



Pearson

Moderators' Report

Principal Moderator Feedback

Summer 2017

Pearson Edexcel A Level
In History (9HI0) Paper 04

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Summer 2017

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Introduction

This is the first year that centres have entered candidates for the coursework element of the new Specification, and it is clear that centres have responded positively to the new approach to coursework at Advanced level.

Many teachers had used Edexcel's coursework advisory service regarding the choice for their students of appropriate topics, interpretations and reading, and while this is not obligatory, it meant the candidates in those centres were completing coursework tasks that fitted the requirements stated in the specification. It should be noted that this does not mean that centres who did not use the service submitted tasks that were not appropriate, though in some cases tasks were too broad, and this would have been spotted and raised as an issue via the advisory service.

It was also evident that many centres had attended training courses provided by Edexcel regarding task setting and applying the new mark scheme. This stood them in good stead when it came to supporting and guiding their students and to assessing their work.

In this first external moderation of the new format coursework, centres are advised to take note of advice given in the moderator report, which is specific to their centre, and the findings and advice given in this report. This will assist future marking and assessing of candidates work for this unit.

Centre administration

- Most coursework samples arrived on time with their moderator, and there were very few that failed to include work from the highest and lowest scoring candidates if they were not part of the pre-selected sample. However, some moderators had to contact centres to request the highest and lowest, which inevitably delayed the process. The most common omission was the EDI form.
- The Specification requires candidates to include a word count. Best practice was seen by moderators when the word count was included at the end of the piece of work, or as an accumulative word count on each page. Either method is acceptable. It was noted by moderators that some candidates did not include a word count at all. It is important that centres check this and ensure a word count is on candidates work.
- Most Centres adhered to the word recommendations, and where a candidate went over this was usually commented on by the Centre. Centres are advised that in all levels of the mark scheme the statement 'it is not concise' is a reference to those candidates who do not operate within word limit, and, therefore, that is the mark range that should be applied when the 'best fit' level has been determined.
- The resource records appeared to be problematic for some centres:
 - Some were 'signed off' by the teacher concerned on the same day. Such centres had failed to appreciate that regular monitoring of the resource records is a necessary part of the validation process. Furthermore, they had clearly missed the opportunity of utilising the

resource records for mentoring their students as their research progressed.

➤ Some students (and therefore their teachers) clearly failed to appreciate how the resource records should be used. There were instances where only the three selected works appeared on the resource records, but the submission was accompanied by an extensive bibliography – that stretched credulity.

➤ Some students failed to asterisk their selected works.

➤ Most students had word processed their resource records and some teachers made this the reason for failing to demonstrate access to the records. This is clearly unsatisfactory, both as an excuse and as a process. It should /must be possible for teachers to access word-processed resource records at regular intervals. Many centres managed to do this, and all must.

- Moderators appreciated centres that had put the sample in mark order, starting with the highest scoring candidate. Centres that clearly indicated on the front cover sheet which were the highest and lowest scoring candidates was also appreciated by moderators, as it assists the moderation process when sampling.
- Moderators reported that many centres had indicated on the front cover sheet the levels awarded for each of the bullet points, and then arrived at a 'best fit' overall level and mark. However, some centres merely put a total mark and a general summative comment about the piece of work. The former method assists in the moderation process very much, while the latter method makes it difficult to see how the overall mark has been arrived at. Centres are advised that candidates do not always operate completely within one level (particularly candidates at Level 3 and Level 4) and more often display qualities across two levels (and sometimes even three), so a breakdown of bullet points and levels is very helpful in understanding the mark awarded.

Standard of work

The standard of work was generally good, and the majority of candidates were able to engage, with varying degrees of success, with their selected interpretations. Weaker candidates were those who had selected text-books as one or more of their chosen works, had selected factors relating to an event rather than significantly different interpretations or who simply reiterated the interpretations in their own words. The higher scoring candidates demonstrated sound evidence of wider reading and were confident in challenging historians' different interpretations with their own research.

A significant number of candidates followed a set formula: analysis (or attempted analysis) of the views of the three chosen historians, followed by comparison/cross reference with other historians. Some candidates tended to use the chosen works as sources to illustrate rather than interrogate their argument.

Some points, however, need to be made:

- A sizeable number of candidates engaged with schools of thought, particularly when dealing with 20th century Germany and the Cold War. They selected works that were representative of the different schools and so which, obviously, presented different interpretations. Where some candidates went off-piste was where they focused on the schools of thought themselves, rather than the specific interpretations of the three historians, and this weakened their responses. This is not an exercise in simply identifying that a historian is an 'intentionalist' or 'revisionist'. That in itself is not sufficient, and often sent candidates down a path of description rather than an analysis and evaluation of interpretations and how they differ.
- Most candidates struggled with bullet 4 in finding and applying 'appropriate criteria'. Some used the criteria on the Edexcel web-site – and used it not very successfully; others invented their own check list, and still more assessed the validity of the interpretations by testing them against their own reading / research. These latter methods were generally the more successful. Centres need to work with their students in relation to thinking about the criteria by which interpretations can be judged. This is not something that can be simply taught, as each coursework task can be different, and it is up to the student to determine valid criteria. For centres where candidates all do the same questions, this raises a challenging teaching issue.
- In many centres, candidates all researched interpretations of the same topic. It is important that centres ensure, nevertheless, that this constitutes independent research, particularly as many used the same basic reading list, selecting, usually, three from the same five 'works' on which to focus. Anecdotally, where a centre allowed its students a free choice of topics, candidates tended to do better and real enthusiasm shone through their research.

The following examples demonstrate some of the above issues:

Example 1

Moderated mark 16/40 Level 2

This script demonstrated the qualities of all of the bullet points in Level 2, so was awarded a mark at the top of the level. Information was taken from a range of reading, judgement related to the information rather than the issues of interpretation, some analysis of the three chosen works was evident, selection of criteria was implicit and the answer was concise.

