

Examiners' Report  
June 2018

GCE History 9HI0 1E

## Edexcel and BTEC Qualifications

Edexcel and BTEC qualifications come from Pearson, the UK's largest awarding body. We provide a wide range of qualifications including academic, vocational, occupational and specific programmes for employers. For further information visit our qualifications websites at [www.edexcel.com](http://www.edexcel.com) or [www.btec.co.uk](http://www.btec.co.uk).

Alternatively, you can get in touch with us using the details on our contact us page at [www.edexcel.com/contactus](http://www.edexcel.com/contactus).



### Giving you insight to inform next steps

ResultsPlus is Pearson's free online service giving instant and detailed analysis of your students' exam results.

- See students' scores for every exam question.
- Understand how your students' performance compares with class and national averages.
- Identify potential topics, skills and types of question where students may need to develop their learning further.

For more information on ResultsPlus, or to log in, visit [www.edexcel.com/resultsplus](http://www.edexcel.com/resultsplus). Your exams officer will be able to set up your ResultsPlus account in minutes via Edexcel Online.

### Pearson: helping people progress, everywhere

Pearson aspires to be the world's leading learning company. Our aim is to help everyone progress in their lives through education. We believe in every kind of learning, for all kinds of people, wherever they are in the world. We've been involved in education for over 150 years, and by working across 70 countries, in 100 languages, we have built an international reputation for our commitment to high standards and raising achievement through innovation in education. Find out more about how we can help you and your students at: [www.pearson.com/uk](http://www.pearson.com/uk).

June 2018

Publications Code 9HI0\_1E\_1806\_ER

All the material in this publication is copyright  
© Pearson Education Ltd 2018

# Introduction

It was pleasing to see candidates able to engage effectively across the ability range in this, the second year of the Advanced Level Paper 1E which deals with Russia, 1917-91: from Lenin to Yeltsin.

The paper is divided into three sections. Both Sections A and B comprise a choice of essays - from two in each - that assess understanding of the period in depth (AO1) by targeting the second order concepts of cause, consequence, change and continuity, similarity and difference, and significance. Section C contains a compulsory question which is based on two given extracts. It assesses analysis and evaluation of historical interpretations in context (AO3). Candidates in the main appeared to organise their time effectively, although there were some cases of candidates not completing one of the three responses within the time allocated. Examiners did note a number of scripts that posed some problems with the legibility of hand writing. Examiners can only give credit for what they can read.

Of the three sections, candidates are generally more familiar with the essay sections, and in Sections A and B most candidates were well prepared to write, or to attempt, an analytical response. Stronger answers clearly understood the importance of identifying the appropriate second order concept(s) that were being targeted by the question. A minority of often knowledgeable candidates wanted to focus on causes and engage in a main factor/other factors approach, even where this did not necessarily address the demands of the conceptual focus. Candidates in the main were able to apply their knowledge and understanding in a manner suited to the different demands of questions in these two sections in terms of the depth of knowledge required. Section A questions targeted a shorter period and Section B questions covered a broader timespan.

Candidates do need to formulate their planning so that there is an argument and a counterargument within their answer. Some candidates lacked sufficient treatment of these. The generic mark scheme clearly indicates the four bullet-pointed strands which are the focus for awarding marks and centres should note how these strands progress through the levels. Candidates do need to be aware of key dates, as identified in the specification, and to ensure that they draw their evidence in responses from the appropriate time period.

In Section C, the strongest answers demonstrated a clear focus on the need to discuss different arguments given within the two extracts, clearly recognising these as historical interpretations. Such responses tended to offer comparative analysis of the merits of the different views. Higher-scoring responses explored the validity of the arguments offered by the two historians in the light of the evidence, both from within the extracts, and the candidates' own contextual knowledge. Such responses tended to avoid attempts to examine the extracts, e.g. assertions of the inferiority of an extract on the basis of it offering less factual evidence, or a drift away from the specific demands of the question to the wider-taught topic.

## **Question 1**

On Question 1, stronger responses offered an analysis of the similarities and differences between Lenin (1918-24) and Stalin's (1930s) use of terror and included an analysis of the relationships between the key issues and concepts required by the question. Sufficient knowledge was used to develop the similarities/differences between Lenin and Stalin's use of terror (e.g. both used purges to remove 'unreliable' party elements, both used 'class war' terror tactics to consolidate their regimes, unlike Stalin's party purges, Lenin's were non-violent, Lenin's Red Terror never reached the scale of Stalin's mass terror of the 1930s) with a consistent focus on 'fundamentally similar'. Judgements made about the similarities and differences were reasoned and based on clear criteria such as motivation, nature and extent. High scoring answers were also clearly organised and effectively communicated.

Weaker responses tended to offer limited knowledge of Lenin and Stalin's use of terror, or a largely narrative account of the years 1918-39 with little focus on 'fundamentally similar'. Where some analysis using relevant knowledge was evident, it was not developed very far or was offered only on one aspect of the question (e.g. features of the Stalinist terror of the 1930s). Some low-scoring candidates dealt with one leader at the expense of the other (again often focusing disproportionately on Stalin). Furthermore, such responses were often fairly brief, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements.

