

Principal Moderator Report

9HI01/04 GCE History

May/June 2018

Introduction

This is the second year that centres have entered candidates for the coursework element of the new Specification, and it is clear that centres have responded positively to the new approach to coursework at Advanced level and the comments and reports that followed moderation in 2017. Many teachers had used Edexcel's coursework advisory service regarding the choice for their students of appropriate topics, interpretations and reading, and while this is not obligatory, it meant the candidates in those centres were completing coursework tasks that fitted the requirements stated in the specification. It should be noted that this does not mean that centres who did not use the service submitted tasks that were not appropriate, though in some cases tasks were too broad, and this would have been spotted and raised as an issue via the advisory service. It was also evident that many centres had attended training courses provided by Edexcel regarding task setting and applying the new mark scheme. This stood them in good stead when it came to supporting and guiding their students and to assessing their work.

Team leaders reported very few concerns with the application of the agreed moderation standard by moderators, and where there were concerns the centre work was reviewed by the Team Leader, and, if necessary the Principal Moderator, in order to ensure fair moderation.

The purpose of external moderation is two-fold. Firstly, it ensures that all centres have applied the requirements of the specification, completed the required paperwork, supported and guided candidates appropriately and applied the generic mark scheme. Secondly, it ensures that centres are brought into line with the agreed standard of how the mark scheme should be applied, so there is consistency across all centres. The adjustments of centre marks up or down, or marks remaining the same, is a reflection of the application of the agreed standard.

In this second external moderation of the new format coursework, centres are advised to take note of advice given in the moderator report, which is specific to their centre, and the findings and advice given in this report. This will assist future marking and assessing of candidates work for this unit.

Centre administration

- Most coursework samples arrived on time with their moderator, and there were very few that failed to include work from the highest and lowest scoring candidates if they were not part of the pre-selected sample. However, some moderators had to contact centres to request the highest and lowest, which inevitably delayed the process. Also, some centres did not submit a copy of the EDI form.
- The Specification requires candidates to include a word count. Best practice was seen by moderators when the word count was included at the end of the piece of work, or as an accumulative word count on each page. Either method is acceptable. It was noted by moderators that some candidates did not include a word count at all. It is important that centres check this and ensure a word count is on candidates work.
- Most Centres adhered to the word recommendations, and the further guidance provided by Edexcel, where a candidate was either over or under, and this was

usually commented on by the Centre. Centres are advised that in all levels of the mark scheme the statement 'it is not concise' is a reference to those candidates who do not operate within word recommendations, and, therefore, that is the mark range that should be applied when the 'best fit' level has been determined.

- The resource records sheet still appears to be problematic for some centres:
 - Some were 'signed off' by the teacher concerned on the same day. Such centres had failed to appreciate that regular monitoring of the resource records is a necessary part of the validation process. Furthermore, they had clearly missed the opportunity of utilising the resource records for mentoring their students as their research progressed.
 - Some students (and therefore their teachers) clearly failed to appreciate how the resource records should be used. There were instances where only the three selected works appeared on the resource records, but the submission was accompanied by an extensive bibliography – that stretched credulity.
 - Some students failed to asterisk their selected works.
 - Most students had word processed their resource records and some teachers made this the reason for failing to demonstrate access to the records. This is clearly unsatisfactory, both as an excuse and as a process. It should /must be possible for teachers to access word-processed resource records at regular intervals. Many centres manage to do this, and all must.
- Moderators appreciated centres that had put the sample in mark order, starting with the highest scoring candidate. Centres that clearly indicated on the front cover sheet which were the highest and lowest scoring candidates was also appreciated by moderators, as it assists the moderation process when sampling.
- Moderators reported that many centres had indicated on the front cover sheet the levels awarded for each of the bullet points, and then arrived at a 'best fit' overall level and mark. However, some centres merely put a total mark and a general summative comment about the piece of work. The former method assists in the moderation process very much, while the latter method makes it difficult to see how the overall mark has been arrived at. Centres are advised that candidates do not always operate completely within one level (particularly candidates at Level 3 and Level 4) and more often display qualities across two levels (and sometimes even three), so a breakdown of bullet points and levels is very helpful in understanding the mark awarded.

Standard of work

The standard of work was generally good, and the majority of candidates were able to engage, with varying degrees of success, with their selected interpretations. Weaker candidates were those who had selected text-books as one or more of their chosen works, had selected factors relating to an event rather than significantly different interpretations or who simply reiterated the interpretations in their own words. The higher scoring candidates demonstrated sound evidence of wider reading and were confident in challenging historians' different interpretations with their own research.

A significant number of candidates followed a set formula: analysis (or attempted analysis) of the views of the three chosen historians, followed by comparison/cross reference with other historians. Some candidates tended to use the chosen works as sources to illustrate rather than interrogate their argument.

Some points, however, still need to be made:

- A sizeable number of candidates engaged with schools of thought, particularly when dealing with 20th century Germany and the Cold War. They selected works that were representative of the different schools and, obviously, presented different interpretations. However, where some candidates went off-piste was where they focused on the schools of thought themselves, rather than the specific interpretations of the three historians, and this weakened their responses. This is not an exercise in simply identifying that a historian is an 'intentionalist', functionalist, or 'revisionist'. That in itself is not sufficient, and often sent candidates down a path of description rather than an analysis and evaluation of interpretations and how they differ.
- Most candidates struggled with bullet 4 in finding and applying 'appropriate criteria'. Some used the criteria on the Edexcel web-site – and used it not very successfully; others invented their own check list, and still more assessed the validity of the interpretations by testing them against their own reading / research. These latter methods were generally the more successful. Centres need to work with their students in relation to thinking about the criteria by which interpretations can be judged. This is not something that can be simply taught, as each coursework task can be different, and it is up to the student to determine valid criteria. For centres where candidates all do the same questions, this raises a challenging teaching issue.
- In many centres, candidates all researched interpretations of the same topic. It is important that centres ensure, nevertheless, that this constitutes independent research, particularly as many used the same basic reading list, selecting, usually, three from the same five 'works' on which to focus. Anecdotally, where a centre allowed its students a free choice of topics, candidates tended to do better and real enthusiasm shone through their research.
- The following examples demonstrate some of the above issues:

Example 1 (Standardisation script 3) Moderated mark 40/40 Level 5

This script demonstrated the qualities of all the bullet points in Level 5, so was awarded a mark at the top of the level. There is a real sense here of the candidate exploring and discussing the issue raised by the question. A range of relevant material has been appropriately selected and deployed with precision, and used with discrimination to support a judgement based on the differences found in the three works. Valid criteria are established and applied in reaching a judgement, based on a logical and coherent argument.

