century in France*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Colbert had considerable difficulty persuading Frenchmen to engage in overseas trade.

All had to be done to develop sales of French goods abroad, something which required an overall economic policy enjoying a degree of conscious collaboration from the king's subjects. The king and Colbert did their best, developing the road network, tackling regressive tolls, encouraging water-borne transportation; but it was still necessary to have a wider degree of co-operation. Colbert reproached his compatriots for their laziness: the clerics without a sense of vocation, the merchants who retired early, the *rentiers* who set no example. The national obsession with offices turned away thousands from the world of commerce. And then there was the prejudice provoked by noble derogation (*dérogance*). A Colbertian ordinance of 1669 announced, and an edict of 1701 repeated, but to no avail, that merchant endeavour did not demean noble status; the French aristocracy would never imitate the English gentry in this respect.

From: François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Colbert implemented several successful financial reforms.

From 1658 to the mid-1660s the *taille* was reduced from 50 million *livres* annually to 32 million. With a view to the longer term, a lot of attention was paid to the exorbitant costs of collection, occasioned by the fraudulent practices of royal agents and reluctance to pay on the part of the overburdened peasants. Colbert reduced the fees taken by the receiver of tithes from 25 per cent to 3.75 per cent of all tax paid, and used the intendants to root out many malpractices. In 1670 he could claim with justified satisfaction that the *taille*, when at the wartime level of 52 million, had yielded only 16 million for the treasury, whereas it now produced 24 million from a levy of 32. Still part of the measures taken to reduce the royal debts were the arbitrary reductions in interest on royal loans guaranteed by various institutions such as the Paris municipality: *rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville*. On the grounds that contracts had been made at exorbitantly high rates of interest during the wars, some *rentes* were cancelled and others rescheduled at a very low rate of interest. The results of all this activity were remarkable. In 1661 about 27 million *livres* had to be paid each year in interest on the debts, but by 1683, even after the Dutch War, this amount had been reduced to only 8 million. In the ten years from 1661 to 1671, net revenues had increased from 31,845,038 *livres* (according to Fouquet) to 75,433,497 *livres* (according to Colbert). Several further measures were taken to create a sounder financial system. The periodic and much resented *recherches de noblesse* were intended to weed out false nobles claiming unjust tax exemptions – although they were later to become simply another way of making families pay for the confirmation of their titles. The intendants were given wide powers to oversee the collection of the *taille* and impose their own assessment on the undertaxed. Colbert increased the weight of the various indirect taxes compared with the direct ones. At the same time he reorganised the collection of many of them, already in the hands of numerous tax farms, into one ensemble, the General Farm, with a single lease. He was thus able to impose better book-keeping, less fraud and consequently a higher price, while forcing a cut in costs. The first of the great tax farms in 1681 was sold for 56,670,000 *livres* annually, and this sum was subsequently increased.

From: Peter Campbell, *Louis XIV*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Colbert pursued ill-conceived economic policies.

Recent scholarship has exposed and emphasised the limitations and contradictions of Colbert's policies and the degree to which he was the prisoner of a whole set of crippling misapprehensions. He emerges as the practitioner of a kind of *dirigisme* [state intervention] which never worked out as he intended; of all his enterprises, only the navy and a few luxury industries achieved any real success. The whole idea of forcing merchants into trading companies was clearly ill-conceived; the merchants would go along with such organizations only when special conditions made ordinary trade impossible, and the companies also suffered from their close association with the state, which had such a catastrophic reputation as a guardian of other people's funds. Companies were losing favour in the leading mercantile nations, the Netherlands and England, despite the exceptional successes of their East India Companies, at the very time when French merchants were being chivvied into them. Colbert's policies for the regulation of industry also involved the fatal fallacy that high quality goods would sell best; low prices were more important in most markets, and the whole apparatus of inspectors and controls worked against the necessary corner-cutting. The worst misconception of all came in the field of foreign trade, with the belief that tariffs and other forms of state intervention could exclude the Dutch middlemen to the advantage of their French rivals. Throughout the century ministers were lobbied by short-sighted enthusiasts for this type of economic imperialism, but Colbert displayed an extreme lack of judgement in listening to them, and above all in trying to rush the whole process.

From: Robin Briggs, *Early Modern France 1560-1715*, published in 1998.

### 10c. Louis XIV's Foreign Policy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Louis XIV was more concerned with personal glory than the needs of France.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Louis XIV was motivated by personal reputation and not national defence in shaping his policy towards north-eastern France.

Neither his *Memoirs* nor his correspondence provide any support for the assumption that Louis felt the need for a more securely-defended frontier and strove to obtain it. On the contrary, Louis approached the problem not from the starting-point of national security, but of personal reputation and the extension of French influence; and the only contemporary who appears to have thought of the problem of defence was Vauban. It would be idle to condemn Louis on the ground of his inability to perceive that France might one day be obliged to exchange the offensive for the defensive; but on the other hand it is definitely untrue that his wars had for their object the attainment of national security. In the course of his wars he captured outlying fortresses such as Freiburg, Breisach, and Philippsburg; by purchase and annexation France had also acquired Pignerol and Casale; but the cost of upkeep entailed by these places was out of all proportion to their strategic value, and their retention helped to make the French frontier still more artificial. This was the opinion of Vauban, who was in the unique position that, while more than any other man he was the agent by which Louis scored his military successes, he yet expressed regret that these successes were not dictated by any coherent policy, and still left Paris and the north-eastern frontier dangerously exposed.

From: David Ogg, *Louis XIV*, published in 1933.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Louis was an aggressor who was willing to use war as a means of achieving his aims.

Louis' ambitions soared higher than mere frontier gains. Like his contemporaries, he saw Europe as an ordered hierarchy of kingdoms under a head; but unlike them he saw himself, not the Emperor, as the head. 'The Kings of France', he said, 'hereditary Kings...can boast that, without exception, there is not in the world today a better house than theirs, nor a more ancient monarchy, nor a greater power, nor a more absolute authority.' His mouth began to water at the prospect of the declining kingdom of Spain. Philip IV died in 1665, leaving everything to his already moribund heir, Charles II, the son of his second wife. Louis' queen was the eldest daughter of Philip's first wife, and certain clauses in the Treaty of the Pyrenees had been so skilfully drawn up by Mazarin's men, that Louis' lawyers were able to concoct quite a reasonable claim, first of all to sections of the Spanish inheritance (such as the Netherlands and Franche-Comté), and eventually to the entire kingdom itself. Louis' foreign policy from 1667 to practically the end of his reign is the story of the glories, and then the miseries, of perpetual diplomacy and war in pursuit of these lands.

From: E. N. Williams, *The Ancien Regime in Europe*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Louis XIV's foreign policy was essentially defensive but often resulted in aggression.

The European situation never remained stable, and since the position of France in Europe was, traditionally, the chief concern of its ruler, foreign affairs increasingly occupied Louis' time and energy, while four wars (1667-68, 1672-78/9, 1688/9-97, 1702-13/14) interrupted reform work at home. The reason was not far to seek. France had extended northern and eastern borders which could easily be invaded – along the river valleys which led from Southern Netherlands and the lower Rhineland territory deep into France, through Lorraine and the Belfort gap in the Burgundy region, over the Savoy passes and Barcelonette further south. Problems could and did arise which were independent of France in their origins but which profoundly and immediately affected French strategic interests. In this respect Louis' foreign policy reactions may be labelled defensive in intent, even where war ensued. But the very recovery of France and the determination of Louis and his ministers to exploit France's resources created problems for other European powers. Louis' concern to strengthen his northern and eastern strategic position caused fear in his German neighbours; his drive to catch up with the Maritime Powers in trade and colonial ventures met with counter-measures. In this respect Louis' initiatives had aggressive implications which brought fear of France as an exorbitant power and became catalysts of war.

From: Ragnhild Hatton, *Louis XIV and his World*, published in 1972.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Louis was motivated in his foreign policy by a search for glory.

A common reproach of the Sun King is to point out the length of 'his' wars: six years for the Dutch War, ten for the War of the League of Augsburg, thirteen for the War of the Spanish Succession – the war for the queen's rightful inheritance (1667-8) being regarded as 'no more than a military manoeuvre'. Clearly, to some, there is a mystical proportion between the number of years that a war lasted and the number wounded or killed. If it were accepted that the wars ascribed to him took place in circumstances favourable to France and with beneficial results, these criticisms would have little force. It is also often forgotten that Louis' predecessors fought or engaged in 'their' wars in circumstances which were much more desperate, with internal security in question and the realm threatened with invasion. Nor should the results of these conflicts be ignored. It is still widely believed to be the case that France lost much in terms of territory by the terms of the Peace of Utrecht (1712-13); but it is a simple exercise to draw a map of the limits of France in 1715 and subtract the frontier limits of 1661: the difference is a measure of the results of war. In 1667, warfare was discussed in terms purely of the king's glory, not even distinguishing it from that of the realm. The search for glory, in and for itself, did not then seem to be an empty quest. As Montesquieu said, monarchy was founded upon honour – nothing in its pursuit could be regarded as fruitless.

From: François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, published in 1990.

## Louis XIV 1661-1715 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions
10.1 Assess the view that Louis XIV's rule of France was more autocratic than despotic. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10a
10.2 How far do you agree that Louis XIV's policies towards the nobility made for more effective government by the monarchy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10a
10.3 How far did Colbert achieve his economic objectives? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10b
10.4 How far do you agree that the gains for France outweighed its losses in the War of the Spanish Succession? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10c
10.5 Assess the view that the only aim of Louis XIV's foreign policy was to increase his own glory. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10c
10.6 To what extent do you agree that Versailles served the interests of Louis XIV rather than those of his subjects? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.7 How far did France influence European culture in the period from 1661 to 1715? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.8 How successful was Louis XIV's religious policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.9 Assess the view that Louis XIV's policies towards the Papacy caused more problems than they solved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.10 Assess the view that the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was necessary because the Huguenots presented a serious problem to the French monarchy. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 11. British India 1784-1857

### 11a The British advance in India

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the British aim in India was to gain control to advance their own interests.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that under Wellesley the East India Company was bent on conquest.

The Marquess Wellesley was appointed to India in 1797: his mind was stored with ideas quite different from those of his predecessor, Lord Cornwallis, Cornwallis had acted in the light of Pitt's India Act; he was a reformer who had studied the career of Warren Hastings. Wellesley saw India as a theatre in the world war with France; he was a statesman who feared the conquests of Napoleon. By temperament he was, in any case, imperious, arrogant and splendour-loving. It is said that he even wore his decorations on his night attire. He was aware, as everyone was, that the East India Company had not yet solved the problem of balancing its books. But, whereas Charles Grant, the chairman of the Company, urged that honest administration and no expansion was the best course morally, legally, and for the dividends, Wellesley and Dundas seem to have decided that the intentions of Pitt's India Act should now be disregarded. It seems likely that their unconfessed objective was to expand British rule and to make the larger empire pay for itself by opening up the trade to interests outside the old Company. By 1801, Wellesley the expansionist could claim to have ousted French influence from southern India. For, in addition to gaining the Carnatic and destroying Mysore he had reduced Hyderabad to a subject state where the Nizam had been forced to disband his own army and to cede territory to pay British costs in defending him.

From: J Steven Watson, *The Reign of George III*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the British were interested in conquest to preserve British India.

The boundaries of India under British rule were effectively established in the first half of the nineteenth century. This was the consequence of several phases of war and annexations with the East India Company's frontiers moving forward more rapidly at some times than at others but with few prolonged periods of peace. These wars were rarely planned or sanctioned in Britain. Wars often began on the initiative of men in India itself, above all of those who held the office of Governor-General. Some governors-general made little secret of their willingness to extend British rule on almost any pretext. This was true of the Marquess Wellesley between 1798 and 1805, of the Marquess of Hastings between 1813 and 1823, and of Lord Dalhousie from 1848 to 1856. Others professed their abhorrence of war, above all because of its effect on the finances of the government of India. Yet few avoided war altogether. For all its immense military power, British India was constantly apprehensive about its security. Stable relations with states on the British frontier must be maintained at all costs. Any Indian state that appeared to offer a challenge to the British or to be lapsing into disorder as the British interpreted it must be brought under control before it spread its contagion into British India. Official explanations for British policy constantly portray the British as reluctantly intervening to stabilize their frontiers or remove unsatisfactory rulers. What such accounts do not explain is that the instability that the British deplored and feared was often produced by British pressures for military alliances, for financial contributions or for commercial access.

From: Peter Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian sees the British as aiming to bring fair government to India.

Public opinion in the late eighteenth century refused to tolerate a tyranny run in Britain's name and had insisted, in the teeth of the Company's opposition, on extending to India the framework of honest and fair government. While British politicians were seeking for some kind of ethical basis for the new empire, officials in India were groping towards a moral justification for the fledgling Raj. The result was a compound of pragmatism and idealism. Experience showed that for the time being Indians lacked that sense of public responsibility which was necessary if a people were to govern themselves. John Shore, a member of the Calcutta Council who became Governor-General in 1793, justified what amounted to an alien autocracy on the grounds of the superiority of the British character. 'A sense of Humour and Virtue' and a reputation for 'Bravery, Clemency and Good Faith' were the distinguishing marks of the Company's servants, which ideally qualified them to rule over those without these virtues. This vision of a benign Raj, actively promoting the happiness and prosperity of its subjects went a long way towards satisfying Burke's demand for an Indian Empire governed in accordance with British principles of equity and respect for the rights of individuals. A new generation of Company servants were coming into prominence at the end of the century. They shared with their predecessors, the nabobs, the conviction that the Indians were 'wholly devoid of Public Virtue'. Thus British government could be defended on moral grounds because it was disinterested, just and directed by men of the highest integrity, who placed public duty before self-interest.

From: Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that the British appreciated Indian civilization.

The period of the British Raj lasted roughly 200 years. It is a long and tortured story. In the open-minded atmosphere of the eighteenth century there were many meetings of minds. General Charles 'Hindoo' Stuart in Calcutta bathed daily in the Ganges, recommended English ladies to wear the sari, and made the first collection of Indian art. With striking foresight, Stuart also argued for native customs to be allowed in sepoy army regiments. In his *Vindication of the Hindoos* he scathingly deprecated European missionaries and praised Hinduism as a religion that 'little needs the improving hand of Christianity to render its followers a sufficiently correct and moral people for all useful purposes of a civilized society'. Such 'White Mughals' had their counterparts in the intellectual sciences. William Jones, James Prinsep and Francis Buchanan, for example, were leading lights in the rediscovery of ancient Indian history; nor should one forget Warren Hastings, the troubled first governor general of British India, who knew native languages and played an instrumental role in the cultivation of scholarship in Bengal. This meeting of cultures led to a prodigious multilingual flowering of Bengali civilization.

From: Michael Wood, *The Story of India*, published in 2007.



### 11b. The outbreak of unrest in India in 1857.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the main reason for unrest in 1857 was the result of sepoy discontent with their terms of service.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the sepoys believed that forcible conversion was imminent.

Rural grudges were long standing and directed in equal parts against the government which extracted taxes and the money lenders who supplied the peasantry with the wherewithal to pay. In some districts in north western India there was a largely artificial sense of foreboding caused by the appearance of strangers in villages. The visitor would seek out the chowdika (village headman), present him with four small chapattis, instruct him to bake four more and have them delivered to neighbouring villages. Officers were perplexed and the best explanation they could offer was that the rigmorale had been contrived to ward off some unspecified but imminent catastrophe. Indians saw the distribution of food as a token that in the near future the Company would end all distinctions of caste and religion and that everyone would share a common diet. This prediction was a variation on an old but persistent theme: the Company's secret plans to impose Christianity on India. 'The Lord Sahib (the Governor-General, Lord Canning) has given orders to all commanding officers which he has received from the Company to destroy the religion of the country' was the assertion of sepoys of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bengal NI. The signs were unmistakable; why, they asked, had a law been passed to allow Hindu widows to remarry? Now the Company was contaminating the salt, ghi and sugar of its sepoys with the bones of pigs and cows and, as every soldier knew, the cartridge for the new Enfield rifle had been lubricated with the mixture of pig and cow fat. A government which had just demonstrated its absolute supremacy by dethroning the most powerful prince in India, the Nawab of Awadh, would stop at nothing to get its way.

From: Lawrence James, *Raj, The Making and Unmaking of British India*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers that grievances among the army were the main cause of the rebellion.

All armies have generic grievances relating to conditions of service, including pay, promotion, discipline and relations with officers. What set the Bengal army apart was that it was a volunteer mercenary force officered by men of a different religion and race. Its' soldiers loyalty to its paymasters, therefore, was entirely dependent upon the incentives for service outweighing the disincentives. By 1857 this was no longer the case, mainly because the number and seriousness of the sepoys' grievances were increasing and the Bengal Army's control over its soldiers was weakening. Minor grievances included uncomfortable European-style uniforms and equipment, irksome peacetime duties, such as guarding treasuries and government buildings and poor insanitary barracks. The more serious grievances, which played a part in the outbreak of the mutiny, were low pay, a lack of career prospects and deteriorating relations with the European officers. Basic pay was the same in 1857 as it had been in 1800. During the same period the cost of living had almost doubled. This was not such a problem when low pay could be offset by booty from successful campaigns. But by the 1850s the internal conquest of India was complete. Only by serving outside India which was an unappealing prospect for a high-caste soldier, could a Bengal sepoy hope to augment his pay. Under these circumstances, an uprising against their colonial masters and a return therefore to the traditional cycle of war, would have appealed to many.

From: Saul David, *Victoria's Wars, The Rise of Empire*, published in 2006.

**Interpretation C:** This historian believes that the sepoy were unhappy because of their conditions.

There were many good reasons for the extreme unhappiness of the sepoy. Many sons of established sepoy families in Hindustan now found themselves refused jobs in the army as the Company was busy filling its ranks with Gurkhas and Sikhs, whose fighting skills had come to impress the British during the closely fought Gurkha and Sikh wars of the early and mid nineteenth century. And for those who could get positions, there was little chance of promotion: even after years of faithful and gallant service, no Indian could rise above the ranks of subhadar (or officer, of whom there were ten to a regiment) or subhadar-major (senior officer, one per regiment); real authority remained entirely with the British. To add to their unhappiness, the relative value of the sepoy's pay had seriously declined – valuable perks such as free postage and an extra wartime allowance called *bhatta* had been slowly whittled away – yet conditions of service were now more demanding than ever: around the same time as the Company annexed Awadh, the home of many of the sepoy, it had also passed the hugely unpopular General Service Enlistment Act, which required that all sepoy should be prepared to serve abroad. Since 'Crossing the Black Water' was forbidden to orthodox high-caste Hindus, this only went further to confirm the fears of the sepoy that the Company was actively conspiring to take away their status.

From: William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal*, published in 2006.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that the westernizing reforms of Lord Dalhousie led to unrest.

The drive to reform India along European lines continued until 1857. Its pace was variable and so were its consequences. For westernisation, which eventually fostered liberal nationalism, initially provoked a conservative revolution. The Indian Mutiny (to use its British name) was a reaction against all sorts of grievances, some long-standing, others immediate. There was the attack on native customs such as sati, most forcefully conducted by General Napier who promised to act according to the custom of his own country: 'when men burn women alive we hang them'. Many Indians regarded the 'great engines of social improvement' which Lord Dalhousie championed – 'Railways, uniform Postage and the Electric Telegraph' – as assaults on the caste system. Caste segregated people, whereas they were brought together by these instruments of hell – villagers thought that locomotives 'were driven by the force of demons trying to escape from the iron box' in which the *Feringhees* (foreigners) had imprisoned them. The Marquess of Dalhousie, the most masterful Governor-General since Wellesley, bore down on opposition with patrician hauteur. He reformed the revenue system, alienating the tax farmers who were dismissed as 'drones of the soil'. He tried to improve the lot of women. He completed the conquest of the Punjab, golden 'Land of the Five Rivers'. He seized lower Burma to 'secure our power in India'. He annexed princely states in the subcontinent when the ruler left no direct heir, flouting the Hindu tradition of adoption.

From: Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, published in 2007.

### 11c. British attempts to end Indian customs

Using these four passages and your own knowledge assess the view that religious factors were paramount in efforts to end traditional Indian practices.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that the replacement of Indian customs by British habits was the main motive.

The Indian territories were allotted by providence to Great Britain, wrote Charles Grant, the evangelical chairman of the East India Company's Court of Directors, 'not merely that we might draw an annual profit from them, but that we might diffuse among their inhabitants, long sunk in darkness, vice and misery, the light and benign influence of the truth, the blessings of well-regulated society, the improvements and comforts of active industry'. James Stephen wrote of the 'barbarous and obscene rites of Hindoo superstition'. It became axiomatic that things English were superior to things Indian. The old Indian ruling class, which had once worked or fought in equality with the British, was reduced in their eyes to comical or despicable ineptitude or at most to glittering incompetence. The eighteenth century sahibs had respected the Moghul culture and viewed its decline with a reverent melancholy: their successors mocked and caricatured it. Now there arose a respectable Anglo-Indian community of administrators, merchants and planters living with their families in genteel circumstances, and decorously attending church on Sundays. Now the way ahead was clearer: India must be Anglicized. The historian Macaulay, who spent some years in India, argued that this could best be achieved by higher education in the English manner and in the English language for 'the literature now extant in that language is of far greater value than all the literature which 300 years ago was extant in all the languages of the earth put together'. Others went further and diligently tried to alter the nature of Indian life. They boldly set out to stifle the most offensive of native customs, however ancient, popular or divinely rooted. They forbade human sacrifice and infanticide and they put down sati.

From: Jan Morris, *Heaven's Command, An Imperial Progress*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes the East India Company was influenced by opinion in Britain in ending unpalatable customs.

In 1813 it was proposed in the India bill that the Company should remove all obstructions to Christian missions. In response, the arguments of the Company were wholly pragmatic: commerce, government and harmony between rulers would be disrupted once missionaries were allowed to wander freely, found schools, set up churches and chapels and, if they were Dissenters, preach by the wayside and in the markets. These objections made no headway against the heavy guns of the Evangelical movement which thundered in the Commons and at meetings of shareholders and directors. Conversion of the heathen Indian was both a Christian and an imperial duty. The Protestant faith was part and parcel of the civilization that Britain was spreading across the world. According to the Evangelical vision, the conversion of India would bring unlimited benefits, for it would liberate the Indian mind and make it receptive to all the fruits of human reason. From 1813 missionaries of all denominations were free to trawl for converts throughout the Company's territories so long as they possessed an official licence. The men-on-the-spot were uneasy and attempted to bypass these unwelcome orders and argued that if the Raj was universally perceived as a Christian government then it would alienate the Indian masses who were perturbed by the activity of the missionaries. Many officers and administrators privately agreed and discreetly continued to show favours to Hindus and Moslems.

From: Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian suggests that sati was banned after a campaign by missionaries.

For years the British authorities had tolerated sati in the belief that a clampdown would be seen as an unwarranted interference in Indian religious customs. Now and then individual officials, following the example of the founder of Calcutta, Job Charnock, would intervene where it seemed possible to save a widow; but official policy remained strictly laissez faire. Indeed, a regulation of 1812 requiring the presence of an official to ensure that the widow was not under sixteen, pregnant, the mother of children under the age of three or under the influence of drugs seemed to condone sati in all other circumstances. Inevitably it was the Clapham Sect who led the campaign for a ban, and it followed a familiar pattern: emotive speeches in Parliament, graphic reports in the *Missionary Register* and *Missionary Papers* and a pile of public petitions. In 1829 the recently appointed Governor-General, William Bentinck, responded. Under Regulation XVII, sati was banned. Of all the Victorian Governors-General, Bentinck was perhaps the most strongly influenced by both the Evangelical and the Liberal movements. Bentinck was a modernizer. In the debate which raged between Orientalists and Anglicists over education policy in India, he unhesitatingly sided with the Anglicists, whose object was, in the words of Charles Trevelyan, 'to educate Asiatics in the sciences of the West', not to clutter up good British brains with Sanskrit.

From: Niall Ferguson, *Empire*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the Thugs were suppressed because they were murderers and not because they worshipped Kali.

The Thug gangs took auspices and participated in religious ceremonies before departing on each expedition. There was nothing unusual in this. Religious ceremonies designed to seek the blessing of the gods were an important part of Indian folk religion and a common feature of village life. Farmers attempted to invoke good harvests; merchants and travellers sought protection on the roads. Thugs, whose livelihood depended heavily on chance and whose expeditions promised to be dangerous, did likewise. Thug legends about Kali featured typical stories enshrined in folklore; in some Kali saved worthy stranglers from their enemies, but in others she deserted them for their faithlessness in carrying out her commands. Indian villagers did not engage in Thuggee because they worshipped Kali. Rather Kali worship was a factor in life as a Thug. Thugs felt little sympathy for the people they killed. The business was the only way of making money that many stranglers knew although many bands experienced difficulties in making a decent living from their murders. 'The love of money makes us kill them', explained one Thug, 'we care not for their life'. In 1830 William Sleeman set out in pursuit of a gang of stranglers and soon had around a hundred newly detained stranglers in custody with evidence obtained by approvers (informers) who then set out on the roads in search of other Thugs. A full decade of service in India had earned Sleeman little notice and he had a new wife to support, so he needed to make a name for himself in the Company.

From: Mike Dash, *Thug, The True Story of India's Murderous Cult*, published in 2005.

### British India, 1784-1857 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
11.1 Assess the view that government intervention in India from 1784 was vital in maintaining British interests there. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
11.2 Assess the view that the activities of the East India Company in India up to 1813 were beneficial to Indians. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
11.3 Assess the importance of the reforms of Dalhousie in bringing unrest to India in 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20b.
11.4 Assess the view that the Christian mission in India was unrealistic in its aims. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
11.5 How serious a threat did the Thugs pose to Indian society? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
11.6 How far can the events of 1857 be validly described as a 'War of Independence'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
11.7 Assess the view that the main British aim in India was to improve its administration after 1813. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
11.8 Assess the degree to which Indians gave consent to the government of India from 1815 to 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
11.9 Assess the judgement that Indian Governors-General were despots in all but name with reference to any individual Governor-General from 1800 to 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
11.10 How far can the career of Warren Hastings in India be seen as an example of self-aggrandisement? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 12. Napoleon I, 1795-1815

### 12a. Napoleon and the French Revolution

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon was more of a despotic dictator than a ruler who continued the work of the French Revolution.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees Napoleon ruling along military and dictatorial lines.

