Please check the examination deta	ils bel	ow before ente	ring your candidate information
Candidate surname			Other names
Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level	Cer	ntre Number	Candidate Number
Time 2 hours		Paper reference	WHI04/1D
History			
International Advanced PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations			
Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90			
You must have: Extracts Booklet (enclosed)			Total Marks

### **Instructions**

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and ONE question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
  - there may be more space than you need.

### Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
  - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.

#### **Advice**

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
- Good luck with your examination.

Turn over ▶





### **SECTION A**

## Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

## Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

1	How far do you agree with the view that General MacArthur's dismissal as
	commander of the UN forces in Korea in April 1951 was mainly because it was feared
	that he wanted to 'needlessly expand the conflict beyond Korea' (Extract 1 line 6)?

Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(25)















TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS



#### **SECTION B**

#### Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

#### **EITHER**

2 How far do you agree that the main reason for the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948–60) was the role of General Sir Gerald Templer?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

#### OR

3 To what extent did US policy towards Vietnam under President Nixon differ from US policy towards Vietnam under President Johnson?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)






















TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS



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# **Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level**

Time 2 hours

Paper reference

**WHI04/1D** 



**History** 

**International Advanced** 

**PAPER 4: International Study with Historical** 

**Interpretations** 

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

**Extracts Booklet** 

Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.

Turn over ▶





#### Extracts for use with Section A.

**Extract 1:** From W Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, published in 1995.

On 5 April 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US military drafted an instruction to MacArthur granting him the authority to allow UN planes to pursue Chinese aircraft back to their bases in Manchuria. The President approved it. However, the instruction was never sent because US officials in Washington did not trust MacArthur with broadened authority. They feared he would use it to needlessly expand the conflict beyond Korea. The possibility of the conflict expanding would have been reduced by continuing to keep the final authority to make decisions with the President in Washington. However, replacing MacArthur was a more effective way to contain the war.

The opinion of America's allies probably influenced Truman and his advisers' final decision to replace MacArthur. No foreign government requested the General's dismissal. However, Washington officials knew that, while MacArthur remained in the job as UN commander, it would be difficult to persuade America's UN Allies to grant him expanded authority.

On 5 April, the British Ambassador met with US officials. He reported that
London doubted that the danger of a Communist air offensive in Korea was as
great as the Americans claimed. The British Foreign Secretary had said, 'We are
inclined to think that the major danger is MacArthur's rashness and political
irresponsibility'. Diplomats from four other allied UN nations had approached a
US official to express concern about granting MacArthur any new authority.

**Extract 2:** From J W Spanier, *Truman versus MacArthur: Achilles Rebound*, published in 1967.

Communist China's appearance on the battlefield in October-November 1950 brought into the open the almost total disagreement between the Truman Administration and General MacArthur. This was a disagreement which had, of course, never been far from the surface and had irritated their relationship from the beginning of the war. Since shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, MacArthur had openly argued that the United States take a strong stand against Communist China. He had also made repeated 'military' criticisms of the Truman Administration's preoccupation with Europe and neglect of American interests in the Far East.

The frequent, and increasingly vigorous, challenges to Truman's policy after China's intervention, had become incompatible with the President's supremacy. MacArthur challenged Truman's authority as chief diplomat and Commander-in-Chief. He challenged Truman's authority to formulate and implement the policies Truman considered necessary to ensure America's self-preservation.

MacArthur embarrassed the Administration by giving the world the impression that the United States spoke on foreign policy with two voices – one civilian, one military. MacArthur's communication on 24 March 1951 to the Chinese had actually prevented the implementation of a Presidential policy. The situation was intolerable and left Mr Truman no choice but to dismiss General MacArthur.

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