When the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917, they were a minority party that desperately needed to consolidate their hold on power to avoid being overthrown by opposition groups such as the Social revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Therefore, Lenin first, ~~and~~ continued by Stalin, employed terror in order to enforce conformity from the Soviet people. The extent to which Lenin and Stalin's use of terror can be regarded as similar however is dependent upon whether the leaders used the same methods of terror, on the same scale, and towards the same groups of people.

Arguably, Lenin's use of terror in ~~the~~ 1918-24 and Stalin's use of terror in the 1930s could be argued similar, as Lenin initiated the use of the secret police in December 1917 under the leadership of Felix Dzerinsky, and arguably Stalin merely developed this use of secret police further. For example, Lenin did indeed order the arrest of 5,000 mensheviks in 1901.

(Section A continued) In only the first three months, likewise, Lenin used the CHEKA to crush the Constituent Assembly on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 1918 when the social revolutionaries earned 21 million votes as opposed to the Bolsheviks mere 9 million. Evidently, Lenin did use terror in order to suppress his opposition groups, as Stalin did also, suggesting their use of terror was similar. Further exemplifying this, during NEP, a show trial of 34 social revolutionary leaders condemned as terrorists unfolded fear into the lives of other potential political opponents, as even 11 more were executed as accused for working for Denikin. Clearly, Lenin used terror to suppress opposition forming politically against his government. Similarly, Stalin used terror to deter his political opponents, such as sending 'counter-revolutionaries' to gulags, a label which made up part of Yezhov's 1938 list of 250,000 anti-Soviet elements. Further to this, Stalin used terror against the Churches pre WW2, to ensure that no opposition group could form from within the Orthodox Church, for example, even ethnic minorities from the East Asian republics and Muslims were targeted in the 1930s. Therefore,



(Section A continued) given that both Lenin and Stalin used terror to defeat their potential political opponents, it could be argued that their use of terror was indeed similar, and therefore to say Lenin's terror 1918-24 and Stalin's terror in the 1930s were fundamentally similar would be accurate.

In addition, it could be argued that both Lenin and Stalin's use of terror was similar as both targeted rebellions that could have potentially threatened their hold on power. For example, Lenin used the CHEKA and Red Army in 1921 to put down the Tambov Rebellion, where 50,000 fighter peasants resisted grain requisitioning. Over 100,000 were sent to labour camps in Siberia, where poison gas was also used. Another example of Lenin using terror to suppress rebellion is the Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921, where sailors at a naval base began to demand political freedoms and free, genuine elections, and were crushed by the Red Army. Therefore, Lenin clearly used terror to suppress uprisings, arguably as Stalin did also. For example, the 'Chistka' continued into 1930 and 1931,

(Section A continued) whereby party officials resisting collectivisation were punished. Though this instance was non-violent, 25% party officials lost their jobs, Stalin still used terror to enforce conformity, as those became fearful of their fate and were later targeted in the remainder of the 1930s. Further to this, Stalin used terror to stop rebellions arising in the first place, for example the fear of night time interrogations between 11pm and 3pm as one example of the Soviet people being forced into obedience. Therefore, clearly both Lenin and Stalin willingly employed terror in order to both prevent and suppress opposition to the government, and because of this, arguably they both targeted the same individuals and groups, hence Lenin's use of terror 1917-24 and Stalin's terror of the 1930s could be said fundamentally similar.

However, it could be argued that Lenin and Stalin's use of terror in 1917-24 and the 1930s was not similar, as they did, in some respects, use terror against different people within Soviet Russia. Specifically, Lenin did not tend to use terror against his own



(Section A continued) party members, whereas Stalin did. For example, under Lenin, the greatest threat towards the party members was mere removal of party cards, rather than any physical harm. Likewise, Lenin criticised his opponents in his testament of 1924, such as stating that Trotsky was 'too far reaching in confidence', yet would never physically harm his political ally. In contrast, Stalin viewed those strong in power as a threat to himself, and so used force against his own party, differentiating Stalin and Lenin's use of terror. As an example, Kirov was murdered in 1934 after the 'Congress of Victors', in which he criticised Stalin's targets for the Second Five Year Plan, which demonstrated how Stalin would employ terror against his own political rivals. Further exemplifying this, in 1936, the trial of the sixteen targeted left leaders including Zinoviev and Kamenev, whilst the trial of the seventeen in 1937 targeted party members accused of working for Trotsky, and as a final example, the trial of the twentyone in 1938 targeted rightists such as Bukharin. Therefore, evidently Stalin used terror against

(Section A continued) His own party members or personal enemies, which was not advocated by Lenin. Lenin persecuted other political groups, but not his own, like Stalin. Therefore, because Lenin and Stalin employed different methods of terror (eg party card removal vs. murder) and targeted different people (eg. other political groups vs Communist party) it could be deemed inaccurate to state that Lenin's terror of 1918-24 was fundamentally similar to that of Stalin in <sup>the</sup> 1930s.