Bonaparte had never believed in parliamentary government. A state should be governed like an army, by a strong and centralized executive. Liberty was the fruit of discipline; and the remedy for indiscipline was less liberty. Civil mutiny was the worst of all crimes, punishable by civil death. Continuity of control was essential; if the general in command is struck down, there must be someone else designated and trained to take his place. There was growing in Bonaparte's mind a fondness for the old monarchical way of government, with its throne, its court, its royal succession; for a tradition as deeply planted in the French mind as the catholic church; for a regime in which he would play the part both of emperor and pope. More and more appointments – of electors, chairmen, magistrates, senators and public servants of all kinds fell into Bonaparte's hands after 1802. He transformed a nominally democratic government into an oligarchy of officials and experts appointed and dismissed by a single guiding will. This was a new theory of government. It set the pattern for much that happened in later years and has become a model for political dictatorships.

From: J.M. Thompson, *Napoleon Bonaparte, His Rise and Fall*, published in 1951.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees the Napoleonic state as partly emerging from the Revolutionary enthusiasm for equality and being supported by former Revolutionaries.

Like the structures of the administrative state, the *Code Napoléon* is the Consulate's lasting legacy to modern France. In the two centuries which separate it from us, political regimes would change, but the country would not change its entire foundation, as it had in 1789; it had received its administrative institutions and the decisive features of its law for a long time to come. The price paid for this national establishment of the principles of 1789 was the disappearance of representative government, subject to the free choice of the citizens. Bonaparte had invaded the whole political theatre, and occupied it entirely on his own. The democracy of notables, both great and small which had emerged from the revolution had rebuilt a virtual monarchy, infinitely more powerful and despotic than the old one, since there was no longer any intermediary body to oppose its domination over equal citizens. Equality had been the Revolution's ruling passion and Bonaparte reigned over France by embodying that alone. Prisoners of the unforgettable memory of the popular dictatorship of the Year II and of the European War, why would the French fear a strong man, if that man were born out of their own history? In this sense, despite appearances, there has never been a less military coup than that of Brumaire. It was the profound movement of the whole of society which assured Napoleon's success and guaranteed for the future his reforms of the state. Only a handful of liberal intellectuals or democratic Jacobins sulked over the Bonaparte of the Consulate. The men of 1789 and 1793 filled the Council of State, The Consulate's great integral strength lay in the fact that careers had been laid open to those with ability; and that Bonaparte was its symbol and guarantor; he had become king of a property-owning France, proud of its state and its army.

From: Francois Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770-1880*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Napoleon's internal policies reflected some of the principles of the Revolution and offered France benefits.

Revolutionary watchwords of liberty, equality and fraternity were replaced by those of order and unity, and the latter were pursued by applying military forms of organization. Chain of command with power emanating from the top and filtering downwards by delegation was pervasive. Complementing the corrosion of parliamentary independence were the Fundamental laws which transferred local government from elected bodies to state appointed agents, led by a prefect in each department. Members of the judiciary were appointed not elected. Political liberty was, however, not the sole guiding principle of the Revolution. Rationalization of government administration had been part of the work of the Constituent Assembly, and from the standpoint of efficiency, the work of the Consulate was impressive. Fiscal order was partly achieved. Improved revenues enabled the state to expand public works, and the regime gained the reputation for drawing in talented personnel who would implement its policies. Napoleonic unity through repression of factionalism amounted to obedience to one man and his state, but it did mean that the vast majority could pursue their day-to-day lives with increasing security.

From: R.S. Alexander, *Napoleon*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation D:** This historian challenges the view that Napoleon was despotic and sees him as emerging from the democratic developments of the Revolution rather than recreating absolute monarchy.

Napoleon Bonaparte was not as First Consul, nor ever would be the true equivalent or successor to Louis XIV. Louis had no parliamentary opposition whatever to contend with, even a broken one. Louis could not be disputed; Bonaparte could be, and was, if with increasing infrequency. Louis did not lose debates in his council, as Napoleon sometimes did – for example, on the crucial debate on whether the émigré nobility should have to accept amnesty (with its admission of guilt), an obligation which the First Consul considered humiliating for them. Unlike Louis XIV, the First Consul could not pass a budget or create new taxes without legislative approval. He could not remove judges or lift due judicial process or place regions under martial law without recourse to the senate. The Consulate's extra judicial procedures still amounted to a legal regime, limited by a liberal judicial system in that the courts required hard evidence before they convicted. In sum, the First Consulship is not well described as despotic, enlightened or royal as the era understood these terms; these terms had become outdated in France by the democratic revolution which made it possible for Bonaparte to become head of state. His power, both consular and imperial pointed to something new: a form of democratic authoritarianism.

From: Steven Englund, *Napoleon a Political Life*, published in 2004.



## 12b. Napoleon's Military Reputation

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon's greatness as a military commander has been exaggerated.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian is critical of the Napoleonic legend.

Some historians, basing themselves largely on Bonaparte's own later explanations, have described how from 21 November 1805 he tempted his enemies into attacking him by a subtle display of military and diplomatic weakness. There is little evidence in Bonaparte's correspondence before the battle of Austerlitz to bear out the story of an elaborate plot to induce the allied sovereigns to advance and give battle, indeed rather more evidence to the contrary. It is likely that Bonaparte simply reacted to the enemy advance with the same high speed opportunism as when attacked by the Austrians in Italy and afterwards fabricated a story by which what just happened became what he had planned all along. Austerlitz stands as Bonaparte's supreme professional performance; it was to become the grand set piece of the Napoleonic myth. Yet a battle is not a heroic adventure, nor even a game in which the prowess of the victor is to be admired for its own sake, but a piece of state business which serves – or ought to serve – national policy. The purely technical brilliance of Austerlitz has obscured the fact that but for the ineptitude of Bonaparte's conduct of foreign affairs, it need never have been fought. Against the Prussians, his own performance was nothing like so immaculate, marred this time by the carelessness and misjudgement reminiscent of his Italian battles.

From: Correlli Barnett, *Bonaparte*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Napoleon being reliant on previous developments and his generalship being flawed, but still regards him as a commander of genius.

As has been often pointed out, Napoleon's system of warfare was based on theories developed during the ancient regime and put, at least partially, into effect during the Revolution. He also profited by the advances in manufacturing, population and road building. Eighteenth century commanders 'understood, like Napoleon, that rapidity of movement, security of movement, ease of manoeuvre and efficient supply are the primary conditions for victory' (BH Liddell Hart, *The Ghost of Napoleon*, 1933). They however lacked the physical means to translate their theories into practice. Napoleon, absolute head of state and commander in chief, was able to achieve the realization of these theories, and his short and relentless campaigns restored decisiveness to land warfare. Yet there were substantial weaknesses in Napoleon's approach and in his armies. Combining all aspects of government and war in one hand led to over-centralization and neglect of detail. When Napoleon failed, or when he was absent, difficulties arose which could not be compensated. He had little interest in technology, and considering the scope and duration of his wars, there was little technological change. Communication on the battlefield and in the period of concentration of forces remained haphazard; several of his victories were won only by the fortuitous arrival of detached forces – Marengo, Eylau and Friedland were examples. Napoleon's army was to a large degree the product of its historical experience, transformed and made more powerful by the charismatic genius of its leader.

From: Gunther Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation C:** This historian sees Napoleon's strengths as a commander to be greater than his weaknesses.

The French organizational and command structures were vital to Napoleon's characteristic rapidity of strategic and tactical movement, while his troops travelled lightly. Napoleon employed this mobility to strategic effect. The manoeuvre of the central position was employed to divide more numerous opposing forces and then defeat them separately; while a strategy of envelopment was used against weaker forces: they were pinned down by an attack mounted by a section of the French army, while most of the army enveloped them by cleaving past them and cutting their lines of supply. Napoleon sought battle; he was a firm believer in the efficacy of artillery, organized into powerful batteries. The heavy cavalry was similarly massed for use at the vital moment, as with Murat's charge through the Russian centre at Eylau in 1807. Napoleon used *l'ordre mixte* for the infantry, a mixture of line and column. His skill as a general has been a matter of some controversy. Like Nelson he was a commander dominated by the desire to engage and win, but who could make strategic errors. Yet whatever his strategic errors, which were far from easy to avoid given the primitive communications of the period and the difficulty of establishing the position, let alone intentions of opponents, he deserves high praise for having prepared the effective military machine that his victories revealed.

From: Jeremy Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian defends Napoleon against criticisms and offers reasons for his dominance on the battlefield.

Owen Connelly has advanced the thesis that the emperor 'blundered to glory' – that in short, his genius lay in scrambling, not in carrying out a preconceived aim' (Owen Connelly, *Blundering to Glory*, 1987) To the extent that Napoleon sometimes made mistakes and further, that the events frequently did not turn out in the manner that he expected, this is undoubtedly fair enough, but in arguing thus Connelly misses the point that, if France's victories were not always the product of a preconceived plan, the French ruler did possess a single, unwavering purpose in the form of the destruction of the enemy's means and will to resist through the medium of a decisive battle. And 'scrambler' or not, Napoleon was a commander of extraordinary capacities, being a master of detail, calculation, deception, celerity, concentration and morale. Aided by boundless energy, and a capacious memory, Napoleon was able to assimilate and make use of immense quantities of information, much of it ever-changing. On this basis he was able to calculate the most likely situation of the enemy, to plan for every contingency that might arise, to foresee the effects of chance and misfortune, and to establish both the risks and consequences of every course of action. Finally, Napoleon was a master of morale. The secret of Napoleon's generalship lay, in the first place, in a commitment at all times and in all situations to the offensive, and in the second, in an almost unparalleled ability to ensure that this was achieved in conditions of superiority. With no enemy commander able to match such dynamism, his dominance was virtually guaranteed.

From: Charles Esdaile, *The Wars of Napoleon*, published in 1995.

### 12c. The Fall of Napoleon

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon himself was most to blame for his own downfall.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian stresses the serious consequences for Napoleon of the Russian campaign.

On 22 October 1812 a deranged general Claude de Malet had escaped from a Parisian mental institution and claiming that Napoleon had perished in Russia, tried to proclaim a republic. Although this bizarre coup was quashed within hours, it highlighted the political nervousness engendered by the Emperor's prolonged absence from the seat of government. Realizing that his retreat would lead to Prussia's defection, Napoleon resolved to return to Paris to prepare for a new war. By the closing days of 1812 the full extent of the catastrophe which had befallen Napoleon's Grand Army was gradually being revealed and yet another diplomatic alignment of the European powers was under way. The precise numbers of men, horses, guns and other pieces of equipment which the Emperor had lost on the Russian Steppes will never be known. One authority puts them at 570,000 personnel, 200,000 cavalry and draught horses, and 1050 cannon. Nor were many of the troops who did survive in any condition to take up arms again. One eyewitness who saw remnants of some units stagger into Berlin recalls that 'One saw no guns, no cavalry, only suffering men crippled by frightful wounds, men with hands, arms or feet missing or else completely destroyed by frostbite'. Indeed, of the I Corps which commenced the campaign with 70,000 personnel, only 2281 men could be mustered in mid January 1813. So great were the losses of men and *matériel* that all of Napoleon's gains over the preceding eight years now stood in jeopardy. Just as Napoleon had feared, Prussia's defection from his cause began almost immediately.

From: David Gates, *The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation B:** This historian offers an evaluation of the role of nationalism in the fall of Napoleon.

Authors once portrayed the wars of liberation of 1813-14 as a manifestation of emergent mass nationalism, allegedly the main offspring of the Empire. As evidence they pointed to the civil war in Spain, and the massive rebellions in the Tyrol and various parts of Italy. On the whole, though, the Empire does not appear to have been much threatened by internal rebellion, and recently historians have cast doubts on whether mass nationalism was much in evidence. Popular resistance is now more frequently attributed to the defence of particular interests and local customs from state intervention. Attention thus shifts from nationalism to which European regimes adopted the Napoleonic model. From this perspective, modernisation of the state and society emerges as the main consequence of the Empire. Ultimately, the Empire fell because Napoleon failed to extricate himself from Spain prior to taking the Grand Army deep into Russia. The Imperial edifice then rapidly collapsed because it had been hastily cobbled together, but the key to liberation lay in Coalition regular armies. Britain's doggedness counted for much, although her ambitions were apparent to all, making the 'vampire of the seas' as much a source of allied discord as unity. The Sixth Coalition, composed progressively of Russia, Sweden, Britain, Prussia, Austria and various smaller states, expanded through 1813 and held in 1814. This was largely due to Napoleon's unwillingness to settle for anything less than victory. When he was forced to abdicate on 6 April 1814, the odds against Napoleon salvaging his rule were very long indeed. Yet, because of treachery, it was possible to maintain that defeat was due to betrayal. The marshals lied when they told Bonaparte that their troops would no longer fight. Talleyrand said that it was Bonaparte who had betrayed France by jeopardizing the Revolution with warmongering.

From: R S Alexander, *Napoleon*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation C:** This historian sees Napoleon's fall being brought about by conspiracy and internal opposition.

On at least six occasions between early 1813 and July 1815 Napoleon came within days or hours of inflicting a decisive defeat on the Allies – a defeat that was essential if he were to regain control of the lands of his lost Empire. Had he succeeded, alliances would have been reshuffled and once again he would have dominated Europe. His fall was not brought about by military failure, even at Waterloo, but by a series of betrayals. When Napoleon, Emperor of the French, finally abdicated after more than twenty years of unparalleled military and diplomatic successes, France fell once more into a dark age. To the people of France he was their Emperor, created by their will and unbeaten in war. Betrayed in 1814 by Talleyrand's conspiracy, aided by Marmont and Augereau and the Senators. Betrayed again in 1815 by Fouché, La Fayette, Davout and the members of the Chambers. Betrayed by his father-in-law, Emperor Francis, and by his wife. But not by the people of France. All the British money, Allied military occupations, atrocities and depredations could not break the bond between the people and the man who personified their Revolution. You cannot kill an ideal. And Napoleon was the ideal. Had he not said it himself? 'I am France! And France is me!'

From: David Hamilton-Williams, *The Fall of Napoleon*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Napoleon misjudging the options open to him in 1814.

The French army in 1814 was outnumbered by the Prussian, Russian and Austrian forces by factors of two, three and four to one – with the promise of endlessly more Coalition, but not French, reinforcements. Napoleon alone kept his faith and his cool, perhaps at the price of his realism. The Emperor's generalship in the Campaigne de France stands comparisons with that of Hannibal, but the fact remains: his defeats of the allies were never pulverizing, only demoralizing and humiliating for them – and most often more costly in French casualties than Napoleon could afford. Sharp temporary reverses inflicted on this or that Coalition general- even as late as the French recapture of Reims on March 13 1814 sorely tested Allied nerve and resolve. The peace conference sitting at Châtillon even offered the French emperor terms in February 1814, but Napoleon preferred to gamble on complete victory. Given the crushing numbers he faced that was as remote as the hope that his father in law Francis I might detach from the allies. The coalition had been fragile, but Napoleon, true to form, kept it intact. He did so, not least, because he insisted on changing the terms that he would accept, as his military position improved. This went on into March, exasperating the powers and ultimately resulting in Napoleon failing to negotiate while he had anything left to negotiate with.

From: Steven Englund, *Napoleon a Political Life*, published in 2004.

## Napoleon I, 1795-1815 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
12.1 Assess the view that the Civil Code was the greatest achievement of the Consulate. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12a.
12.2 How far is it appropriate to refer to Napoleonic France as a 'police state'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12a.
12.3 To what extent did Napoleon's successes as a general before 1807 owe more to the mistakes of his enemies than his own abilities as a commander? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12b.
12.4 Assess the view that the main reason for the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 was Wellington's leadership. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12b.
12.5 Assess the view that the 'Spanish Ulcer' was the main reason for Napoleon's downfall. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.6 Assess the view that the Hundred Days stood no chance of success. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.7 To what extent was Britain responsible for the fall of Napoleon? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.8 With what justification can Napoleon be seen as a significant figure in the growth of nationalism in Europe? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.9 Assess the view that the success of the coup of Brumaire owed little to Napoleon's personal abilities. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
12.10 To what extent does a study of any one region confirm the view that Napoleon's Empire brought few benefits to his subjects outside France? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

### 13. Gladstone and Disraeli 1865-86

#### 13a. Understanding why the Conservatives wanted to pass a Reform Act

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Conservatives were ready to pass a Reform Act in 1867 because they were desperate to return to government.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that the Conservatives wanted to be seen as the party of government.

The events of 1866-67 had permanently altered the position of the Conservatives. They had ceased to be the 'stupid' party. They had become a viable alternative to the still dominant, but no longer unchallengeable Liberals. The objective of establishing their party as a party of government explains most of the actions of Derby and Disraeli throughout the crisis. This is why they brought in a Reform Bill at all: it was vital to keep the Liberals divided and nothing was surer to do so than reform. Of course 'the climate of opinion' was relevant too, though not public agitation which had little effect on Derby or Disraeli. But a viable Conservative government had to show that it could move with the times. This aim to be a party of government also explains the form of the bill. It had to be based on a principle and the principle had to appear different from Gladstone's. In reality all sides of an intensely conservative House of Commons wanted a moderate measure which would exclude the 'residuum' – i.e. the poorest, most feckless and easily corrupted element in the urban working class. The Conservative Bill, based on personal payment of rates would, with its original safeguards and restrictions, have produced a very similar electorate to Gladstone's £7 rental limit. But it seemed to embody a different and more democratic principle.

From: Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes the Reform Act was an improvised measure with no long term aims.

The second Reform Act of 1867 would, in retrospect, play an important part in shaping the Conservative Party's sense of its own identity, confirming, as it appeared to do, the belief that the Conservatives were the 'national' party. Disraeli himself was to make a crucial contribution to the perpetuation of this Conservative myth about the events of 1867. But, in reality, the Reform Act was not the product of a preconceived plan on Disraeli's (or anyone else's) part, inspired by a belief in the conservatism of the masses; it can be properly understood only as an improvised measure, the details of which were largely dependent on the tactical situation facing Disraeli in the House of Commons. Parliamentary Reform in 1867, after all, was implemented by a *minority* Conservative government, still headed at this stage by Derby, which had come into office in June 1866 as a result of the Liberal party's inability to maintain unity on the Reform issue. Once in power there were a number of options available to the Conservatives. One was to do nothing, an approach which initially found favour with Disraeli. During the autumn of 1866, ministers inclined more to the view that some attempt ought to be made to settle the reform question, and this was no doubt partly influenced by the popular demonstrations taking place in various parts of the country. Yet there was no sense of urgency within the Cabinet. It was not until February that Disraeli, having gauged the state of opinion in the House of Commons pledged the government to introduce a bill at once.

From: Terry Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Disraeli was motivated by a desire to stay in office.

It needs no more than the inspiration of party conflict and the ambition at all costs to succeed and stay in office to explain Disraeli's conduct of the 1867 Reform Bill and his acceptance of Hodgkinson's amendment. For both him and Derby, the essential objectives were those which they had pursued with less success in 1858-9. As he put it in his Mansion House speech towards the close of the session, they were the 'termination of the monopoly of Liberalism' over constitutional change and the resumption of 'its natural function of government of the country by a Tory party' representative of 'national feeling'. The hopes of 'realising the dream of my life and re-establishing Toryism on a national foundation', of which Disraeli wrote a few days after his triumph were of a piece with the aspirations he had expressed since he first sought to turn the Tory party into the vehicle for his career. His vision of national and popular Toryism was social as well as political. It rested on the nexus of reciprocal obligation uniting all orders in a mutually advantageous social hierarchy, which it was the function of the Tory party to represent and to preserve. Nothing in it dictated commitment to a very restricted franchise or precluded consideration of a very extensive one. The proper purpose of reform, Disraeli insisted, was not to recognise democratic rights but to extend popular privileges.

From: Paul Smith, *Disraeli, A Brief Life*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests that the Conservatives were determined to hold on to power.

In 1866 two things became apparent. First, no deeply-held vision of Tory Democracy was driving ministers forward. What did exist was the intention to prove Conservative government responsive, enlightened, and capable of reform. Secondly, the Hyde Park riot of the late summer did not propel the cabinet onward with an urgent sense of necessary action. Derby did not believe in June 1866 that the political excitement among the upper classes over reform was shared to any extent by the people, a view he still held to six months later. Witnessing the large reform meetings of 1866 he thought the crowds drawn by curiosity as much as by reforming fervour. What more forcefully influenced Conservative official thinking was the disturbing fact that the 1865 election had left the conservatives in a minority throughout the country. Both in Parliament and in the country Derby faced minority support and power on sufferance. In blunt, tactical terms remedying this situation meant having 'to destroy the present agitation and extinguish Gladstone & Co'. He intended to establish the Conservatives as a credible and moderate party of government and having taken the premiership he meant to keep it. He well understood that reform was an issue on which his government must act. He overruled Disraeli's reluctance to take up the issue and insisted Disraeli give the matter serious consideration and committed the cabinet to discuss reform in November 1866.

From: Angus Hawkins, *British Party Politics, 1852-1886*, published in 1998.



### 13b. Understanding the impact of Gladstone's Irish reforms.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Gladstone's reforms in Ireland did little to satisfy Irish grievances in the period 1868-1886.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Land Acts of 1870 and 1881 had considerable drawbacks.

The Land Act of 1870 had placed the three Fs (fair rent, free sale and fixity of tenure) on a statutory instead of the more flexible customary basis. However the 1870 Land Act failed because there was no guaranteed perpetuity of tenure or any definition of fair rents. Eviction for non payment of rents was not regarded as a disturbance for which the tenant could legally obtain compensation and there was no way of preventing the landlord from arbitrarily raising the rent. The provisions of the 1870 Act collapsed when tested by the appalling weather and poor harvests of the late seventies. Evictions for non-payment of rent increased, as did agrarian crime. In truth, Irish agriculture was both inefficient and obsolete; the growing imports of wheat and agricultural products from North America only aggravated the situation. The Land Act of 1881, by introducing what was virtually a system of dual ownership, did little or nothing to improve the productive or competitive side of Irish farming. It did largely satisfy the Land League's essentially political aim of curtailing or terminating the existing system of land ownership, for so long the essential basis of influence and authority in the state. Parnell and the Land League made up their minds to test the fairness of the Land Act's provisions by bringing selected cases before the courts. To Gladstone this represented a challenge that 'there is still to be fought a final conflict in Ireland between law on one side and sheer lawlessness upon the other'. Parnell referred to Gladstone as a 'masquerading knight errant prepared to carry fire and sword into Irish homesteads' and argued that the Acts had been a manifest failure.

From: Grenfell Morton, *Home Rule and the Irish Question*, published in 1980.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that Gladstone tried hard to meet Irish grievances, but with little real success.

Gladstone's second ministry was dominated by his hopeless obsession with the Irish question, which he optimistically assumed had been solved by earlier legislation. In contrast with the late 1860s when he had taken a conscious decision to introduce reform, the crisis was sparked off by an agricultural depression in Ireland which provoked widespread demands from farmers for immediate legislative action on rents, tenure and the rights of tenants to sell unexpired leases to whomever they chose i.e. the three Fs. Led by overt nationalists like Charles Stuart Parnell and Michael Davitt, whose Irish Land League orchestrated the agitation, the 'Land War' posed a serious threat to British rule in Ireland. Reluctantly Gladstone's government conceded to the farmers' demands in the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act of the following year, only to find that this did little to dampen enthusiasm for the nationalist cause. After the shattering Liberal defeat in Ireland in the election of 1885 Gladstone unilaterally concluded that some form of devolved government short of independence, 'Home Rule' was the only option.

From: Michael Winstanley, *Gladstone and the Liberal Party*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian believes that the Land Act of 1870 was seen as far reaching in Britain but less radical in Ireland.

For Gladstone personally, the desire to 'pacify Ireland' was a major preoccupation throughout the lifetime of his government, and he had never been in any doubt that a comprehensive settlement of the Irish problem required action on the question of land. Accordingly in 1870, an Irish Land Bill was introduced in an attempt to redress the grievances of Irish tenant farmers. This bill, in which the Prime Minister had invested a great deal of his own time, offered greater security for the tenant by enabling him to claim compensation from his landlord for unfair eviction, although this did not cover eviction for non-payment of rent, as well as a right to compensation for improvements made by him, when he vacated his holding. There can be no doubt that, by the standards of the time, the Land Bill appeared to be a drastic step, interfering as it did in the contractual relations between landlord and tenant; and while there was no serious resistance to the bill and the Irish landlords themselves seemed resigned to the inevitability of some such measure, it was nevertheless thought to represent a dangerous departure from generally accepted notions of the legitimate role of government. It would be quite unfair then to dismiss Gladstone's bill as a timid or half-hearted measure, but unfortunately this was how it was viewed by many Irish MPs, notably Isaac Butt, who had wanted a much more far reaching system of tenant rights (the so-called 3 Fs). The consequences of Irish disappointment with the Land Bill were to become fully apparent when Gladstone tried to tackle university reform in Ireland.

From: Terry Jenkins, *The Liberal Ascendancy 1830-1886*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that Gladstone's early reforms responded to Irish grievances.

In the election campaign of 1868, disestablishment was the foremost issue among the Catholic clergy in Ireland, but other questions, including land reform, amnesty for Fenian prisoners and the demand for a Catholic university funded from state resources were promoted as well. Disestablishment was accorded first place as a symbolic demand from which other demands might follow, but for the bulk of Irish electors the land was the most essential matter. The Irish Church Bill of 1869 was perhaps the single most successful major legislation for Ireland in the post 1867 period, offering something to nearly everyone. Catholics and Presbyterians shed the detested establishment, receiving compensation for the loss of their own grants for theological training. Generous financial compensation was awarded to the Church of Ireland. Protestants welcomed the cessation of finance for the Catholic seminary at Maynooth. Disestablishment was a remarkable event if only because it united, however briefly, the interests of Catholics and Presbyterians. The clergy and moderate lay Catholics saw in Gladstone's administration a means of gaining their ends. Above all, Gladstone demonstrated that Ireland with its large membership of 103 seats in the House of Commons could, in collusion with a British party, hope to win significant concessions within the framework of the constitution. Isaac Butt recognised the possibilities and noted that they should pursue the release of prisoners 'in a temperate, moderate, yet firm manner'.

