



# Mark Scheme (Results)

January 2021

Pearson Edexcel International  
Advanced Level in History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with  
Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot  
War in Asia, 1945–90

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## **General Marking Guidance**

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

## Section A

**Targets: A01 (5 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

**A03 (20 marks):** Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	<b>0</b>	No rewardable material
<b>1</b>	<b>1–4</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts.</li> <li>• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.</li> </ul>
<b>2</b>	<b>5–8</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.</li> <li>• Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.</li> <li>• A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.</li> </ul>
<b>3</b>	<b>9–14</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.</li> <li>• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.</li> <li>• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.</li> </ul>
<b>4</b>	<b>15–20</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them.</li> <li>• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge.</li> <li>• Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.</li> </ul>

<b>5</b>	<b>21–25</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.</li><li>• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.</li><li>• A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.</li></ul>
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## Section B

**Target: AO1 (25 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	<b>0</b>	No rewardable material
<b>1</b>	<b>1–4</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.</li><li>• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.</li><li>• The overall judgement is missing or asserted.</li><li>• There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.</li></ul>
<b>2</b>	<b>5–8</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question.</li><li>• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.</li><li>• An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.</li><li>• The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.</li></ul>
<b>3</b>	<b>9–14</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included.</li><li>• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.</li><li>• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.</li><li>• The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.</li></ul>
<b>4</b>	<b>15–20</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period.</li><li>• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.</li><li>• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.</li><li>• The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.</li></ul>

<b>5</b>	<b>21–25</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period.</li><li>• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.</li><li>• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.</li><li>• The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.</li></ul>
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## Section A: indicative content

### Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
<b>1</b>	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument.</p> <p>Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, was the individual most responsible for the decision to invade South Korea in June 1950.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Kim's main objective was to reverse the decision made to divide Korea at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and to unify Korea under his leadership</li><li>• Kim purposefully sought the support of the communist regimes in Russia and in China to carry out an invasion of South Korea</li><li>• Neither Stalin nor Mao were particularly eager to support Kim's plan to invade Korea but Kim was insistent</li><li>• Kim appears to have worn Stalin down and manipulated Mao into agreeing to the invasion.</li></ul> <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The invasion was part of a broad strategic plan designed by Stalin to manipulate the Sino-US relationship</li><li>• Kim Il Sung was manipulated by Stalin into gaining the support of Mao</li><li>• Kim Il Sung exaggerated Mao's enthusiasm for the invasion</li><li>• Kim Il Sung did have a desire to start a war to unite Korea but in early 1950 he had some reservations</li><li>• Stalin was responsible for approving the invasion and determining the nature and goals of the invasion.</li></ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, was the individual most responsible for the decision to invade South Korea in June 1950. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A number of incidents in the vicinity of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and activity near the border by the South Koreans convinced Kim that he should invade South Korea before North Korea was invaded itself</li><li>• Kim had been encouraged by the apparent abandonment of South Korea in the foreign policy strategy of the USA, and the withdrawal of US military advisers, in early 1950</li><li>• Stalin was very concerned about the likelihood of US support for South Korea in the event of invasion; in 1950 Stalin was unwilling to become involved in a 'hot war' with the USA</li><li>• In 1950 Mao was more concerned with establishing his own control over China, and his desire to invade Taiwan, than with the invasion of South Korea.</li></ul> <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, was the individual most responsible for the decision to invade South Korea in June 1950.</p>



Question	Indicative content
	<p data-bbox="300 159 691 185">Relevant points may include:</p> <ul data-bbox="347 208 1406 562" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="347 208 1406 297">• In 1950 Stalin was concerned about the impact of a newly-established rival communist power on the geopolitical situation in Asia; Stalin and Mao signed a military pact in February but the relationship was uneasy</li><li data-bbox="347 304 1406 365">• In February 1950 Stalin supplied North Korea with sufficient equipment for three extra divisions, heavy armaments and river-crossing technology</li><li data-bbox="347 371 1406 461">• Stalin arranged for Kim to visit Mao in China in order for Kim to gain an agreement from Mao that, in the event of the invasion going badly, China would intervene on behalf of North Korea</li><li data-bbox="347 468 1406 562">• It was in the interests of Soviet pre-eminence in the Communist sphere of influence for Mao to be in conflict with the USA, which would in turn probably make China more dependent on the USSR.</li></ul>