Furthermore, also separating Lenin and Stalin's use of terror is the scale upon which both leaders employed their terror. It could be said that Lenin would not have used terror to the same extent on the ordinary people of Russia as Stalin did, thus suggesting that their use of terror was not similar. For example, Lenin did use terror on his people in times of crisis, such as in the Civil War 1918-1921, where official figures put death rates up to 13,000, however, when terror wasn't so essential, such as after 1922, Lenin ~~at~~ lessened his use of it. As an example, after the Civil War, the GPU sent mere surveillance

(Section A continued) reports to the Politburo and kept public opinion under scrutiny, which exemplifies how Lenin used terror only when essential. By contrast, Stalin appeared to use terror unnecessarily or without any obvious threat having been posed. For example, in 1938, a quota system of 25% purges was set up, and if this quota was not met, Stalin expected NKVD agents to add their own names to the list. Clearly, Stalin's use of terror in the 1930's was far less systematic than that of Lenin's. Also exemplifying this, in 1937, 14 out of 16 army officers, 35,000 junior army officials and the chief of the Soviet Airforce (who commented that Soviet planes were poor quality) were all shot. It therefore seems questionable whether Stalin's use of terror was always well planned or considered, or whether Stalin more so resorted to terror when in any simple doubt. Therefore, Lenin's terror of 1918-24 and Stalin's terror of the 1930's could be argued not fundamentally similar, as Stalin's terror became far more widespread, and used in situations where it was not always necessary.

In summary, though Lenin and Stalin could be



(Section A continued) argued to have used fundamentally similar terror in Lenin's 1918-1924 and Stalin's 1930s due to the fact that both used terror to crush rebellions/uprisings and political opponents, it is evident that Stalin's use of terror went beyond one precedent that Lenin had set. Due to the fact that Stalin used more physical violence and ergo different measures of terror and used terror against his own party members unlike Stalin, their uses of terror could not be said fundamentally similar as to different extents, against different people, and in different manners.



This Level 5 response possesses several obvious strengths, namely (1) it targets Lenin and Stalin's use of terror and clearly focuses on the concept of similarity/difference, (2) detailed own knowledge of the 1918-24 and 1930s periods is incorporated to support the arguments made and (3) a reasoned judgement is reached in the conclusion based on the criteria developed in the analysis.



Higher level responses are often based on brief plans that offer a logical structure for the analysis. They identify three or four themes and points for and against the proposition. Take a minute or two at the beginning to plan before you start writing your response. That way, you are more likely to produce a relevant, logical and well-structured response.



## **Question 2**

On Question 2, stronger responses targeted the successes/failures of Soviet economic policy in the years 1945-64 and included an analysis of links between key factors and a clear focus on the concept (consequence). Such responses offered reasonable chronological coverage, and a sufficient range of successes/failures for discussion (e.g. Fourth Five Year Plan helped restore the Soviet economy after 1945, Khrushchev's emphasis on light industry improved the supply of consumer goods, the failures of the Virgin Lands Scheme, the military-industrial complex ignored or watered down economic initiatives which did not focus on the heavy or armament industries). Judgements made about the successes/failures of Soviet economic policy during this period were reasoned and based on clear criteria such as economic growth, living standards and a 'balanced' economy. Higher scoring answers were also clearly organised and effectively communicated.

Weaker responses tended to offer limited knowledge of Soviet economic policies in the years 1945-64, often taking the form of a patchy economic narrative of the period. Alternatively, lower-scoring candidates provided a limited analysis of the successes/failures of Soviet economic policy that offered little development on the focus of the question (success outweighed failure). Where some analysis using relevant knowledge was evident, it was not developed very far or only offered one aspect related to the demands of the question (e.g. the failure of the Virgin Lands Scheme). Furthermore, such responses were often brief, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements.

Economic policy had different aims during the specified periods, so the ~~defects~~ successfulness of the policies varied over time. During the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> five year plans the goal was to rebuild the economy as had been torn apart by the war. However from 1956 when Khrushchev took over, there was more focus on lighter industry as aimed to create a better society through improved consumer goods for the Soviet society.

~~Stalin's~~ Stalin's main concern with the economy after the war was a return to 'High Stalinism' and rebuilding the economy. This was done by the focus of production being on heavy industry such as steel. Although progress was slow, after the ~~birth~~ ~~five~~ ~~years~~ plans leading up to Stalin's death, pre-war production levels were

(Section A continued)

met again. This could be considered to be successful as the aims set out were achieved. Nevertheless, there were still overwhelming issues that remained in the economy. The working conditions were still poor and workers were expected to work in dangerous conditions and many lives were lost in the gulags when constructing dangerous projects such as the Volga-Don Canal. An important question raised here, is ~~was~~ were the human losses worth the limited economic development. (Development was considered limited as much of what was produced was wasted and the public projects often had limited economic value but primarily developed the cult of personality of Stalin).

~~After~~ The death of Stalin marked a turning point in how the economy was run as Khrushchev took over and disagreed with many of Stalin's policies in his Secret Speech about De-stalinisation, mainly using terror

(Section A continued)

to stimulate ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> economy as it wasn't sustainable. Khrushchev's focus for the economy shifted ~~to more~~ towards light industry. The fact that the production of synthetic fibres increased by 15 times shows his commitment to the cause as these were used to make plastics which allowed the production of consumer goods. The success is reflected as the number of TV sets increased from 10,000 in 1952 to 3 million in 1958.

However the success of Khrushchev's ~~in~~ policies in industry shouldn't be overstated as there were some difficulties. The economy he inherited from Stalin was a rigid command economy which was resistant to reform meaning much of what he attempted was limited in success. A good example of this was his policies with agriculture.