From: Alan O'Day, *Irish Home Rule, 1867-1921*, published in 1998.

### 13c. Understanding Disraeli's response to the Eastern Question.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Disraeli achieved little in his foreign policy regarding the Eastern Question beyond boosting his own reputation.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that Disraeli achieved little at the Congress of Berlin.

From the Berlin Congress in 1878 Beaconsfield and Salisbury returned, bearing, as Beaconsfield claimed 'peace with honour'. They both got the Order of the Garter. The essential issues at Berlin were of the simplest. Bismarck staged a face-saving operation for the Russians whereby he cajoled them into replacing San Stefano with a 'European' settlement. Big Bulgaria was trisected and Turkey-in-Europe re-emerged. The largest part was restored to direct Turkish rule. The British were allowed to occupy Cyprus to balance Russian acquisitions in the Caucasus. Thus Beaconsfield was saved from the consequences of his persistent application of a bankrupt policy by the brokerage of Bismarck rescuing the Russians from the consequences of succumbing to their pan-Slav tendencies. Beaconsfield achieved nothing serious himself at the Congress except to be the gratified recipient of Bismarck's heavy flattery. There was really nothing for him to do. Beaconsfield's empty role at Berlin aptly symbolized the speciousness of his ultimate achievement in foreign affairs. Turkey-in-Europe was saved; but more could have been saved at the Constantinople Conference at the beginning of 1877 and more of it still at the time of the Berlin Memorandum. The division of the two Bulgarias in any case only lasted until 1884. Otherwise nothing substantial was achieved, except perhaps to please the 'national' public. Above all, the re-imposition of a Palmerstonian European credit was not attained.

From: Richard Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915*, published in 1976.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that Disraeli did have some successes in foreign policy but Gladstone did not always approve.

The Russia and India motifs recurred in Disraeli's policy, coupled with a desire to assert British prestige, honour and activity on the European stage. The famous purchase of the Suez Canal shares from the near-bankrupt Khedive of Egypt in 1875 was justified by the need to have a voice in the management of this key waterway, the shortest route to India, which might otherwise have fallen under the control of French interests. Disraeli savoured the drama and magnified the extent of his success, but this was indeed a major coup, and it is significant that Gladstone recognised its popularity, swallowed his principled objections, and left it out of his Midlothian indictment of 'Beaconsfieldism'. In 1878 Disraeli was able to return from the Congress of Berlin with the famous slogan, 'Peace with Honour', and a new Mediterranean acquisition, Cyprus, to provide a further base from which to safeguard the lines of communication with India. This new dependency epitomized many of Gladstone's objections to Disraelian foreign policy: there were no real cultural ties between Britons and Cypriots, and the only possible relationship would be one of subordination and submission, rather than the fraternal ideal which Gladstone espoused. And the obsession with India, which had brought about this further extension of British rule, would inevitably continue to impel Britain into new commitments, expenditures and international immoralities.

From: John Walton, *Disraeli*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Disraeli was extremely successful at the Congress of Berlin and became very popular.

The Berlin settlement was widely regarded as a victory in Beaconsfield's own country, whither he returned on July 16. The acquisition of Cyprus, confirmed by the Congress, won particular applause. The premier could justly tell the welcoming crowd gathered in London that he had brought back 'peace with honour'. He capped his triumph by modestly declining the honours which the Queen offered to him and his relations, except the Garter which he accepted for himself and which was also, at his suggestion, bestowed on Salisbury.

It was at this moment, rather than in 1868 or 1874 that he reached the top of his pole. He had attained not only national but European triumph. Some aspects of the Berlin settlement had proved hard to achieve and some did not last very long. The conclusions on Bulgaria were altered in seven years, and even Cyprus did not retain its potential importance as a naval base after Egypt was occupied by British forces in 1882. But Beaconsfield's main object, the defence of Turkey as an aid to British imperial interests, particularly in regard to India, had been clearly attained. His personal success as a participant in the diplomatic discussions and the social festivities at Berlin, and the territorial conclusions reached there which were so much in his interests, represented his very peak of power. They were also accompanied by domestic political triumph. He had overcome the challenge from Gladstone and his own Cabinet. Altogether it was difficult to imagine what further success he could hope to gain.

From: Ian Machin, *Disraeli*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that Disraeli's main success at the Congress was in its impact on domestic politics.

The outcome of the Berlin Congress differed remarkably little from the bag and baggage policy recommended by Gladstone. Turkish power in the Balkans had been effectively broken. But in terms of domestic politics, the outcome could not have been more different. Disraeli had been obsessed by the public's judgement of his policy. Indeed Derby, when reflecting on Disraeli's motives during the crisis believed that he was 'ready to adopt any course which seems the most likely to be popular'. 'He only desires the credit at home of a spirited policy.' What alarmed him was not so much Russia's move on Constantinople, but the reaction of the Conservative party, the House of Commons, the Queen and the general public to such an eventuality. The transformation in the government's standing which had occurred by June 1878 was Disraeli's greatest personal triumph. He had secured for the Conservatives the neglected heritage of Palmerstonian diplomacy against the unpatriotic cosmopolitanism of the Liberals; he had watched Gladstone re-open Liberal divisions, as sections of front and back bench opinion recoiled from his emotional language and apparent pro-Russia sympathies; he had been seen to assert British power and make her opinion count in the councils of Europe; he had sounded the note of Empire, bringing Indian troops into the European arena and guarding the imperial arteries; he had won the gratitude of his monarch; and he had secured his legacy as a statesman, making states, drawing frontiers and disposing of peoples amidst gilded salons and the aroma of cigar smoke.

From: Ian St John, *Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics*, published in 2005.

### Gladstone and Disraeli 1865-86 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
13.1 Assess the view that the Second Reform Act of 1867 illustrates Disraeli's consistent commitment to parliamentary reform. <b>[40 marks]</b>	13a.
13.2 How far can Gladstone's Irish policy be validly described as <i>too little, too late</i> ? <b>[40 marks]</b>	13b.
13.3 How far was Disraeli committed to a 'forward' policy in the Empire? <b>[40 marks]</b>	13c.
13.4 How valid is it to argue that Disraeli brought back <i>Peace with Honour</i> from the Congress of Berlin in 1878? <b>[40 marks]</b>	13c.
13.5 <i>Moral maybe, but hardly realistic.</i> How valid is this judgement of Gladstone's foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
13.6 How far did the domestic reforms of Gladstone's first ministry disappoint his supporters? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
13.7 Did Gladstone lose the 1874 election or did Disraeli win it? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
13.8 How far were the domestic reforms of Disraeli's second ministry 'piecemeal and opportunist'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
13.9 Did Gladstone and Disraeli have more similarities than differences in their imperial policies? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
13.10 Assess the reasons why Gladstone decided to introduce a Home Rule bill for Ireland. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 14. Bismarck and German Unification 1815-71

### 14a. Bismarck and Austria to 1866

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the main factor in bringing about greater unification in Germany by the defeat of Austria in 1866 was Bismarck's diplomatic and political skill.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that economic unification was very important in explaining greater political unification in 1866.

Bismarck built up the political fabric of the German Empire, but the foundations of a United Germany had already been laid by the Zollverein. Economic unity paved the way for political unity, and community of material interests stimulated the growth of national feeling and fostered national consciousness. The Prussian tariff policy had been fatal to the independence of the secondary states, which had been confronted with economic ruin if they endeavored to hold aloof from the Prussian system. In 1834 the important states of Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony entered the Zollverein and the system eventually extended over the whole of Germany. The exclusion of Austria, owing to her protectionist policy, deprived her of any voice in the commercial policy of Germany, and helped to eliminate the political barriers which divided Germany, and helped to eliminate the various territorial and dynastic influences which worked towards separation.

From: E Lipson, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, published in 1957.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Bismarck as the central figure in the defeat of Austria.

Is it a mistake to begin with Bismarck? Whatever may be said about the movement of economic forces, there is no denying the fact that the decision concerning the form Unification would take was made not in economic and commercial policy but on the battlefield of Königgrätz on 3 July 1866, and it would be idle to deny that when the broken fragments of the Austrian army retreated under the cover of their artillery to the banks of the Elbe on that dark afternoon they were registering the triumph of Bismarck's policy. It had been he who possessed the temerity to break with the traditions of Prussian military diplomacy and choose an anti-Austrian policy as the means of dividing the parliamentary opposition that was threatening to paralyse the Prussian government when he came to power in September 1862; and he had chartered the strategy that had jockeyed the Austrian government into which it had felt compelled to assume the responsibility for beginning the war, despite the fact that its political and military resources made its chances of winning doubtful. Had the Prussian army not been as good as Bismarck had believed it to be, he would have been a dead man before the day of the battle was over – or so he told the British ambassador. But he had not been mistaken in this fundamental judgement, and the victory of the army was also his.

From: Gordon A Craig, *Germany 1866-1945*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that circumstances and luck were more important than Bismarck's skill in achieving success for Prussia in 1866.

The military balance of power had shifted very sharply from Austria to Prussia over a very few years. No one, not even Bismarck or Moltke realised this, let alone understood many of the conditions of the shift. However, in general economic, let alone demographic terms, Prussia was not stronger than Austria. Bismarck was lucky. The 'great men' of History always are; their greatness lies in the fact that their particular qualities are precisely the right ones for the circumstances in which they find themselves; circumstances they neither created, nor fully appreciated. So it was in 1866. Many historians have exaggerated the extent of Bismarck's achievements in laying the groundwork for the war against Austria. Britain and Russia were always unlikely to intervene; Italy was anxious to use the Austro-Prussian conflict to secure Venice; Bismarck's rather desperate threats to consort with Habsburg rebels never materialized; the German national movement looked on aghast and impotent; the significant German states supported Austria. French policy was only undone by rapid, comprehensive and unexpected Prussian military success. Indeed, one could argue that any ordinary statesman in Berlin, bent on war with Austria would not have done significantly worse.

From: John Breuilly, *The Formation of the First German Nation-State*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees the outcome of the struggle in 1866 as uncertain.

The uncertainties were so great that Bismarck left lines of compromise open, even as mobilization measures, with all their attendant expenses, made it progressively more risky for his own survival to pull back from the brink of war. An effort at mediation was made, with some encouragement from Bismarck by the Gablenz brothers (Ludwig the Austrian commissioner in Holstein and Anton a Prussian army officer). For Bismarck, the Gablenz mediation held open a fall-back position at a time when the French attitude caused him much disquiet. It also helped him to assuage the King's misgivings about war. The Austrian politicians had been more successful in their preparations for the impending conflict than Bismarck. German public opinion was flowing more strongly for Austria than for the Prussian government. The domestic situation in Prussia seemed so intractable that the Landtag was once more dissolved on 9 May 1866. Bismarck had done a great deal to court the German national movement, but when the courtship was palpably unsuccessful he was contemptuous: 'One does not shoot with public opinion, but with powder and lead'. All the larger states, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Hesse-Darmstadt and finally even Baden went with Austria. Only states virtually encircled by Prussian territory, such as the two Mecklenburgs, Brunswick and Anhalt, went with Prussia.

From: Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Bismarck*, published in 2002.

#### 14b. Bismarck, France and Unification 1866-70.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Bismarck did not plan either further unification of Germany or war with France after 1866, but rather responded to changing circumstances.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees no desire for further unification or war on Bismarck's part in 1866 and 1867.

In foreign affairs, even more than at home, Bismarck had no clear aim after the victories of 1866. Previously he had been determined to settle the problem of German dualism. Now he asked only to be left alone; and his desire seemed to challenge no one. He was content to leave the south German states in their 'international independent existence'. He repeatedly said 'We have done enough for our generation'. Austria was no doubt disgruntled; and Francis Joseph showed his hope for revenge when he appointed Beust, former prime minister of Saxony and Bismarck's principal opponent among the German states, as Austrian foreign minister. But the danger was remote. The Austrian army was disorganized; her finances weak; and every force in the Habsburg Empire pulled against war. France and Prussia had no reason for conflict and much ground for agreement. Napoleon III welcomed the victory of the national principle in Germany. The Prussian generals and some politicians were eager for war in 1867. Bismarck set his face against it. War, he held, must be fought only for essential interests. He said 'No one who has ever looked into the eyes of a man dying in a ditch will ever again go lightly to war'.

From: A.J.P.Taylor, *Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Bismarck had no set timetable for completing unification, but did envisage it occurring eventually.

The Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 had brought about a temporary change of opinion in the south. Bismarck exploited this change and concluded secret military alliances with the Southern states in August. He did not wish to go any further. He declined an immediate absorption of the South. He did not wish to make France his enemy. Bismarck stopped short primarily because he believed he could carry through the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany without complications with France, by other means. These were the development of the military agreements, the conversion of the Zollverein into a Customs Parliament and constitutional preparations for final unification. The armed victory had had other effects in Prussia than merely strengthening the special position of the army and of the dominance of Prussia in north Germany. Bismarck set about constructing his north German house and so arranging it that the south Germans could move in when they wished and the Great Powers, especially France, would not be able to oppose it. The fact that war between France and Prussia-Germany finally broke out over differences of opinion in the Spanish Succession may be considered almost an irony of history; for, when in the autumn of 1868 a revolution in Spain swept the Bourbons from the throne of Spain, Bismarck held that this event provided excellent means to keep Napoleon at peace.

From: Helmut Böhme, *The Foundation of the German Empire*, published in 1967.



**Interpretation C:** This historian sees long term determination on Bismarck's part to unify Germany, if necessary by war.

What in 1867 was Bismarck up to? Not at that time to start a war with France, that was clear. He could have had one for the asking and knew well that Napoleon III was in a poor condition to fight, with some of his best troops not returned from the Mexican fiasco and the re-equipment of the army far from complete. Moltke wanted war and said so forcefully. It was bound to come, let it come while Prussia was strong. But Bismarck was far from sure that Prussia was as strong as Moltke assumed, and the military alliances with south Germany meant a good deal less in practice than they did on paper. As he said 'every day is a day gained'. In a conversation with the Free Conservative leader Bethusy-Hue he said 'Unhappily I believe a war with France must come along before long – her vanity, wounded by our victories, will drive her towards it. Yet I know of no French or German interest which calls for a resort to arms. Only a country's vital national interest justifies the launching of a war'. Bismarck actively provoked two wars, with Denmark and Austria for a 'vital national interest'. Now, although he did not want a war with France he had already embarked on the course of provocation which was to end with Napoleon III's declaration of war in August 1870. That he needed an exterior threat to weld Germany together was self-evident and the most plausible threat was France whose congenital belligerence was widely feared. In 1870 his conduct in the Spanish affair indicated at least a determination to elevate Prussia at the expense of France, and in so doing to goad Paris into expressions of hostility which would induce all German states to draw together. He was quite relentlessly working for the public humiliation of Napoleon – which must have either led to war or the end of the Second Empire.

From: Edward Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Bismarck responding to circumstances after 1867.

The North German Confederation proved such a success that many, especially liberals, called it permanent. Thus, if one cannot confidently say that the 1866 settlement could have lasted and further unification been delayed for years or decades, neither can one assert to the contrary. Some signs clearly pointed to this possibility, and Bismarck himself spoke of it. Moreover, the crisis that led to Franco-German war in July 1870, especially Bismarck's campaign to put a Hohenzollern prince on the vacant throne of Spain, seems highly contrived in comparison with his usual policy. He had gambled before, but only when he had to, after carefully preparing every possible contingency and rigging the odds in his favour. His scheme here involved numerous uncontrollable risks, and was virtually bound to blow up in his face, as it finally did. What his exact motives were cannot be established with certainty; a sensible guess is that he was gambling less to gain a prize, unification with South Germany, than to avert a loss, the possible defection of Bavaria to the Austro-French camp, which would have indefinitely postponed unification, dealt Bismarck a grave political defeat, and made the liberals in north Germany harder to handle. In any case, the collapse of his manoeuvre in Spain, followed by French exposure of it spawned a European crisis and threatened Bismarck with public humiliation and dismissal. He escaped by using France's foolishly aggressive response to enflame French national pride and German national honour against one another. When France committed its folly by declaring war first, the reluctant south German governments were swept into war by the nationalist tide.

From: Paul W Schroeder, *International Politics, Peace and War 1815-1914*, in *Short Oxford History of Europe*, ed. T.C.W. Blanning. Published in 2000.

#### 14c. Liberalism and the New Germany after 1867

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that in the new Germany created in 1867 there was very limited liberalism.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees the dominance of a military elite after 1867.

The German Empire of 1871 did not stand in the line of continuity emanating from the mediaeval empire, as the name might suggest, but in that of the state of Brandenburg-Prussia, which the Bavarian historian Karl Alexander von Müller described in August 1914 as an 'heroic-aristocratic warrior state in which everything – taxation, officialdom, economy, society – revolved round the army, was determined by the needs of the army. It had defeated the Revolution of 1848 and in the army and constitutional conflict of 1862-6 it had once again repulsed parliamentary government and democracy as well as the subordination of the army to parliamentary control. Even the introduction of manhood suffrage for the parliament of the North German confederation proceeded from an anti-democratic calculation on Bismarck's part. Federal elements thinly disguised the dominance of Prussia, just as the liberal constitutional elements merely served the purpose of masking the dominance of the crown, the aristocracy (holding the leading positions in the army, the high bureaucracy and the diplomatic service) in an age of liberal ascendancy. A pre-industrial elite retained political power.

From: Fritz Fischer, *From Kaiserreich to the Third Reich*, published in 1979.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees different elements in the Constitution of the new Germany.

The structure of the Empire reflected the way it had been created. It represented the promise rather than the achievement of the nation state. The constitution of the Empire differed little from that of its predecessor, the North German Confederation. It was federation, though a highly asymmetrical one. It contained elements of democracy, limited monarchy and autocracy. The democratic element was the Reichstag elected by full adult male suffrage. The element of limited monarchy lay in the relationship between the Emperor and the chief minister, the Chancellor and the considerable prerogatives the two possessed. The autocratic element lay in the Emperor's all but unqualified control of diplomatic and military affairs. Dominating all three was the deferral character of the Empire which underlined the continuities in political structures that straddled the events of 1871. The twenty five states that made up the new Empire retained their existing constitutions that dated in the main from the post-revolutionary period of 1849-50. Some of these, like those of Baden and Bavaria were relatively liberal and others less so. The grand duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz were still governed by the Estates Settlement of 1775 and until 1918 these states had no elected parliaments. The parliaments of the other states were all elected by restricted franchises. Typical of these was the three class franchise of Prussia. In many constituencies east of the Elbe the local landowner, as the chief taxpayer had one third of the votes. In the city of Essen the head of the firm of Krupp enjoyed the same privilege.

The democratic element- the Reichstag - was far from powerless. All imperial legislation needed its consent as did the annual Imperial budget. So did the military budget which initially accounted for nearly 90% of Imperial expenditure, though this needed to be passed every seven years. In all matters of domestic policy, the Emperor's acts required the Chancellor's counter signature. The making of treaties and the declaration of war required only the consent of the Bundesrat.

From: Peter Pulzer, *Germany 1870-1945*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there was strong potential for a liberal Germany by 1871.

Unification has often been presented as a more or less willing liberal capitulation. But that is one-sided, and ignores those aspects of the process that liberals could welcome. After all, anything that was disliked by conservative ultras, particularists and Catholics was bound to have positive features in liberal eyes. Unification finally answered the question of where Germany was located, a question that the Confederation fudged. It created a sovereign, territorially defined national state, with a constitution, a parliament and a German chancellor. Nor did the liberal nationalists simply sacrifice 'liberal' values to the 'national' cause. The new Germany embodied much that was central to contemporary liberal programmes: the rule of law and the legal accountability of ministers, freedom of movement, a liberal commercial code, the harmonizing of currency and patents. These were not trivial matters to liberals, but an institutional foundation on which they hoped to build a genuinely liberal state. They did not choose unity over freedom, but looked to extend freedom through unity. True, the centralizing North German Confederation was rather closer to liberal conceptions of the modern state than the Empire of 1871, with its greater concessions to states' rights and generally looser, federal features. But the National liberals were the most powerful political party in Germany and there was good reason to think they would place their own imprint on the state-building process.

From: David Blackbourn, *The Fontana History of Germany*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees strong representative elements in the Constitutional arrangements made in 1867 and 1871.

The historic force of particularism was too important in Germany, however, to allow Prussia a dominant position in the new federal structure of the North German Confederation— especially if the wary and vigilant South German states were to be coaxed into membership. Hence, legal jurisdiction and matters of religion and education were left to the states. Bismarck also conceded the Federal Council (Bundesrat) a central role in the legislative process and stipulated that federal laws required only a simple majority, thus balancing Prussia's veto power ( it had 17 out of 43 seats) to constitutional issues which needed a two thirds majority. The legislative accomplishments of the first North German Reichstag and its successor the first diet of the German Empire were impressive. A national currency, a central bank, a standard set of weights and measures, a unified postal system, a liberal German industrial code and elimination of remaining toll barriers. Along with the creation of the Reichstag itself, these reforms and enactments were more than tactical sops to a subdued bourgeoisie. They were, writes Lothar Gall 'the expression in political terms of a highly realistic understanding of the way things were going economically, socially and politically'. Unlike the conservatives, Bismarck had a keen sense of the *Zeitgeist* (The Spirit of the Age).

From: Eric Dorn Bose, *German History, 1789-1871*, published in 1997.

### Bismarck and German Unification 1815-71 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
14.1 Assess the view that the economic growth of Prussia made the victory of 1866 inevitable. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.2 Assess the view that Austrian errors were the key to the outcome of the war of 1866. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.3 Assess the view that the importance of the Zollverein in German unification has become a historical myth and cannot be sustained by a study of the evidence. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.4 Assess the view that Bismarck intended a war against France from 1866. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14b.
14.5 Assess the view that France, not Prussia was more to blame for the War of 1870-1. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14b.
14.6 Assess the view that German liberalism was doomed after the success of the 1866 war with Austria. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14c.
14.7 Assess the view that the new German state which emerged between 1867 and 1871 had substantial liberal elements. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14c.
14.8 Assess the view that the strength of the German nationalist movement between 1815 and 1849 has been exaggerated. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
14.9 How far do you agree that the Revolutions of 1848-9 failed because of the strength of opposition against them? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
14.10 To what extent did Bismarck's survival as Chancellor from 1862 to 1866 depend mostly on his political skill? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 15. Russian Revolutions 1894-1924

### 15a. The Tsarist system before 1914.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the reforms passed after 1905 made the Tsarist regime more secure by 1914.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that there is evidence of change and challenge in the period 1907-14; there was some success and some failure for the regime.

In the Third Duma (1907-12) the focal position was held by the Union of 17 October (the date of the imperial manifesto of 1905), which was committed to working with the government for reform in the agrarian field, civil rights, education, workers' insurance, justice and local government. Stolypin's agrarian reform, passed irregularly under emergency decree in 1906, was endorsed by them. The nobility, which had supported Stolypin's agrarian reform, opposed him on a number of other issues where they felt their interests or that of the monarchy threatened and they used their dominant position in the upper house, the 'State Council', where many of the reform measures adopted by the Duma were blocked. If the Duma had few successful reforms to its credit, it did change enormously the climate of Russian politics by bringing official abuses out into the open, and by forcing public discussion of contentious issues. From 1912 there was a resurgence of workers' movements following the massacre of protesters at the Lena gold mines in Siberia. Ultimately, this led to the erection of barricades and to street fighting in St Petersburg on the eve of the First World War.

From: G. Hosking, *Russia in Crisis*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the Tsarist system faced growing challenges by 1912-14, yet these may not have been that threatening; the regime had problems but the opposition was weak.

Visions of a new era of industrial peace and prosperity were rudely shattered by a fresh wave of labour protest that began in April, 1912, when hundreds of striking workers were shot by soldiers in the Lena valley goldfields of eastern Siberia. Strikes continued throughout 1913, and during the first six months of 1914 more than a million workers went on strike, with political as well as economic issues figuring among their demands. Was this escalating labour militancy evidence of mounting social instability in urban Russia? Had it not been for the outbreak of war, might the Tsarist regime have collapsed in late 1914, rather than early 1917? These questions have been debated at length by historians of Russia, most of whom would now agree that the revival of militancy, while undeniably important, was scarcely the beginning of an organized revolutionary effort. It demonstrated beyond question that the regime was incapable of devising and pursuing an imaginative and flexible labour policy. In addition, it furnished dramatic evidence of the short-sightedness of employers, and of the police and military officials who reinforced their authority. Yet in St Petersburg especially, the degree of unrest was neither uniform nor seriously revolutionary: Western historians have disproved earlier Soviet claims that the militancy was planned or directed by the Bolsheviks; nor, for that matter, was it the work of other socialist parties. The typical pre-war militant in the Imperial capital was likely to be a skilled metal-worker who distrusted intelligentsia organizers as much as he despised policemen and factory inspectors. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks, with their maximalist programme, appeared closer to the militant mood of Russian workers than did the Mensheviks or the SRs.

From: J. F. Hutchinson, *Imperial Russia 1890-1917*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the 1905 Revolution's aftermath provides evidence of minimal changes; the regime had its problems but the opposition was poor.