## Section B: Indicative content

### Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on how accurate it is to say that, during the period 1961-73, the NLF-Vietcong campaigns in South Vietnam were overwhelmingly successful.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that, during the period 1961-73, the NLF-Vietcong campaigns in South Vietnam were overwhelmingly successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Throughout the period, from the Battle of Ap Bac (1963) to the Tet Offensive (1968), the NLF-Vietcong generally outfought and outstrategised the ARVN</li><li>• The military success of the NLF-Vietcong resulted in the escalation of US involvement, resulting in a guerrilla-style ground war that the US was unlikely to win; by 1968 the Vietcong controlled 80% of South Vietnam</li><li>• The success of the NLF-Vietcong in the countryside resulted in the 'strategic hamlets' programme and the US army often treating the South Vietnamese as hostile agents</li><li>• The NLF-Vietcong propaganda victory during, and following, the Tet Offensive (1968) was instrumental in the undermining the continued US commitment to South Vietnam</li><li>• The degree of NLF-Vietcong persistence contributed in 1973 to the US agreement to a ceasefire (January) and the US withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam (March).</li></ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that counter the statement that, during the period 1961-73, the NLF-Vietcong campaigns in South Vietnam were not overwhelmingly successful should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There were ARVN successes and the NLF-Vietcong were never able to deliver a decisive blow either to the ARVN or US forces, e.g. ARVN success in the North Mekong Delta (1962), the failure of the Tet Offensive (1968)</li><li>• The willingness of the US to intervene in South Vietnam, and the introduction of US combat troops, meant that the NLF-Vietcong were as much bogged down in 'quagmire of war' as their opponents</li><li>• In the years 1969-73, a change in US strategy, e.g. the Phoenix Program saw the NLF-Vietcong begin to lose control of the countryside, with only 50% under their control in September 1969 compared to 80% previously</li><li>• NLF-Vietcong setbacks were influential in bringing North Vietnam to the peace table in Paris in 1968 and the continuing negotiations and secret talks up to the ceasefire of 1973</li><li>• The NLF-Vietcong did not win over sufficient support in South Vietnam to be able to take over popular control; the war continued when US forces left in 1973.</li></ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the role of Prince Sihanouk in the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the years 1965-75.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the role of Prince Sihanouk was significant in the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the years 1965-75 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prince Sihanouk was responsible for inviting the North Vietnamese into Cambodia from 1965, so increasing the exposure of Cambodians to communist ideas</li> <li>• The corruption and intrigue surrounding Prince Sihanouk's government in the years 1965-70 encouraged a significant number of Cambodians to look to the communist Khmer Rouge for an alternative political ideology</li> <li>• The US-supported coup d'état by Lon Nol against Prince Sihanouk encouraged anti-American Cambodians to begin to support the communist Khmer Rouge</li> <li>• After he was deposed in 1970, Prince Sihanouk actively encouraged his own followers to work with the Khmer Rouge in the ensuing civil war</li> <li>• Prince Sihanouk particularly used his popularity amongst the peasantry in the countryside to gain support for the Khmer Rouge; he made personal appearances in the rural areas in support of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.</li> </ul> <p>Arguments and evidence that the role of Prince Sihanouk was not significant/other factors were more significant in the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the years 1965-75 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prince Sihanouk had carried out a policy of repression against the Khmer Rouge before his overthrow in 1970</li> <li>• Prince Sihanouk's contribution was mainly as a result of external factors rather than his own agency and in 1975 he was in exile in China when the Khmer Rouge came to power</li> <li>• The Khmer Rouge built a steady presence in the Cambodian countryside under the leadership of Pol Pot and were in a good position to take advantage of the political chaos in 1970 even without Sihanouk's support</li> <li>• The Cold War encouraged US interference in the political situation in Cambodia, which created a climate of destabilisation in which the Khmer Rouge thrived</li> <li>• It was US military action in Cambodia, first through secret targeted bombing (1969) and later direct invasion and blanket bombing, that was most responsible for Khmer Rouge support in the countryside</li> <li>• After 1970 the Khmer Rouge were given active support, including military intervention, from the North Vietnamese during the civil war.</li> </ul> <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>