Khrushchev's ~~as~~ <sup>an</sup> main agricultural failure was the Virgin Lands Scheme as it

(Section A continued)

was too ambitious and overall led to a decrease in grain produced from 93.3 million tonnes to 60 million tonnes through the late 1950s - early 1960s. Reasons behind the failure of the scheme was lack of investment so not enough fertilisers used, and uneducated peasants operating the scheme as often grew wrong crops that weren't suitable for cultivation on that land and didn't rotate the crops.

Additionally, another mistake Khrushchev made was abolishing the Machine and Tractor stations as they were resented by the peasants due to them being a sign of central interference. This resulted in the peasants being expected to supply their own machinery which was incredibly naive. Despite slight progress made in industry, the mistakes Khrushchev made in agriculture severely restricts the extent to which his overall policies could be labelled as a success.



(Section A continued)

To conclude, Soviet <sup>economic</sup> policy was a success up until Stalin's death as the economy was able to be rebuilt after the damaging effects ~~that~~ <sup>of</sup> the Second World War had. The success could be argued to have continued to under Khrushchev's economic policy as managed to increase consumer goods, however major aspects holding the success back include the failures he made in agriculture and the fact that many of the goods he produced were of poor quality and ended up being wasted e.g. the heels of shoes being attached to the front end. So it could be said these significantly held back the success of Khrushchev's policies.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This Level 3 response offers (1) some analysis of the successes and failures of Soviet economic policy in the years 1945-64 but there is scope to develop greater range/depth, (2) limited focus on the issue of 'outweighed', (3) the criteria for judgement are mostly implicit and the conclusion at the end needs further development in terms of 'outweighed'.



When planning your answer to a support/challenge question make sure you have a good balance of key points on either side of the argument, or be prepared to argue support and challenge within each key point.

### **Question 3**

On Question 3, stronger responses were targeted on an analysis of how accurate it is to say that Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression remained unchanged in the years 1917-85. These also included an analysis of relationships between key issues and a focus on the concept (change/continuity) in the question. Such responses had a solid grasp of relevant issues regarding 'remained unchanged' (e.g. all Soviet governments expected art and culture to serve the needs and objectives of the communist regime, Stalin expected all forms of artistic and cultural expression to conform to Socialist Realism, Khrushchev and Brezhnev continued this policy by persecuting artistic and cultural nonconformity, Lenin permitted a degree of artistic and cultural freedom, the Brezhnev and Andropov governments proved unable to stem the influence of popular music on the young). Judgements made about the extent of change and continuity concerning Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression were reasoned and based on clear criteria (e.g. motives for, or the degree of, change/continuity). Higher scoring answers were also clearly organised and effectively communicated.

Weaker responses tended to be generalised and, at best, offered a fairly limited analysis of aspects or features of Soviet restrictions on artistic and cultural expression in the years 1917-85 with limited focus on 'remained unchanged'. Low scoring answers were also often essentially a description of Soviet government policies towards the arts and culture. Where some analysis using relevant knowledge was evident, it tended to lack range/depth (e.g. limited comments on restrictions in the 1930s under Stalin). Furthermore, such responses were often fairly brief, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements.

From the years 1917 to 1985 ~~in~~ Russia was ~~was~~ a communist state known as the USSR, and had many changes regarding arts and culture, making the idea that <sup>restrictions on</sup> arts and culture remained unchanged totally wrong, as despite the restrictions remaining in place, the severity of these restrictions were erratic at times dependent upon who was the leader.

From 1917 to 1924 the leader of the communist party was Lenin. The most popular type of art at this time was Proletkult, which was centred entirely on the working class in order to represent the shift in power from Bourgeoisie to peasants thanks to the Bolsheviks. Additionally in 1917 Lenin passed the Decree of the Press, which essentially placed all Russian newspapers under strict control, being the very first of the restrictions in this period. The next restriction came in 1920, as Lenin ~~stopped~~ stopped Proletkult as he felt it was too abstract and hard to understand, making Avant-Garde

(Section B continued) The main form of art. Thus again was a restriction on artists. Avant-Garde, was also driven by the working class, a famous posters such as the "Reds vs Whites" were created to inspire the public to join the civil war and fight for no Reds, being communists.

Under Stalin however, the restrictions did not remain unchanged, but in fact became even more severe. In 1928 when he took over, Stalin banned Avant-Garde and demanded Socialist Realism art, which was a lot more realistic but was again ~~essentially~~ based on the working class. The reason that ~~the~~ restrictions under did change, and got worse, was because under Stalin there was now no confusion, as all of arts and culture was publically under communist control, and all of this was used as a form of propaganda. Socialist Realism was created ~~to~~ to serve the government as was the ~~most~~ most outright propaganda seen under any leader. Art would eventually begin to represent and portray Stalin's "Cult of Personality", which was essentially his own extreme form of propaganda that ~~and~~ would portray Stalin as a farmer. The most famous example of this being the painting



(Section B continued) "Morning of our motherland" released in 1949. Due to these clear changes made to the severity of the restrictions, it is not accurate to say that restrictions on art and culture ~~stayed~~ remained unchanged in the years 1917 to 1985.