Was the 1905 Revolution a failure? Clearly it had failed as a revolution since it did not bring about a change of ruler. It did alter somewhat the way in which Russia was ruled and brought into question the autocratic powers of the tsar. But there was no unity of purpose among the groups that took to the streets in St Petersburg. There was little middle ground between a Milyukov and a Trotsky, or between a Shipov and a Milyukov. The revolution collapsed ultimately because the government's concessions divided the liberals, who were unsure of what exactly they were fighting for and repelled by the excesses and more extreme aims of the socialists. The Social Democrats had not anticipated the upheaval, and of the leading figures in the party, only Trotsky played a brief role in the revolutionary actions. Nonetheless, 1905 was a highly significant event: it led to the formation of a Duma and it saw the initiation of the St Petersburg Soviet, which was to play a pivotal role in 1917. The government, in turn, had suffered a grave shock and would try to recover. Even before the Duma met in May 1906, the government had taken advantage of the more peaceful situation to make some counter-moves. Chief among these was the issuance of the Fundamental Laws, which could only be altered with the express permission of the tsar. The Fundamental Laws were intended to be an impediment to the operation of the Duma and the concessions granted during the October days of 1905. The Duma, thus opposed, had no opportunity to become a Constituent Assembly, as the Kadets had wished. Much of the optimism of 1905 had disappeared therefore by the spring of 1906.

From: D. R. Marples, *Lenin's Russia 1917-21*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that there is evidence for a stronger regime but that is not very convincing.

The historians who hold that the Tsarist regime had the potential to reform itself from within point to 'tendencies' which might have blossomed in 'normal' conditions. Stolypin's efforts in creating a more prosperous and socially differentiated peasantry appear to bear fruit; the Russian economy enjoyed a period of rapid growth between 1909 and 1914; a stable social and political structure was snatched from the Russian people only by their involvement in the war. The problems with this line of argument are obvious. However successful Russian industry may have become by 1914, major problems, amounting to a potential political crisis, were all too apparent. Most new industry was still financed by foreign capital. And the bourgeoisie which had established itself may have had little reason to support the regime by 1914, denied as it was from participating in a democratic process, hindered as often as it was aided by tsarist regulations. Outside the narrow ranks of the Petersburg elite, peasant discontent and working-class radicalism threatened to boil over into rebellion at any time. The peasants' problems do not seem to have been resolved by the Stolypin reforms. In the cities, rapid and uneven economic development had created new industries, new factories and a greatly expanded workforce without the infrastructure to support them. All historians agree that its living and working conditions were among the worst in Europe. By 1905 there were many people in Russia who were not content to let this situation continue unchallenged. The last decade of Tsarism was marked by frequent and coherent expressions of worker protest. The regime's response, which was usually to use troops, was inflammatory and brutish. Sooner or later, it can be argued some kind of confrontation on a large scale was almost inevitable.

From: C. Merrivale, *'The Soviet Revolution'*, an essay published in 2002.

### 15b. The nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the failures of the Provisional Government were the main factors in enabling Lenin and the Bolsheviks to seize power.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues the Bolsheviks staged a limited coup in October 1917.

The Communists were pioneers in the arts of activating and manipulating the fears and hopes of the common man. They raised extravagant illusions and held out a promise, certified by the laws of history to become true, of a world order free from anxiety, hunger, exploitation and, most important, war. As it turned out, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd was rather a minor event, important only in retrospect. The Bolsheviks could not overthrow the previous regime by telegraph as the Provisional Government had done in March. They had to conquer power in each locality afresh. This was fairly easy where they possessed solid support in the Great Russian heartland. But the course of events ran differently in the rural expanses along the mid-Volga, the Ukraine, the South and in the fringe territories inhabited by non-Slavic peoples. And even when they held power, they did so tenuously, having to combat not only political enemies as desperate as themselves but also incredible disorganization, hunger, cold, exhaustion, explosive anarchy and all the miseries of backwardness compounded by war and revolution. How under these conditions was a small minority to make itself master of Russia?

From: T. H. Von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that there was increasing support for Lenin's programme after April 1917.

Lenin's rationale might be beyond most workers and soldiers but his programme was not. It was disseminated in crisp, clear and hard-hitting propaganda. With the help of energetic agitation, highly effective mass oratory, and a burgeoning party press, Bolshevism occupied the ground towards which growing numbers of workers, soldiers and peasants were being drawn by the frustrations of 1917. The bulk of the party's new membership was drawn from the industrial proletariat. Progress was most dramatic where confrontation with employers was direct. It was symptomatic that Bolsheviks dominated factory committees long before they ousted moderate socialist leadership from the trade unions, and they captured local district soviets in the capital long before they gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet itself. Accurate membership figures are unavailable, but the Party's secretariat estimated that from some 23,000 in February 1917 the total rose to 200,000 by October. The rate of growth was most impressive in the Petrograd area, where the Party benefited from the feverish atmosphere of the capital. By the summer the Bolsheviks were making rapid inroads in major cities and industrial complexes across the country. As Menshevik and SR influence declined in both the army and navy, Bolsheviks cells mushroomed there too, and the Party developed a whole network of Military Organizations. Much less impact was made on the peasantry whose goals could be achieved only by direct action at village level. The same was not true for workers and soldiers. The struggle against employers and for food and raw materials could only be resolved in their favour with the aid of government action, and the State alone could end the war. The Bolshevik Party and programme offered a solution. It was against this background of rapid though uneven radicalisation of the masses that the struggle for political power unfolded. As early as June, Lenin felt sufficiently confident to tell the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets that his party was willing to take state power alone.

From: Edward Acton, *Russia*, published in 1986.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the Provisional Government was seriously weakened in the Autumn of 1917.

The Bolsheviks were the principal beneficiaries of the Kornilov crisis, winning their first majority in the Petrograd Soviet on 31 August. Without the Kornilov movement, they might never have come to power at all. On 4 September Trotsky was finally released from prison, along with two other Bolshevik leaders destined to play a prominent part in the seizure of power, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko and P. E. Dybenko. The Bolshevik Military Organization, which had been forced underground after the July Days, could now expand its subversive activities under the guise of its leading role in the Committee for Struggle. Indeed, the Military Revolutionary Committee, which led the Bolshevik seizure of power, was partly modelled on the latter. The Red Guards and the Kronstadt sailors, who were to be the foot-soldiers in October, also emerged strengthened from the struggle against Kornilov. The whole affair was a dress rehearsal for the seizure of power, with the workers, in particular, trained in the art of handling guns. Some 40,000 were armed in the Kornilov crisis, and most of them no doubt retained their weapons after it was over. As Trotsky put it, 'the army that rose against Kornilov was the army-to-be of the October revolution'. Kerensky's victory over Kornilov was also his own political defeat. He had won dictatorial powers but lost all real authority. Beyond the corridors of the Winter Palace, all Kerensky's decrees were ignored. There was a vacuum of power; and it was now only a question of who would dare to fill it.

From: O. Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** These historians argue that the Provisional Government faced collapse in the Autumn of 1917 and that the Bolsheviks derived the benefit.

By directly threatening the revolution as it was popularly conceived, the affair gave renewed momentum to their demands for socialists to take power. Under the impact of the Kornilov affair, the coalition collapsed for a second time and Kerensky formed a five-man caretaker 'Directory'. It was at this moment that, desperate to shore up his radical credentials, Kerensky abandoned the Provisional Government's long-standing insistence that only the Constituent Assembly could decide upon the country's state form. He declared Russia a republic. Kerensky's gestures, however, failed to restore the initiative to the Provisional Government. Moreover, patching the coalition together again proved almost impossible, so deep now was the left's suspicion of the Kadets. The Third Coalition cabinet could not get to grips with the military, social and economic problems it faced. Exacerbating everything else was an increasingly desperate shortage of food. In party-political terms, the prime beneficiary of this reaction to the Kornilov affair was the Bolshevik party. The party's repeated warnings that coalition with the representatives of 'the bourgeoisie' opened the way to counter-revolution seemed vindicated. The leaders arrested after the July Days were freed and the charge of German gold was overshadowed by what seemed the treachery of Kornilov and the High Command. In soviets across the country, the Menshevik/SR leadership which had held sway since February found it ever harder to resist increasingly militant resolutions.

From: E. Acton and T. Stableford, *The Soviet Union: A Documentary History 1917-1940*, published in 2005.



### 15c. Reasons why the Bolsheviks won the Civil War of 1918-21.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Bolshevik success in the Civil War depended more on the weaknesses of the Whites than the strengths of the Reds.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Whites' weaknesses can be contrasted with Reds' strengths.

Historians whose views are broadly sympathetic to the White cause have often stressed the 'objective factors' that were said to have stacked the odds against them. The Reds had an overwhelming superiority of numbers, they controlled the vast terrain of central Russia with its prestigious capitals, most of the country's industry and the core of its railway network, which enabled them to shift their forces from one Front to another. The Whites, by contrast, were divided between several different Fronts, which made it difficult to co-ordinate their operations; and they were dependent on the untrustworthy Allies for much of their supplies. Other historians have stressed the strategic errors of the Whites, the Moscow Directive foremost among them, and the Reds' superior leadership, commitment and discipline. Both the Reds and Whites were constantly crippled by mass desertion, by the breakdown of supplies, by strikes and peasant revolts in the rear. But their ability to maintain their campaigns in spite of all these problems depended less on military factors than on political ones. It was essentially a question of political organization and mass mobilization. Terror of course also played a role. But by itself terror was not enough – the people were too many and the regimes too weak to apply it everywhere – and, in any case, terror often turned out to be counter-productive. Here the Reds had one crucial advantage that enabled them to get more soldiers on to the battlefield when it really mattered: they could claim to be defending 'the revolution' – a conveniently polyvalent symbol on to which the people could project their own ideas. Being able to fight under the Red Flag gave the Bolsheviks a decisive advantage. Its symbolic power largely accounts for the fact that the peasants, including hundreds of thousands of deserters, rallied to the Red Army during the Whites' advance towards Moscow in the autumn of 1919. At the root of the Whites' defeat was a failure of politics. They proved unable and unwilling to frame policies capable of getting the mass of the population on their side.

From: O. Figes, *A People's Tragedy: the Russian Revolution, 1891-1924*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that terror tactics were a major feature of Bolshevik success.

War Communism was characterised by extreme centralisation of production and distribution, the banning of free trade and good requisitioning from the peasants. Trotsky became one of the most eloquent exponents of dictatorial centralisation and brutal discipline. Carried away by War Communism, he advocated unlimited coercion not only to defend the workers' state but also to manage it. In early 1920, in connection with the anticipated end of the Civil War, he had suggested a rethinking of policy, but, once this had been rejected by the party leadership, he veered to the opposite extreme. War Communism represented the attempt to concentrate the whole economic life of the country in the hands of the state economic apparatus.

From: R. Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that several factors explain Bolshevik success; these included Whites' weaknesses.

How were the Bolsheviks able to win the civil war? Perhaps the main reason was their control over the central heartland of Russia. They had a better system of communications, and controlled a considerable part of the industrial territories of the former empire. Factories in Petrograd and Moscow that had been harnessed to the war effort against the Central Powers could easily be redirected to the needs of the civil war. The Bolsheviks had better organization and, crucially, leadership. The Whites in turn were divided as to overall leadership and goals. To many observers they represented the forces of the past. The White leaders had few political goals other than personal power, which would have resulted in a military dictatorship in some form or other. Their armies were plentiful but they were widely scattered over a vast territory. They were also impeded by the Anarchist troops of Makhno. The Bolsheviks ultimately had two additional advantages. The Whites could only be supplied by foreign powers and once that support was reduced, their armies faded away. Second, the civil war became at least in part a national struggle. Bolshevik propaganda emphasized the need to preserve Russia from outside enemies. The Bolshevik campaign for world revolution was temporarily subsumed by a rally to Russian patriotism.

From: D. R. Marples, *Lenin's Russia*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Bolshevik success was based on ruthless, centralised controls, political, economic and military.

The attempt on Lenin's life was answered with the promulgation of a Red Terror. In some cities, prisoners were shot out of hand, including 1300 prisoners in Petrograd alone. Fire would be met by fire: Dzerzhinsky's Cheka had previously killed on an informal basis and not very often; now their executions became a general phenomenon. Lenin, as he recovered from his wounds, wrote the booklet *Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade K. Kautsky*, in which he advocated dictatorship and terror. Terror was to be based on the criterion of class. Martyn Latsis, a Cheka functionary, was in favour of exterminating the entire middle class; and even Lenin made remarks to this effect. The purpose was to terrify all hostile social groups. Lenin intended that even the regime's supporters should be intimidated. According to official records, 12,733 prisoners were killed in the Cheka in 1918-20; but other estimates put the figure as high as 300,000. Other prisoners were held either in prison or in the concentration camps that were sanctioned by official decrees in September 1918 and April 1919. The Bolsheviks recognized the patchiness of their military, political and economic control over town and countryside. Their leaders in Moscow and the provinces aspired to a centralized party, a centralized government, a centralized army, a centralized security force. A strengthened campaign of industrial nationalization had occurred, and by 1919 all large factories and mines were owned by government. Grain requisitioning, too, was uncontroversial among the Bolsheviks. The Russian Communist Party became more militaristic in methods. Their members grow from about 300,000 in late 1917 to 625,000 in early 1921, and most of these Bolsheviks, old and new, fought in the Red Army.

From: R. Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, published in 2003.

## Russian Revolutions 1894 – 1924 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
15.1 Assess the success of Stolypin's reforms in the period 1906-11. <b>[40 marks]</b>	15a
15.2 How strong was Tsarism in 1914? <b>[40 marks]</b>	15a
15.3 Assess the view that it was mainly the failure of the Provisional Government that made possible the Bolshevik takeover of October 1917. <b>[40 marks]</b>	15b
15.4 How important was the 'Red Terror' to Bolshevik success in the civil war of 1918-21? <b>[40 marks]</b>	15c
15.5 How important was Trotsky in the achievement and maintenance of Bolshevik power in the period late 1917-1924? <b>[40 marks]</b>	15c
15.6 Assess the view that Lenin's rule between 1917 and 1924 was merely a brutal dictatorship. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
15.7 Assess the view that the First World War was the main cause of the collapse of Romanov rule. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
15.8 To what extent did the NEP of 1921 represent a humiliating reversal of Lenin's policies? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
15.9 Assess the view that serious defeat in the War of 1904-5 was the main factor in the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1905. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
15.10 Assess the view that Nicholas II survived the Revolution of 1905 mainly because of the divisions of his opponents. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 16. America Between the Wars 1918 – 1941

### 16a. The Wall Street Crash.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Hoover's policies only served to worsen the economic collapse after the Wall Street Crash.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues Hoover was active in trying to end the Depression.

Like most Americans in 1929 – 1930, Hoover assumed the crash was a temporary dip in the business cycle. But from the beginning he was not prepared to sit back and do nothing. On taking office he called a special session of Congress to deal with depressed farm prices. In 1930 he asked Congress for, and received, a tax cut of \$160 million. He also used his position as president to urge businessmen and labour leaders to co-operate. When economic conditions deteriorated in 1931, Hoover moved further in the direction of Federal intervention. In June he called for a cancellation in the payment of war debts to America. He speeded up work on the Boulder Dam and developed plans for a further dam in 1933. He approved the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1931. This was authorised to lend \$500 million to banks, which in turn would pass on the money to their customers. In 1932 he let the Reconstruction Finance Corporation lend \$300 million to the states for unemployed relief.

From: James Patterson, *America in the Twentieth Century*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the continuation of the Depression can be blamed on Hoover's inability to accept responsibility.

Seeing unemployment as a local issue, Hoover called on city and state governments to create public works projects. However, the crisis only intensified. As early as November 1930, voters gave a harsh verdict on Hoover. Republicans lost not only eight Senate seats but the control of the House of Representatives as well. Hoover's strategy failed dismally. Unemployment mounted, and in 1931 US Steel, General Motors and other large corporations announced wage cuts. Public charities and local welfare agencies could not cope with the problem. Hoover blamed the Depression on global forces and argued that only international measures would help. He supported a one-year cancellation on war debts and reparations repayments. In 1931, dreading an unbalanced budget, Hoover called for a tax increase, thereby angering voters. The man once portrayed as a masterful manager was now portrayed as incompetent and hard-hearted. Unable to concede error, Hoover told an aide, 'No president must ever admit that he has been wrong'.

From: Paul Boyer, *The Enduring Vision*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues for a mixed view of Hoover's presidency.

Hoover has been viewed as a victim both of his mindset and of a crisis it would take great efforts to solve. Roosevelt was prepared to listen to ideas, to show flexibility. Hoover never altered. This was his biggest failing. He would consider all remedies short of direct federal intervention. He believed it was the job of the government to provide the circumstances within which self-help and community responsibility could thrive. Hoover did involve the government in more areas of life than ever before. However, Hoover's legislation was limited because he would not support direct government action at a time when it was desperately needed. Hoover was no champion of *laissez-faire*. He believed that the government should be a positive force for good in society. It should enable, for example, equality of opportunity and high moral standards in its citizens. Unfortunately, Hoover's principal philosophies of voluntarism and self-help were wholly inadequate to meet the magnitude of the crisis facing the USA when he was President. Nevertheless, his vision of the role of government was far in excess of that of his immediate predecessors. In this respect, Hoover may well be described as the 'first of the new Presidents' and 'last of the old'.

From: P. Clements, *Prosperity, Depression and the New Deal*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Hoover's efforts were never enough to halt the economic collapse.

Hoover was inconsistent. He allowed, indeed encouraged, the states and the cities to organize relief; he set up a Reconstruction Finance Corporation to assist businesses in trouble by making them loans; he came to the rescue of farm animals whose owners could no longer pay for their feed. Why then would he do nothing for the mass of his fellow-countrymen? Hoover had an answer, but by the election of 1932 the people were no longer listening to him. He had become a joke in bad taste. The shanty towns that sprang up round the great cities, where impoverished families sought shelter, were known as 'Hoovervilles'. The newspapers they slept beneath were 'Hoover blankets'. He was seen as stony, unimaginative, hard-hearted, inert. These impressions were reinforced by the affair of the Bonus Marchers. These were unemployed First World War veterans, who had been promised 'bonus' payments in 1945, cash presents to see them through their old age; now they demanded payment in advance, since old could hardly be worse than what was already happening to them; and they marched on Washington to demand their due. Hoover hid in his office and refused their petition, seeing it as no more than an unusually spectacular raid on the Treasury. Eventually he ordered the army to disperse them from the little Hooverville they had established not far from the White House. The army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, a flamboyant egoist on a white horse, made a bad affair worse by driving off the veterans with tanks, guns and tear-gas, giving them no chance to leave quietly. The public was revolted by the business, and if Hoover had not already lost the coming election, he did so then. Meanwhile the economy continued to spin down the deflationary spiral. Even crime and vice felt the cold wind: in 1933 the New York police estimated that the number of speakeasies in the city had fallen from a high of 32,000 to only 9,000. The scandals of the palmy days began to be uncovered. Senate investigators began to publish the full extent of the frauds and malpractices that Wall Street had tolerated while the going was good.

From: H. Brogan, *The History of the USA*, published in 2001

## 16b. The New Deal.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the success of the New Deals (1933-41) has been much over-rated by historians.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the New Deal brought some relief and reform during the 1930s.

The basic goals of the Roosevelt administration were relief, recovery and reform. The New Deal's greatest success was in the area of relief. It employed a bewildering number of 'alphabet agencies', the most prominent being the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. They co-ordinated the work of state, local and private organisations. The administration brought relief to most of the destitute and jobless. Yet despite the scope and imaginativeness of the New Deal's relief program, not everyone was taken care of. There was never sufficient money available, and even those on relief seldom received enough. The New Deal reforms were many and far-reaching. Deficiencies of the stock market and banking were remedied. Bargaining by trade unions was made vastly more effective under the National Industrial Recovery and Wagner Acts. The Federal government and the States assumed some on-going responsibility for the needs of the aged, dependent mothers and children, the handicapped, and the unemployed. The relief given to the needy was substantial and reform significant. Far less effective were the Federal government's efforts to promote recovery.

From: David McCoy, *Coming of Age*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the New Deal had some serious faults, brought only a partial recovery in the 1930s, yet had achievements.

Not even the staunchest admirers of the New Deal could claim that it had brought about more than partial recovery. By 1939 there had been great improvement in some sectors of the economy. Manufacturing production, for example, had returned to the level of 1929 – though critics alleged that this had occurred in spite of New Deal policies, not because of them. But investment still lagged and there remained nine and a half million unemployed – 17% of the working population. Not until 1941 would full employment and prosperity return, and only then because of the war and rearmament. Some New Deal policies did more harm than good: the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) for example, the New Deal's social welfare program, was seriously deficient. There were also major omissions, notably the failure to embark on a large-scale housing program like that in Britain; Federal government built only 180,000 homes during the Depression. Yet for all its failures and limitations, the New Deal can claim achievements which have stood the test of time and become part of the national consensus. It laid the foundations of the welfare state and created a new legal framework for industrial relations. It introduced controls on banks and stock exchanges. It established the principle that government had the primary responsibility for regulating the economy. And although it is too much to claim that Roosevelt saved America from revolution – there was never a real danger of one – he restored national morale.

From: Maldwyn A. Jones, *Limits of Liberty, American History, 1607-1992*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation C:** This argues that the New Deal both continued Hoover policies and had a very mixed impact.

It was Roosevelt's greatest constructive triumph, and won him the regard of the liberals and the progressives, which continues to this day. But as Walter Lippmann pointed out at the time (1935), in all essentials the New Deal continued the innovatory corporatism of Hoover, using public money to bolster private credit and activity, what Lippmann called the 'permanent New Deal'. If Hoover-Roosevelt interventionism was thus a continuum, the question arises, why did it not work better? Pro-Roosevelt historians argue that the additional elements FDR brought to the continuum worked the miracle, enabling the New Deal to initiate recovery. Pro-Hoover historians argue that Roosevelt's acts, if anything, delayed what Hoover's were already bringing about. A third possibility is that both administrations, by their meddlesome activism, impeded a natural recovery brought about by deflation: from the perspective at the end of the century, that seems the most probable explanation. The truth is, the recovery was slow and feeble. The only reasonably good year was 1937, when unemployment at 14.3 percent dipped below 8 million; but by the end of the year the economy was in free fall again – the fastest fall so far recorded – and unemployment was at 19 percent in 1938. In 1937 production briefly passed 1929 levels, but soon slipped below again. The real recovery from the boom atmosphere of the 1920s came only on the Monday after the Labor Day weekend of September 1939, when news of the war in Europe plunged the New York Stock Exchange into a joyful confusion which finally wiped out the traces (though not the memory) of October 1929. Two years later, with America on the brink of war itself, the dollar value of production finally passed the 1929 levels for good. If interventionism worked, it took nine years and a world war to demonstrate the fact.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the New Deal's significance should be viewed in a wider context.

Radicals could mourn; but their works remained, enormous and irreversible. Later critics have blamed the New Deal for not going further, faster: it is always so easy to demand the impossible, and so tempting to play down the importance of starting something. FDR and his team had started a lot, and as he himself said after the 1938 elections, 'It takes a long, long time to bring the past up to the present.' Rather than comparing the New Deal to Utopia, it is better to bring out its actual achievements. Of these unquestionably the most important was the preservation of American democracy, the American Constitution and American capitalism. His task entailed adaptation and sacrifice, and hence aroused fierce opposition. But in the end he prevailed, even in defeat: for if the Supreme Court reminded him, forcibly, of the limits of his own power, he taught the Court itself an even more salutary lesson – not to stand in the way of necessary change – and so equipped it for its important role in modern American democracy. He also accustomed Congress, and the country, to the necessary activism of modern government, so that the stream of statutes, which seemed so astonishing in the Hundred Days, has become the norm of Congressional life (though few of the laws passed have anything like the importance of the first New Deal legislation). Thanks to Franklin Roosevelt, in short, six years (1933 to 1938) transformed America from a country which had been laid low by troubles which its own incompetence had brought on it, and which it was quite unable to cope with, to a country, as it proved, superbly equipped to meet the worst shocks that the modern world could hurl at it.

From: H. Brogan, *The History of the USA*, published in 2001

### 16c. American Foreign Policy, 1920-41.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that America followed a deeply isolationist foreign policy in the period 1920-41.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the United States was not completely isolationist during the 1920s.

The 1920s have traditionally been viewed as an 'isolationist' phase for America. This view is itself based on an ignorance of many of the facts. What happened was partly a return to pre-war views on foreign relations, partly a reaction to the war and the Treaty of Versailles, and partly an adjustment to the facts of international affairs during the 1920s. Plainly, America's foreign relations represented a change from pre-war attitudes. Although America sought to avoid entangling alliances and pressed for debt payment, it also extended friendship and goodwill. The United States aggressively sought business expansion. But America also, in its search for trade, extended loans that other nations eagerly accepted. The country lessened its interference in Latin America and sought stability everywhere. However, its search for peace was unsuccessful. This was true whether it involved disarmament based on goodwill, or the outlawing of war based on public opinion. In short, during the 1920s, American foreign policy was no less internationalist than the foreign policies of most other nations.

From: Donald R. McCoy, *Coming of Age*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues for the pressures on Roosevelt which prevented him from following a more interventionist foreign policy in the 1930s.

Americans were sharply divided on how they should deal with this inflamed world. One group, the 'isolationists', believed that the USA should maintain complete freedom of action. However, this group did not want the US to be entirely isolated. Indeed, many isolationists wanted to help China against Japan; they just opposed military involvement in Europe. 'Internationalists', on the other hand, assumed that new technology (such as aircraft) had drawn the world together and that US prosperity depended on orderly world markets. Americans consequently bore responsibility for co-operating in the maintenance of a stable world – because that was in their own self-interest. The internationalists won few victories in the mid-1930s. US officials were frightened of the isolationists' strength in Congress. Roosevelt was also wary. In 1935 he had bowed to State Department and internationalist demands that the United States join the League's World Court. The President sent the appropriate agreement to the Senate for ratification. He quickly ran into opposition led by publisher William Randolph Hearst, Father Charles Coughlin, and Huey Long. Roosevelt refused to wage what he saw as a losing fight, and the agreement went down to a humiliating defeat. Worse lay ahead for FDR. The isolationists next forced the 1935 Neutrality Act through Congress. According to the act, if the president declared that a war existed in the world, Americans could not ship arms to any belligerent nation. The 1936 Neutrality Act further restricted FDR's power. It was the most serious defeat Roosevelt ever suffered in foreign policy.

From: Walter Le Feber, *The American Age. US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*, published in 1989.