Historians have disagreed about how far Cromwell himself was responsible for his limited success as Lord Protector.

What is your view about how far Cromwell himself was responsible for his limited success as Lord Protector?

The extent to which Oliver Cromwell was personally responsible for his limited success as Lord Protector has been a topic of dispute among historians. Many interwoven factors ranging from individual bodies of power, to the constitution, to the deep divisions in society contributed to preventing the success of the protectorate government. The limited success of the Protectorate rests in these fundamentals; Cromwell's narrow basis of support among the ruling classes, his failure to gain a functional relationship with his parliaments, which ultimately prevented the establishment of a stable constitutional settlement. Coward's argument is centred on how Cromwell's failures were a consequence of his prioritizing godly reform over his want for 'healing and settlement'. Coward makes use of many of sources produced by Cromwell himself, which contrasts with Worden who uses the views of Cromwell's contemporaries to conclude that the major causes of failure were Cromwell's character and the military origins of the Instrument of Government. Unlike Coward and Worden, whose investigations surround the life and influence of Cromwell, Aylmer's focus is on constitutional changes throughout the Stuart age and their impact on society. Consequently, he argues that the failures were rooted in the deep divisions in society and that they were then worsened by the Army presence in protectorate rule. When considering the whole of the protectorate rule, it can be argued that the deep severances in society, coupled with the military influence in government were the underlying causes of the limited success, however, had it not been for Cromwell's strong desire for godly reformation preventing cordial relations with Parliament, the rule of the Lord Protector would most probably have experienced more success.

A major limitation of the protectorate was the amount of support it received from the ruling classes; according to Aylmer 'whatever constitution might be

Historical debate
lines 1-8

clearly aware of historical argument

BP3/5

Argument Historian

difference with some reasons for them

Summary of argument

that is the Aylmer's view

implemented, the basis of support for the Protector was too narrow'.¹ He claims that this problem was rooted in the chronic divides in society; there were deep civil-military splits among his supporters and many ex-Rumpers had turned against Cromwell because they saw 'a Protectorate as a step backward towards the monarchy'.² This view is supported by Tanner's investigation into the opposition facing the constitution. With the use of speeches from contemporary preachers and republicans, Tanner concludes that the Instrument failed to satisfy extreme republicans because of its creation of a permanent executive authority, which was to a great extent independent of parliament.³ This meant that the style of Cromwell's regime immediately isolated him from the support of strong republicans, thereby restricting the breadth of those in favour of his government. However, the preachers cited by Tanner were Fifth Monarchist, a small radical group in the 1640s and 1650s, so the extent to which divisions in society prevented the Protector from gaining support among the moderate majority of the ruling class cannot be determined with the use of Tanner's investigation.

Additional
historian
used to
evaluate

Own
evaluation

BP5

The protectorate regime was faced with the challenge of uniting a divided nation that was still recovering from the civil wars. There were divisions between royalists and parliamentarians, but more importantly there had been a fall out between the ruling classes and the Army. Jones claims that 'no ingenuity could bridge the gap between soldier masters and civilian subjects'.⁴ He uses the Humble Petition and Advice to exemplify this. The Humble Petition was a

Contextual
knowledge

Additional
historian
+ support
for his
argument

¹ G. Aylmer, *The Struggle for the Constitution*, London, Blandford Press, 1963, p. 148

² Ibid.

³ J.R. Tanner, *English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century 1603-1689*, London, The Syndics of the University Cambridge Press, 1928, p. 185

⁴ I.D. Jones, *The English Revolution*, London, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1931, p. 99

critera
BP2

parliamentary constitution which moved the country in the conservative direction that the majority of MPs wanted to go. Although the Army Council's constitution had been a principle area of conflict, the introduction of a parliamentary constitution did not ease the tension. This shows that despite the compromises the partitions remained evident, strengthening Aylmer's argument that the chronic divides in society limited the success in the protectorate regime. That being said, Cromwell's lack of popularity was not solely due to people's dislike of the style of government, many contemporaries criticised his character. He lost the support of many allies and 'his sympathizers were outnumbered by his haters'⁵.

Evolution
Judgment

Worden argues that Cromwell's support diminished throughout his rule and 'people who had once rejoiced in the regicide or in the abolition of the monarchy... saw their cause of retreat'⁶ Unlike Aylmer whose inquiry delves into the progression of society during the Stuart age, Worden focuses on Cromwell's influence during the Interregnum. As a result of this, he makes use of personal sources, like diaries and letters from parliamentarians during the protectorate, to explore Cromwell's impact on politics during the Interregnum. This leads to Worden to conclude that, although deep divides were apparent, Cromwell's unpopularity stemmed from the disillusionment of his allies, which was caused by their perception of the Protector rather than the regime. He claims that 'Cromwell was universally mistrusted'⁷ especially among those who were once his allies. Many of his contemporaries thought that he 'used godly reformation as engine of his own advancement and he abandoned it and fatally

Worden's view
Explanation of difference focus and sources

⁵ B. Worden, *God's Instrument*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 231
⁶ *Ibid*, p. 232
⁷ *Ibid*, p. 231

compromised it once the advancement had been achieved'⁸, however this can only be argued to a certain degree. Beliefs concerning religious toleration were widely shared within the Army. By failing to fully achieve his aims in regards to godly reform, Cromwell may have been perceived to be using godly reform as a means to maintain military support. Morrill strengthens this argument by comparing the words and actions of Cromwell, claiming that 'Cromwell's public performance became more king-like. But whenever he described himself he downplayed it'⁹. Cromwell's misrepresentation of his actions makes it plausible that there may have been suspicion surrounding him. The protectorate's drift towards a more conservative government with the acceptance of the Humble Petition and Advice, most likely solidified this distrust.