Some of the clearest signs of changes in the severity of restrictions however came under Khrushchev. At his secret speech in 1956, Khrushchev introduced Destalinisation, a policy that symbolised an end to all things Stalin, and essentially a return to Leninism. This policy also applied to arts and culture, as Stalin's strict regime of propaganda ended, ~~and~~ and many of the severe restrictions such as all propaganda being based on Stalin came to an end. Under Khrushchev ~~the~~ arts begin to take the shape of satirical magazines, no longer ~~the~~ forced cult of personality. Despite the arts still being under communist control which would be ~~an~~ an argument as to why the restrictions were unchanged, ~~so~~ many of the other restrictions such as the strict guidelines being lifted show that the restrictions did not in fact remain unchanged.

From 1964 - 82 another flip happened as all

(Section B continued) of the harsh restrictions that existed under Stalin and back under Brezhnev, inspired by his restoration policy, with the goal of replicating a Stalinist Russia. The restrictions had again become extreme, as shown by the Singavsky and Daniel trial of 1967, in which Brezhnev tried and punished two of the most popular artists of the Khrushchev reign. This again shows a clear flip of the severity of the restrictions on arts and culture, therefore rendering the idea that restrictions remain unchanged, totally incorrect.

In conclusion, the only aspect of arts of cultures restrictions that remained ~~for~~ permanent throughout the communist <sup>era</sup> ~~or~~ was the decree of the press of 1917 that put arts under government control. However to say that meant the restrictions were unchanged is incorrect, as nearly every other aspect of the restrictions such as the types of art required and purpose of art, ~~remain~~ was not unchanged, but in fact erratic.



This Level 5 response possesses several obvious strengths, namely (1) it targets Soviet government restrictions on artistic and cultural expression and clearly focuses on the issue of 'remained unchanged' (change/continuity), (2) it covers the time frame set in the question - 1917-85 (3) detailed own knowledge is incorporated to support the arguments made and (3) a reasoned judgement is reached in the conclusion based on the criteria developed in the analysis.



If you use the key phrases from the question throughout your essay, this will help you to write a relevant analytical response.

## **Question 4**

On Question 4, stronger responses were targeted on an analysis of the significance of employment in promoting a stable Soviet society in the years 1953-85 and weighed this factor against others (e.g. the extension of health care provision from the 1950s, Khrushchev's extensive housing programme and increased state welfare spending between the 1950s and 1980s, the repetitive nature of many jobs and high annual labour turnover). These responses included an analysis of the links between key issues and a focus on the concept (significance) in the question. Judgements made about the relative significance of employment for social stability were reasoned and based on clear criteria (e.g. real wage increases, low wage differentials, job security). Higher scoring answers were also clearly organised and effectively communicated.

Weaker responses tended to describe aspects or features of Soviet society in the years 1953-85 with limited focus on the significance of employment in promoting a stable society. Low scoring responses also devoted little or virtually all attention to the stated factor (employment) or else focused on part of the period (e.g. the 1950s or 1960s), thus restricting range. Where some analysis using relevant knowledge was evident, it lacked range/depth (e.g. the state was the main employer and this encouraged loyalty to the system). Furthermore, such responses were often brief, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements.

Employment was a significant problem for the Russian people before the establishment of the Communist Party in 1917. However economic policies such as the five-year plans and policies such as compulsory labour did start the trend for change in not only employment but other social provisions also namely: health and housing. Being through employment came communes and places like Lenin-grad that did take Soviet people in. However during the years 1953-85 it's ~~th~~ clear that the government wanted to push for the promotion of stable Soviet society. These social provisions were long the by-products of another more significant policy. In this essay I will be testing ~~both~~ how significant provisions such as education for the promotion of stable society through the following criteria: how long it lasted, how many people it affect and whether the change was genuine. Overall, it's clear that employment was significant for stability <sup>but its only</sup> when coupled with the other social provisions, ~~th~~ <sup>it is the</sup> that ~~real~~ significance of employment provisions show.



(Section B continued)

Khrushchev and Brezhnev both wanted to promote a stable Soviet society in order to ~~have~~ <sup>create a</sup> better living standard for all Soviet people living in Russia. One such provision they favoured was employment. A drastic change within employment happened seeing an employment was advocated ~~not only~~ for both men and women, ~~but it was also~~ and Khrushchev through his policies of the virgin land scheme and using corn farms actually opened up and created more jobs for people. The virgin land scheme essentially re-vitalised ~~the~~ old farms and encouraged peasants to work in Asia growing maize for better crop production. Essentially Khrushchev's schemes increased the number of jobs and the style. Unlike with industry the jobs weren't specific to a certain group of people it was a job the masses could perform. In terms of length these provisions in employment did last ~~to~~ with the change being that under Brezhnev women weren't encouraged to work, <sup>rather</sup> they were ~~rather~~ expected to take on traditional roles within the family. Furthermore unlike with other leaders the push towards employment was much more genuine because even though the employment provisions could be seen as a by-product, Khrushchev's push towards consumer goods in the first place highlights how

(Section B continued) The government understood the needs of the people and they created opportunities according to those needs. Overall employment was significant for the promotion of a stable Soviet society seeing as it set a precedent and ~~entirely~~ resulted in a decrease in the number of unemployed people within society.

Employment often consisted of people working in communal or large industrial cities such as Leningrad, and although employment can be seen as a somewhat genuine push towards a stable Soviet society, housing can't.