Centre Marks

9/40

Mod mark

Coursework authentication sheet

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History	
Assignment title: To what extent was the Holocaust a long term plan	
Have you received advice on the title from the Assignment guidance service?	Y/N
Centre name	Centre number:
Candidate name:	Candidate number:
State the examined options that are being taken:	
Paper 1: In search of the American dream Dream c 1917-1996 Paper 2: South Africa 1948-1994. From Apartheid state to Rainbow nation Paper 3: Poverty, Public health and the state in Britain (1780-1999)	
Mark awarded	Comments [Comment box expands as you start entering text]
9/40	<p>Some wider reading but rarely cited + not included in resource record. Some information not appropriately selected but rarely furthers argument.</p> <p>Judgement provided but limited support + contextual knowledge.</p> <p>Attempts analysis but many misunderstandings.</p> <p>Judgement on chosen works are difficult to find + have limited support largely due to a lack of understanding of topic.</p> <p>Often incoherent.</p> <p>For further comments please see end of essay.</p>

Teacher declaration

I declare that the work submitted for assessment has been carried out without assistance other than that which is acceptable according to the rules of the specification.

Assessor name			
Assessor signature		Date	5/5/17.

Candidate declaration

I certify that the work submitted for this assignment is my own. I have clearly referenced any materials used in the work. I understand that false declaration is a form of malpractice.

Candidate signature		Date	26/04/17
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Additional Candidate declaration

By signing this additional declaration, you agree to your work being used to support Professional Development, Online Support and Training of Centre-Assessors and Pearson Moderators.

Candidate signature		Date	26/04/17
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Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the holocaust was a long term plan.

What is your view about the extent to which the Holocaust was a long term plan?

With reference to three chosen works:

- Analyse the ways in which interpretations of the question, problems or issues differ
- Explain the differences you have identified

My view on the matter at hand is that yes to some extent I believe that the Holocaust was not a long term plan. My definition of a long term plan is a plan that has been set up previous to the present events of the Holocaust, these plans in my definition have to have a time span of five years before the actual events of the Holocaust, purely on the basis that it is from then, we know it has been thought out thoroughly. It has been devised from before hand and now is slowly being implemented in this case the events of the Holocaust. My definition of a plan is something that is a goal to reach at the end, in doing so there must be clear facts to suggest there was step by step actions which have taken place to reach this goal. A plan has My three chosen works on this topic is 'War Against The Jews' by Lucy Dawidowicz who took on an alternate approach in saying that the Holocaust was a long term plan on the basis of bringing quotes from Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler to back up her point that it was a long term plan. On the other hand " Becoming Eichmann' by David Cesarani and also Laurence Rees's - 'The Nazi.' had a belief that due to unseen circumstances the Holocaust was a short term plan due to the failure of the Madagascar Plan in 1941. The historical debate we are enticed into by the treacherous actions of the nazi party and their sadistic leader Adolf Hitler is the question to whether the Holocaust was a plan that was thought out beforehand or a plan that was brought about from unfortunate luck with their other plans.

Lacks coherence.

unclear what argument is

My first chosen work is Lucy Dawidowicz's 'war against the Jews.' who claims that the Holocaust was indeed a long term plan, holding views of an intentionalist. On the grounds that she believed that the attack on Poland was interdependent with the annihilation of the Jews. She stated that " the disorder of war would provide Hitler with the cover for the unchecked commission of murder. He needed an arena for his operations where the restraints of common and morality and accepted rules of warfare would not extend."¹ This quote would then lead me to believe that Lucy bases her argument on the idea that the cover of war allowing such horrific actions to be deemed suitable and plain acceptable would lead to the events of the Holocaust. Dawidowicz then states there was two aims when attacking Poland, one for raw materials and gain a bigger empire but also to wage war on the Jewish minority. This would then suggest the actions from 1939 with the attack on Poland meant that it was just stepping stones to then further the actions of Hitler and the Nazi party on the annihilation of the Jewish people. she states that " he had long-range plans to realise his ideological goals and the

basins for war

¹ Dawidowicz L, *The War Against the jews*, 1975 page 167

sums up view but not clear explanation.

534

without support

destruction of the Jews was at the centre." ²Due to these points it's clear to make out that Lucy Dawidowicz's interpretation of the Holocaust was that it was a long term plan which had the extermination of the Jewish minority at the centre. Another historian who shares a similar view on the matter is one of Goldhagen who stated that the German people are the ones who first initiated the hate on the Jews, which would then lead to the Holocaust, his idea resembles one of a long term believer, Goldhagen identifies that the holocaust could not start straight away, there had to be stepping stone in order for the 'final solution' to occur, Goldhagen brings up points in page 131 stating this view "The Holocaust was a "task...that had to be carried out under a variety of constraints."³ They'd assumed power "under trying circumstances in the middle of a depression."⁴ We can infer from this that the nazi party understood the plans for the holocaust had to be carried out in different ways for it become normalised. In page 139 Goldhagen continues to suggest ways in which the holocaust couldn't be implemented as quick as they would want to "Hitler's ideal... was scaled down to the more modest goal of making Germany judenrein, free of Jews. It was the most effective, even if ultimately unsatisfying, policy that could have been pursued under the international conditions of the 1930s."⁵This could be seen as a historian that supports Lucy as Goldhagen understands that the holocaust couldn't be set out at the start instead there had to plan that would lead up to the event. Both Historians clearly state that the holocaust was thought out. Goldhagen also saw that "After Kristallnacht, the Germans' eliminationist enterprise steadily evolved more comprehensive and deadly."⁶ This suggests that as the years went on the war on the Jews became almost acceptable to the German public as there was little effort to stop such monstrosities. In comparison the work of George L. Mosse who would go against claims of the Holocaust being a long term plan on the basis that " in contrast the 'structuralist' type of approach lay emphasis upon the unsystematic and improvised shaping of nazi 'policies' towards the jews, seeing them as a series of ad hoc responses of a splintered and disorderly government machinery. Although, it is argued that this produced an inevitable spiral of radicalisation, the actual physical extermination of the Jews was not planned in advance, could at no time before 1941 be in any realistic sense envisaged or predicted, and emerged itself as a an ad hoc 'solution' to a massive and self induced, administrative problems of the regime."⁷ George is saying that the war was the main reason for the holocaust and seems to imply that there was no law to make anti-semitism violent. In the case for kristallnacht even though he had goebbels encouraging him it was still ultimately spontaneous and a one off event. Despite the fact all three historians come from a jewish background George L. Moose holds arguments to support a short term plan whereas Dawidowicz and Goldhagen suggest that the Holocaust was a long term plan.

Wider reading but weakly used to support chosen work.

Large by assertion

Who?