**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that isolationism developed slowly and was a part of a particular foreign policy attitude, above all towards Japan.

Between the two world wars, America sometimes appeared, in theory as well as in practice, isolationist, and much of the tragedy of World War Two is attributed to this. But, despite rejection of the League, America was certainly not isolationist in the 1920s, though its intervention in international affairs was not always prudent, particularly in the Pacific.

The one Asian country which resisted Americanization was Japan, and it symbolized this rejection of American cultural notions (though not its technology) by building an ocean-going navy on a large scale. At the same time, American-Japanese relations, especially over China, continued to deteriorate. Under President Hoover, the American government continued to play a world role, with the object of preserving peace. But its actions were usually counterproductive.

There followed the 1931 Japanese occupation of Manchuria and, in 1933, Japan's departure from the League of Nations. Hoover made no positive moves to oppose Japanese expansion.

When Roosevelt took over, he made matters worse. Hoover had helped to plan a world economic conference, to be held in London in June 1933. It might have persuaded the 'have not' powers like Japan and Germany that there were alternatives to fighting for a living. But on July 3 Roosevelt torpedoed it. Thereafter the United States did indeed move into isolation, though it was not the only great and civilized power to do so in the 1930s. At the time, however, the emotional drive to cut America off from what was seen as an incorrigibly corrupt Europe was strong and gave rise to the 1935-9 Neutrality Acts.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Roosevelt was forced to be very cautious in his foreign policy after 1933.

This might have mattered less if Roosevelt had seen his way to being more imaginative himself; but he too was constrained by a circumscribed vision. Even as late as the 1940 elections he seems to have thought that America might contrive to stay at peace without handing victory in the Second World War to Hitler; and there is no reason to question the solidity of his earlier commitment to the base policy of peace at any price. Furthermore, as he showed again and again during the thirties, he would not allow foreign policy considerations of any kind to interfere with his domestic programme. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia; the Spanish Civil War; the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia – in every one of these crises Roosevelt felt himself unable to take any effective action because of possible adverse repercussions in Congress. He loathed the turn the world was taking, but did not feel he could do anything about it. To judge from the response of Congress and the people to the deepening crisis, he was right in his assessment. Between 1933 and 1935, when comparatively little was happening, he was allowed a fairly free hand; but after the outbreak of the Ethiopian War and Hitler's announcement of German re-armament, he was put on a very short rein by various Neutrality Acts. Their state of mind is commonly spoken of as isolationist, but this label, though convenient and emotionally accurate, obscures the point that at least two tendencies were at work. One was unilateralism: the conviction that America must remain a free agent, as she had been ever since her treaty with France was ended during the French Revolution. It was easy enough to argue that unless Roosevelt was closely watched he might drag America into a war so that he could, as war leader, gratify his well-known dictatorial tendencies and overthrow American democracy. Most of the more contemptible manifestations of isolationism grew from this root. The other tendency was pacifism, a more honourable but no less foolish persuasion. It had given the world the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the twenties; its proponents were incapable of acknowledging that conditions in the thirties demanded a different sort of response. The Depression took its toll. Domestic economic problems seemed more pressing, more real, than any foreign scare, and diminished confidence that America had answers for the world's difficulties.

From: H. Brogan, *The History of the USA*, published in 2001

### America Between the Wars 1918-41 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions
16.1 How far were the economic policies of the Republican government mainly responsible for the collapse of 1929-33? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16a
16.2 Assess the view that the New Deal promised much but achieved little of real substance. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b
16.3 Assess the view that it was the Second New Deal and not the First that represented Roosevelt's major domestic achievement. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b
16.4 Assess the success of the New Deal in bringing about economic recovery by 1941. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b
16.5 How isolationist was American foreign policy in the period 1920-41? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16c
16.6 How convincingly can it be argued that Roosevelt's foreign policy was in the best interests of the USA in the period 1933-41? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16c
16.7 How important was the strength of opposition to the New Deal in the period 1933-37? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
16.8 Assess the view that the policy of National Prohibition (1919-33) created more problems than it solved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
16.9 How far has the impact of the Boom of the 1920s been exaggerated? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
16.10 How far do you agree that in policy areas to deal with the Depression there was more continuity between Hoover and Roosevelt than is often admitted? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 17. The Causes of World War II 1918-41

### 17a. The peacemakers of Versailles

Using all four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the peacemakers of Versailles deserve to be criticized for creating problems that brought on a further conflict.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians see Versailles as having a huge impact on Germans and thus being likely to lead to further conflict.

In early March 1918 peace was signed between Germany and Russia at Brest-Litovsk. The terms of the treaty were devastating. German troops and their allies were to occupy and control the whole of Western Russia. The Kaiser's forces brought the German Empire farther into Russia than Hitler reached a generation later. Germany's new empire lasted only six months. Within a year she was the victim in her turn of a punitive peace settlement at Versailles that stripped her of territory, all her shipping, her overseas colonies, and imposed disarmament and a vast war indemnity. Internationally isolated, with her great armed might disbanded, German power in Europe was shattered. The Bismarckian Reich had brought industrial prosperity and national pride to two generations of Germans. Now the allies forced Germany to confess openly to her sole responsibility for the Armageddon of 1914. 'Our entire national existence to be condemned as guilty and erroneous', complained the novelist, Thomas Mann. Germany became the pariah of Europe; the German people were forced to adjust to a very different post-war world of political uncertainty and economic stagnation. The expectations of 1914 were rudely dispelled; a powerful sense of injustice scarred a whole generation of Germans. The desire to reverse the judgement of Versailles sank deep roots in German society.

From: Richard Overy with Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, published in 1989.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the leniency of Versailles caused problems as well as its severity.

It is difficult in the circumstances to see how the doctrine of self-determination could have been more fully applied. The deficiencies of the settlement were exposed in the 1920s and played a major role in the eventual collapse of the system in the 1930s. The central decision to leave Germany as a unified state, still possessing, in essence, the necessary resources to become one of the giants of the continent had been taken quite deliberately. Yet at the same time the Allies did little to foster the new democratic Germany that they hoped would ensure peace. Allied insistence on German war guilt and reparations, upon stringent disarmament proved fatal to some German leaders such as Matthias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau, assassinated by right-wing death squads, and perhaps even to German democracy itself. Thus the treaty has been accused as being too severe where it should have been too lenient and vice-versa. Germany felt humiliated by the Treaty, but it had not crippled her; and now, surrounded by minor powers, except on her French border, the startling paradox was that she might actually be in a stronger position than in 1914. The peacemakers were as much victims of their virtues as their vices. They might not have allowed Germany to expand, but they did not destroy her. They tried, in vain, to draw their maps around people, rather than move the people to fit the maps.

From: Alan Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement*, published in 1991

**Interpretation C:** This historian is sympathetic to the makers of the Treaty and does not see it as the main cause of another war.

Later it became commonplace to blame everything that went wrong in the 1920s and 1930s on the peacemakers and the settlements they made in 1919, just as it became easy to despair of democracy. Eighty years later the old charges still have a wide circulation. 'The final crime', declared the *Economist*, in its special millennium issue in 2000 'was the Treaty of Versailles whose harsh terms would ensure a second war'. That is to ignore the actions of everyone – political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters – for twenty years between 1919 and 1939. Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles, although he found its existence a godsend for propaganda. Even if Germany had been left with its old borders, even it had been allowed whatever military forces it wanted, even it had been permitted to join with Austria, he would still have wanted more: the destruction of Poland, control of Czechoslovakia, above all the conquest of the Soviet Union. He would have demanded room for the German people to expand and the destruction of their enemies, whether Jews or Bolsheviks. There was nothing in the Treaty of Versailles about that. The peacemakers had to deal with reality, not what might have been. They grappled with huge, difficult questions. How can the irrational passions of nationalism or religion be contained before they do more damage? How can we outlaw war? We are still asking those questions.

From: Margaret Macmillan, *Peacemakers*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation D:** This historian places great emphasis on the problems of minorities, originating from weaknesses in the peace treaties, as a major element in the unrest leading to future conflict.

Applying the principle of self-determination proved far from easy. First, there were more than 13 million Germans already living east of the borders of pre-war Germany – perhaps a fifth of the total German speaking population of Europe. If self-determination were to be upheld then Germany might well end up bigger, which was certainly not the intention of Wilson's fellow peacemakers. From the outset there had to be inconsistency, if not hypocrisy, in the way that Germany was treated: no *Anschluss* of the rump of Austria to the Reich – despite the fact that the post-revolutionary governments in both Berlin and Vienna voted for it – and no vote at all for the South Tyroleans, 90% of whom were Germans, on whether they wanted to become Italian, but plebiscites to determine the fate of northern Schleswig, which went to Denmark, eastern Upper Silesia (to Poland) and Eupen-Malmedy (to Belgium). France regained Alsace Lorraine despite the fact that less than one in ten of the population were French-speakers. More than 3.2 million Germans in Bohemia, southern Moravia and the hastily constituted Austrian province of Sudetenland found themselves reluctant citizens of a new state, Czechoslovakia. There were 750,000 Germans in the new Poland, the same number in Romania, half a million in Yugoslavia and another half million in the rump Hungary left over after the Treaty of Trianon. The second problem for self-determination was that none of the peacemakers saw it as applying to their own empires – only to the empires that they had defeated. The new era of peace supposedly ushered in by the Paris treaty was over in the blink of an eye. The borders of the new Polish state were determined as much by violence as by voting or international arbitration as the Poles fought wars against the Ukraine, Germany, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and Russia. German communities came under attack by Polish mobs. The Germans feared reprisals from the new masters of the successor states. And with good reason.

From: Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World*, published in 2006.

## 17b. Appeasement

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that appeasement was the only sensible policy for Britain and France in 1938.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian outlines the case for a missed opportunity by France and Britain to act against Germany in September 1938.

Though the hysterical relief which greeted the news of the Munich settlement in 1938 testified to the strength of support for appeasement, this does not mean that no other policy was possible at the time. Militarily, there was a case for resisting Germany in September 1938. France had a last chance of fighting Germany on better, or at least even terms. With Germany nearing the peak of her rearmament and amassing more trained reserves, France's position could only deteriorate. At sea, the two democracies were more than a match for Germany. Their weakness lay in air power and air defences. Only the Thames estuary was protected by radar. France had 1454 aircraft of all types, Britain had 1500 and Germany 3356. But there was no danger of the much-feared knock out blow from the air. The Luftwaffe was a tactical air force designed for close support of ground forces. Without bases in the Low Countries it could not mount an effective bombing offensive against Britain. Germany's shortcomings were serious- shortage of trained reserves and of essential resources such as oil, for which she was heavily dependent on purchases from the west. Though known at the time, Germany's lack of oil reserves was never brought to the attention of the British cabinet. Moreover, the bulk of the German army had to be deployed against Czechoslovakia. By 30 September 1938 there were only ten German divisions in the west facing the French army. Since the concrete in the Siegfried line was not dry, there was little to stop a determined French offensive.

From: Anthony P. Adamthwaite, *The Making of the Second World War*, published in 1977

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Chamberlain pursuing a logical and popular policy in 1938.

When the French representatives came to London on 18 September 1938 Chamberlain asked them what they would do if war broke out against Germany. This was precisely the question which his critics considered unnecessary and distasteful. 'Fire your cannon' was Churchill's vague prescription, 'and all will be well'. Chamberlain was no more swayed by this prognosis for war against Germany than he was by the answer to his enquiry he actually received from the French Prime Minister – 'Each of us will do our duty'. Under penetrating cross-examination in Downing Street it appeared that the French conception of 'duty' was to launch a few probing offensives in front of the Maginot Line, whilst awaiting the arrival of Britain's Kitchener-type mass armies. This was Chamberlain's secret weapon against waverers within his own government: that the *only* alternative to his policy of appeasement was a straight-forward repeat of the casualties of 1914-18. The French, whose willingness to go to war had anyway been problematic throughout, were isolated and Chamberlain flew to Munich. His key source of strength was the great personal popularity which the preservation of peace had earned him. Probably his greatest mistake was to have decided against an immediate general election.

From: Robert Holland, *The Pursuit of Greatness, Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970*, published in 1991

**Interpretation C:** This historian rejects alternatives to appeasement in 1938.

Churchill spoke in the House of Commons on 14 March 1938. It was the classic statement of his desire for a 'Grand Alliance', Britain and France should, he said, concert their 'Staff arrangements' and gather together under the League of Nations a great alliance which could 'even now, arrest this approaching war'. Chamberlain did not simply ignore Churchill's idea, and he asked the foreign office and the Chiefs of Staff to look at how a 'Grand Alliance' would help matters. 'Simply by looking at a map of Czechoslovakia', Chamberlain wrote, 'one could see that nothing we or France could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans if they wanted to do it'. Military and diplomatic advice coincided with what Chamberlain's instincts told him. Until the rearmament programme was further advanced, it was not a good idea to get involved in a war – and to get involved in one over Czechoslovakia which could not be helped anyway was simply to compound one folly with another. The 'Grand Alliance' was a wonderful slogan, but it was not practical politics. Britain was not ready for war, nor were the French. Russia caused more problems than she solved as a member of a potential alliance.

From: John Charmley, *Churchill, The End of Glory*, published in 1993

**Interpretation D:** This historian is critical of appeasement in 1938.

Chamberlain, like many statesmen of his generation, had a fear of war. They were afraid that modern war would destroy civilization. However in spite of great loss of life, the Second World War did not ruin the world, but the aggressive powers instead. Preventing war requires a strategist's clear sightedness and the courage to face war rather than fear risk. No matter how genuine his motives, Chamberlain followed a policy which plunged the country (and, in a certain sense, Europe and the world) into catastrophe. He still maintained that he had established an influence over Hitler in spite of all the evidence that Hitler was untrustworthy. Chamberlain was cheated not by Hitler, but by himself – by his own self-confidence when dealing with the dictators, and by his own delusions about appeasement. Because of these delusions he had to believe what Hitler said and turned a deaf ear to information he did not want to hear. If he had realized that war was inevitable and had stood firm by taking the risk of war, Hitler might have shrunk from it. However, denying the inevitability of war, he ruled out force to defend peace and not only made war inevitable, but brought it forward. Munich started the process of Russo-German rapprochement. Excluded from Munich, Moscow began to look for German friendship. This cast a shadow on the forthcoming Anglo-Russian talks, which aimed to build up the last possible deterrent against Hitler's aggression.

From: Peijian Shen, *The Age of Appeasement*, published in 1999

### 17c. Japanese involvement in the war.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Japan was driven into war with the western powers in 1941 by American policies.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees America justifiably responding to a naïve and unthinking Japanese aggression.

Nothing could have prevented a Japanese-American war after Japan's takeover of French Indochina in July 1941. And behind this incident lay the shadow of Japanese aggression in China itself. China had become America's Poland. Liberal opinion in the USA had come to regard the embattled land as another outpost of decency and innocence locked in frantic conflict with a predatory aggressor. Japan would not disengage from the China quagmire without the severest loss of face and influence in the Asian world whose destiny Tokyo so ardently wished to shape. Washington felt, rightly or wrongly that spreading Japanese aggression could only be strangled by stopping the flow of essential war materials. An aroused American press and public asserted that to continue supplying such materials to an aggressor power was to abet aggression. Who could or can contest such a point in a world at war? But it is Japanese lack of planning after Pearl Harbour that most strikes the historian's attention as he seeks to resolve the question of whether Japan posed a real threat to the USA in 1941. Tokyo developed no serious plans to meet the menace of a furious, revengeful United States after Pearl Harbour. A government, nation and military were blinded by easy victories over forlorn garrisons in the Pacific. It is difficult to escape the impression that Tokyo hoped the American problem would just go away after Pearl Harbour. There was so much to conquer and consolidate; it was too much to plan seriously for an early American menace.

From: Lisle A. Rose, *The Long Shadow, Reflections on the Second World War*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** These historians see US pressure as a significant reason for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.

The urging of American army and navy leaders to string out negotiations with Japan about the oil embargo until the Philippines could be reinforced went unheeded. An eleventh hour *modus vivendi* proposed a small trickle of oil to Japan and negotiations between China and Tokyo, while maintaining American aid to China; Japan would have to abrogate the Tripartite Pact and accept basic principles of international conduct. Not trusting the Japanese, Hull and Roosevelt decided to shelve the proposal. 'I have washed my hands of it', muttered Hull on 27 November, 'and it is now in the hands of the army and the navy.' The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour cannot be explained simply as an act of irrationality, an impulsive act by an unstable leader. After months of discussion among civilian and military leaders in Japan, a commitment was made at the Imperial Conference in September 1941 to fight the Americans if the life-strangling embargo on strategic materials was not lifted by 15 October. The date was later extended to 25 November and then to 30 November. With 12,000 tons of oil used each day by Japan, moderates and militants alike saw American pressure as provocative. The choices were fighting the United States or pulling out of China, and no Japanese leader counseled the latter. American power and potential were well-known, but as General Tojo put it 'sometimes a man has to jump with his eyes closed from the veranda of Kiyomizu Temple'.

From: Thomas G Paterson, J Garry Clifford and Kenneth J Hagan, *American Foreign Policy, A History Since 1900*, published in 1983.



**Interpretation C:** These historians point out the importance of Japan's justified concerns about the Soviet Union as being an element in the cause of war in 1941.

On 8 August 1936 there emerged from Tokyo a document entitled 'The Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan'. A new 'positive' foreign policy was revealed which aimed at the progressive development of Manchukuo; independent adjustment of relations with USSR and China and the peaceful advance of Japan to the South. The document stated that 'thwarting the USSR's aggressive intentions, therefore has become the most crucial element in our diplomacy'. There was apprehension in Japanese military circles as to the future intentions of the Soviet army. The Comintern had criticized Japan and Germany's 'ambitions of world division'. There was a mutual assistance pact signed by the Soviets with the Mongolian People's Republic in March 1936. Most significant in Japanese eyes were the military clashes between Red and Imperial forces along the Mongolian-Manchukuo and Soviet-Manchukuo borders. There was the Tauran incident in March 1936; the Kanch'atzu incident June-July 1937, the Amur incident June-July 1937, the Changkufeng incident July-August 1938; and the Nomonham incident May-September 1939. For Japan, wariness of the Soviet Union can be said to have played a crucial part in the growing rapprochement with Germany which led to the German-Japanese Pact, the keystone of the 1937 Anti-Comintern Pact. This antagonized Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States and convinced many nations that Germany, Italy and Japan had united in a single bloc aimed at radical amendment of the International status quo. The signing of the Tripartite Pact, 27 September 1940 was to lead to the onset of global warfare.

From: R. H. Haigh and D. S. Morris, *Japan, Italy and the Anti-Comintern Pact* (in *Rethinking Japan*, ed. A Boscaro and others), published in 1990.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Japan believing that there was no realistic alternative but to launch the southward expansion that began war in 1941.

The collision was not inevitable. There had been no invisible hand of destiny guiding Japan on the course to war against the might of the United States. That disastrous course was the consequence of the fateful choices made by Japan's leaders in the summer and autumn of 1940. These choices were, however, in good measure shaped by mentalities forged over the previous twenty years or so, and by the way that those mentalities interpreted economic realities. The leading political philosophies of the time, as Japan was modernizing and beginning to flex her muscles, assumed that acquiring an empire provided the basis of prosperity and future national security. America, most of all, stood in the way of this through their control of resources in South East Asia. By the time the war in China began in 1937 politicians favouring expansionism were in high offices of state. By now politics were in any case being ever more determined by the demands of the army. By the time the fateful decision for the southern advance was taken in July 1940, it was impossible to put forward a convincing alternative strategy. Better relations with the United States meant effectively to capitulate over China. In the eyes of Japan's leaders that would have entailed a colossal loss of prestige with incalculable internal consequences. It would have left Japan, her international strength undermined, even more dependent on America for the long-term future than she had been before embarking on the war in China.

From: Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices, Ten decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941*, published in 2007.

### The Causes of World War II, 1918-41 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
17.1 Assess the view that the Peace Treaties of 1919-20, which dealt with the former Austria-Hungary, were misguided. <b>[40 marks]</b>	17a.
17.2 Assess the view that the main fault of the Treaty of Versailles was leniency rather than severity. <b>[40 marks]</b>	17a.
17.3 Assess the view that appeasement was the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938. <b>[40 marks]</b>	17b.
17.4 Assess the view that the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1938 marked the end of appeasement. <b>[40 marks]</b>	17b.
17.5 Assess the view that the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1941 was more the fault of the USA than Japan. <b>[40 marks]</b>	17c.
17.6 To what extent did Roosevelt's policies towards Germany make it inevitable that the USA would enter the war in Europe? <b>[40 marks]</b>	17c.
17.7 To what extent was Hitler pursuing a purely ideological foreign policy between 1935 and 1939? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
17.8 How far can Hitler be blamed for the outbreak of war in 1939? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
17.9 Assess the view that the League of Nations was doomed to fail. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
17.10 Assess the view that the Locarno Agreements of 1925 did more harm than good to the hopes of lasting international peace. <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 18. The Cold War 1941-56

### 18a. Russia and the West during the Second World War

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the interpretation that Stalin was most to blame for wartime disagreements between Russia and the West.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that there was mutual misunderstanding between Russia and the West.

In 1942 and 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt indicated readiness to open a second front in Western Europe. Their backs to the wall, the Soviets seized on these indications as ironclad pledges. When the Allies invaded North Africa and Sicily, thus stalling the second front invasion, Stalin became increasingly suspicious and resentful. Nor did the Russian dictator care for the Anglo-American refusal to assure him that after the conflict the Soviet borders would essentially be those recognized by the Nazi-Soviet treaty, that is the Baltic States and parts of Finland and Rumania. The Cold War consequently developed on a foundation of a half century of Russian-American distrust and apprehension. The Soviet approach to East European governments varied. In Rumania, which had been an ally of Hitler and whose troops had actually invaded Russia, the Soviets at first attempted to rule through a government in which the Soviets were a minority. Two weeks after Yalta, however, Stalin issued a brutal ultimatum demanding that the Communist party obtain power within two hours. On the other hand the Soviets held elections which allowed a non-communist government to obtain power in Hungary; suffered an overwhelming defeat in the Russian controlled zone of Austria; supervised elections in Bulgaria which satisfied British, if not American officials, and agreed to an independent government in Finland.

From: Walter Le Feber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1966*, published in 1967.

**Interpretation B:** This historian is sympathetic to Russian criticisms of lack of support from the West during the war and defends Soviet policy in Eastern Europe in 1945.

It seems likely that about one-tenth of Russian military needs in all forms came from the Allies. However, Soviet military successes were unmistakably based primarily on the efforts and sacrifices of the Russians themselves, and not on such external aid as the USA gave them. Many Russians were to die in World War II to defeat Germany – the final count reached twenty millions, seven million of them soldiers; in comparison, the Americans lost 405,000, the British 375,000. American living standards, after the grim decade of the depression, had never been higher. The West's failure to initiate a second front until Germany was on the defensive must certainly have raised very serious questions in the Kremlin about the ultimate value and reliability of the coalition. The failure of the West on the second front issue struck at the very basis of the tenuous Allied collaboration. To the Russians it appeared that the West was making politics while Russia made war. Other than reconsidering the coalition after so many broken promises in regard to a second front, the Russians must no doubt have realized that Anglo-American delays, whether intended to do so or not, were weakening them materially, and this would affect their relations with the West at the end of the War. What was also certain to the USSR was that Anglo-American temporization had also weakened the force of its own obligations to its allies. By the Yalta Conference the military experience of the Grand Alliance had done nothing to mitigate the political differences that appeared during the course of 1943 and 1944.

From: Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War*, published in 1968.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there was less disagreement between Russia and the West than has been argued about the Second Front.

Though some British Cabinet colleagues favoured opening a front in the West, Churchill would have none of it. He told Stalin in 1942 that there was no chance of a British offensive in France or the Balkans and that action however well-meaning, leading only to costly fiasco would be of no help to anyone but Hitler. The issue of a Second Front would become a recurrent theme over the following three years, with Stalin returning repeatedly to the failure of Britain and America to land troops in France. But there must be doubt as to whether he really expected action in 1942 or 1943. The Western allies lacked men and landing craft, and Hitler had superior forces across the Channel. Molotov told an interviewer towards the end of his life, 'From the first I did not believe they would do it. This was a completely impossible operation for them. I don't doubt that Stalin too believed they would not carry it out'. The demand for a Second Front was too useful a political tool not to be used to ensure the Western allies would compensate by pumping supplies to the Eastern Front. For Britain the danger was that this would divert desperately needed American supplies and strain their own domestic production. The service ministers and chiefs of staff opposed this and made their feelings plain at a meeting in Downing Street on 19 September 1941.

From: Jonathan Fenby, *Alliance*, published in 2006.

**Interpretation D:** This historian is critical of Soviet wartime policy in Poland.

By the late June of 1944, the Red Army's progress into Poland brought the administration of the newly 'liberated' territories to the fore. Upon Churchill's pleading, Stalin agreed to meet Mikolajczk to seek a settlement. The Polish leader met Stalin on 27 June, just a day after the Soviets, with exquisitely brutal timing had announced that their puppet Polish Committee of National Liberation based in Lublin would oversee the administration of Polish territories. Mikolajczk faced a rival government and demanding terms from Stalin in June 1944. To the shifting of Poland's borders west, the Soviets now added the requirement that the Polish "governments" now be integrated. His refusal helped bring the Polish issue to a disastrous dénouement. After the courageous and reckless Warsaw uprising in August 1944 Stalin rested his forces short of Warsaw at the Vistula River and left the Germans to take a vicious revenge on the Poles. Until late in the uprising, Stalin even refused the use of Russian airfields to the Americans and British who were trying to supply the Poles. Soviet behaviour during the Warsaw rising shook the faith of keen observers in the west. British Air Marshall Sir John Slessor later noted: "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust any Russian Communist further than he could kick him passes the comprehension of ordinary men".

From: Wilson D. Miscamble, *Roosevelt to Truman*, published in 2007.

## 18b. The Marshall Plan

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the US policy of Marshall in 1947 was motivated mainly by the altruistic desire to help the economic recovery of Europe.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian is sympathetic to Russia seeing the Marshall Plan as part of a generally hostile plan to boost capitalism.