However, this movement away from the desires of the Army cannot be solely blamed on Cromwell's character. Had there not been the civil-military divide in society, Cromwell would not have had to jeopardize the support of his military and Rump allies in hopes of winning over the opposition. Furthermore, throughout his rule, Cromwell never gave up on achieving religious reform in England, causing him to experience political isolation. In many ways his pursuit for reformation prevented him from expanding his basis of support.

One of the main factors that attributed to the failure of the protectorate rule was Cromwell's personal priorities. Coward believes that it was this rather than his character that limited his success. His argument revolves around the fact that Cromwell often prioritized his aim for godly reform over his desire for 'healing

⁸ B. Worden, *God's Instrument*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 233

⁹ J. Morrill, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 91

and settling'¹⁰. Religious freedom and settlement were two contrasting goals. The degree of tolerance that Cromwell wanted required progressive thinking; it was far more radical than any toleration that had been upheld in the country previously, yet at the same time he wanted a settlement, which meant returning to the old conservative ways. It was difficult to push for one goal without stifling the other. The Major Generals' 'reformation of manner' strongly demonstrates Coward's point. Following the Penruddock in 1655 Major Generals were added to local governments as a security measure; but after the failure of expeditions to capture Hispaniola, Cromwell introduced the 'reformation of manners'. This was most likely because he saw the failure as a sign of God rebuking England. The majority of historians agree that the 'reformation of manners' and the decimation tax were significant failures of the protectorate; they exacerbated and unearthed divisions in society and 'roused hatred in localities'¹¹. This failure was a direct consequence of Cromwell favouring godly reform over the 'healing and settling' of the country. Although the initiative was short lived, its infamy most likely impacted any future attempts Cromwell made to try and gain support.

Evaluation
drawing
on
contextual
knowledge
judgment

Coward also argues that by focusing on religious reformation, Cromwell was unable to build good relations with the ruling classes and rid himself of army ties, which constrained his support basis. This is evident in the Major General experiment but can also be supported by the Fundamentals laid down by Cromwell in the parliament of 1654. Included in the Fundamentals was the preservation of religious liberties, a matter which he refused to compromise on.

Use of
contextual
knowledge
to
evaluate

¹⁰ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 268
¹¹ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 272

Few shared Cromwell's views on toleration, making it a major source of tension between him and his parliament. This leads Woolrych to claim that, had Cromwell abandoned the cause he believed in, 'his path might have been smoother.'¹² This reiterates the significance of Cromwell's priorities in limiting his success. Additionally, it challenges Worden's argument by suggesting that it was not the fact that Cromwell appeared to be moving away from his godly cause, but his refusal to relent on these beliefs that restricted his support.

Additional historian

Evaluation

The contrast in Worden and Coward's viewpoints lies in their focus. Worden focuses more on why Cromwell lost the support of many of his allies whilst Coward concentrates on why Cromwell failed to gain support from the pre-existing opposition. Consequently, whilst Coward puts more emphasis on the actions and words of Cromwell, Worden observes how the Protector was viewed by his associates. When considering why Cromwell did not gain sufficient support, Coward's argument holds more strength; because, although some were very vocal, those who supported Cromwell's religious aims and oppositions to his acceptance of the Humble Petition, were a minority among the ruling classes. It was Cromwell's actions rather than his character that limited his success. Driven by his desire for godly reform, he pushed for changes such as the 'reformation of manners', which heightened pre-existing tensions, preventing him from gaining sufficient support for a successful regime.

Explanation of differences: historians' foci and questions

Evaluation with sound justification

Cromwell's failure to establish a strong working partnership with Parliament was closely tied to his failure to achieve a lasting constitutional settlement, which

Second issue

¹² A. Woolrych, *England Without a King*, London, Methuen & Co, Ltd, 1983, p. 35

criteria

BP3

Further criteria

contributed significantly to his limited success. These problems hindered the legislative function of government and caused financial difficulties. The political instability in the country made landowners increasingly reluctant to lend money. The regime's limited support created hostile parliamentary relations and failures to achieve settlement, but factors such as the Instrument of Government, military presence in government and Cromwell's rejection of the Crown also contributed.

Aylmer argues that Cromwell's failures with Parliament were largely a result of political mismanagement. He claims that 'Cromwell did not grasp the need to build up a properly led and organized government party in the House of Commons'¹³. Cromwell had several Councillors in the Commons as well as several well-spoken military colleagues, but he failed to strategically place them in the Commons for his benefit. Furthermore, Cromwell attended less than half of the 800 meetings with his Council, from his attendance patterns Morrill argues that 'at times it is hard not to conclude that he was deliberately absenting himself at a time of decisions with which he did not wish to be associated'¹⁴. This lack of control of his advisors most likely fed into the problems he had controlling parliament, especially given that as head of state he rarely attended parliamentary session. Although political mismanagement contributed to Cromwell's disharmony with Parliament, Aylmer overlooks the significance of the constitutions in preventing the smooth running of Parliament. In the first protectorate parliament, especially, it was the Parliament's opposition to the

¹³ G. Aylmer, *The Struggle for the Constitution*, London, Blandford Press, 1963, p. 150

¹⁴ J. Morrill, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 87

Instrument of Government rather than Cromwell's management that obstructed his successful governing.