Some quotes not footnoted

In comparison the views of Laurence Rees who advanced ideas of a functionalist stating that despite the fact there was some implications that showed the removal of the Jews in the

² Dawidowicz L, *The War Against the Jews*, 1975 page

³ Goldhagen D, *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust** page 131

⁴ Goldhagen D, *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust** page 131

⁵ Goldhagen D, *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust** page 139

⁶ Goldhagen D, *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust** page 139

⁷ Moose G, *Nazi culture* page 186

✓ Some evidence of wider reading, although you is not convincing

German society could lead to the events of the Holocaust. We are shown early in history the initial stages of the isolation of Jews. In his public stance in the 1930s Hitler was consistent with calls for the Jews to be excluded from German citizenship and to be forced out of Germany altogether. Rees continues with implying that despite the speculations of the Nazi policies leading to the extermination of the Jews. Rees sees logical reason to why the Nazi policies would lead to the removal of Jews in Europe not in a inhumane way just yet. Laurence Rees goes on to say that it wasn't until March 26, 1941 where plans to Madagascar was abandoned, meaning that there was some thought going into the plan to evacuate the Jews from Europe to Madagascar. In addition many historians who share a functionalist view on whether the the holocaust being a long term plan adapted and evolved the idea of the 'weak fuhrer theory' this stated arguments that Hitler often acted to remain power in Germany and also made up decisions that would appeal to the German people. One historian which would share these views would be Mary Fulbrook who stated in one of her articles that "Hitler appeared to lack interest in the day-to-day details of policy and legislation. Cabinet government fell into disuse, and on many matters Hitler tended simply to agree with the last person who had succeeded in 'catching his ear', or having a word with him when he was in a good mood. Patterns of political decision-making appear to have become increasingly haphazard, and competing centres of power proliferated, characterised by personal rivalries and animosities. Powerful underlings developed their own empires. All this would suggest that Hitler's role was that of 'weak' dictator."⁸ If this is true then the works of Hitler would imply a great deal proof that the functionalist historians were correct about the holocaust being a short term plan as if he was a weak leader then all his actions would've been him succumbing to pressure from his advisers, meaning the events to the holocaust were forms of ideas gifted to him by other people. Rees states many times in his book that the holocaust was a short term plan. As if Hitler was a leader who wasn't 'weak' Rees basing most of his ideas on the idea man functionalist believe in which is that the Madagascar plan, he goes on to explain that there was a plan that took shape in europe in 1940 with the fall of France, the almost inevitable plan - to send the Jews to Madagascar, an account from Franz Rademacher, who worked in the German Foreign Ministry stated in 1940 that the island of Madagascar was available for solution of the Jewish question. 2,500 French people were supposed to live there and the island supposedly meant to be transferred into the Germans hands, the Jews were also jointly liable for the value of the island. Rees the continues to say that this plan was the logical conclusion of the expulsion policy which the Nazis has been following this point, this goes to show that the Rees believes that the the policies were all leading to this point. By the Furthermore Rees says that with Britain still in the war, this could not be guaranteed. Of course, when Rademacher wrote his memo in July 1940, the nazis thought it likely that Britain would shortly be out of the war. Hitler had never wanted to fight the British and was prepared to discuss peace terms. Seeing as Britain controlled the seas it was hard for the Nazi party to fully implement their idea of shipping them off to Madagascar. One historian who had a functionalist view that would share similar ideas to Laurence Rees was one of David Cesarani who invested his work into putting his work forth his idea that the Jews were used as hostages to prevent Jews in the free world bringing America into the world. Cesarani stated that despite World War Two occurring in unfortunate timing it meant for Cesarani that it forced the Nazi's to reassess their anti- Jewish policy, while war removed the need to worry about international

unclear at times

poor phrasing

lacks clarity

poor sentence structure lack of punctuation

not convincing in use of historical sources of Nazi

⁸ http://www.johndclare.net/Nazi_Germany2_WeakDictator.htm

lacking any referring relating to chosen work.

637 - outlines some key arguments in interpretation. Some evidence wider reading but not referenced.

Attempts judgement

opinion, it meant diminished the opportunities for Jewish emigration, just when the conquest of Poland added 1.5 million Jews to those already under German rule. Cesarani then goes on to say that in October 1941 Hitler agreed to the deportation of German and Austrian Jews to the east but said they were not to be murdered This would suggest to a great deal that the holocaust was not in fact a long term plan if Hitler had agreed to the deportation and not the extermination of the Jewish people. Gerald Fleming who took an intentionalist view stated that "the same basic premise of the early formulation and unshakable retention of Hitler's exterminate the Jews as sufficient explanation of 'the holocaust' underlines Gerald's study, which seeks to document as fully as possible Hitler's personal responsibility for the 'final solution.' Though the concentrating almost exclusively on the period of extermination itself, the introductory chapters deal with the growth of Hitler's anti-semitism and the development of his original hatred of the Jews to his personal liquidation orders during the war - 'a straight path from Hitler's anti-semitism as shaped in Linz in the period 1904-7 to 29 November 1941.' Physical extermination in Fleming's view was the aim maintained continuously by Hitler from his experience of the November Revolution in 1918 down to his end in the bunker, and at the beginning of the 1920s 'Hitler developed..... a strategic plan for the realization of his political aim."⁹This is one way in which you can argue points against Rees.

being focus on Q

'Becoming Eichmann' The book by David Cesarani, which shows the horrific genocide monster Adolf Eichmann who was responsible for the transportation of millions of Jews to their inhumane tragic death. Cesarani presents Eichmann as more committed he was no longer simply carrying out orders but had adopted eliminationist anti-Semitism as his own. Cesarani then highlights the fundamental basis of what the nazi's done in the beginning to isolate the Jews and strip them of their identity, from my own knowledge i have gained insight to the way nazi's saw the Jewish people, they were numbered instead of having names. Cesarani highlights the events in which the leading members of the Jewish community and Jewish political activists were arrested by the Gestapo sent to Dachau or local jails by removing already key heads. Cesarani shows the stripping of voice in the Jewish race, taking away their key leaders they remove the chance for the Jewish people to voice their opinion. Cesarani presents a more committed Eichmann, who was no longer simply carrying out orders but had adopted eliminationist anti-semitism as his own. Cesarani also states that Eichmann then came with a procedure which would then insist on the removal of the Jews as a quick and efficient way. Eichmann then goes on to state that 'achievement in Vienna was to devise a 'conveyor-belt' system for accelerating the Jewish exodus, the whole plan was trying to find a solution and way that is quick in removing the Jewish people. Some Historians such as Broszat who had the belief that "deportation of the Jews was still the aim until autumn 1941, and it was only in the light of the unexpected failure of the Blitzkrieg invasion of the Soviet Union that problems in the deportation plans and the inability of Gauleiter, police chiefs, SS bosses, and the Nazi leaders in the occupied Territories to cope with the vast numbers of the Jews transported to and concentrated in their domains that lead to a growing number of 'local initiatives' being taken to liquidate Jews, which then gained retrospective sanction 'from above.'" ¹⁰This just shows another historian's perspective to support Cesarani idea that the events occurred by result of Eichmann is accurate, as another Historian suggests the same idea. Cesarani then goes on to say that the expression meant by Exodus was the ultimate