A main objective of the Marshall Plan had been to win the mouths and minds of the West European peoples so as to prevent them from turning Communist. The money needed for the Plan would never have been granted by Congress unless a considerable amount of emphasis had been laid on the danger of Communism in Europe and on the significance of US aid as a protective device. The Russians can hardly be blamed for interpreting the Plan as an attempt to halt their advance and limit their influence. Western capitalism, which had been on the point of justifying Marxist predictions by collapsing, was being resuscitated and given a prosperity highly alluring to countries on the fringe of the USSR. Molotov at Paris, in the conference of 22 June 1947 which he walked out of in protest, had represented Marshall Aid as an attempt by American capitalists to capture additional markets and thus avoid depression. But the Plan later came to be given a more military significance. Its intention was seen as being to recreate the military power of Western Europe, enable Britain and France to resume their roles as Great Powers and provide armies which would be strong enough, especially when backed by American atomic weapons, to recover the position which had been lost between 1944 and 1947.

From: Michael Balfour, *The Adversaries*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees economic and political concerns being interlinked in the establishment of the Marshall Plan.

The originator of the idea to link the economic recovery of West Germany and France was John Foster Dulles. In a speech of 1947 he put the future of Germany in the context of the economic unity of Europe rather than in the Potsdam view of Germany as an economic entity. He argued that small economic units in a divided Europe could not prosper; Europe had to unite so as to provide a market large enough to justify modern mass-production techniques. Walter Lippman, an influential columnist, advocated a European economic union. A State, War, Navy coordinating unit was set up to examine the possibility of future foreign loans. The failure of the council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow in April 1947 to reach any agreement on Germany speeded up the process. Three reasons suggest themselves to explain the attractiveness of the concept. In the first place, a multinational aid programme in Europe would permit a more rational use of US funds by aiding integration and the division of labour. Secondly, it promised to solve the French problem. France's desperate need for German reparations would be replaced by US credits, and the marrying of the French and German economies would reduce French fears of German economic power. Thirdly, by linking it to anti-Communism the concept would be very popular in the USA. Benefits, it was emphasized, would accrue to all sides; an expanding European market would take more US goods and a strong Europe would be a powerful bulwark against communist expansion.

From: Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation C:** This historian sees America following a political grand strategy through economic means.

Marshall - following Truman's lead – was constructing a Cold War grand strategy. Kennan's "Long Telegram" had identified the problem: the Soviet Union's internationally driven hostility towards the outside world. It had however suggested no solution. Now Marshall told Kennan to come up with one: his only guideline was 'avoid trivia'. The instruction, it is fair to say, was met. The European Recovery Programme, which Marshall announced in June 1947, committed the United States to nothing less than the reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan, as it instantly became known, did not at that point distinguish between those parts of the Continent that were under Soviet control and those that were not - but the thinking behind it certainly did. Several premises shaped the Marshall Plan: that the greatest threat to western interests was not the prospect of Soviet military intervention, but rather the risk that hunger, poverty, and despair might cause Europeans to vote their own communists into office, who would then obediently serve Moscow's wishes; that American economic assistance would produce immediate psychological benefits and later material ones that would reverse this trend; that the Soviet union would not accept such aid or allow its satellites to, thereby straining relationships with them, and that the USA could then seize the geopolitical and the moral initiative in the emerging Cold War.

From: J. L. Gaddis, *The Cold War*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Marshall Aid was part of a wider economic programme to reform the European economy as a whole.

The fact that money from Marshall Aid was to be confined to the West (with Greece and Turkey honorary West Europeans) undoubtedly made it easier for Truman to secure passage of the European Recovery Programme through Congress the following year, 1948. But by then much had changed. In June 1947, however, the offer of aid through Marshall's new programme was made to all European countries without distinction. Stalin and Molotov were of course suspicious – the terms Marshall was proposing were quite incompatible with the closed Soviet economy - but their sentiments were not widely shared elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in what was not yet a bloc. The programme obliged European governments to plan ahead and calculate future investment needs, it laid on them a requirement to negotiate and confer not just with the USA but with each other, since the trading and exchanges implied in the programme were intended to move from the bilateral to the multilateral as soon as possible. It constrained governments, businesses and labour unions to collaborate in planning increased rates of output and the conditions likely to facilitate them. And above all it blocked any return to the temptations that had so stymied the inter-war economy; under-production, mutually destructive protectionism and a collapse of trade. The 'productivity missions' funded by the Marshall Plan, brought to the US many thousands of managers, technicians and trade unionists to study the American way of business – 5000 from France alone. Enthusiastic American New Dealers urged upon European colleagues the virtues of freer trade, international collaboration and inter-state integration.

From: Tony Judt, *Postwar, A History of Europe Since 1945*, published in 2005

### 18c. The Korean War

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Stalin was mainly responsible for the Korean War.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees Stalin taking a cautious view on Korea

Two states came into being, thus artificially dividing the Korean nation into two. Soviet troops withdrew in the North to be followed by the withdrawal of US troops in the South. Each side believed that in each case the government was supported by a majority of the population. Unfortunately, it seems that conflict arose because each side wanted to extend its authority over the whole peninsula. Stalin took an extremely cautious view of events in Korea and from the outset made every attempt to avoid direct confrontation between the USSR and the USA. Mao was more decisive. During their meetings from November 1949 to February 1950 Stalin and Mao frequently discussed Korea. Stalin's view was that it would be difficult to create a unitary state in Korea painlessly. He was sceptical of the idea of trusteeship over Korea as he was of the idea of 'free elections'. After all, there was a significantly bigger population in the South. The 38<sup>th</sup> parallel had been fixed without any political basis but merely as a line of demarcation between Soviet and American troops. Once thirty Chinese divisions were on the move, however, the situation in the peninsula changed markedly.

From: Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin, Triumph and Tragedy*, published in 1991

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that America was unwittingly the cause of direct Chinese involvement in Korea

There was such strong support in Washington for defending South Korea that some historians have suggested that the Truman administration must have set the whole thing up. What has given rise to these suspicions is that during spring of 1950 the National Security Council had undertaken a fundamental policy reassessment in the wake of the "loss" of China and the Soviet atomic bomb. Completed in April, NSC-68 portrayed communism as a coordinated global movement and called for a tripling of the American defence budget. Were the North Koreans somehow manoeuvred into attacking South Korea as the necessary excuse for US rearmament? No one has found convincing evidence to support such an argument, although both sides had been conducting raids along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The Truman administration remained determined to keep the US out of what was left of the Chinese Civil War, but reconsidered the methods to be employed. The seventh fleet would from 27 June 1950 patrol the Taiwan Strait with orders to prevent either Chinese Communist or Chinese nationalist activity there while UN troops were fighting in Korea. This decision had a profound effect in Beijing. Hypersensitive as always to the indications that the Americans were about to invade China, Mao interpreted the Seventh Fleet deployment not as an attempt to limit conflict but to expand it. Noting the US increase in military and economic assistance to the Filipinos and to the French in their struggle against the Viet Minh, Mao now concluded that he faced a coordinated American offensive to be directed from Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines and Indo China. Mao also appears to have decided, soon after this, that the Korean peninsula would be a good place for Chinese armies to confront the American aggressors.

From: J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War History*, published in 1997

**Interpretation C:** While seeing the advantages for Stalin in a war in Korea, these historians see the initiative for war coming from Mao and Kim Il Sung.

Mao encouraged Pyongyang to invade the South and take on the USA – and volunteered Chinese manpower – as early as May 1949. At that stage he was talking about sending in Chinese troops clandestinely. During his visit to Russia, however, later in the year, Mao changed. He became determined to fight America openly because he thought that only such a war would gouge out of Stalin what he needed to build his own world-class war machine. What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment. Stalin received reports from both his ambassador in Korea and his liaison with Mao about Mao's eagerness to have a war in Korea. As a result of this new factor, Stalin began to reconsider his previous refusal to let Kim invade the South. Stalin was given a push by Kim. He told the Russian ambassador that Mao had promised to render him assistance and raised the possibility of setting up an Eastern bureau of the Cominform without the mention of talking to Stalin about this. If Stalin would not endorse an invasion, Kim would go to Mao direct and place himself under Mao. A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages. It could field-test both its own equipment, especially its MiG jets and America's technology, as well as allowing Russia to acquire some of this technology along with valuable intelligence on America. Both China and Korea would be dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine tune the degree of Russian involvement. Moreover he could test how far America would go in a war with the Communist camp. But the greatest attraction was that the Chinese with their massive numbers would eliminate or tie down so many American troops that the balance of power would tilt in Stalin's favour.

From: Jung Chan and Jon Halliday, *Mao, The Unknown Story*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Stalin's role in the Korean War as crucial.

In June 1949 the last American troops withdrew from Korea and in September Kim Il Sung proposed a limited offensive against the South to improve North Korea's defensive position along the border. Stalin gave this proposal serious consideration but in the end rejected it on the grounds that it would be difficult to keep such an attack limited and it could result in serious international complications. In January 1950 Stalin began to change his mind and when he met Kim again in March, he was ready to give the go-ahead for an invasion, if the idea was endorsed by the Chinese. Stalin explained his change of mind as the result of two main considerations. First the communist victory in China meant that Mao would be able to assist the North Koreans if necessary. Second, the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance meant that the Americans were less likely to intervene. The mood in the US was against intervention – a mood reinforced by the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb. At this stage, Kim's plan was for localized offensive operations that would later develop into a more general offensive. However, the plan changed and, with Stalin's blessing, the North Koreans launched a broad attack across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. Stalin was anxious that the South should be "liberated" before the Americans had a chance to intervene.

From: Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, published in 2006.



## The Cold War 1941-56 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
18.1 Assess the view that the disagreements about the Second Front were the most significant cause of tension between Russia and the West between 1941 and 1945. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18a.
18.2 Assess the view that Stalin's suspicions of his western allies between 1941 and 1945 were justified. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18a.
18.3 To what extent was Marshall Aid merely a policy of American self-interest? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18b.
18.4 To what extent was Containment a policy based on the desire to defend freedom? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18b.
18.5 To what extent was Stalin responsible for the Korean War? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18c.
18.6 How far was US policy in Asia between September 1945 and 1953 driven by economic considerations? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18c.
18.7 How important was the arms race in the Cold War between 1949 and 1956? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
18.8 Assess the view that the prospects for peaceful coexistence were less likely in 1956 than they had been in 1949. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
18.9 Assess the view that Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe in 1945-7 were brutal and expansionist. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
18.10 How far was Stalin to blame for the Berlin crisis 1948-9? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 19. The War in Vietnam, 1955–1975

### 19a. The escalation of the war in 1965.

Using these four passages and your knowledge, assess the view that, for President Johnson in 1965, the arguments in favour of escalating the war in South Vietnam were stronger than those against.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Johnson was cautious about committing US troops to South Vietnam.

The only course tolerable to Johnson was continuation of a gradual build-up of US forces – the very policy that had failed to defeat the NFL or bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese government for the previous year. He hoped to keep the buildup quiet and present it as a continuation of policy, not a dramatically increased American commitment. He wanted to avoid provoking the Soviets or “stir talk about controls over the economy and inflation.” Johnson expected that by downplaying the significance of the new commitment, he would avoid a divisive public debate and prevent the sort of public war weariness that had wrecked the Truman administration during the Korean War. At the height of his authority with Congress, he feared that congressional discussion of Vietnam would interfere with passage of his ambitious program of domestic reform legislation, the Great Society. Some of the President’s aides believed a forthright statement that the United States had raised the stakes in Vietnam “would create the false impression that we have to have guns, not butter – and would help the enemies of the president’s domestic legislative agenda.” For his part, the President often expressed greater awareness of the risks than did some of his more militant advisers. He wanted assurances that the efforts to encourage other nations to support the US effort in Vietnam had “wrung every single soldier out of every country we can.” Johnson also recognized the fragility of public support for the war. A June public opinion poll by Louis Harris gave the president an overall approval rating of 69 percent. Sixty-five percent of the public approved and 35 percent disapproved of his handling of Vietnam issues.

From: R. Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that President Johnson had little option but to maintain the US commitment to South Vietnam.

President Kennedy left to Lyndon Johnson a US military force in Vietnam of 16,000 and a commitment to the growing Vietnamese war that was not going well. Kennedy had avoided, as had Eisenhower before him, making the ultimate decision to leave or commit combat troops. Johnson would not have that luxury. United States leaders remained committed to Vietnam as a battle in the Cold War. Maintaining their faith in the domino theory, they believed the loss of South Vietnam would threaten other states in the region and endanger America’s standing in the world. President Johnson, as had Kennedy before him, also felt that failure in Vietnam would have serious political repercussions from Republicans who had used Democratic presidents in the past as scapegoats for communist advances in Asia. Though Johnson remained committed to Kennedy’s policy, he found it necessary to increase US involvement in order to preserve the Saigon regime. He came to realize that there were no easy options.

From: M.K. Hall, *The Vietnam War*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Johnson and his advisers were well aware of the difficulties that greater US involvement in Vietnam would bring.

If the passage of a quarter century grants us the luxury of hindsight, and if the opponents of war too often failed to really press their case, the fact remains that Lyndon Johnson had a legitimate choice on which way to proceed in Vietnam, a choice laid out *at the time* by both the opponents and proponents of negotiations. This makes the decision for war more difficult to explain than many studies would have one believe, as does the fact that senior US officials shared many of the same judgments as their detractors about the state of the war in Vietnam and the prospects for a turn-around. Lyndon Johnson and his top foreign policy aides were, for the most part, gloomy realists on Vietnam, well aware of the problems in the war effort and the obstacles in the way of significant improvement. They talked confidently about what Operation Rolling Thunder could achieve, but privately they were sceptical that the bombing would cause Hanoi to call it quits or that it would do much to help the politico-military problems in the South. Even as they sent the first contingent of US ground forces, senior officials understood that it would bring resentment from many South Vietnamese, including those in leadership positions, and generate charges of 'colonialism' from elsewhere in Asia and around the world. As for the quality of the Saigon government, US policy-makers were no less dubious than their critics; they knew it had less popular support than ever, that it was characterized by in-fighting and incompetence, and that at least some of its members were flirting with the idea of seeking an early negotiated settlement of the conflict.

From: F. Logevall, *The Origins of the Vietnam War*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that US fears about the threat of communism shaped its policy towards Vietnam.

Ever since 1947, the fundamental principle of America's Cold War strategy was the maintenance of the international status quo through a policy of containment of the communist powers. Containment had worked. And it meant that the ability of the West to defeat any communist attempt to change the global balance by force of arms was itself a precondition for the pursuit of détente in other spheres. In Vietnam it seemed as if that ability was being put to the test. The outcome of the struggle in Vietnam had immediate implications for the geopolitical future of Southeast Asia. The "domino theory" – famously stated by Eisenhower in 1954 – was a valid explanation of American interests; it left the US no choice but to stand up to the challenge posed by North Vietnam. Communist success in Vietnam would inexorably lead to the collapse of other noncommunist states. Like a row of "dominos", the nations in Southeast Asia and beyond would succumb to communism, not necessarily through the spread of communist insurrections, although that might occur in some instances, but mainly through a political process. An American "loss" in Vietnam would create a momentum toward communism – a sense that it represented the wave of the future – thus pulling countries away from the West. Containment of North Vietnam was not just to prevent the loss of South Vietnam, but to assure that communism would not gain the ascendancy in strategically-located Indonesia, the resource-rich and most populous country in Southeast Asia. The West's position in Southeast Asia was precarious. Failing to stand by South Vietnam would have accelerated the erosion of American stature and the movement of nations in the region toward accommodation with the communist powers. So the loss of Vietnam would have had enormous political ramifications. Nothing less than the capacity of the US to help shape the future of Southeast Asia was being challenged – by Beijing and to some extent by Moscow – and America's influence might decline altogether if it retreated from the "liberation struggle" in Vietnam.

From: G. R. Hess, *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*, published in 2008.

### 19b. The significance of 1968.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a greater reverse for the North Vietnamese than for the Americans.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Tet Offensive was a turning point in the Vietnam War.

Journalists who had grown disgusted with the optimistic assessments from Westmoreland's staff refused to believe that Tet represented a defeat for the revolutionary forces. *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *US News* all characterized the Tet offensive as a major psychological blow for the United States. The *New York Times*, long critical of the Johnson administration's handling of the war, claimed that Tet revealed "the weakness of the political structure on which the American military effort is based." Later critics of the press's behavior during Tet claimed that excessively negative coverage of Tet colored the public's perception of the war. That view is hard to sustain, however. The public's reaction to Tet occurred in the context of the dashed hopes for victory before the end of 1968. Even Johnson acknowledged that his own representatives had raised hopes too high at the end of 1967. From North Vietnam to New Hampshire the Tet Offensive signaled a turning point in the war. General Giap recalled that while Tet did not trigger an immediate rising of the population against the Saigon government, it vindicated the strategy of protracted war. He claimed that "our biggest victory was to change the ideas of the United States." Before early 1968 the primary aim of the United States, had, he claimed, been "to find and kill. It was replaced by a new strategy of defense."

From: R. Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the American media misrepresented the Tet offensive.

Media misrepresentation came to a decisive head in the handling of the Vietcong 'Tet Offensive'. The military position at this time was that the Americans and their Vietnamese allies, having strongly established themselves in all the urban centers of the South, were winning important successes in the countryside too. That persuaded the Communists to change their tactics, and try their first major offensive in the open. On the first day of Tet, their units attacked five of Vietnam's six cities, most of its provincial and district capitals, and fifty hamlets. The Vietnam forces and units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), though taken by surprise, responded quickly. Within a week they had regained all the ground the attackers had won, except in one town, Hué, which was not retaken until February 24. Media coverage concentrated on the fact that the Vietcong enjoyed initial successes in attacking the Government Palace in Saigon, the airport, and the US embassy compound, and the cameras focussed on the continued fighting in Hué rather than US successes elsewhere. In military terms, the Tet Offensive was the worst reverse the Vietcong suffered throughout the war: they lost over 40,000 of their best troops and a great number of heavy weapons. But the media, especially TV, presented it as a decisive American defeat, a Vietcong victory on the scale of Dien Bien Phu. The image not the reality of Tet was probably decisive, especially among influential East Coast liberals. In general American public opinion backed forceful action in the war. Among the people as a whole, support for withdrawal never rose above 20 percent until after the November 1968 election, by which time the decision to get out had already been taken. The American citizenry were resolute, even if their leaders were not. The crumbling of American leadership began in the last months of 1967 and accelerated after the media reaction to Tet. The Defence Secretary, Clark Clifford, turned against the war; so did old Dean Acheson. Even Senate hardliners began to oppose further reinforcements.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the political impact of the Tet Offensive was far greater than its military significance.

During late spring and summer, the United States and ARVN regained much of the territory lost during Tet. Recognizing limits to their commitment, however, American officials had by then chosen a new approach. Through Tet, North Vietnam had broken the pattern of American escalation. For much of the American public, the Tet Offensive was a rude awakening to the realities of the war that prompted a re-evaluation of the nation's commitment. Having been repeatedly told by leading political and military leaders that the communists were fading, the public was stunned to find them still capable of such an effort. Pictures of close-quarter fighting appeared on their television screens and in newspapers and magazines, reminding them once again of the ongoing human costs of the war. The new reality reinforced public discontent with the war. The press reflected the American public's response to Tet and interpreted the offensive as a psychological blow to the United States effort. Having generally accepted the optimistic reports of government authorities, they found the continued claims of victory far less credible. Respected television newscaster Walter Cronkite's reaction epitomized the media's shock when he exclaimed, 'What the hell is going on? I thought we were winning the war'. Public opinion polls showed a drop in support for Johnson's conduct of the war. In this light many people re-evaluated the motivations for being there. Government officials were shocked by Tet and remained unsure whether the communists would follow with another offensive. For General Giap, the Tet Offensive vindicated North Vietnam's protracted war strategy. Speaking of the Americans, he claimed, 'Until Tet they had thought they could win the war, but now they knew that they could not.'

From: M. K. Hall, *The Vietnam War*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the Tet Offensive increased the credibility of the government of South Vietnam.

By quickly recapturing control of the cities (except for Hué) and inflicting substantial casualties on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the Americans and South Vietnamese forces shattered communist objectives. And the month-long battle at Hué ended in a decisive American-South Vietnamese victory. After the battle of Hué ended, South Vietnamese soldiers made a gruesome discovery: some 3,000 civilian supporters or suspected sympathisers of the Saigon government had been summarily executed by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. This atrocity discredited any claims to communist legitimacy and foreshadowed what would happen if they won the war. Throughout the Tet fighting, the VC suffered especially devastating losses, virtually ending its viability as a fighting force. The Saigon government gained credibility with its own people and confidence in its ability to prevail over the communists. Before Tet, the Saigon government had almost no chance of surviving without large-scale US support, but afterward its prospects for long-term success were much more substantial. The much-criticized South Vietnamese Army fought effectively, heroically at places. Its units bore the brunt of the attacks, but most soldiers remained loyal and fought to regain the cities. More importantly, the communist assaults unleashed a sense of patriotic zeal among the people of South Vietnam, "never before had the rapport between the people and the armed forces and the people and the government been so close," retired General Phillip Davidson writes in *Vietnam at War*, "with Tet, the Government of Vietnam had won a major battle for the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese."

From: G. R. Hess, *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*, published in 2008.

### 19c. The significance of the USA's defeat in South Vietnam.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the war in Vietnam had a more lasting impact on the USA than on the people of South-East Asia.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that defeat in Vietnam had profound consequences for the USA.

The Vietnam War taught Americans a few lessons, chief among them the dangers of large-scale military intervention in strategically marginal areas of the world. In future years American politicians and military leaders were more likely to set limits before sliding into quagmires like the one that had swallowed so much humanity in Southeast Asia. "No more Vietnams," they warned. Given the grand expectations that Americans had had until then about their ability to shape the world, this was a shift of historic importance. This useful lesson, however, was learned only after extraordinary costs that Nixon's policies helped to escalate. After 1969 the war further savaged and badly destabilised Vietnam and Cambodia. It diverted the attention of American foreign policy-makers from serious problems elsewhere, especially in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Continuing fixation on Vietnam also left the United States relatively weaker vis-à-vis the Soviets, whose arsenal of missiles and delivery capability reached parity with that of the United States by the 1970s. At home, the war provoked serious economic difficulties, especially inflation, by 1973. It accelerated the rise of an imperial presidency and contributed powerfully – thanks to Nixon's quest for control – to the constitutional crisis of Watergate. More generally the war undercut the standing of political elites. Popular doubt and cynicism about "the system" and the Washington Establishment lingered long after the men came home. The war, above all, left an abiding sourness in the United States. Veterans, dumped into civilian life after surviving the terrors of the bush, experienced staggering problems including unemployment, guilt, depression, rage and a sense of rejection. Hundreds of thousands suffered from "post-traumatic neurosis", flashbacks, and nightmares. Suicide rates among the veterans were much higher than in the population at large. But some Americans, including political leaders like Ronald Reagan, never stopped insisting that the war need not have been lost. They regarded anti-war activists and draft avoiders with a fury and contempt that did not abate with time. Other people, including many who had once supported the war, raged at the military and political leaders who had dragged the country into the conflict. America's longest war inflicted wounds that time was very slow to heal.

From: James T Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States 1945-74*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the American defeat in Vietnam had significant effects for South-East Asia.

On April 21 1975, the South Vietnamese government abdicated. It was indeed the most shameful defeat in the whole of American history. The democratic world looked on in dismay at this abrupt collapse of American power, which had looked so formidable only two years before. But it was the helpless people of the region who had to pay the real price. Nine days after the last US helicopter clattered out to sea, Communist tanks entered the city of Saigon, and the secret trial and shootings of America's abandoned allies began almost immediately. All over Indochina, the Communist elites which had seized power by force began their programs of 'social engineering.' The best-documented is the 'ruralization' conducted by the Communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Members of Congress were made well aware of what they were permitting to happen. But they averted their gaze. Between April 1975 and the beginning of 1977, the Marxist-Leninist ideologues ruling Cambodia ended the lives of 1,200,000 people, a fifth of the population. Comparable atrocities took place in Laos, and during Communist efforts to unify Vietnam by force, between 1975 and 1977. Following this, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and occupied Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. Laos was likewise occupied by Vietnamese troops.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the outcome of the Vietnam War was mixed and varied.

So, was the war in Vietnam worth it – for the Americans or the Vietnamese? The immediate response is: of course not. Vietnam was unified; the nationalists/ revolutionaries won. But the cost included three million dead, as many as fifteen million made refugees at different times throughout the war, horrible physical devastation, over one million people, including some of the most industrious and educated, forced to flee, and the creation of one of the world's poorest economies. Despite the fears expressed by American officials, Vietnam did not endure a bloodbath after the communist triumph, but the victors did impose an authoritarian, repressive regime. Much of the death and damage was the responsibility of the United States. The victorious revolutionaries bore responsibility for the forced departure of the refugees, the terrible economic mismanagement, and the political repression of postwar Vietnam. Was the war worth it for the United States? Again, of course, the predominant answer is no. There were 58,000 dead and far more severely wounded than in earlier wars (primarily because of the improvements in medical evacuation). The US economy suffered years of inflation because of government policies pursued during the Vietnam years. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is also hard to see that the investment in Vietnam had anything much to do with the demise of the Soviet Union. The most enduring legacy of all, perhaps, was a persistent distrust of public institutions and the officials who ran them. But the United States emerged stronger than many people expected from the crucible of Vietnam.

From: R. Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the Vietnam War had a limited impact on the USA.

Reminders of a war that Americans wished to forget, most veterans were ignored when they returned home. Beyond media attention to the psychological difficulties that they faced in re-adjusting to civilian life (which principally fostered an image of veterans as disturbed and dangerous) the nation paid little heed to those who had served and sacrificed. Most Americans wanted “to put Vietnam behind us” and just forget. The bitterness of many veterans, as of embattled hawks and doves, moderated with time. Few Americans gave much thought to the two million casualties and the devastation in Vietnam, or to the suffering in Laos, or the price paid by Cambodia. “We’ve adjusted too well,” complained Tim O’Brien, a veteran and novelist of the war, in 1980. “Too many of us have lost touch with the horror of war. It would seem that the memories of soldiers should serve, at least in a modest way, as a restraint on national bellicosity. But time and distance erode memory. We adjust, we lose the intensity. I fear that we are back where we started. I wish we were more troubled.”