The Instrument caused disharmony between Cromwell and Parliament; so much so that 'both [protectorate parliaments] had to be purged before they could safely be allowed to proceed'¹⁵. Coward claims that the Instrument infringed parliamentary liberties 'in ways no monarch... had done'¹⁶. He argues that the Instrument perpetuated the power of the Army and 'there would be no cooperation with Parliament until the Instrument... was amended'¹⁷. There is strength in this claim, as during the seventeenth century, the primary role of Parliament was to control taxation. Under the Instrument of Government, Parliament first needed to provide enough revenue for 30,000 men, a sufficient fleet and £200,000 per annum for civil government, before they could control taxation¹⁸. To many MPs, this may have been seen as a breach of their liberties as it restricted their main role, which supports Coward's claim. However, Bennet challenges the extent to which the Instrument brought about new restrictions.

Like Coward, he argues that the content of the Instrument troubled Parliament, but emphasises their desire for military control, a desire he traces back to the settlement presented to Charles I in the 1640s. He argues that a key issue in the Instrument that was challenged was the Protector's control of the militia¹⁹. Under a single head of state, Parliament usually did not have military control, which suggests that it was the demands of Parliament rather than new constraints presented in the Instrument that caused problems. This is more

¹⁵ G. Aylmer, *The Struggle for the Constitution*, London, Blandford Press, 1963, p. 148

¹⁶ B. Coward, *Oliver Cromwell*, United States of America, Longman Inc., 1991, p. 104-5

¹⁷ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 269

¹⁸ A. Woolrych, *England Without a King*, London, Methuen & Co, Ltd, 1983, p. 32

¹⁹ M. Bennet, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, p. 228

likely to have been the case as during the first protectorate parliament, outside of MPs attacking the constitution and toleration, the Army was the main points of conflict.

Like Coward, Worden states that the Instrument was problematic for the Protector, but emphasised the constitution's 'genesis' rather than its content.

According to Worden, MPs were willing to accept the general outline of the constitution provided that it was acknowledged to be devised from Parliament.

Worden develops his argument, by citing Thomas Burton - an MP from 1656-1659- who said 'the sense and opinion in the House was generally in favour of

the principal of a parliament and a single person, limited as parliament should see fit'²⁰ This implies that, because Army Council established the constitution,

many MPs felt that their power entitlement was undermined. Consequently, the Instrument lacked legitimacy. This problem of legitimacy is particularly

highlighted by the Cony case. George Cony was imprisoned in May 1655 for refusing to pay customs duties on silk, on the grounds that the ordinance levying

customs duties was invalid as it lacked parliamentary sanction. However, the ordinance was legal under the Instrument of Government, meaning his case

undermined the constitution, and consequently the position of the Protector. The trial highlights how, by refusing the government legitimacy, the Army origins

of the constitution limited the amount of authority people perceived of it, which is likely to be a reason that Parliament attacked the Instrument. These attacks,

coupled with Cromwell's refusal to amend the constitution, also limited the quest for settlement, which hindered the success of the protectorate.

²⁰ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 248

Worden explores the idea further by looking at the introduction of the Humble Petition and Advice, arguing that it was an anti-military constitution, and that the large support was garnered from it being a parliamentary document. This claim was justified by John Birch, an MP who had been the leader of the opposition in 1654, and states; 'our parliament could not be free by the Instrument... were it no more, but for this freedom of parliament, I should be in love with the Petition and Advice'²¹. The phrase 'freedom of parliament' is ambiguous without wider context. It can support Worden, by implying that the creation of Instrument in the Army Council had impeded the right of Parliament to create legislature. However, it can also be interpreted as Birch saying that the content of the constitution constrained Parliamentary liberties, aiding Coward's argument. The slight difference between the views of Coward and Worden lies in the focus of each historian's investigation.

ambiguity of reasons for different interpretations
Historians' focus

Worden explores Cromwell's influence in government during the Interregnum, so his investigation focuses on how Cromwell's contemporaries viewed his regime. Worden largely sources information from MPs, looking at how they retaliated to the Instrument to draw conclusions as to why there was such strong opposition to the constitution. Meanwhile Coward's investigation is dealing with the Stuart Age in England, meaning he makes use of a broader time scale and compares the Instrument to the previous constitution. As a result, he concentrates on the content of Lambert's constitution, emphasising the changes to parliamentary liberties. For exploring how the Instrument limited parliamentary relations and settlement, and in turn the success of the

Criteria

Explanation of bases for different interpretations

²¹ B. Worden, *God's Instrument*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 251

protectorate rule, the views of MPs provide a clearer picture, as it was their opposition to the constitution that contributed to preventing effective governing. However, whilst sources from MPs are useful, the evidence Worden presents is too limited, and at times too ambiguous, to fully conclude that the majority of the Commons were most troubled by the origins of the constitution. The fact the Army was a main source of debate in the first protectorate parliament suggests that the content of the Instrument, especially parliamentary liberties in regard to the army, also played a substantial role in causing Cromwell tensions with Parliament.

Evaluation

Judgment

Even though the Instrument of Government was a central cause of Cromwell's limited success, it is impossible to deny that the Army were an underlying cause.