poor phrasing

repetition

lacks understanding

⁹ Cesarani D, 'Becoming Eichmann' page 65
¹⁰ Cesarani D, 'Becoming Eichmann' page 66

crime in murder but to a mass scale, once again saying that it built up a system of getting rid of Jews quicker. It became common to see this as the moment when 'Adolf Eichmann's career as mass murder began'. The message was clear: the only future for the Jews in Austria was in emigration to Palestine or somewhere else. However there are some points where we see Eichmann mention the fact that there were some signs that could show the Nazis actually going down a different path to the Holocaust, signs showing that maybe the Nazis were looking for a less harrowing final solution. Emigrants allowed to leave Austria with enough to show that they would not be a burden on a state to which they were intending to migrate. Central office of Jewish Emigration opened for business in Rothschild Palais in August 1938 - Branch of Jewish emigration set up by Nazi Party. In other works David Cesarani states that despite the years of anti-semitic rhetoric, when Hitler and the Nazis came into power they had few concrete powers to establish a whole idea of the extermination of the Jewish people. Cesarani explains that Hitler was interested in the destroying of his political opposition, improving the economy and rebuilding German power, the ideas of Broszat whose suggestion that the unexpected success of the Red Army in December 1941, which was the crucial factor leading to the Holocaust. Cesarani places most of his argument on the fundamental basis that the Holocaust was the result of unfortunate events that didn't go to plan for the Nazis. Peter Longerich another Historian that had thoughts of the Holocaust being a short term plan explaining that during the 1920s and as far as the mid 1930s, the main aim of the Nazi anti-Jewish policy was to undermine the legal and economic situation of the German Jews to force them to emigrate. The Jews were to disappear from the German public life and later on disappear from German territory altogether. This just shows another historian's idea to why the extent to which the Holocaust is a long term plan is very thin. *Attempts to explain view.*

To conclude on the grounds of the functionalist ideas I believe that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but it was rather a short term plan that based its fundamental idea which made logical sense that due to unforeseen events that could not be calculated, the Nazis and their sinister leader Adolf Hitler were stuck with a whole race which were then increased to more Jews due to the invasion of Poland. David Cesarani who invested his work into putting his work forth his idea that the Jews were used as Hostages to prevent Jews in the free world bringing America into the world. Cesarani stated that despite World War Two occurring in unfortunate timing it meant for Cesarani that it forced the Nazis to reassess their anti-Jewish policy, while war removed the need to worry about international opinion. Also with the addition to Laurence Rees stating that there were logical reasons to why the Nazi policies would lead to the removal of Jews in Europe not in an inhumane way just yet. Laurence Rees goes on to say that it wasn't until March 26, 1941 where plans to Madagascar was abandoned, meaning that there was some thought going into the plan to evacuate the Jews from Europe to Madagascar. Also if you were to take in the idea of the 'weak Führer theory' which implies that Hitler only made decisions which made the German people support him more than on this there are some controversies as Hitler already had strong anti-semitism views. Rees suggested that the Nazis blamed the Jewish people for communism in Germany. However the ideas of Lucy Dawidowicz who had an intentionalist view which suggested that there were two objections when attacking Poland, one for raw materials and gain a bigger empire but also to wage war on the Jewish minority. This would suggest the actions from 1939 with the attack on Poland meant that it was just a stepping stone to then further the actions of Hitler and the Nazi Party

lacks reference

lacks sources + clarity

lacks clarity

on the annihilation of the Jewish people. The intentionalist view does shed some light to why there would be some aspect that would lead to the idea that the Holocaust was a long term plan.

BP1 - Some evidence of wider reading but
L2 - most not referenced anywhere. Some information has been appropriately selected but often does not further argument ✓
agreed

BP2 - A judgement is provided but limited support
L2 - + limited contextual knowledge. ✓

BP3 - Attempts analysis of interpretations but many misunderstandings. Some points are developed which are relevant to the debate, but often limited understanding of differences *not relevant*.
~~L1+~~
~~L2-~~ ✓

BP4 - Judgements on chosen works are difficult to ~~to~~ locate + have limited backing.
L1+
~~L2-~~ ✓
not helped by a lack of understanding about topic & works themselves

BP5 - Some accurate + relevant O/K but not always linked to enquiry. Lacking in coherence throughout. *Some attempts made to organise*.
L2-

9/40 ✓

Agreed - an incoherent essay in many ways that is unconvincing in the points ~~is~~ put forward + arguments made.

Books (Bibliography)

- Cesarani D, 'Becoming Eichmann' 2005 De Capo Press
- Goldhagen D, *Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* 1986 Abacus
- Moose G, *Nazi culture* 1966
- Dawidowicz L, *The War Against the Jews* 1975

Very limited.