From: Paul S. Boyer, *The Enduring Vision*, published in 2000



## The War in Vietnam 1955-75 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions:
<p>19.1 Assess the view that the main reason the US became increasingly involved in Vietnam between 1955 and 1965 was the fear of successive presidents that they would be labelled as weak by their domestic opponents.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
<p>19.2 Assess the view that Kennedy lacked a clear policy about US involvement in Vietnam.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
<p>19.3 Assess the view that Lyndon Johnson had no choice but to send US troops to Vietnam in 1965.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
<p>19.4 To what extent has the importance of the Tet Offensive of 1968 been over-rated?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
<p>19.5 Assess the view that the Vietnam War was a pointless, costly failure.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19c.
<p>19.6 Assess the view that the American 'hearts and minds' strategy in South Vietnam never had any chance of success.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
<p>19.7 To what extent can the programme of Vietnamisation be defended?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
<p>19.8 To what extent was the Vietnam War lost because of the hostility of much of the American media?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
<p>19.9 Assess the view that American military commanders, rather than American politicians, lost the war in Vietnam.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
<p>19.10 How far can it be argued that Nixon's peace negotiations sacrificed the chance of victory in South Vietnam?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	

## 20. The Development of Rights of Women in Great Britain 1867-1918

### 20a. Women and work

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that wider job opportunities did nothing to advance the cause of gender equality in Britain by 1914.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that opportunities and earnings in industrial jobs improved only for certain groups of women.

Once women left full-time work for marriage, they rarely returned unless they were widowed or deserted. This is suggested in oral testimony and borne out by statistical evidence about the ages of women in work. In 1901 77% of women aged 15-34 were in work but only 13% aged 35-44 and 11% aged 45-59. The pattern of the typical woman worker in full-time, wage-earning work was of a younger rather than an older person and this undoubtedly had some effect on the generally lower wages women earned compared with those of men. In many industries older, more experienced, workers could expect to earn higher wages. Obviously there were far fewer older women in work who could have boosted the average wages for all. However, aggregated wages should not be allowed to obscure the fact that sometimes women did earn more than men. In the cotton industry oral evidence has revealed many examples of individual highly skilled women weavers earning more than their male colleagues. The same was true in the Potteries, a very important area for female employment. Low aggregated wage rates hide the fact that highly skilled women decorators doing transferring, gilding and painting were paid more than some of the male potters doing less skilled jobs. But in general, women were concentrated in unskilled industrial jobs and one reason for this would seem to be a definite policy by male employers and male workers to 'deskill' work done by women, notably by denying them apprenticeships.

From: Elizabeth Roberts, *Women's Work 1840-1940*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes that more opportunities opened up for women.

What was more significant, as regards women in society, than trends in moral and political attitudes, was the changing British economy. Growing numbers of women found themselves in employment. This was nothing new, since from 1850 over a third of the total work force was female. But the number of women being attracted to a greater variety of jobs was new, and this ran across the classes. After 1900 the typewriter, telephone and department store revolution hit Britain: it absorbed thousands of new women workers every year. By 1914 more than half a million women were at work in shops and offices. Teaching and nursing expanded at the same time and 1914 saw nearly a quarter of a million women in these professions. The more traditional areas of female employment, such as textiles, clothing and food processing, also grew steadily. Domestic service employment declined steadily so that by 1914 the typical woman worker was no longer employed there. Such changes also meant that Trade Union membership among women tripled between 1900 and 1914, the figure then being 437'000. Increasing job opportunities for females led to women being concerned in the improvement of wages and conditions of employment and to the search for more tangible acceptance of equality with men. The mill girls of Lancashire were persuaded to swell the ranks of the Suffragettes mainly on the ground that votes for women would lead to betterment of wages and conditions of employment.

From: Ian McKellar, *The Edwardian Age, Complacency and Concern*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that opportunities increased for women but only in particular fields.

The expansion of business concerns and the demand for clerical labour brought a ready demand for the cheaper work of women, sometimes better educated than the men they replaced. And the coming of the typewriter – widely sold from 1882 – confirmed this: the skills of typing were frequently compared with those of piano playing. Even before women entered private offices in significant numbers they had been found valuable in the service of the government and in particular the Post Office, which took over the private telegraph companies in 1870. These had found women employees to be ‘more teachable, more attentive and quicker-eyed and sooner satisfied with lower wages’ than the men previously employed. Almost as soon as telephones were made available in 1879, women became telephone operators. Women were not employed in the higher grades of the civil service, except for a very small number of female inspectors of areas seen as appropriate for women, such as workhouse schools and infirmaries, educational establishments, especially those dealing with domestic subjects and factories. Nineteenth century feminists were deeply concerned that women’s employment be recognized and extended, but their arguments were for the admission of women to occupations for which they were particularly fitted, for the service jobs which fell so naturally into women’s sphere. Industrialization did not bring about an expansion of women’s opportunities in manufacturing industry. Rather, with an increasingly clear-cut definition of gender roles, it enabled some women’s labour to be cheaply used, while for others it brought occupations which might be seen as reflecting the concerns of their domestic lives.

From: Jane Rendall, *Women in an Industrializing Society, England 1750-1880*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that working class women remained deprived of opportunities and were poorly paid.

Domestic service remained a major employer of working women and teenage girls. The number employed grew prodigiously by 1914 to 2.6 million, making domestic service the largest single employer of working class women. Girls flocked from areas of high unemployment to more prosperous regions where they worked both for middle class families and in hotels, boarding houses and nursing homes. Otherwise women remained confined to a limited range of low-paid jobs in retailing, clothing and domestic service. Even when women did manage to find work in high-wage industries such as the cotton or pottery industries, it did them little good. For, even when wage rates were nominally equal, there remained ways of depressing female earnings. In the north Staffordshire pottery industry, for example, it was the unwritten rule that women were not allowed to earn more than their male colleagues, with the result that they were forced to stop work if it seemed to the men in their shops that they were increasing their pay to unacceptable levels. Thus working class women found it hard for them to earn as much as the male members of their families, let alone to support themselves independently or to maintain any dependants for whom they might be responsible. Widowhood and desertion remained disasters from which many women were never able to recover.

From: John Benson, *The Working Class in Britain, 1850-1939*, published in 2003.

## 20b Suffragettes and the Campaign for the Vote

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the militancy of the Suffragettes was the main reason why women were denied the vote in the period up to 1914.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the reaction of the Liberal government was more to blame than the actions of the Suffragettes.

The most violent of the Liberal Government's enemies were the middle-class women who wanted the vote; and their violence could have been avoided altogether by the simple process of giving them what they wanted. The really militant phase of the Suffragette movement did not begin until after the Liberals had come to power and the formidable Mrs Pankhurst was able to exploit the situation created by the Government's evasions. There is little excuse for the failure to grant the suffrage; and there is less for the way in which the Government sustained its refusal. Women, imprisoned for their violent acts against property and public order, would then go on hunger strike. They were thereupon forcibly fed. An alternative device was the Cat and Mouse Act of 1913. The attitude of the Government to middle-class Englishwomen demanding the right to vote, and reacting with violence to the Government's provocative and pointless delay, provides a sinister comment on the persistent Liberal claim to stand for a higher morality than other political parties. The Cat and Mouse Act came strangely from a Government which a few years before had been grieved so sorely by the hardships suffered by Boer women and children and by Chinese coolies in the Transvaal.

From: L. C. B. Seaman, *Post-Victorian Britain, 1902-1951*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes that increasingly violent methods did not attract support.

Club windows were smashed in London, the Orchid House at Kew gardens was wrecked, golf courses in Birmingham were attacked with acid. All criminal acts were dealt with by the Law. Arrests were made, trials took place, often giving the Suffragettes even more publicity than they deserved, and sentences issued. Often the Suffragettes went to prison for non-payment of fines. There they continued to raise difficulties for the Government by going on hunger strike. This forced the Government to sponsor the 'Cat and Mouse' Act which allowed release for recuperation but followed this with rearrest. The fanaticism began to disgust even many friends of the women's cause. 'Diseased emotionalism' was how the Manchester Guardian described it. Questions were asked about the mental and emotional stability of leading Suffragettes, such as Emily Davison. There was a lack of political judgement shown by Mrs Pankhurst and her daughters, particularly when dissension appeared in the ranks and some of their leading colleagues deserted. The Suffragettes chose their targets indiscriminately. Setting fire to public buildings, planting bombs in Westminster Abbey, smashing exhibits in the British Museum and damaging paintings, like the Rokeby Venus, did little to endear the Suffragettes to the public or politicians. More important is the effect the hysteria had on influential ministers, like Churchill and Lloyd George – it merely aggravated them. Lloyd George declared: 'I have no desire to speak by gracious permission of Queen Christabel'. Mrs Pankhurst claimed in her Memoirs that militancy had been proved right because it attracted attention. But the increasing violence and hysteria of the years 1911 to 1914 evoked anger, not sympathy.

From: Ian McKellar, *The Edwardian Age, Complacency and Concern*, published in 1980.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers that Suffragette aims were not helped by their increasing use of violence.

Extreme militancy does not seem to have helped the cause of women's suffrage. In the House of Commons opinion moved against giving women the vote. In 1911 the House had accepted the principle by giving a second reading to the Conciliation Bill; in 1913 a private member's Bill was defeated. In the same year the government felt strong enough to arm itself against hunger strikers by passing an act to allow it to release them and then rearrest them as soon as they were well enough to serve their sentences. The Act, nicknamed the 'Cat and Mouse' Act probably helped the women's cause; the public seems to have accepted that public disobedience was a reasonable method by which women could show that they were in earnest, but militancy – the use of violence and the destruction of property – was not accepted in the same way. Perhaps because of militancy, or a calculation that women's suffrage would help the Conservatives, or irritation at the way the WSPU treated as its main enemy the Liberal and Labour parties, most of whom supported women's suffrage, the political struggle seemed less hopeful in late 1913 than for some years. The defeat of the private member's Bill meant that the government no longer felt it had to provide time for another Bill, so the cause was blocked indefinitely, unless the Prime Minister took a hand. And, as Asquith had all along been the most eminent of the opponents of women's suffrage, it seemed unlikely that he would do anything.

From: T. O. Lloyd, *Empire, Welfare State, Europe; English History, 1906-1992*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that the Liberal Government lacked enough support to pass the franchise for females.

Asquith was not the only barrier to female suffrage. His cabinet was divided on the issue, with some significant figures, such as the colonial secretary, Lewis Harcourt, in opposition to it. More significantly, Asquith's government depended upon a coalition of interests in the House of Commons, all with differing priorities. The Irish Nationalists, after 1910, were vital to the government's survival. Prior to 1912 they had broadly supported proposals for female enfranchisement. But in that year they shifted their position and helped to defeat the Conciliation Bill by 222 votes to 208, thereby inflicting the first serious parliamentary setback on women's suffrage for some considerable time. Foremost in Irish Nationalist calculations was the fear that attempting to carry votes for women would consume too much parliamentary time, and thereby threaten the progress of the Home Rule Bill. Many Liberal MPs also had an ambiguous attitude towards women's suffrage. A majority of them supported it in principle, but they set greater store by the attainment of full manhood suffrage. This still had some way to go as less than 60% of all adult males possessed the vote between 1884 and 1918. Many Liberals indeed saw women's suffrage as a potential threat to their party's interests, for if women were in fact to receive the vote on the same terms as men, under existing arrangements this would only benefit a minority, composed mainly of independent and probably unmarried householders. Apart, as some Liberals piously claimed, from undermining the institution of marriage, the effect was likely to be to enfranchise a propertied class of staunchly Conservative voters.

From: David Brooks, *The Age of Upheaval, Edwardian Politics, 1899-1914*, published in 1995.

## 20c. World War I and Women

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that women's war service was the main reason they were given the vote in 1918.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that the War did not make much difference in attitudes to women's right to vote.

There is little evidence that war service caused a change in attitudes towards women's political rights. Opponents of the female franchise, like Asquith, appear to have been ready to concede defeat in 1914, but war had delayed progress. The 1916 Speaker's Conference on electoral issues, unanimous on most recommendations including one for proportional representation, only voted by a narrow majority for a limited female suffrage. The restriction on women's voting rights contrasted with attitudes to male members of the forces. The withholding of the vote from members of the auxiliary services under the age of thirty suggests little alteration in the treatment of women as second class citizens. War had provided the opportunity for such change as had occurred, but it was not the cause of it. Political representation remained largely a male prerogative. These attitudes were backed by a barrage of propaganda on the joys of motherhood and domesticity in 1918 and women tended to be used as a reserve of labour in low-paid jobs.

From: Rex Pope, *War and Society in Britain, 1899-1948*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that the War did lead to improvements for women.

It has been argued that the Act of February 1918 was a muted victory, and less than women would have got, had there been no war. But it seems to me that the United Suffragists got it right. As early as 26 November 1915 the front page of their paper, *Votes for Women*, carried a cartoon headed: 'Votes for Heroines as well as Heroes'. They saw the Act as a mighty victory which would lead quickly and inevitably towards complete women's suffrage; indeed they brought publication of *Votes for Women* to an end. It is perfectly true that a broad, liberal-democratic movement starting in the late nineteenth century, and supported by men as well as women, had come near to achieving votes for women before 1914. Yet the political advance of women was still blocked by two great forces of prejudice: the vigorous hostility of a majority of men, particularly powerful ones, and the often fearful reluctance and opposition of many women. The war experience brought a new confidence to women, dissipated apathy and silenced the female anti-suffragists. Asquith was only the most prominent of the converts among men. No doubt the actual swing among Members of the House of Commons was not enormous; but as politicians, whatever their private convictions, most came to feel that it was no longer politically wise to make strong statements against women's suffrage. No doubt many agreed with a member of the Conservative Party Central Office that; 'the granting of a vote to wives of the duly qualified male electors would as a rule increase the majority of the opinion of the male voters'. The replacement of militant Suffragette activity by frantic patriotic endeavour played its part as well.

From: Arthur Marwick, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1914-1990*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the 1918 Act was passed because it had Conservative support.

Many of the Conservative MPs who voted for the 1918 Representation of the People Act were anti-suffragists who changed sides rather than opinion. Some shared the view that reform was inevitable and that conceding a limited measure of reform now would postpone more radical change for 20 or 30 years. Others refrained from voting against the bill because they feared retribution by female voters if the measure passed. Also, by the time the vote was taken, MPs had become aware that Conservative opinion in the constituencies favoured reform. The overwhelming vote for women's suffrage also reflected the fact that it was an extremely conservative measure. Despite wartime publicity about the nation's gratitude to female munition workers, the 1918 legislation left most of them disenfranchised because they were under 30. Women over 30 were believed to be less likely to support radical or feminist reforms than those who were younger. Also, women who had reached the age of 30 were more likely to be married and to be mothers, factors which were expected to make them less susceptible to radical movements. Finally, the educated women, who had been an important source of support for the suffrage movement often remained voteless. Because they typically rented furnished lodgings or lived with their parents, they did not qualify as local government electors and thus did not gain the parliamentary franchise. Many female teachers found themselves excluded for that reason.

From: Harold Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign, 1866-1928*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that changing opinion among men was the reason for women to get the vote.

The intellectual case for enfranchising women had long been won. The war simply created circumstances in which Votes for Women could be granted with minimum political disturbance, since the existence of the National Government meant that the suffrage issue was no longer intertwined with party rivalries. Asquith, along with many former 'antis', including many Conservatives, was looking for an escape from the impossible position into which he had boxed himself in the pre-war years, and this the argument about women's service conveniently furnished. In any case, male MPs could gracefully concede the vote to women in 1917 without fear of being reproached for giving way to violence and agitation; for although some members of the NUWSS had cautiously started to revive their campaigns in 1917, they did not make many ripples, and neither government nor Parliament felt itself under serious external pressure. Raising the age-bar for women, in any case helped remove male fears by ensuring that men would not be 'swamped' by the new female voters, who comprised only 39.6 of the electorate in 1918. Mrs Fawcett weakly accepted this restriction, saying she did not wish to 'risk their prospects for partial success by standing out for more'. The fact that women gained the vote as a gift from men, rather than forcing it from recalcitrant opponents by their own heroic endeavours, had a dampening effect on the feminist cause for a generation. True, the 1918 Act went beyond the demands of the pre-war suffrage societies by allowing women to sit in the Commons. But in the event few tried to do so – only seventeen in the 1918 election. Even fewer were successful. Countess Markievicz of Sinn Fein, who refused to take her seat, was the only victor in 1918.

From: G. R. Searle, *A New England? Peace and War 1886-1918*, published in 2004.

### The Development of Rights for Women in Great Britain 1867-1918 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions
20.1 Assess the view that working opportunities and conditions for the working class woman changed little before 1900. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
20.2 Assess the view that the methods of Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst were responsible for the delay in women obtaining the vote. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20b.
20.3 Assess the view that Asquith was the main barrier to the granting of the female franchise before 1914. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
20.4 How valid is the view that the hard work of women during World War I was the reason for them achieving the vote in 1918? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
20.5 How far were women able to influence the political process up to 1906? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.6 How significant was the work of Millicent Fawcett in advancing the rights of women? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.7 Assess the significance of any female educational reformer in the period 1867 – 1902. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.8 Assess the view that the argument over female suffrage was won by 1914 but the war held up its implementation. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.9 Has the impact of World War I on women's employment been exaggerated? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.10 Assess the view that education for women before 1900 was aimed at improving their domestic accomplishments and little else. <b>[40 marks]</b>	



## 21. Nazi Germany 1933-1945

### 21a. The maintenance of power by the Nazis 1933-1945.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the most important element in maintaining Hitler's regime in power between 1933 and 1945 was the consent of the German people.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian suggests that the Germans supported Hitler because of a mixture of tradition, a divided opposition, propaganda and repression.

Freedom of individual speech and action, of the press, of publication of books, disappeared as Germany under her new Nazi masters drew away from western development. It is not easy to explain why the German people not merely suffered but supported this regime, giving it vote after vote of overwhelming confidence. They were the most literate people in Europe, producing and reading more books than any other nation. But reading, as Francis Bacon long ago pointed out, produced a fool rather than a wise man. And some writers in the nineteenth century had remarked on the contrast between German boldness in philosophical speculation and their meekness before authority. The long tradition of obedience to authority and the retarded development of political and civil freedom undoubtedly played their part. So too did the divided state of the political parties under the Weimar Republic, not least that of organized labour, in which the Communists deluded themselves that the Nazi triumph was only a brief prelude to the proletarian revolution, whose advent it would hasten. The effects of the First World War in destroying the old leadership, leaving a vacuum of power which the democratic leaders were not ready to fill, likewise contributed. While neither workers nor the middle class entirely succumbed to the allurements of Nazi propaganda, the power available and ruthlessly employed by the new regime effectively disposed of opposition.

From: Ralph Flenly, *Modern German History*, published in 1953.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that economic conditions and force were important in explaining how Hitler maintained power.

Certainly no one even moderately familiar with totalitarian methods and practices will be tempted to consider the 100 per cent plebiscites in favour of Hitler as genuine expressions of support. Yet there can be no doubt about the widespread effectiveness of that diabolical mixture of terror and propaganda which was characteristic of the National Socialist regime. And it was not only fear of the overt and concealed weapons of the regime, of the rubber truncheon or the block supervisor which provoked a rush to join the Party or its affiliated organizations. To a great degree it was the necessity of economic existence which since the inflation had been reduced to bare subsistence. And reinforcing these motives there was undeniably an emotional urge, played on in masterly fashion by the instruments of propaganda, a sham-idealistic attraction which cast a spell, particularly on young people. The fact that Hitler's admirers abroad who sought peace at any price contributed considerably to the victory of a well-calculated mass psychology in no way alters the significance of this propaganda success. All the same, the men of the German opposition were entitled to look at this support for Hitler from outside as a stab in the back. Can Hitler be blamed on constitutional weakness in the German character or a kind of special problem in national development which prevented the growth of democratic support in Germany, the result of disastrous tendencies in German history? It is easy to pass judgements never having undergone experiences comparable to the Germans in 1933. Hundreds of thousands submitted because they were defenceless and without legal remedy. They faced brute force, whether this was confined to threats or took the form of actual maltreatment and torture. Bearing in mind the threat of the rubber truncheon, one looks sceptically at explanations of weaknesses supposed to be typically German.

From: Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation C:** This historian summarizes the view that the propaganda of the Hitler Myth was a vital element in sustaining support for the regime.

Frustration and disappointment with life in National Socialist Germany led ordinary Germans to grumble and complain, but seldom to engage in behaviour that can be appropriately termed 'resistance'. The most important mechanism of social integration which held people together and kept their belief in the state was Hitler's charismatic leadership. The 'Hitler Myth' secured the loyalty of millions of even those who opposed the Nazi movement itself. Millions of ordinary Germans believed that the Fuhrer would certainly right all the wrongs in Nazi Germany, especially those done by his lieutenants, the so-called 'little Führers', if only these abuses could be brought to Hitler's personal attention. Hitler's successes convinced ordinary Germans (at least until the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943) that the Fuhrer was a brilliant, indeed infallible leader who was leading Germany to world power. The 'Hitler Myth' was not just a cunning triumph of Goebbels' propaganda machine; mass belief in the charismatic leader was the inevitable result of the disappointments of daily life in the Third Reich. In the 'Hitler Myth' ordinary Germans found compensation for the tensions, anxieties and frustrations of everyday life under National Socialism. By the time Allied bombing raids and German defeats in Russia in the war had begun to deflate this myth, Hitler was already a prisoner of his own propaganda image.

From: David Crew, *Nazism and German Society 1933-1945*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian, in a study of the Gestapo in the German town of Krefeld, suggests that terror was of limited significance in maintaining Nazi support.

Once the threat from the political left had been eliminated ( from the mid 1930s) the Nazi terror began to concentrate on silencing potential sources of opposition in religious circles and on removing from society what the regime deemed social outsiders, such as homosexuals, career criminals and the physically and mentally disabled. During the war the terror reached its most drastic phase. Although many German citizens belonged to one or more of the targeted groups, most Germans suffered not at all from the terror. There was no need to target them because most Germans remained loyal to the Nazi leadership and supported it voluntarily from the beginning to the end, to various degrees. Some Germans voluntarily spied on and denounced their neighbours, but the overwhelming majority of German citizens did not. It remains true, however, that the German civilian population played a large part in its own control and its collusion and accommodation with the Nazi regime made the Nazi crimes against humanity possible.

From: Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror*, published in 1999.

### 21b. The nature of Hitler's dictatorship.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Hitler was more of a weak dictator than master of the Third Reich.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian gives an unfavourable view of Hitler's personal abilities in government.

Hitler had always hated the discipline of regular work. 'A single idea of genius is worth a lifetime of conscientious office work', he used to say. It was only during the first month of his Chancellorship that Hitler could be induced to take his duties seriously. Back came the old bohemian traits, the dependence on emotion and the abrupt changes of mood. Irresolutely – according to unanimous witnesses – he frittered away his disorderly days by sudden changes of interest, putting off important decisions and pursuing others with disproportionate zeal. Meanwhile whole areas of the state's functions went to rack and ruin because of his lack of interest, while the uncertainty of the various institutions as to their responsibilities at times led to chaos. His growing obstinacy and arrogance increased the void around him. He never laughed without putting his hand over his face for fear of showing any natural human reaction.

From: Joachim Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** Two modern historians argue that government in the Third Reich was fatally flawed.

In any government, people tend to look to the head of government for instructions and decisions. This is even more true of a dictatorship in which authority is concentrated in the hands of a dictator. Should a dictator avoid decisions or decline to get involved, something like a vacuum develops at the heart of government. This increasingly happened in the Third Reich. The vacuum was filled by confusion and dissention which could not be resolved by the sporadic and arbitrary interventions of the Fuhrer. Hitler failed to understand that for any system to operate effectively, individuals and their actions must be coordinated into an organized structure. A potentially fatal weakness of the regime was its inability to create an effective political and administrative apparatus that could, first of all, define realistic objectives related to the resources available, and then deploy the resources of the community with maximum efficiency to achieve these objectives. For example, Hitler's failure to plan and coordinate a comprehensive and balanced armaments programme resulted in damaging competition between the three armed services. Rational methods were inappropriate to an essentially irrational movement. Indeed Hitler's unwillingness to get involved in decision-making, in the domestic field, at any rate, was almost certainly due in part to the intractability of the problems confronting him. It was far easier for him to press on without thinking too hard about priorities. The final bankruptcy of Nazism was encouraged by the defects of the apparatus of government itself, defects arising both from Hitler's limitations as a dictator and from the kind of movement and regime which he had created.

From: G. Noakes and D. Pridham, *Nazism*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation C:** This historian looks critically at arguments that Hitler had a deliberate policy of 'divide and rule' and also the nature of government meant that he was a weak dictator.

The governmental chaos of the Third Reich seems better explained if the notion that Hitler deliberately pursued a policy of 'Divide and Rule' is left aside. Hitler consciously protected his authority against any potential attempt to limit it institutionally. Though the chaotic structure of government was not a deliberate creation, it would seem unsatisfactory evidence for the view that Hitler was in some respects a weak dictator. Indeed, the notion of 'weakness' seems misplaced in this case. If Hitler had wanted a different government structure, but had been prevented from attaining it, or if he had intended to make decisions, but found himself unable to do so, there might have been some conflict between 'intention' and 'structure' and it might have been possible to conclude that Hitler was 'weak'. Since there is no evidence for either point, but rather every indication that Hitler was content, indeed wanted, to keep out of wrangles between his subordinates, had little interest in participating in the legislative process – especially in areas of peripheral concern – and actively furthered rather than tried to hinder the governmental chaos on occasion, then one would have to reject the conclusion that, because of the 'structural' restrictions imposed on his dictatorship, Hitler was 'weak'.