Judgment

Both Aylmer and Worden argue that it was the Instrument's association with the Army that hindered it. Worden postulates that the army was a permanent block

Comparison

to 'the civilisation of the regime.'²² During the debates over the standing army in the 1690s, the MPs referred to two traumatic points: the reign of the James II and the Interregnum. Hutton uses this to justify his claim that the 'transformation from a de-militarised government in the early 17th Century to militarised one in the 1640s and 1650s was dramatic'²³ This implies that the

Additional historian

military's presence in the country was viewed as damaging. It is possible that Cromwell would have been more successful, had he cut his military ties; but Cromwell needed them to implement godly reforms. Through the use of speeches and Parliament's history of intolerance, Tanner argues that 'the army

Additional historian

²² Ibid, p. 250

²³ R. Hutton, *Military Dictatorship*, [podcast], <http://www.history.org.uk/historian/module/8460/the-cromwell-discussion>, (04/10/2016)

was the sole guarantee of toleration²⁴, as Cromwell feared that parliamentary control would lead of persecution. This suggest that the problems Cromwell faced with Parliament over the Army stemmed from his drive for religious toleration, supporting Coward's earlier argument that a cause of Cromwell's limited success was his personal priorities. *Evaluation*

Another factor that hindered Cromwell's parliamentary relations and the foundation of a lasting settlement was his rejection of the Crown. Many historians believe that, had Cromwell accepted the Crown under the Humble Petition and Advice, support for his regime would have increased and it 'would have provided a familiar kind of resolution to civil strife'²⁵.

Although there is uncertainty as to why Cromwell refused kingship, Aylmer and Worden emphasise the Army's influence over the Protector. Aylmer claims that Cromwell was 'under very heavy pressure from the Army to refuse'²⁶ and Worden furthers this view, arguing that Cromwell's rejection of the Crown 'at the Army's behest showed little security for civilian and parliamentary rule the new constitution gave'²⁷. Cromwell's military background meant he held strong ties to the army, and though there were only four officers in Cromwell's original Council of State, the Protector was still subject to their opinion. He had officers in the Commons and also held weekly dinners with army officers, in which he may have faced political lobbying from officers.²⁸ However, there is a degree of *contextual knowledge applied.*

²⁴ J.R. Tanner, *English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century 1603-1689*, London, The Syndics of the University Cambridge Press, 1928, p. 183

²⁵ B. Worden, *God's Instrument*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 237

²⁶ G. Aylmer, *The Struggle for the Constitution*, London, Blandford Press, 1963, p. 149

²⁷ B. Worden, *God's Instrument*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 250

²⁸ J. Morrill, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 89

uncertainty as to the level of influence the Army had over Cromwell. His meetings with his officers were unminuted making it difficult to determine what they entailed. Furthermore, during the rule of the Lord Protector there was a decline in the army's influence in government. By the end of 1656, Cromwell was in 'close association with groups of advisers who had no connection to the army.'²⁹

Evaluation
+ description
of uncertainty

Unlike Worden and Aylmer, Coward finds 'it difficult to believe, given the bravado performance in outfacing hostile army officers on 27 February 1657 and at other times in his career, fear of the army was a prime consideration.'³⁰

diffidence
of

Worden and Aylmer examine how Cromwell still had the views of the Army surrounding him, producing a causal link between their demand and the rejection of the Crown. This is a reasonable conclusion given the initial willingness Cromwell presented to accepting the Crown. Coward, however, contrasts this by broadening the time scale and reviewing Cromwell's dealings with political input from the Army in the past. Outside of establishing Cromwell as Lord Protector, the Army's influence in the executive had been minimal.

interpretation

Evaluation

Worden's investigation places a lot of emphasis on the words of contemporary parliamentarians; whose opposition to the Army, possibly caused them to view it to have obstructed their attempts at settlement. Meanwhile Coward focuses more on Cromwell's speeches, in particular, those made in March and April of 1657. On 3rd March the Protector said 'if these considerations [the powers detailed in the proposed new constitution] fall upon a person or persons that God has no pleasure in... that perhaps may be the end of this work.'³¹ This leads

Explanation
- historians'
focus and
sources

²⁹ B. Coward, *Oliver Cromwell*, United States of America, Longman Inc., 1991, p. 146

³⁰ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 274

³¹ *Ibid*, p.274

Coward to argue that it was the fear that he was someone in whom 'God had no pleasure' that made Cromwell realize that restoring 'the monarch that had been abolished by God's blessing'³² could result in 'God's rebuke' and an end to godly reformation. This idea is furthered by the speech Cromwell gave on 13 April 1657 in which he repeated five times that God had blasted the title and name. There is an apparent implication that he rejected the Crown as he believed it was the will of God, supporting Coward's argument that a key problem in Cromwell's rule was his prioritizing of godly reform over his want for settlement³³. Bennet suggests that 'Cromwell had no intention of accepting the Crown'³⁴. He draws upon the same speech as Cowardice, but views that Cromwell's expression of interest during negotiations led people to believe that he was favouring the kingship, when in actuality he saw no need to accept the Crown. This discrepancy between their arguments is probably due to their individual perceptions of Cromwell's character.

Evaluation

Additional
historian

Explanation

When Cromwell became Lord Protector, the nature of evidence available for historians on him changes from a flow of personal letters to a series of speeches³⁵. Since there is much controversy surrounding how genuine Cromwell's public image was; Coward and Bennet's interpretation of his speeches partly depend on their views about Cromwell. Whether or not Cromwell wanted the Crown, the issue remains that had he accepted it, his regime could have been more successful.

Access

of

sources

and

problems

of

interpretation

³² Ibid

³³ J. Morrill, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 104

³⁴ M. Bennet, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxon, Routledge, 2006, p. 251

³⁵ P. Gaunt, *Oliver Cromwell*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1996, p. 153-4

The argument that Cromwell's priorities prevented him from accepting the Crown is strengthened when reviewing why Cromwell was initially willing to accept the Humble Petition. From the start of his rule, up until 1656, Cromwell had adamantly stuck by the Instrument of Government. The turning point in Cromwell's attitude towards accepting a new constitution was the Nayler Case in October 1656. This was when James Nayler, a Quaker who re-enacted Christ's entry to Jerusalem, was sentenced to whipping and mutilation by parliament. The religious intolerance of the MPs concerned the Protector, and 'highlighted the danger that parliamentary religious intolerance might be extended to religious groups with which Cromwell sympathised'³⁶. It was this realization that most likely opened Cromwell to the idea of constitutional reform, as it presented a way for him to keep the MPs' intolerance in check. Even the establishment of the Humble Petition showed that Cromwell's aims were centred on the success of godly reform rather than settlement, again supporting the Coward's argument that Cromwell's aim limited his success.