Article

http://www.johndclare.net/Nazi_Germany2_WeakDictator.htm

Coursework resource record

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History

Centre name: _____

Candidate name: _____

Resources used. The three works chosen for the assignment must be asterisked.	Page/web reference	Student comments	Student date(s) when accessed	Teacher initials and date resource record checked
Becoming Eichmann D, Cesarani *		the same basic premise of the early formulation and unshakable retention of Hitler's exterminate the Jews as sufficient explanation of ' the holocaust' underlines Gerald's study, which seeks to document as fully as possible Hitler's personal responsibility for the 'final solution.' Though the concentrating almost exclusively on the period of extermination itself, the introductory chapters deal with the growth of Hitler's anti- semitism and the development of his original hatred of the jews to his personal liquidation orders during the war - ' a straight path from Hitler's anti-semitism as shaped in Linz in the period 1904-7 to 29 November 1941.' Physical extermination in flemming's view was the aim maintained continuously by Hitler from his experience of the November Revolution in 1918 down to his end in the bunker, and at the beginning of the 1920s ' Hitler developed..... a strategic plan for the realization of his political aim. "	28/09/16	3/17
Internet	https://www.w.quora.co	You can see from as early as 1920 so 13 years before nazi party came into power the nazi's published a 25 point	02/10/16	3/17

	m/Was-the-Holocaust-the-result-of-a-long-range-plan	<p>program which consisted many laws that stated that only Aryans can be citizens of Germany, "no Jew can be a member of the aryan race" already we see from an early that the nazis had a clear overview of what they wanted to do with the Jewish community but still unclear as this could show that they were only trying to exclude them from Germany. At this stage Nazi policy only focused on curtailing basic rights, not segregation or deportation, let alone extermination.</p>		
Internet	http://www2history.com/experts/Sir_Ian_Kershaw/Hitler_and_the_Holocaust	<p>This man Sir Ian Kershaw states in his article that there are clear reasons to why you could say that the holocaust was a long term objective of the nazis. He thinks that from the 1930s the aim of the nazi party was to expel the Jews as far away from Germany as possible "Those policies became more extreme, more radical and more genocidal as the 18 months went on between the invasion of Poland in September '39 and the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941. So in those 18 months an immense radicalisation in the direction of genocide had already taken place on Polish soil." this is what he had to say.</p>	03/10/16	3/17
Laurence Rees *	Pg 288	<p>Even on to the later years you could argue that the death toll in treblinka (800,00 some even say 1 million) show that they were working towards a goal that has been set there for time, there is an obvious reason to why they continued with the human genocide.</p>	05/10/16	3/17
http://www.johndclare.net/Nazi_Germany2_WeakDictator.htm	\	<p>"Hitler appeared to lack interest in the day-to-day details of policy and legislation. Cabinet government fell into disuse, and on many matters Hitler tended simply to agree with the last person who had succeeded in 'catching his ear', or having a word with him when he was in a good mood. Patterns of political decision-making appear to have become increasingly haphazard, and competing centres of power proliferated,</p>	24/11/16	

		characterised by personal rivalries and animosities. Powerful underlings developed their own empires. All this would suggest that Hitler's role was that of 'weak' dictator." shows a factor that Hitler could be the reason for the holocaust.	
Goldhagen D, <i>Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust</i> * page 131 *		"The Holocaust was a "task..that had to be carried out under a variety of constraints." This shows how about how they could not start the holocaust straight away, there had to be other precautions when approach the holocaust.	1/12/16
Goldhagen D, <i>Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust</i> * page 131		"under trying circumstances in the middle of a depression." Due to the depression of the German people this could be argued to be the reason why the hate for Jews came about.	1/12/16
Goldhagen D, <i>Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust</i> * page 139		"Hitler's ideal... was scaled down to the more modest goal of making Germany judenrein, free of Jews. It was the most effective, even if ultimately unsatisfying, policy that could have been pursued under the international conditions of the 1930s."	1/12/16

Partly used. Chosen works not even all included.

Example 2**Moderated mark 25/40 Level 4**

This script demonstrated mostly Level 3 qualities, however, bullet point 1 satisfied Level 4 so was awarded a mark just in to Level 4. It contained a range of relevant material taken from a range of reading and selected and deployed it with precision. Judgement was related to some of the key points, there was some analysis of the differences within the three works, attempts were made to establish criteria, and some understanding of the conceptual focus of the enquiry was demonstrated.

Centre Marks

27/40

Mod mark

Coursework authentication sheet

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History	
Assignment title: To what extent was the Holocaust a long term plan?	
Have you received advice on the title from the <i>Assignment guidance service</i> ?	Y(N)
Centre name:	Centre number:
Candidate name:	Candidate number:
State the examined options that are being taken:	
Paper 1: In search of the American Dream c1917-1996	
Paper 2: South Africa, c1948-1994: from apartheid state to 'rainbow nation'	
Paper 3: Poverty, public health and the state in Britain c1780-1939.	
Mark awarded	Comments [<i>Comment box expands as you start entering text</i>]
27	<p>Answer is largely well written with good clarity of communication.</p> <p>A range of relevant material is deployed + appropriately cited.</p> <p>Judgements reached on 3 chosen works with decent contextual knowledge. Reasons for differences fairly weak / basic in places.</p>

More comments at end of essay.

Teacher declaration

I declare that the work submitted for assessment has been carried out without assistance other than that which is acceptable according to the rules of the specification.

Assessor name			
Assessor signature		Date	01.05.17

Candidate declaration

I certify that the work submitted for this assignment is my own. I have clearly referenced any materials used in the work. I understand that false declaration is a form of malpractice.

Candidate signature		Date	27/04/17
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Additional Candidate declaration

By signing this additional declaration, you agree to your work being used to support Professional Development, Online Support and Training of Centre-Assessors and Pearson Moderators.

Candidate signature		Date	27/04/17
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Historians have disagreed about the extent to which the Holocaust was a long-term plan.
What is your view about the extent to which the Holocaust was a long-term plan?

The Holocaust was the systematic murder and persecution of European Jews where the Nazis killed over six million Jews. The Nazis believed that they were exceptional so their aim was to exterminate and destruct all European Jews to create the superior Aryan race through using the final solution. The Holocaust took place between the years 1941-1945 and this was the period when European Jews were sent to concentration or death camps, often in Germany or Poland, or were simply shot dead by Nazi officials. A long term plan is difficult to interpret but in the context of this essay a long term plan would be before the Nazis entered power in 1933. These were the years that Hitler first expressed his anti-semitic views towards the Jews and was when Mein Kampf was written which illustrates Hitler's intentions and actions towards them in the future. A short term plan would be between the years 1939 -1942 when the war started and the Wannsee conference took place to discuss the final solution. The three works which will be focused on are from Dawidowicz, Browning and Farmer. Dawidowicz puts forward the argument that the Holocaust was a long term plan and Hitler had these intentions as early as 1918 and into the 1920's when he first put his views in Mein Kampf to exterminate the Jews. This supports the argument that the Holocaust was a long term plan and that everything else was just leading up to the mass-murder in 1941. However, Browning expresses the view that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but there was always a plan to remove the Jews when he came to power. He conveys this view by writing about deportation and other plans that were tried before the actual 'final solution.' Farmer believes the Holocaust was a short term plan and a reaction to the victories of war and battles in Eastern Europe. This suggests that the Holocaust was not planned and Hitler's views were only thoughts and not actions he intended on carrying out. My research has denoted that the Holocaust was arguably not a long term plan but there was always a plan to despatch and destroy the whole of the Jewish race from 1918, especially enforced when Hitler came into power in 1933.