At the beginning housing was a by-product of industrial cities that did little to actually house and shelter people properly. Housing was inefficient and so many people were made homeless and because of past wars and conflicts there was already a significant number of homeless within Russia. The trend only continued during 1953-85. The government did try and enforce build new houses for people however there wasn't enough and ~~all~~ houses were made basic with very basic <sup>and cheap</sup> materials. Many families were forced to share one home with others and other people only got a room they had to share with ~~it~~ coming up to 7 people if not more. Houses were also built badly seeing as some houses lacked basic necessities such as toilets and

(Section B continued) Witcher. Therefore highlighting how not all government social provisions made life significantly better. What was significant was that the government actually set to create homes for all people of all social backgrounds. But the execution of such genuine provisions was undermined by a lack of planning and skill. Therefore unlike employment, housing was poor and insignificant for the promotion of a stable Soviet society.

Health was ~~severely~~ significant ~~for~~ for the promotion of a stable Soviet society because unlike with housing and employment, this government provision could affect the lives of all people for a significant amount of time. Death rates were higher than birth rates at the time, and infant mortality was a severe and persistent issue for all Soviet people. Unlike with employment and housing, health was a far more difficult to tackle ~~with~~ and deal with effectively, seeing ~~it~~ <sup>as there's</sup> wasn't clear answer to the issue. However a way in which government dealt with it was through housing and employment, it took people off the streets and into a social area where health could be monitored. Furthermore the government worked on growing more crops and giving out more food in order to help deal with starvation in poorer areas of the



(Section B continued) country. Overall, health provisions were significant because they ensured not only that there would be a stable Soviet society. But it also helped and benefited everyone. Unlike with employment and housing, health had a direct impact on the stability of society because a dying workforce and country wouldn't have led to any further promotion of a stable Soviet society.

To conclude, the significance of employment for the promotion of a Soviet society was undermined by provisions made in both housing and health. Seeing as both employment and housing highlighted how un-organised and ~~the~~ clueless the government was. Though they genuinely wanted to bring about positive social change and stability, they didn't know how to.



**ResultsPlus**  
Examiner Comments

This Level 2 response exhibits many of the shortcomings of lower scoring answers. (1) It offers a limited and generalised analysis of the significance of employment for the promotion of a stable Soviet society in the years 1953-85. (2) The candidate's own knowledge lacks range and depth. (3) An overall judgement is given but because of the limitations noted above it lacks proper substantiation.



You will be expected to offer detailed knowledge to support your arguments. Check the specification so you know what is required.



## Question 5

On Question 5, stronger responses developed a clear extract-based analysis of the extent to which the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms. Such responses explored most of the arguments raised within the extracts (e.g. the consequences of Gorbachev's amendment of Article 6, the unelected post of President of the USSR lacked legitimacy, Gorbachev lacked the political authority to deal with economic and nationalist issues, perestroika failed to supply adequate food and domestic goods, removing economic controls led to rising inflation, Gorbachev was hampered by a Soviet economic mind-set). Contextual knowledge was also used effectively to examine the merits/validity of the views put forward in the extracts (e.g. due to the amendment of Article 6, the CPSU was rendered powerless by the end of 1990, Gorbachev's political reforms failed to generate popular support for central government, inflation and shortages depressed Soviet living standards and sharpened popular discontent, Gorbachev's economic reforms undermined the unity of the USSR and contributed to the economic crisis, the growth and damaging impact of nationalist sentiment in parts of the USSR such as the Baltic republics). Stronger responses were also clearly focused on the precise terms of the question (the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms) and put forward a reasoned judgement on the given issue, referencing the views in the extracts.

Weaker responses showed some understanding of the extracts but tended to select quotations, paraphrase or describe, without proper reasoning. At this level, material from the extracts was used simply to illustrate (e.g. Gorbachev lacked legitimacy because he had not been elected by the people (extract 1), or by 1990 the Soviet economy was falling apart (extract 2)). Such responses often revealed limited recognition of the differences between the two extracts and sometimes drifted from the specific question to the wider controversy surrounding the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Low-scoring candidates also relied heavily on the extracts as sources of information. Alternatively they made limited use of the sources, attempting instead to answer the question, relying almost exclusively on their own knowledge. Here, too, candidates' own knowledge tended to be illustrative (e.g. 'tacked on' to points from the extracts) or drifted on to less relevant points. Furthermore, such responses were often brief, lacked coherence and structure, and made unsubstantiated or weakly supported judgements.

5 In the light of differing interpretations, how convincing do you find the view that the USSR collapsed in 1991 because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms?

To explain your answer, analyse and evaluate the material in both extracts, using your own knowledge of the issues.

(20)

Yes - political

Democratisation - Yeltsin

- encouraged nationalism

Undermined the Union

No - not

Nationalism - article 6

Bulgaria - abandoned com

Democratisation

- Glasnost - weakened party

Economy - weaknesses

Alcohol, Perestroika,

500 day programme

The cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the 31<sup>st</sup> December 1991 has been a topic of much dispute amongst historians for years.

Whilst some emphasise Gorbachev's political policies as to blame, as Hosking does, others place greater weight on economic factors, as Figes' extract demonstrates. Other historians have also suggested further contributing factors were to blame, such as the rise of nationalism. The historians' differences in views are evident in Hosking's mention

'they [political reforms] fundamentally weakened the Communist Party' as opposed to Figes description of an 'economic crash'. Ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by it's loss of membership, and so the cause of collapse should be based on which factor most caused the loss of Union membership.