Evaluation

application of contextual

knowledge

judgement

In summary, although many factors contributed to the limited success of Cromwell as the Lord Protector, Coward's argument is most convincing as, had it not been for Cromwell's drive for godly reform, deepening the divisions in society and preventing the creation of a lasting settlement with Parliament, the protectorate may have experienced more success. The fundamental problems for the protectorate were legitimacy and lack of support, which were initially rooted in the chronic divisions in society and the Army's role in the conception of Cromwell's power as protector- two key factors emphasised in the arguments of Aylmer and Worden. Although these problems were out of Cromwell's

Evaluation

judgement

³⁶ B. Coward, *The Stuart Age*, United States of America, Longman Publishing, 1980, p. 270

BR2

control, he exacerbated them by instigating the 'reformation of manner' given Major Generals. Furthermore, Cromwell's desire for godly reform played a key role in guiding his quest for settlement, as evident in the Nayler case. The want for reform most likely pushed him towards rejecting the Crown, a decision which prevented the development of a lasting settlement in the country and increased the support from the ruling classes.

Bp 1 L5

Bp 2 L5

Bp 3 L5

Bp 4 L5

Bp 5 L5

$$\begin{array}{r} 40 \\ \hline 40 \end{array} \quad \boxed{L5}$$

Word Count: 4000

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Example 2 (Standardisation script 6) Moderated mark 23/40 Level 3

This script demonstrated mostly Level 3 qualities. It contained a range of relevant material taken from a range of reading and selected and deployed it with precision. Judgement was related to some of the key points, there was some analysis of the differences within the three works, attempts were made to establish criteria, and some understanding of the conceptual focus of the enquiry was demonstrated.

Historians have disagreed about the extent to which Hitler was responsible for the Final Solution. What is your view about the extent to which Hitler was responsible for the Final Solution?

- Analyse the ways in which interpretations of the question, problem or issue differ
- Explain the differences you have identified
- Evaluate the arguments, indicating which you have found most persuasive and explaining your judgement

Adolf Hitler's responsibility for the 'Final Solution' has been of major dispute amongst historians. Some believe that Hitler was an intentionalist; that he was a strong dictator and that he held the thought of genocide from day one and he worked his way up. Historian Lucy Dawidowicz believes this was the turning point in history and that Hitler had genocide of the Jews planned from 1919 up until 1942. Other historians believe that the responsibility of the final solution lay with the German citizens and that they played an active role during Nazi Germany through the spreading of propaganda and supporting the Nazi Government. Historian Daniel Goldhagen believed that the decision to kill the Jews was taken in summer 1941 in the East when the German shooting squads claimed it psychologically damaging to be killing Jews in cold blood. Other historians argue that Hitler was a structuralist. That he was a weak dictator. They claim that the complex overlap in authorities in the Third Reich meant that Hitler's orders were not always followed and other authorities had considerable power for example Himmler, the SS and the foreign office. Historian Ian Kershaw believes Hitler devised the plan much later, in 1941, when there were too many Jews to be taken care of only through work camps in the Soviet Union. This essay attempts to analyse historian's different views on the final solution and whether or not Hitler was solely responsible for the genocide of the Jews from the beginning or whether other people were involved.

3 different views outlined

The extent to which Adolf Hitler was personally responsible for the final solution of the Jews in 1941 has long been a bone of contention among historians due to varying degrees of responsibility the two other adversaries had in causing the Holocaust. The first interpretation claims that Hitler had in fact planned a permanent end to the Jews back in 1918. That everything after Operation Barbarossa was part of a masterplan Hitler had from 1919. Historian Lucy Dawidowicz believes that Hitler was responsible for the decision to kill the Jews; that 'the hatred of the Jews was Hitler's central and most compelling belief and that it dominated his thoughts and his actions all his life.'¹ Hitler even went as far to blame the Jews for losing the War in 1914, claiming that the Jews were the culprits of Germany's defeat. Lucy Dawidowicz argues that 'From the start, the idea to murder the Jews was just an inchoate phantom inhabiting Hitler's mind'². She insists Hitler had always been fixated on the total destruction of the Jewish race. Her argument is supported by Hitler's autobiography 'Mein Kampf' when he warns the Reichstag: 'if the Jewish financiers outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then

¹ L. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews 1933-45*, New York, 1975, p. xix.

² *Ibid.*, p. xix

confirmed here - this is the January 1939 speech.

the result will not be bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of the Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.³ This piece of evidence suggests that Hitler had always insisted on a definitive solution to the Jewish question. Historian Eberhard Jackel would agree with Dawidowicz that Mein Kampf is a long rant against the three principles that Hitler saw as the antithesis of his three sacred principles, namely internationalism, democracy and pacifism. Jackel argues that Mein Kampf is not only a 'blueprint' for power but also for genocide. Jackel's book was noteworthy as the first account of Hitler's beliefs written in Germany by someone from the left.⁴ Historian Michael Marrus claims some local officials were shocked to hear the plan for the final solution which suggests that the idea did not originate with them but with Hitler.