Dawidowicz argues in the war against the Jews that the Holocaust was a long term plan, this can be shown and supported through works and events she has used including Mein Kampf, the T4 programme and the Gemlich letter. Gathering all the evidence Dawidowicz has used, it is suggested that the Holocaust was desired by Hitler as early as 1918. She frequently refers to Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, which gives many suggestions of how the Holocaust was a longstanding plan and expectation from the early years before he came to power. This can be supported by the evidence presented in chapter eight which states that Hitler did not hold back his intentions about his program against the Jews: "In the years between 1919 and 1925, the political climate had changed and Hitler now openly espoused his program of annihilation, without having to resort to concealment or camouflage."¹ This demonstrates Hitler always expressed his views and did not mind who heard them suggesting the Holocaust was a long term plan as he heavily implied future proposals throughout the book. However, the plans and insights into exactly what was intended were kept behind closed doors due to the fact that nothing was ever written down. Marrus who states Hitler "was reluctant to commit himself to paper with concrete ideas and preferred always to give orders orally"² can support this view because it meant that his desired plan to eliminate the Jews could be done and organised in a

¹ Lucy Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews. Page 158

² Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust in History, Page 33

3 outlines
3 chapters
works

Some
lack of
clarity over
'plan'
confusing
argument

selects
material
relevant to
debate

Wider reading
to support
interpretation

way that he wanted without anyone else's input or interference. This also implies that he could adapt his ideas when he wanted which also made sense why he wouldn't want to expose his plans to the whole of the world. The word 'annihilation' can be interpreted in different ways and is unclear what Hitler meant, but by weighing up the evidence it is suggested that the complete destruction and extinction of the Jews through mass-murder was intended. This quotation strongly suggests that the Holocaust was a long term plan because Dawidowicz deliberately includes the early dates to place emphasis on how long Hitler had intended on the Holocaust but she also uses the words 'concealment' and 'camouflage' to foreshadow future events which were kept secret. For example, the population were never aware that the Holocaust was taking place and it was very much kept between the Nazi Party themselves in order to keep the support and power that Hitler had always strived to have.

In addition to this, the T4 euthanasia programme took place in 1939 which was kept secret from everyone and it was disguised as hospital treatment for the physically or mentally handicapped. This further supports the idea that the Holocaust was a long term plan because the T4 programme seems to have acted like a trial for the final solution on people Hitler frequently called and categorised as inferior to the Aryan race by experimenting different methods and techniques on a smaller scale. Even though the T4 programme took place in 1939 it is not known when it was planned or if Hitler had desired it even when he first portrayed his views publicly. However, this view is heavily criticised by many historians including Mommen who stated that "the Holocaust was not based upon a programme that had been developed over a long period. It was founded upon improvised measures."³ This criticises Dawidowicz's interpretation because it shows that Hitler may not have always planned to annihilate the Jews but after events including the deportation programme (the Madagascar plan) and the Nuremberg Laws, introduced in 1935, the answers directed towards the Holocaust. In addition to Mommen, Browning also states that "on at least four occasions between February 26 and March 30, 1941, he set the tone for a "war of destruction" against Jewish Bolshevism."⁴ Browning suggests that the Holocaust was not a long term plan because if it had been, the war of destruction would have been mentioned prior to 1941 and maybe it would have occurred before this point and been successful. However, this was not the case and it was mentioned close to the Holocaust supporting the claim that the Holocaust occurred through improvised measures. These differences occur because Browning has taken into consideration all of the evidence to form a judgement whereas Dawidowicz ignores events like the deportation programme in order to strengthen her argument.

ignores origins of T4.

but this falls in 'just term plan' time frame outlined earlier.

Wider reading used to evaluate but precision of material is weak.

begins to expose differences

Dawidowicz is still convinced that the Holocaust was a long term plan due to what she talks about earlier in the chapter: "In retrospect, it seems likely that Hitler had settled on his radical "either-or" anti-semitism, as he formulated it in the Gemlich letter of 1919, already back in November 1918, he claims in Mein Kampf."⁵ This strongly portrays her view because throughout the chapter she uses the word "either-or" repeatedly which she has inferred to mean either victory for the Jews or the Aryans. She uses this to explain the rest of her theory and has used it to back up her arguments. When you look at the Gemlich letter it does actively support Dawidowicz's argument that Hitler had planned this since 1918: "Its final objective,

³ Stephen J. Lee, Hitler and Nazi Germany - second edition, Page 146

⁴ Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, Page 426

⁵ Lucy Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, Page 155

Analysis of
cr. sem work
+ understanding
of debate

however, must be the total removal of all Jews from our midst. Both objectives can only be achieved by a government of national strength and not one of national impotence."⁶ This strongly suggests that the Holocaust was always planned and it would always go ahead but other measures would be carried out first in order to see how successful they were. This can be supported by the quote "they were to disappear from the face of the earth, so that the Nazis could reach their goal: a Greater Germany free from Jews. Different solutions were tried: voluntary immigration, forced immigration, and several different plans for deportation."⁷ This demonstrates that other methods were also tried but the final goal was to make them disappear totally. As the list advances, the solutions get worse which suggests the Holocaust stemmed from these and the Nazi party evaluated the reaction before proceeding to the next solution. Hitler used his power to get what he wanted which is implied in this letter. The letter was written in 1918 so this is the first public piece of writing from Hitler about his anti-semitic views. This would suggest that his views did not change from here to 1933 when he became Chancellor which would strongly propose that the Holocaust was his intention from the start. Although the Gemlich letter does support Dawidowicz's view, historians are still reluctant to use this as solid evidence to support the suggestion that the Holocaust was a long term plan because in the letter it does not explicitly say that the final solution would be the mass-murder of the Jews which therefore limits its use within research. In addition, evidence to support the fact that the Holocaust was a long term plan is very limited and many historians still believe that the Holocaust was either a consequence of war or a series of improvised measures. This is a limitation of this work because there is little evidence to defend Dawidowicz's view which makes it difficult in evaluating the whole picture. When comparing Dawidowicz to Browning, it can be seen that Browning has a much more evidence based view as there are many historians that can strengthen his argument including Mommsen which make his view more convincing. Furthermore, Dawidowicz is often one-sided because throughout her work she only uses evidence which supports her view meaning she ignores the other information available to her meaning she does not evaluate the whole picture. This is similar to that of Farmer who portrays his viewpoint profoundly throughout.

