



Mark Scheme (Provisional)

Summer 2021

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced
Level in History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with
Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in
Asia, 1945-90

Note to centres, there was an error in the generic mark scheme for Section B in the original version of the mark scheme and the mark ranges for each level were incorrect. These have been corrected here and the previous version of this mark scheme should be disregarded.

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Targets: A01 (5 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

A03 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts.• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	5–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.• Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.• A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	9–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	15–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them.• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge.• Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

5	21-25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.• A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of
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Section B

Target: AO1 (25 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1-4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.• The overall judgement is missing or asserted.• There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	5-8	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question.• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.• An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.• The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	9-14	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included.• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.• The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	15-20	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period.• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.• The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.

5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.• The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.
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Section A: indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
1	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument.</p> <p>Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that General MacArthur's dismissal as commander of the UN forces in Korea in April 1951 was mainly because it was feared that he wanted to 'needlessly expand the conflict beyond Korea'.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The US military commanders and President Truman did not trust MacArthur to limit the objectives of the war in Korea only to Korea itself• Officials in Washington came to believe that the best way to contain the war in Korea was to replace MacArthur• The feelings of America's UN allies about his true intentions may have tipped the balance in helping Truman make his final decision to dismiss MacArthur• The British were particularly concerned about MacArthur's ability to prosecute the war without escalating the conflict. <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The intervention of China in the Korean War brought long-term simmering disagreements between President Truman and General MacArthur into the public domain• MacArthur was openly critical of all aspects of Truman's foreign policy• MacArthur's criticism of Truman's policies challenged the fundamental relationship between a US President and US military commanders• MacArthur's specific actions in March 1951 undermined the ability of the US President to carry out executive decisions so making his dismissal inevitable. <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that General MacArthur's dismissal as commander of the UN forces in Korea in April 1951 was mainly because it was feared that he wanted to 'needlessly expand the conflict beyond Korea'. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• MacArthur had from the start believed that, to achieve victory in Korea, the war may need to be broadened; on China's entry into the war MacArthur had proposed attacking Chinese strategically• Many felt that MacArthur's prosecution of the war across the 38th parallel and up to the Yalu River, against orders, was a deliberate provocation of the Chinese• MacArthur's actions on 24 March sabotaged Truman's decision to negotiate a ceasefire with the Chinese• The UN alliance states had become increasingly worried that the US would use atomic weapons against China and knew that MacArthur favoured their use if necessary, e.g. Attlee's trip to Washington (December 1950)• MacArthur himself blamed his dismissal on the undue influence of UN allies, particularly Britain, on Truman's final decision.

Question	Indicative content
	<p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that General MacArthur's dismissal as commander of the UN forces in Korea in April 1951 was mainly because it was feared that he wanted to 'needlessly expand the conflict beyond Korea'. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• MacArthur's disagreement with Truman was long-standing and he was at odds with Truman over all aspects of the President's foreign policy with regard to the containment of Communism• MacArthur's <i>de facto</i> position as 'viceroy' in Japan made him supremely self-confident in his own importance and he often treated Truman with contempt, e.g. his apparent lack of respect at the Wake Island meeting• The concept of checks and balances fundamentally underpinned the US constitution; the US civilian president was the <i>de jure</i> Commander-in-Chief and any violation of this had to result in MacArthur's dismissal• President Truman had agreed to MacArthur's request for military action to counter Chinese airforce activity over Korea, it was MacArthur's direct intervention in US diplomatic efforts that sealed his fate• There was an element of US domestic politics in MacArthur's actions; he was in contact with Republicans over his potential candidature for the 1952 presidential election.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the main reason for the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948-60) was the role of General Sir Gerald Templer.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that whether the main reason for the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948-60) was the role of General Sir Gerald Templer should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• From his appointment in October 1951, Templer combined the role of Director of Operations and High Commissioner, enabling a more effective overview of how to deal with the 'Emergency'• At the time of Templer's appointment, initial success against the Communist insurgents by the British had begun to slow down and Templer brought new vitality and energy to the situation• Templer exploited divisions between the Malay and Chinese communities by concentrating on a 'hearts and minds' policy, e.g. the promise of independence once the Communists had been defeated• Templer encouraged the local population to fight against the guerrillas by increasing the numbers of Malay soldiers and organising Home Guards• Templer's policies resulted in increasingly accurate intelligence being provided by local Malay residents, which in turn allowed the British forces to carry out specific attacks on the Communists. <p>Arguments and evidence that the role of Templer was limited/other reasons were responsible for the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948-60) should be analysed and evaluated.</p> <p>Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The British responded to the 'Emergency' quickly from the start; draconian security measures were introduced, and troop numbers increased using National Service conscripts schooled in jungle warfare• Many of the measures deployed by Templer had been introduced before his arrival by Briggs, as Director of Operations, and Gurney, as High Commissioner, and Templer left in 1954 before the end of the 'Emergency'• Throughout the period the British were able to co-ordinate a response, which included representatives from both civilian and military organisations and also attempted to include the indigenous population• The Communist guerrilla movement was relatively small, had little access to supplies from outside of Malaysia and mainly recruited from the minority ethnic Chinese community, making them a weak fighting force• The British policy of cutting off the Communist guerrillas from the support of rural Chinese 'squatters', by building new villages for them, appears to have been decisive in preventing the guerrillas from gaining a foothold• The majority of indigenous Malays did not support the Communist guerrillas and were willing to work actively with the British, in return for credible promises of independence. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
<p>3</p>	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the extent to which US policy towards Vietnam under President Nixon differed from US policy towards Vietnam under President Johnson.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that US policy towards Vietnam under President Nixon was different from US policy towards Vietnam under President Johnson should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nixon came to power on a platform that specifically promised to pursue a different policy to that of President Johnson and to achieve 'peace with honour' • Nixon implemented a policy of Vietnamisation that put more emphasis on the role of the ARVN troops than that of Johnson; resources were put into the ARVN rather than US ground troops • Nixon's aim was to withdraw US troops and to reduce the numbers of young Americans affected by the draft; Johnson had put in ground troops in 1965 and this had escalated during his Presidency • Nixon changed the US military ground tactics from large-scale sweep and destroy missions to smaller more focused actions and introduce Operation Phoenix which modelled the covert activities of the Vietcong • Nixon extended the theatre of war further into South East Asia by initially secretly and later openly bombing Vietcong supply trails in Cambodia • Nixon, with his Secretary of State Kissinger, was able to negotiate a ceasefire and the withdrawal of US troops in 1973 unlike Johnson. <p>Arguments and evidence that US policy towards Vietnam under President Nixon was similar from US policy towards Vietnam under President Johnson should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both were staunch anti-communists who wished to pursue policies which prevented the spread of communism to South Vietnam • Nixon continued to prosecute the ground war in Vietnam, as Johnson had, and appealed to the 'silent majority' to continue to support the war in order to achieve 'peace with honour' • Both Nixon and Johnson were firm supporters of the use of high-level bombing raids on North Vietnam to both undermine their support for the Vietcong and bring North Vietnam to the peace table • Both continued to support the government of South Vietnam despite its corruption and weaknesses; both believed that South Vietnam was a separate state being invaded by a foreign power • Ceasefire negotiations began under Johnson in 1968 and continued under Nixon. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