Support

Dawidowicz believes Hitler's long-term plan to exterminate them was achieved undercover of war and that he 'planned to murder the Jews in coordination with his plans to go to war for Lebensraum'⁵. September 16th 1919 was when Adolf Hitler issued his first written comment on the Jewish Question⁶ when he declared Judaism as a race and not a religion. An intentionalist would argue that Hitler's elimination of the Jews was posed through political speeches and various forms of exoterically/esoterically and ambiguous lexical choices. That he 'turned political anti-Semitism into racial doctrine whose purpose was the destruction of the Jews.'⁷ He used words like 'removal', 'elimination' and 'cleaning up' which, through interpretation and ambiguity, insinuates early thoughts about the finality of the Jews complete destruction. Hitler's meeting on 27th April 1920 is supporting evidence for this interpretation for example in Hitler's closing remarks he said 'We will carry on the struggle until the last Jew is removed from the German Reich'⁸ Although Hitler didn't systematise widespread extermination of the Jews until 1942, he uses severely homicidal noun phrases such as 'destruction of the Jews' which was a proto-genocidal notion. Of course, plans take time to develop and materialise and Dawidowicz would say that this was evident in these three steps: First through foreign policy in 1933 with the boycott of Jewish shops. Intentionalists would argue this reveals Hitler's the intent to undermine the viability of Jews in Germany and the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 removed Jewish citizenship. Then with economic policy in 1938 when Hitler aryanised businesses. Lastly with racial policy in November 1938- the night of the broken glass- 'Kristallnacht'. However, a structuralist would argue that the Boycott of 1933 only lasted a day therefore it wasn't as severe and didn't suggest a long-term plan for the final solution. Also, historian Ian Kershaw would argue that the Nuremberg laws were a last minute draft written up by Hitler- supporting his view that 'the aim was destroying the power of the Jews'⁹ by expulsion, not extermination and that the plan for the permanent destruction of the Jews wasn't until January 1939 when Hitler announced in his speech that 'the war will end with the annihilation of the Jews'. Kershaw would disagree with Lucy Dawidowicz intentionalist view by saying even Hitler couldn't have envisioned the holocaust in detail so early. That in 1920 'he's not thinking in concrete terms about Treblinka and Auschwitz'¹⁰.

LD ?

intent but not supported

draws out some differences

³ <http://www.yadvashem.org/docs/extract-from-hitler-speech.html>

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eberhard_J%C3%A4ckel , visited 23/03/18

⁵ *ibid.*, p. xix.

⁶ Hitler's Power, <http://ww2timelines.com/leaders/hitler/hitler2power.htm>, 28/03/18

⁷ Dawidowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 195.

⁹ Kershaw, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁰ Kershaw, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

some correct citation

Historian Ian Kershaw sees the structures of the Nazi state as far more important than the personality of Hitler. Kershaw's structuralist view believes that the Final Solution wasn't the result of himself as Hitler was a 'weak dictator' and that the blame lies with the Bureaucrats. Lots of bureaucratic agencies played a significant part in the Holocaust. The German Foreign Office promoted anti-Semitic propaganda which supported the Nazi-theory and they defended Nazi policy abroad. In addition to this, other bureaucratic agencies were involved in the transportation of German Jews to the concentration camps. Ian Kershaw criticizes intentionalist views that Hitler had a plan for the holocaust from the beginning and he explains how the holocaust came to materialise throughout numerous attempts of getting rid of the Jews and through the bureaucrats. In one article he mentions that the Final Solution was definitely not thought out until 1931. That there were just too many Jews for the Nazis to handle between the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the invasion of the soviet Union in 1941 and so Hitler had to 'devise policies to deal with those'¹¹. Kershaw believes it was throughout these 18 months when Hitler began to think of a more permanent solution for the Jews. And any time before this, Hitler's original plan was to 'deport Europe's Jews into the Soviet Union and there they will starve to death or they will be worked to death'¹². It was only after this wasn't working and after there were too many Jews that genocide became Hitler's tactic for getting rid of them permanently. Kershaw says that the 'final solution' was 'something that was devised as the war in the East didn't go according to plan in the autumn and the winter of 1941-2.'¹³

Alternative view

Kershaw argues that the bureaucrats took initiative in initiating the policy to meet Hitler's political speeches on anti-Semitism. However when individuals like Eichmann who was Colonel of the Nazi party and responsible for managing the deportation of the Jews to the concentration camps was taken into trail he claimed that 'he was forced to abandon his conscience in order to carry out his work, and that he never did anything without obtaining instructions from Hitler or his superiors.'¹⁴ Historian Peter Longerich would agree that Hitler's policies for the Jews were developed overtime. An example of this was The Madagascar plan which was dropped in 1940. Longerich says that Hitler was 'turning his attention away from Madagascar and thinking more seriously once more of the Generalgouvernement Poland.'¹⁵ Longerich claims that from Goebbels diary entry 'He sets Jews to work and they are also obedient. Later they must leave Europe entirely' and Frank writes 'the Fuhrer has told him that Poland will be the first area made free of Jews' it's clear that Poland was not the final destination for the intended evacuation of the Jews because it was itself to be made 'free of Jews' and the Jews were to 'leave Europe entirely'. These are promises that could only be realised over long term.

Historian Daniel Goldhagen would agree with Kershaw when he says that 'the actual practical steps are taken by his leading figures in the police'. As we know, Hitler's name was never on any documents, Hitler carried out his role in the final solution through propaganda with the title as 'Fuhrer' to legalise policies. Hitler's laws were passed through Himmler such as the Nuremberg laws. Multiple death camps were

3rd view

¹¹ Kershaw, *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹² Kershaw, *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹³ Kershaw, *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁴ Martha Gellhorn, *Eichmann and the Private Conscience*, 1962, p. 52-59.

¹⁵ Peter Longerich, 'The Unwritten Order' *Hitler's Role in the Final Solution*, 2016, London p. 79.

programmed through Himmler and he even said the Nazi party was based on the 'elimination of the Jews'¹⁶. For example, under the direction of Heinrich Himmler the Einsatzgruppen operated in territories occupied by the German armed forces following the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet Union) launched from occupied Poland in June 1941¹⁷. However the shooters declared it 'psychologically damaging' to carry on shooting the Jews in cold blood and with that Hitler began to think up different, more efficient ways to get rid of the Jews. Before Hitler's decision for the ~~final~~ final solution the SS began gassing Jews in the back of vans because it was less psychologically damaging for the SS than shooting them. Although Goldhagen's view differs from Ian Kershaw's, this point supports Kershaw's view; that Hitler didn't have a concrete plan for the final solution from the beginning and that it was conjured up through numerous attempts.