To a large extent, it could be argued valid that the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to Gorbachev's political reforms, as like Hocking states, they 'fatally weakened' the Communist party, and this was the very feature that had held the Union together since it's creation. For example, under the policy of Glasnost (1968-88) openness within the Communist party and state was encouraged, however this dramatically undermined faith in the Soviet system. To exemplify this, as the people of the Union states discovered mistakes or failings of the government like the Aral Sea Disaster, Katyn Massacre and Khrushchev's secret <sup>speech of 1956</sup> ~~policy~~, the Soviet people lost faith in their government. This is partially corroborated by Figes in extracts, as he states 'pornographic videos imported

from abroad, which highlights that due to Glasnost, the Soviet people became more aware of the Western standard of living, which challenged the Communists who appeared to be failing their people, thus increasing desires for independence. It should also be mentioned that the political policy of Glasnost placed a greater expectation upon the Soviet government to be honest with their people and this was not always upheld. For example, Chernobyl of 1986, was not reported until two days afterwards and its seriousness downplayed, which showed the Soviet people that the government had failed its first test of honesty. Therefore, it could be argued that Gorbachev's political reforms were indeed to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union, as they undermined faith in the Communist government, which ~~in turn~~<sup>in turn</sup> created a desire for independence and lost the Union vital membership.

In addition, Gorbachev's political reforms could also be held accountable for the collapse of the Soviet Union as they enabled



strong government opposition to get into positions of power, which undermined the strength of the Party. For example, Hosking comments that Gorbachev 'legalised the formation of alternate political parties', which seems accurate given that he introduced the policy of democratisation. This dramatically weakened the Communist party's hold on the Union, as for the first time since 1921, they could be <sup>politically</sup> opposed. Consequently, in the late 1980s, 60,000 informal groups had begun organising demonstrations across Russia. Further exemplifying the consequence of Gorbachev's political democratisation is the fact that the March-April 1989 elections saw five central committee members defeated, and Yeltsin win 89% of the vote in Moscow. As Hosking states 'these elections transformed the political scene yet again'. For example, by 1988, there were three clear factions in the Communist Party, moderates, conservatives and radicals, which massively undermined its power as no longer a united force. Finally, as Hosking comments there was a 'great vacuum at the centre of Soviet politics', which



was caused by Gorbachev's political reforms. Exemplifying this, Yeltsin began to push for Russian sovereignty, and told republics - 'take as much sovereignty as you can swallow'. Therefore, due to Gorbachev's political policies, the Communist party was divided, and strong opposition allowed to infiltrate into government, thus arguably to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union as a weaker party intensified the desire for republics to break away from the union, thus causing its collapse.

However, not only Gorbachev's political reforms, but also his economic reforms could be held to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Figes appears to advocate. As an example, Figes describes 'the dismantling of a planned economy' which caused an 'economic crash' and thus intensified the desire for union republics to declare their independence. For example, under Perestroika, which Figes describes as having 'a lot in common with NEP', in 25 out of 55 Russian republics, meat rationing was occurring, and 1/5 of food shops continued to

be imported. In fact, between 1986 and 1990, GDP shrank by 4%. Such statistics would therefore support that an 'economic crisis' occurred. This is further validated when considering the impact of Gorbachev's 1985-88 Anti Alcohol Campaign, which, by cutting production of alcohol in state shops by 50% and raising legal age for alcohol consumption to 21, deprived the Union's economy of 67 billion roubles, 9% of GDP. Therefore, it could be suggested that Gorbachev's economic policies, not political policies, caused the Union's collapse, as with such a poor economy in place, the desire for members to declare independence was increased, as many, particularly, Russia, began to believe they could develop better if separated from the Union. This reveals how economic policies, which as Hocking's states, created 'economic crisis', lost the Union vital membership, thus causing its collapse, not political policies.

Finally, it could be argued that not Gorbachev's political policies, but more over his approach to dealing with nationalism, caused the Union to collapse. Hocking's mentions 'he

amended Article 6 of the Soviet constitution, and explained that this 'ended the Communist Party's monopoly'. This seems to be an accurate interpretation, given that Gorbachev's introduction of the 'Sinatra Doctrine', enabled members to 'find their own path to socialism'. Consequently, members of the Union were now able to declare their independence, free of constraints from the Union. Hosking's commented that the Union faced 'inter-ethnic conflict', which seems plausible given that in 1989, several members left the Soviet Union. For example, in Bulgaria, the Communist Party abandoned Communism, whilst in Poland, free elections were held, which were won by a coalition of nationalists and Catholics, thus marking the end to Communism. Gorbachev's Sinatra doctrine was arguably to blame for the Union's collapse, as it enabled membership to drop. Though not mentioned by either Hosking or Fides, Gorbachev touted to realize the growing trend of Yeltsin's Commonwealth of Independent States, which further encouraged nationalism as an appealing alternative became available. Therefore,




not Gorbachev's political policies, but his approach to nationalism caused the Union to collapse, as this enabled the loss of Union membership which ultimately caused its ceased existence.

In conclusion, only to a limited extent ~~is~~ it convincing to suggest that the Soviet Union collapsed due to Gorbachev's political policies. Though Husking convincingly explains their detriment, as in stating that Gorbachev lacked 'actual authority' due to them, it was not the policies in politics that caused the loss of union membership, but instead Gorbachev's approach to the rise of nationalism in itself. Had Gorbachev not introduced the Sinatra Doctrine, the ease at which Union members could exit would have been much less, and so despite political and economic policies worsening the pull of nationalism, they would have been ineffective in actually causing the crucial loss of membership. Therefore, it is not convincing to say the USSR failed due to the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms, but instead, his approach to nationalism.