Comparison
between
chapters
works
+ attempted
eval.

Lacks support
for comments.

Browning conveys the idea in the Origins of the Final Solution that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but there was always a plan to eliminate the Jews through deportation and emigration. Browning uses the evidence of the Madagascar plan and the Wannsee conference to support this idea and his view heavily contradicts Dawidowicz. The Madagascar Plan supports Browning because it demonstrates that deportation was carried out before any other plan to eliminate the Jews was implemented and the Wannsee conference supports him as it suggests that it was the turning point for the Holocaust suggesting that there was no long term plan to murder the Jews. It counters Dawidowicz's view because he does not believe that the Holocaust was always going to occur but other plans and events happened in order to eliminate the Jews first but she believes that the Holocaust was inevitable from when Hitler's thoughts were expressed as early as 1918. These differences occur between the two works because Dawidowicz has a narrow spectrum of evidence which she investigates in order to form a viewpoint whereas Browning is open to broader evidence and events which can also assist in forming a more comprehensive view. This can be seen throughout the book when he

Disagreement
between
H.

needs
greater
development

⁶ http://www.hitler.org/writings/first_writing/

⁷ <http://www.projetaladin.org/holocaust/en/history-of-the-holocaust-shoah/holocaust-the-basics/the-reasons-for-the-holocaust.html>

Analysis + explanation + interpretation of

says: "It was out of this conjuncture of factors that the Madagascar Plan was born, offering the prospect of a final solution to the Jewish question in Europe through the total removal of the continent's entire Jewish population."⁸ This quotation supports the idea that the 'final solution' of the Holocaust was not a long term plan and it was never even suggested until the deportation of European Jews to other countries did not work which demonstrates how Browning assesses the evidence around him to come to a progressive view of how the Holocaust occurred. The Madagascar Plan seemed to offer a good solution to a mass problem at the time and it did remove a large proportion of European Jews so it does seem mindless that the Holocaust was the ultimate goal. If the Holocaust was a long term plan, it is thought that Hitler would not have gone to all the trouble of introducing the Nuremberg laws and carrying out events like Kristallnacht. This can be supported by Farmer who said: "If Hitler was thinking in terms of mass slaughter of all European Jewry in the years 1939-41, why were German Jews still encouraged to emigrate?"⁹ This is a valid question to be asking because it seems pointless and a waste of time for the Nazis to emigrate the Jews when they could have been planning the Holocaust to make sure it was exactly what Hitler envisioned. This therefore leads to the suggestion that the Holocaust was not a long term plan because he could have carried out the mass execution of the Jews before 1941 when the Holocaust actually began. Another historian, Mommsen, agrees with this argument which can be seen in an interview: "The Holocaust was a political process which eventually led to the conclusion that there was no way out but to kill the Jews in Auschwitz and elsewhere."¹⁰ This strongly suggests that the Holocaust was never a long term intention of Hitler's but it was implemented when no other options were available. This can be seen where the phrase "led to the conclusion"¹¹ is used because this demonstrates that the decision was not taken lightly to create the mass extermination of the Jews. However, it is possible that the Holocaust was always planned but not released to the public before it started as Hitler also had many other commitments to deal with which could be potentially ruined if the Holocaust was brought to the population's eye. Hitler intended world domination, starting with World War Two but it may have been that Hitler was busy in ensuring this plan went ahead before dealing with the problem of the Jewish race. In addition to this, Hitler also needed to keep the vital ties with Britain so he did not want to make any drastic changes in his leadership as it may have caused greater conflict. To support this, evidence has been interpreted and Dawidowicz deduces that this was only a stepping stone to the real objective here. This can be seen when she says "pressure for emigration was, in Hitler's plan, only biplay."¹² This means that Hitler may have planned the Holocaust before he came to power but he planned to carry out the emigration of the Jews as a side plan to see what the general reaction would be before escalating it further. This would suggest that the Holocaust was the ultimate goal despite other plans being carried out just to distract everyone from the horrible reality ahead.

use of relevant contextual knowledge

shows sound understanding of debate with C/K to support + explain.

Browning is consistent in his book that the Holocaust was not a long term plan, stating: "In the month following the Wannsee conference he [Hitler] made numerous comments; both public

⁸ Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, Page 81
⁹ Alan Farmer, Hitler and the Holocaust, <http://www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/hitler-and-holocaust>
¹⁰ An Interview With Prof. Hans Mommsen, Page 17, http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20203850.pdf
¹¹ An Interview With Prof. Hans Mommsen, Page 17, http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20203850.pdf
¹² Lucy Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, Page 161

and private, about the fate of the Jews that exceeded in frequency and vitriol even in his comments of the preceding months."¹³ This maintains the argument that the Holocaust was not a long term plan because the Wannsee conference is thought by many, including Jochmann, to be the turning point in deciding whether the 'final solution' of the Holocaust would take place. Jochmann quotes Hitler: "The Jew must get out of Europe... I only say he must go, if he croaks in the process, I can't help it. I see only one thing: total extermination, if they don't go voluntarily."¹⁴ This was said in 1942 when emigration was banned and the Wannsee conference had taken place which supports the idea that total extermination only started to escalate around this period and it was only if the Jews did not go voluntarily. This therefore implies that Hitler had no intention of starting the Holocaust while other plans were ongoing and only after that would he consider the idea. Browning explains in depth the evidence of the Holocaust which includes the Wannsee conference and how he has interpreted what was included to offer a wide variety of solutions and methods to why and how the Holocaust took place. However, Browning does not cover a wide time span which means his argument of the Holocaust being evolutionary is less valid. The book gives a good level of support for the argument portrayed and it allows the view of a short term plan with a long term intention to be studied to a large extent which is very powerful. Browning's argument can be seen to be more convincing than Dawidowicz because he offers a wider diversity of explanation to support the interpretation that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but there was always a plan to emigrate and deport the Jews.

ex = 1 of chapter work

Attempts reasons for difference.