Goldhagen believes that everyone who participated played a significant role and were responsible for the outcome of the Jews in 1941-2, not solely Hitler. He claims that 'those who rounded up the Jews, deported them to a killing location, or cordoned off the area where their compatriots shot them were perpetrators.'¹⁸ each individual who was 'killing them directly through gas chambers or starving them to death'¹⁹ were significant in the involvement towards the Holocaust. Through years of anti-Semitism in Germany, ordinary citizens were conditioned into wanting to and actually eliminating the Jews from society. In addition, ordinary Germans were involved in the various stages of Jewish persecution for example: their role in Kristallnacht. This contradicts historian Lucy Dawidowicz intentionalist view by implying that Hitler wasn't completely responsible for the final solution. Although orders had come from the Fuhrer, the German citizens obliged without objection. In relation to the point of view that ordinary Germans were responsible, there's evidence that fifty guards were necessary for every five hundred prisoners in a satellite camp, a ratio of one to ten. Daniel claims 'if anything resembling this ratio is applied to 10,000 German camps with its millions of prisoners, or even to a smaller number of these camps which housed Jews, it becomes obvious that the number of people managing the system of destruction was enormous.'²⁰ This implies and highlights the amount of regular German citizens that were involved in the managing of the camps which is evident that ordinary Germans did have a significant role to play in the holocaust. Historian Christopher Browning agrees with Goldhagen that ordinary men from a working class background 'played a significant role however he believes that these men killed out of a basic obedience to authority and peer pressure, not blood-lust or primal hatred.'²¹

To conclude, although Hitler's intentions were extremely prominent and he demonstrated his complete hate for the Jews through political speeches and he openly espoused his program of annihilation in Mein Kampf, Hitler's name isn't fixed on any paperwork so he remains guilty of spreading his beliefs and anti-Semitism only through propaganda to the German citizens. Lucy Dawidowicz suggests that Hitler had the

¹⁶ <https://www.zachorfoundation.org/timeline/himmler-elimination-of-all-jews-in-generalgouvernement-by-end-of-1942/>, visited 21/03/18

¹⁷ Einsatzgruppen Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einsatzgruppen>, 14/04/18

¹⁸ D. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, London, 1996, p.164

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 173

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 167

²¹ Christopher Browning, *The Path to Genocide*, 1992, p. 142.

Tends to summarize here

intention of the final solution from as early as 1918. However Dawidowicz builds largely on secondary sources and conveying nothing whatever that could be called new and there's more evidence to suggest that although Hitler had the everlasting anti-Semitic view, he didn't think genocide until 1939. Ian Kershaw said 'removing the Jews meant different things to different people at different times'²². This implies that although Hitler didn't have a concrete plan, German citizens were still willing to support anti-Semitism. However, although each individual played their small but significant role in the holocaust, they would not have done these things without the implementation of the Fuhrer. It is undeniable that individuals like Himmler are fundamental to the holocaust; however, the idea that they bore all responsibility is short sighted due to Hitler's notion as early as 1920. All in all, the final solution was a result of the German state rather than it being a long-term plan of Hitler's and although Hitler hid behind propaganda, he did grant authority to individuals like Himmler and Heydrich and they were able to justify their actions by linking it to the will of the Fuhrer. Hitler was necessary but not sufficient to the cause of the final solution.

Words 2440

BP1 A range of material has been selected. There is some appropriate citation. An understanding of the material and the issues is shown.

BP2 There is a judgement but substantiation is limited and tends to focus only on LO's use of sources as explanation. Some contextual knowledge is integrated.

BP3 Differences are drawn out and some key points explained. Hints at differences in terms of the strength of Hitler and the structure of the state.

BP4 There is an attempt to establish criteria but not developed and weak substantiation. Better than L2 but not severe L3.

²² Ian Kershaw, op. Cit., p. 3.

BP5 clear trend in argument - some knowledge but not developed and explained. Answer is organised and concise

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Ian Kershaw, WWW2HISTORY.COM, 29/09/2016

Peter Longerich, *'The Unwritten Order' Hitler's Role in the Final Solution*, London, 2016

23/40 Meets L3 in all BPs but weaker
in BP4 thus mid high level rather
than at the top.

Annotation and marking

Marking by most centres was generally accurate and there were relatively few centres where moderation resulted in an adjustment of marks to the whole cohort. Many centres annotated their students' work thoroughly, using the wording of the mark scheme and showing where they had identified specific levels of the different bullets. Their summaries on each candidate's authentication sheet gave a brief resume of performance on each of the five bullet points. This practice is to be commended and encouraged. There were some centres, too, where internal moderation was not required, but it had been undertaken, presumably as a precaution. Again, a practice to be commended.

There are, however, still some problems:

- Where marking was inaccurate, it was usually in the assessment of bullets 3 and 4. There was a tendency to reward work at level 5 where there was no real understanding demonstrated of basis of the difference in the arguments presented, and the nature of the historical debate. The problems with bullet 4 have already been touched upon. These impacted on marking in that teachers had difficulty in identifying where, and in what ways, criteria were established and applied.
- A small number of centres failed to annotate the work of their candidates. It was thus tricky – and hard work – for moderators to establish just why specific levels and marks had been awarded on each of the five bullets. It would be politic to remind centres that moderation is not re-marking, but an assessment of the accuracy of the centre's marking.
- There were several instances where the students' work had clearly been marked by two different people, and where there was no indication that any internal moderation had taken place.

Overall, performance by candidates and their teachers represents development of the assessment of this particular component. Challenges have been embraced and met, and where there are problems, it is hoped that the E9 reports and this Principal Moderators Report will serve to rectify these.

Steve May (Principal Moderator)

9HI01/04

May/June 2018