This Level 5 response possesses several obvious strengths, namely (1) it offers a clear understanding of the extracts and uses this to develop an analysis based on the two competing views, (2) it uses own knowledge effectively to examine the merits of these views and (3) it is focused on the precise issue (the USSR collapsed because of the consequences of Gorbachev's political reforms) rather than the general controversy surrounding the downfall of the Soviet Union, and (4) it offers a reasoned judgement on the given issue, which references the views given in the Hosking and Figes extracts.



Good responses often use the introduction to set up the debate by identifying the main arguments offered by the two interpretations. This is then followed by an exploration of these arguments in the main analysis.



# Paper Summary

Based on their performance on this paper, candidates are offered the following advice.

## Section A/B responses

Features commonly found in responses which were successful within the higher levels:

- Candidates paying close attention to the date ranges in the question.
- Sufficient consideration being given to the issue in the question (e.g. main factor), as well as some other factors.
- Candidates explaining their judgement fully – this need not be in an artificial or abstract way, but demonstrate their reasoning in relation to the concepts and topic they are writing about in order to justify their judgements.
- Focusing carefully on the second-order concept(s) targeted in the question.
- Giving consideration to timing, to enable the completion of all three questions with approximately the same time being given over to each response.
- An appropriate level, in terms of depth of detail and analysis, as required by the question – e.g. a realistic amount to enable a balanced and rounded answer on breadth questions.
- With regards to the level and quality of knowledge, candidates and centres should recognise the expectation of Advanced Level. In short, it is a combination of the knowledge candidates are able to bring to the essay, married with their ability to effectively marshal this material towards the analytical demands of the question. It is fair to say that on Paper 1, where candidates study a range of themes across a broad chronological period, the expectations regarding depth of knowledge will not necessarily be as great as in the more in-depth periods studied. As well as offering more depth of knowledge, candidates who have engaged in wider reading tend to be more successful as they are able to select and deploy the most appropriate examples to support analysis and evaluation.

Common issues which hindered performance:

- Paying little heed to the precise demands of the question, e.g. write about the topic without focusing on the question, or attempt to give an answer to a question that hasn't been asked – most frequently, this meant treating questions which targeted other second-order concepts as causation questions.
- Answering a question without giving sufficient consideration to the given issue in the question (e.g. looking at other causes, consequences, etc, with only limited reference to the issue, factor etc. given in the question).
- Answers which only gave a partial response, e.g. a very limited span of the date range, or covered the stated cause/consequence, with no real consideration of other issues.

- Failure to consider the date range as specified in the question e.g. when a candidate discusses the correct issue, but for a time span which differs from that in the question.
- Assertion of change, causation etc. often with formulaic repetition of the words of the question, with limited explanation or analysis of how exactly this was a change, cause, relating to the issue within the question.
- Judgement not being reached or explained.
- A lack of detail.
- Across the units, there was some evidence to suggest that, as might be expected, candidates were somewhat less confident when dealing with topics that were new to the reformed Advanced Level.

### Section C responses

Features commonly found in responses which were successful within the higher levels:

- Candidates paying close attention to the precise demands of the question, as opposed to seemingly pre-prepared material covering the more general controversy as outlined in the specification.
- Thorough use of the extracts; this need not mean using every point they raise, but a strong focus on these as views on the question.
- A confident attempt to use the two extracts together, e.g. consideration of their differences, attempts to compare their arguments, or evaluate their relative merits.
- Careful use of own knowledge, e.g. clearly selected to relate to the issues raised within the sources, confidently using this to examine the arguments made, and reason through these in relation to the given question; at times, this meant selection over sheer amount of knowledge.
- Careful reading of the extracts, to ensure the meaning of individual statements and evidence within them were used in the context of the broader arguments made by the authors.
- Attempts to see beyond the stark differences between sources, e.g. consideration of the extent to which they disagreed, or an attempt to reconcile their arguments.
- Confident handling of the extracts, seemingly from experience in reading and examining excerpts (and no doubt whole books), allied to a sharp focus on the arguments given, recognising the distinct skills demanded by A03.

Common issues which hindered performance:

- Limited or uneven use of the extracts, e.g. extensive use of one, with limited consideration of the other.
- Limited comparison or consideration of the differences between the given interpretations.
- Using the extracts merely as sources of support.
- Arguing one extract is superior to the other on the basis that it offers more factual evidence to back up the claims made, without genuinely analysing the arguments offered.

- Heavy use of own knowledge, or even seemingly pre-prepared arguments, without real consideration of the arguments in the sources.
- Statements or evidence from the source being used in a manner contrary to that given in the sources, e.g. through misinterpretation of the meaning of the arguments, or the lifting of detail out of context from the extract.
- A tendency to see the extracts as being polar opposites, again seemingly through expectation of this, without thought to where there may be degrees of difference, or even common ground.

## Grade Boundaries

Grade boundaries for this, and all other papers, can be found on the website on this link:

<http://www.edexcel.com/iwantto/Pages/grade-boundaries.aspx>