From: Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, published in 1985.

**Interpretation D:** This historian challenges the view that divisions in government in the Third Reich led to weakness.

After an initial stab at routine, Hitler reverted to his indolent habits, although we should not expect a leader who saw himself as an artist-politician genius to behave like a hard-working academic committee man. He was not in power to deal with matters such as coal prices in Silesia. As orthodox historical opinion tells us, government was characterized by multi-centred incoherence, a war of all against all, bordering on chaos. But the exceptional nature of Nazi governmental chaos can be pushed too far. Democratic governments are riven with factional intrigues and personal rivalries; suffer duplication of functions; rely on outsiders to galvanise sluggish bureaucracies and are constrained by innumerable external factors. Moreover many modern corporations depend on managerial Darwinism, based on divide and rule, to no obvious loss of profitability. In other words, what has been elevated to the explanatory master key of Nazi rule, namely the mutually radicalizing effects of competing agencies, may be insufficient, and less remarkable, as an explanation for the single-mindedness with which the Nazis went about realizing their ideological goals. If what is said to be uniquely characteristic of Nazism also typifies many other modern governments and organizations, then this alone cannot explain a regime of rare destructiveness. The massive documentation of the endless squabbles within the regime proves little.

From: Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich*, published in 2000.

### 21c. Hitler and the Holocaust.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Holocaust was mainly the result of a long term plan by Hitler to eliminate the Jews.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian links the final decision to annihilate Jews to the circumstance brought about by war.

If the language of the rabid anti-Semites was to be taken literally, then by 1939 the Jews had good reason to fear for their property, or their citizens' rights but also for their lives. This is not to imply that the inventors of the Final Solution had a clear idea before 1939 of how to solve the 'Jewish Question'. The only organization to take a systematic approach was the SS and it came up with an emigration programme. A revised version of the programme re-emerged in 1940/1 in the shape of a plan to ship all Jews to Madagascar for resettlement. Heydrich called this idea the 'territorial final solution'. However, the outbreak of war and its subsequent escalation into total war seriously weakened the Jews' chances of survival. The military victories in the east and west suddenly added several millions of Jews to the number who had been unable to leave the Reich before September 1939. Any 'resettlement' plans had now become a major logistical and bureaucratic operation, the size of which helped to tip the scales in favour of physical annihilation. However, before this possibility could seriously be contemplated, there were also the psychological barriers to be removed. Resettlement plans were still being discussed as late as the spring of 1941.

From: V R Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Nazi treatment of Jews as part of a widespread belief about alien groups within the community.

Unlike traditional anti-Semitism of a religious or nationalist kind, the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP was directed against an abstract object – 'the Jew' an artificial racialist construct. The all-embracing image entailed an all-embracing 'final solution'. In fact the mythical target of 'the Jew' served to conceal that a racialist interpretation of the world bore little relation to reality. The ostracism and annihilation of the Jews stood at the head of a long list of measures for racial purification. Destructive measures had to be taken against other 'community aliens'. (These included gypsies, homosexuals, the work-shy and the physically and mentally handicapped). The formulators of National Socialist racial policy quite explicitly wanted to prevent the reproduction of families which they labeled 'alien' or 'asocial'. In this they were going back to the imperial period when there was concern that middle class German families were reproducing at a lesser rate than families from lower social groups. Even non-fascist theorists argued in favour of a population policy to encourage 'better' genetic stock. By 1945 a total of between 200,000 and 350,000 had been sterilized. We understate the racialism of the Third Reich if we limit our attention to the pornographic smears of *Der Stürmer*, the grotesque cranial measurements performed by the anthropologist and the sadism of the concentration camps. Surely more dangerous was the ostensibly mild racialism which moved to advocating the eradication of those of 'inferior value'.

From: Detlev Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that it was the long term plan of Hitler, with the support of his party and people, to eliminate the Jews.

Although Hitler and the Nazis' eliminationist desire was, even before their accession to power, clear and constant, the evolution of their immediate intentions and actual policies towards the Jews was not linear and unambiguous. This is not surprising. A regime had come to power determined to undertake a task – the elimination of the Jews from all spheres of social life in Germany and also their capacity to harm Germany. That was enormously complex and difficult and it was without precedent in modern times. It was a task, no less, that had to be carried out under a variety of constraints and at the same time as other competing goals. To expect any regime to have pursued the goal of eliminating Jewry from Germany, from Europe, from the world, without any twists and turns of policy, without any tactical compromises, without deferring long-term goals in favour of short-term goals is to have unrealistic expectations of the nature of government. The anti-Jewish policy was indeed characterized by seeming inconsistencies and by conflicts between different elements of the Nazi regime. This has led to the view that the evolution of Nazi policy was incoherent, that no-one was in control, that the decision to annihilate the Jews had little to do with the long term intentions of the Nazi leadership or Hitler and was not organic to the Nazi world view. These views are erroneous. Nazi policy towards the Jews was eminently coherent and goal directed. The genocide was not the outgrowth of Hitler's moods, nor of local initiatives by men on the spot, nor of the impersonal hand of structural obstacle, but of Hitler's long held ideal to eliminate all Jewish power, an ideal broadly shared in Germany.

From: Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, published in 1996

**Interpretation D:** This historian stresses Hitler's role in the Holocaust

Hitler had not been involved in the Wannsee conference. Probably he knew it was taking place; but even this is not certain. There was no need for his involvement. He had signaled yet again in unmistakable terms in December 1941 what the fate of the Jews should be now that Germany was embroiled in another world war. By then, local and regional killing initiatives had already developed their own momentum. Heydrich was more than happy to use Hitler's blanket authorization of deportations to the east now to expand the killing operations into an overall programme of Europe-wide genocide.

On 30 January 1942, the ninth anniversary of the seizure of power Hitler addressed a packed meeting in Berlin at the Sportpalast. As he had been doing privately over the past weeks, he invoked once again his 'prophecy' of 30 January 1939. As always, he wrongly dated it to the outbreak of war with Poland on 1 September. He said that he had already stated on 1 September 1939 in the German Reichstag that this war would not come to an end as the Jews imagined with the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but with the annihilation of the Jews. For the first time the old Jewish law would be applied; an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. The hour would come when the most evil world-enemy of all time would have played out its role. The message was not lost on its audience. The SD reported that his words had been taken to mean that the Führer's battle with the Jews would now be followed through to the end with merciless consistency and that very soon the Jews would disappear from European soil.

From: Ian Kershaw, *Hitler*, published in 2000.

## Nazi Germany 1933-45 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
21.1 To what extent did Hitler rely on coercion in maintaining power in Germany after 1933? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.2 Assess the view that the role of propaganda in maintaining the Nazi regime in power after 1933 has been exaggerated. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.3 How successfully did Nazi policies succeed in winning the support of the industrial workers? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.4 Assess the view that divided aims were the main reason why internal opposition to the Nazi regime was ineffective. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.5 To what extent was Hitler 'a weak dictator'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21b
21.6 Assess the view that the Holocaust was the result of a predetermined plan by the Nazi regime. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21c.
21.7 Assess the view that the German people were active and enthusiastic supporters of the Holocaust. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21c.
21.8 To what extent did women's status improve in Nazi Germany? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
21.9 How effectively did Nazi policies towards young people achieve their goals? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
21.10 To what extent did the Nazis succeeded in reducing class barriers in Germany? <b>[40 marks]</b>	



## 22. Britain under Margaret Thatcher 1979-90

### 22a. Thatcher's Domestic Policy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, how far do you agree with the interpretation that Thatcher achieved an economic revolution?

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Thatcher's economic policy was a continuation of developments that began under Callaghan.

Arresting the cycle of the country's relative economic decline was the self-proclaimed major task of the Thatcher revolution. Conservative leaders claimed that by curbing the growth in public spending they would create the headroom for tax reductions which in turn would provide incentives and liberate the entrepreneurial energies of the British people. By strictly controlling the money supply they would restore sound finance and squeeze inflation out of the system. Reforms of the internal practices of trade unions and legal changes in their status would provide opportunities for managers to regain their authority and for the emergence of more 'responsible' and less 'political' trade unions. Finally, by reducing the budget deficit and government borrowing they hoped to bring interest rates down.

The ultimate objectives of this strategy were of course no different from those of previous post-war governments. All governments have wanted to strike a balance between the economic aims of low inflation, rapid economic growth, a surplus on the balance of payments, and full employment. However it is important to realise, that what some commentators have called the 'new realism' did not start in 1979. Mr Callaghan's famous speech to the 1976 Labour party conference admitted that governments could not spend their way into full employment; that way only led to more inflation and eventually more unemployment. A squeeze on public spending, adoption of money supply targets, privatisation (sale of BP shares in 1976), and the priority accorded to fighting inflation, even at a time of historically high unemployment, were all in place under Mr Callaghan.

From: Dennis Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics*, published in 1990

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Thatcher's greatest economic legacy was the reduction in Union power.

The most important change achieved on the supply side was the curbing of trade union power. The government had pledged to redress the balance of industrial power between union and employer and this it had done. As important as the laws themselves, however, seems to have been the government's demonstration that the trade unions were no longer running the country. The union ethos no longer pervaded the country. The curve of militancy was now sharply downwards. Partly, of course, this was due to the recession and rising unemployment but there does also seem to have been some kind of change in attitudes, a sense of release perhaps from prisons of the past. Ertswhile militants, the British Leyland car workers, for example, were refusing their shop stewards' call to strike. The TUC's Day of Action against the trade union laws was a flop, a day of inaction. By 1983 the number of days lost in industrial disputes was the lowest since the war. The Thatcher Revolution is entrenched in several ways. It is entrenched in a diffusion of private ownership to the point at which nationalisation (except on a casualty basis) has ceased to be practical politics for any party aspiring to election. It is entrenched in the international financial system which makes it virtually impossible for a government to reimpose exchange controls. This effectively excludes the practice of socialism in one country and would make difficult even the practice of Keynesianism in one country. The diminution of trade union power is not yet so permanent in the eyes of the TUC - or, in this matter, its servant the Labour party - but with the passing of time it will become increasingly difficult, and eventually impossible, to reinstate it as the Fifth Estate.

From: Peter Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the economic legacy of the Thatcher government was mixed.

Thatcher's economic legacy is mixed. One central objective of Thatcherism was to reduce the burden of taxation. This failed. At the end of 1996, taxation accounted for 37.2% of a taxpayer's annual income; in 1979 it had been only 31.1%. However, the burden of direct taxation in the same period went down from 19.9% to 17.7%. Britain's relative economic decline has not been halted since 1979, although the extent of that decline in the second half of the twentieth century should not be exaggerated. It needs to be set against demonstrable improvements in living standards and economic security for the great majority of British people in the second half of the twentieth century. It is true that annual growth rates in the years 1979-88 and 1988-97, at 1.9% and 1.5% respectively, were considerably higher than those achieved in the period 1973-9. However, these successes stand out as relative failures in comparison with other developed economies. Also, growth rates in the hated years of 'Butskellite Consensus' were much higher than in the Thatcher years. However, strategic failure needs to be set against some high-profile tactical successes. The British inflation rate, which stood at 22% at the end of Thatcher's first year, came down dramatically during most of the Thatcher years. The early 1980s and early 1990s were periods of spectacular falls. However, in all years but two the British inflation rate has been higher than those of G7 comparator countries. By design, Britain has become a more unequal society. Incentives for high-earning risk takers were supposed to help them create more jobs, thus increasing overall national prosperity. Tax cuts for the better off were real and the Lawson boom did bring widespread benefits. General consumption levels increased sharply. However, those at the bottom of society failed to benefit. If an official poverty line is drawn at one-half of the average national income, the numbers in poverty increased from 5 million in 1979 to 14.1 million in 1992. The changing balance of work also disadvantaged the poor.

From: Eric Evans, *Thatcher and Thatcherism*, published in 1997

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the economic changes were significant and had a lasting impact.

The Thatcher government did transform the UK economy. The privatisation of the state-owned enterprises during the 1980s was of great symbolic as well as practical significance. Politicians could commit themselves to leave managers alone to make business judgements. Ownership of national assets were transferred to private hands so that by 1993 nationalised industries accounted for just 2.3% of GDP. The impoverishing struggle to preserve old industrial structures was ended. Liberalisation and competition were encouraged, even within public utilities. The regulatory agencies set up to oversee the utilities were given a specific duty to encourage competition and the form of regulation adopted, price cap regulation, was designed to encourage 'new entrants'. Public employment declined and self-employment rose: in 1979 self-employment was 8.2% of total employment; by 1990 13.5%. The service sector grew rapidly due to liberalisation and privatisation. The growth of state spending was halted and then modestly reversed from 44.8% of GDP in 1979 to 39% in 1990. Marginal tax rates fell, the most obvious reflection of this was the fall in the top marginal rate of tax on earned income from 83% in 1978 to 40% in 1988. There was a coherence about these measures that had a lasting and cumulative impact.

From: Martin Ricketts, *Property rights, incentives and privatization, in Margaret Thatcher's Revolution*, published in 2005.

## 22b. Thatcher's Electoral victories.

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, how far do you agree with the interpretation that Thatcher's electoral success was a result of the weakness of the Labour party?

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that divisions within the Labour movement were crucial in explaining Conservative electoral dominance.

The schism on the Left gave the Conservatives their parliamentary victory in 1983. It can be argued that with more than three million unemployed Labour should have won, but it lost because of its defence policy and its spectacular disunity. Alternatively, it can be said that the continuance of the social and political trends which had contributed to Labour's loss in 1979 virtually doomed it to lose again in 1983. That is not to suggest that Labour's defeat was inevitable, although there is no doubt that most of the changes taking place in society were making it more difficult for it to win. Between 1979 and 1983 the working class, which had diminished in size, swung 3% to the Conservatives - in spite of 'Thatcherism', unemployment, the welfare spending cuts and the union laws - or, perhaps, not in spite of, but because of some of these things. Only 38% of manual workers and 39% of trade unionists voted Labour while 32% of trade unionists voted Conservative. The Tories led Labour by 12% among the skilled working class. In 1983 Labour became not 'the party of the working class' but rather the party of the underclass. In part this was due to continuing demographic change. However, there were new or special factors at work. In 1983 it did a good deal worse than socio-economic or demographic changes can explain. In 1983 Labour presented an unelectable face to the electorate, in terms of its leaders, many of its policies and in its general demeanour as a party aspiring to government, and this must explain a good deal of its unnaturally poor showing. Labour and the electorate made a poor 'fit'. Labour had moved Left and the electorate to the Right; or rather the Labour party's concerns and the electorate's had grown increasingly apart.

From: Peter Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution*, published in 1988

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the Conservatives gained from the economic successes of the period.

Two factors made progress towards a third term irresistible. One was the state of the economy, particularly as felt and perceived by Conservative voters. Slow but steady growth had been registered each year since 1981. In the four years after the 1983 election average weekly earnings rose by 14% in real terms. No government had ever been defeated after presiding over real increases in personal disposable income for two years before an election, and this one had done so for longer. One promise the Government delivered as its highest priority was the steady cutting of personal taxation; by 1987 it was three-quarters of the way towards its stated target of a 25% standard rate. All employed people, therefore, felt better off. To this beneficence were added other material successes. The second Thatcher term coincided with a stock-market boom of unprecedented length. If successful politics consists of furthering the interests of your own supporters, the privatisation programme was another consummate exercise in vote-winning. There have been few more obviously potent seductions in the annals of electoral politics. The material advance of the individual, in fact, had begun to supplant the more traditional factors in determining the political verdict. One of the successes of the Thatcherite enterprise consisted in re-educating the electorate not seriously to care about unemployment. Slowly, and not incorrectly, burgeoning economic success became the headline story. By the time of the election, optimism had replaced pessimism in sample surveys of popular opinion.

From: Hugo Young, *One of Us*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there were a number of factors that contributed to the Conservative's electoral success.

Why were the Tories so successful? The so-called 'Falklands factor' played a huge part in the government's recovery of popularity in 1982-3. Many voters supported the Conservatives in 1983 because they saw in Thatcher a powerful leader who had stood up for Britain against a foreign power. The Conservatives had no compunction about unfurling the patriotic flag. It is worth remembering, however, that the tide of popular opinion was beginning to turn with the economic recovery under way at the beginning of 1982, before the war began. In 1987, the economy - enthusiastically stoked by Nigel Lawson - was roaring away, living standards were increasing rapidly and the great Stock Exchange crash of October was still four months off. The electorate voted for the promise of continued prosperity. Other factors also played a part. The election was fought on redrawn boundaries, which gave a small, but not insignificant, advantage to the Tories. As commentators have also pointed out, the Conservatives had the enormous fortune to be faced by a divided opposition. Labour's appalling disarray in 1980-1 led to both splits and deep unpopularity. The Alliance had enough popular support to come a good second in well over 100 constituencies, but in a first past the post system this is of no value. The Tory share of the popular vote under Thatcher never exceeded 43%. Yet this produced two landslides, largely because the anti-Tory vote was so evenly split. There is no doubt that the quirks of the British electoral system favoured the Tories and it is no surprise that Thatcher should be so vehement in her defence of its simple virtue of providing secure majority governments.

From: Eric Evans, *Thatcher and Thatcherism*, published in 1997

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Thatcher's electoral victories were achieved because of Conservative strength in the south and east of England.

The victory for the Thatcherite ethic in 1983 seemed overwhelming. The evidence is less convincing. In 1983 the Conservative party won 42.9% of the popular vote, less than they had achieved in any election between 1945 and 1979. It won because of its residual strength in southern and eastern England, and also greater London, where most of the constituencies were located. Thatcherism triumphed because of its political and social roots. It had coincided with rising prosperity in the expanding towns of southern England and East Anglia. High-tech industries, based on computer software and the like, had meant near-boom conditions for places such as Cambridge, Basingstoke, Winchester and especially Swindon, the outstanding growth town of the decade. Along the so-called M4 corridor, as far west as Newport in Gwent, new technically sophisticated smaller industries were mushrooming. The legacy of four years of Thatcherism, therefore, was an intensification of social division and varied economic expectations in different parts of Britain. It went further than the much-discussed 'north-south divide'. Prosperity, too, had been the product of small enterprises and a lengthy consumer boom financed by credit. The decline in Britain's manufacturing base was indisputable. For the clients of the Thatcher order in the south and east of the nation it was more than enough. The dispiriting memories of the seventies were fading. Mass unemployment had lost its old political potency. It was the suburban conquerors of southern Britain, not the decaying and dispirited north and west, who would pay the piper and call the tune.

From: Kenneth Morgan, *Britain since 1945*, published in 2001

## 22c. Thatcher's Foreign Policy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, how far do you agree with the interpretation that Thatcher stopped Britain's decline as a world power?

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians argue that the Falklands campaign was a significant triumph for Thatcher.

If Mrs Thatcher was only partially successful in reducing Britain's relative economic decline, she had more success in arresting Britain's decline as a world power. The Falklands War in 1982 altered her entire perception of her foreign policy role. Her personal drive won her admirers, in Britain and abroad: the successful outcome, by no means a forgone conclusion, was a great personal victory for her. Her relationship with Reagan proved critical, not just in ensuring US support for the British campaign in the Falklands, but in raising her standing among world leaders. Her support for the deployment of US Cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Britain in the early 1980s lent support to Reagan's crusade to outspend the Soviet Union militarily. Gorbachev's easy relationship with Mrs Thatcher allowed her to play a key brokering role between the leaders of the two superpowers. Not since Churchill's premiership in the early 1950s had Britain enjoyed so much respect in Washington and Moscow. One of her last acts as Prime Minister was to visit Paris to sign the treaty reducing conventional forces in Europe, thereby helping to bring the Cold War to a close.

From: Anthony Seldon and Daniel Collings, *Britain Under Thatcher*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Thatcher's foreign policy achievements have been exaggerated.

In this period there was much journalistic talk of Britain's world reputation having recovered after decades of decline. Mrs Thatcher herself claimed to have 'renewed the spirit and solidarity of the nation'. There was, indeed, some truth to this. Her varied responses in the North Atlantic alliance, in the European community, in Irish affairs, and in attempting to mediate in the Middle East as broker between Arabs and Israel added to this impression. At the same time, this belief in British national strength owed much to short-term factors. Military victory in the Falklands gave Britain a new stature for a time, but by 1987 the impact of this had disappeared. The strength of the British economy in the mid 1980s, the signs of growth and rising prosperity, helped dispel the old image of 'the sick man of Europe'. As long as the balance of payments remained boosted by North Sea oil and the pattern of growth continued, so Britain's international credibility would continue to grow. Above all, there was Mrs Thatcher's uniquely close link with President Reagan - but this too could only be a temporary phenomenon. Even in this area, notably over the American's 'Star Wars' defence system, there had been rifts as well as accord in the transatlantic relationship. The Reykjavik summit, when Reagan met Gorbachev for the second time, led to notable strain between Washington and London. Mrs Thatcher's approach to world affairs remained in key aspects significantly insular, her approach to full European collaboration notably hesitant. To the extent that her position was based on a reputation as a creative world leader or participant in great events, it was a partial deception.

From: Kenneth Morgan, *Britain since 1945*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Thatcher's influence on the USA was limited.

Thatcher really only had any impact on American policy when US opinion was divided. By 1979, the special relationship was long gone, but a complex interdependence remained. Being a very strong anti-communist, Thatcher naturally assumed that keeping on good terms with America was automatically in the interests of the UK. She was anxious to retain US forces in Europe and in the UK as a barrier against Communism. There was close co-operation over military and intelligence matters - it was in the interests of both sides to do so. She acquired Trident on very generous terms in 1981 and had lots of help over the Falklands crisis, especially in terms of spare parts and military intelligence, as well as the use of Ascension Island. However, on some issues, such as the West Indian island of Grenada, the UK was simply ignored by the USA. When the US felt that 'Communist' influence was too strong in Grenada, they simply invaded it, even though it was a member of the Commonwealth and a former British colony. The UK was neither consulted nor informed and Thatcher was furious. Thatcher was able to have some influence over US arms control policy, particularly as the US government was badly divided on the issue. Thatcher used her influence as a restraining factor over the SDI. Unlike the rest of Europe, she opposed Star Wars quietly and offered nominal support to keep on good terms with Reagan. She helped to persuade Reagan to use it more as a bargaining tool with the Russians than anything else. Her regular visits to the US had a moderating, but declining influence. Thatcher really had limited influence over US policy outside specific areas.

From: Patrick Walsh-Atkins, *Thatcher*, published in 2004.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that her foreign policy achievements outweighed her failures.

There had been no original strategy for a more active foreign policy. Major events such as the Falklands War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were not predicted, and the British government, like so many others, was catapulted by events into an interventionist response. Sometimes, that response was ill-considered. On South African apartheid it was reasonable for the government to question whether sanctions and isolation were the best means of forcing the pace of change. But Thatcher deliberately adopted a confrontational and contemptuous tone with Commonwealth colleagues. Genuine differences were exacerbated and unnecessary damage was done to the Commonwealth. On Europe, too, no emollient could have concealed the deep differences between British and Continental aspirations as to the future of the Community but Thatcher's hectoring manner made the inevitable compromises more rather than less difficult. These defects were modest, however, compared to the positive achievements of her decade in power. The Falklands War not only repulsed an obnoxious dictatorship but restored the United Kingdom's reputation throughout the world as a significant power with professional armed forces that won their wars. Her contribution on East-West relations showed a high degree of statesmanship. She put aside her original prejudices to develop a strong working relationship with Gorbachev, but she did not allow her admiration for him to lead her to endorse naïve or utopian policies on either arms control or wider Western strategy. Her relationship with American Presidents was warm and supportive but, unlike Blair, she did not hesitate to criticise, in public as well as in private, when she felt that the United States was being unreasonable or acting contrary to basic British interests. The Thatcher years led to the British people feeling prouder, more confident and more relaxed as to their role in the world. Under Thatcher the so-called 'British disease' became transformed into the 'British example'.

From: Malcolm Rifkind, *Margaret Thatcher's Revolution*; ed. Roy and Clarke, published in 2005

### Britain under Margaret Thatcher 1979-90 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions:
22.1 How far did Thatcher reduce the power of the Trade Unions? <b>[40 marks]</b>	22a.
22.2 Assess the view that Thatcher achieved a 'social revolution'. <b>[40 marks]</b>	22a.
22.3 Assess the view that the Thatcher government deliberately provoked the Miners' strike. <b>[40 marks]</b>	22a.
22.4 Assess the view that Thatcher's electoral success in the period from 1979 to 1989 was the result of Labour weakness, rather than Conservative strengths. <b>[40 marks]</b>	22b.
22.5 How successful was Thatcher's handling of the Falklands crisis? <b>[40 marks]</b>	22c.
22.6 To what extent was Thatcher's policy towards the USSR militaristic and hostile? <b>[40 marks]</b>	22c.
22.7 Assess the view that Thatcher's policy towards Europe did more to damage than improve Britain's interests. <b>[40 marks]</b>	22c.
22.8 Assess the view that Thatcher reformulated Conservative ideology. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
22.9 Assess the view that the events of 1990 were the main reason for the fall of Thatcher. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
22.10 How far was New Labour influenced by Thatcher? <b>[40 marks]</b>	











**Copyright Information**

OCR is committed to seeking permission to reproduce all third-party content that it uses in its assessment materials. OCR has attempted to identify and contact all copyright holders whose work is used in this paper. To avoid the issue of disclosure of answer-related information to candidates, all copyright acknowledgements are reproduced in the OCR Copyright Acknowledgements Booklet. This is produced for each series of examinations, is given to all schools that receive assessment material and is freely available to download from our public website ([www.ocr.org.uk](http://www.ocr.org.uk)) after the live examination series.

If OCR has unwittingly failed to correctly acknowledge or clear any third-party content in this assessment material, OCR will be happy to correct its mistake at the earliest possible opportunity.

For queries or further information please contact the Copyright Team, First Floor, 9 Hills Road, Cambridge CB2 1GE.

OCR is part of the Cambridge Assessment Group; Cambridge Assessment is the brand name of University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate (UCLES), which is itself a department of the University of Cambridge.