Thirdly, Farmer communicates through Hitler and the Holocaust that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but it was a consequence and reaction of events that had happened including victories of war and battles over Eastern Europe. This opposes both Browning and Dawidowicz' view but Farmer has more similarities with Browning than Dawidowicz. This is because both Browning and Farmer believe that the Holocaust happened as a consequence of events and failures throughout Hitler's reign which therefore led to the Holocaust. The differences occur because all three works look at different evidence and believe some arguments are more convincing than others. This is seen throughout Farmer's article where his view is strongly portrayed that Operation Barbarossa played a huge part in determining the Holocaust: "While there is some evidence that he had made the fateful decision to exterminate all European Jews by January 1941, it is far more likely that the decision was taken after the launch of Operation Barbarossa."¹⁵ Operation Barbarossa was the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War Two in 1941 which some people think was more important than the Wannsee conference itself. This was because it meant that the plans for the Holocaust were already in place before the conference even took place in 1942. Furthermore, Farmer adds that "most likely, an elated Hitler, confident victory over the USSR, gave the fateful nod to Himmler in 1941."¹⁶ This quotation supports the previous one as it says that the victory over the USSR played a huge part in the development of the Holocaust. Both of these show that the Holocaust was not a long term plan and it was not suggested until Hitler was comfortable with the outcomes of the other battles himself and Germany were taking part in. It could be suggested that the Holocaust was planned after the T4 euthanasia plan in 1941 to see

?

looks judgement

well explained int.

¹³ Christopher R. Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution*, Page 427

¹⁴ Jochmann, *Monologe im Führerhauptquartier*, Page 229

¹⁵ Alan Farmer, *Hitler and the Holocaust*, <http://www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/hitler-and-holocaust>

¹⁶ Alan Farmer, *Hitler and the Holocaust*, <http://www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/hitler-and-holocaust>

whether the extermination of undesirables was a success. Only when this was certain could Hitler give the nod to Himmler to proceed with the Holocaust otherwise too many plans and battles would be ongoing at the same time. Another historian, Broszat, also proposes the idea that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but one which was reviewed upon closer to war as he says: "There was no overall order concerning the extermination of the Jews and that the programme of extermination developed through individual actions and then reached gradually its institutional and factual character in the spring of 1942."¹⁷ This suggests that the Holocaust was a consequence of events which happened in the short term and it was not a long term aim of the Nazi Party. This could be implied as great emphasis is put on "individual actions"¹⁸ which would suggest that only recent events or victories could impact the start of the Holocaust, including the Invasion of Poland and France, because collectively before this period there was no reason to start mass extermination of the Jews. Although Dawidowicz supports the view that the Holocaust was a long term plan she does say in her book that: "In December 1940 Operation Barbarossa entered the formal planning stage, and Hitler then no doubt explored with Himmler, and perhaps Heydrich, various possibilities for the last stage of the Final Solution."¹⁹ This does suggest that even Dawidowicz is swayed to the idea that the Holocaust was a short term plan and significant evidence does point in this direction. It suggests that Operation Barbarossa did play a vital role in the making of the Holocaust as it implies that many of the final ideas and solutions came from the invasion and the success of it. Another Historian who also supports this argument is Hillgruber who argues that: "killing on a mass scale emerged from the ideological mobilization for the onslaught on the Soviet Union that began on 22nd June 1941."²⁰ This links with Operation Barbarossa because it suggests that the Holocaust was only started after seeing the positive outcome of what was achieved in the Soviet Union and this seemed to offer a solution to the Jewish question. This would suggest that the Wannsee conference did not have as larger impact on the Holocaust as first thought. However, Browning says that: "at the Wannsee Conference Heydrich noted that "practical experiences" were being gathered for the purpose of implementing the final solution."²¹ This disagrees with Farmer because it suggests the Holocaust did not happen as a consequence of recent victories but from something like the T4 programme which Farmer fails to talk about. Browning suggests that the Wannsee conference will have finalised all the solutions and ideas for the Holocaust whereas Farmer would definitely disagree with this as he says that "Operation Barbarossa was the key to the Holocaust."²² Both of these arguments have significant evidence behind them to suggest that the Holocaust was prepared for in different ways but they both do agree that the Holocaust was a short term plan. Farmer can appear one sided in his writings about how the Holocaust started and he fails to take into account other people's opinions who may have a broader spectrum on the issue. He is very set in his views which makes it very hard to take other plans into consideration when he fails to mention them at all, for example the Wannsee Conference. This therefore means that it is impossible to use Farmer independently to explain why the Holocaust was not a long term

relevant
from
ready
selected ✓

Wider readings
displayed with
precision ✓

attempted
eval. ✓

¹⁷ Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final solution, Page xvi

¹⁸ Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final solution, Page xvi

¹⁹ Lucy Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews, Page 163

²⁰ Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust in History, Page 39

²¹ Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, Page 416

²² Alan Farmer, Hitler and the Holocaust, <http://www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/hitler-and-holocaust>

plan and other evidence needs to be taken into account to build up an argument and judgement.

In conclusion, Dawidowicz, Browning and Farmer all offer valid and convincing arguments to why the Holocaust took place. Dawidowicz provides a concise and in depth case into why the Holocaust was a long term plan but fails to take into account all the other solutions. The same can be applied to Farmer as he includes all his own opinion and does not back his argument up with any other evidence. This is very much a limitation when deciding whether the Holocaust was a long term plan as the evidence presented does not offer all the views and a wide selection of information to weigh up. However, Browning offers the perspective that the Holocaust was not always a long term plan but there was always a plan to remove all Jews from Germany. His argument is supported by other historians who offer supporting and opposing evidence which makes it easier to come to a judgement. After evaluating the evidence available, it would be fair to come to the conclusion that the Holocaust was not a long term plan despite Hitler's anti-semitic views being voiced ever since he was young. However, there was always a plan to remove the Jews from society and Germany otherwise there would have been no need to introduce the Nuremberg laws and then escalate the process to the deportation programme to Madagascar. It is difficult to know the exact intentions of the Nazi Party and Hitler from early and before his power but there has been enough documentation released to help form a decision and view on the Holocaust that it was not a long term plan, even if there had always been a long term hatred of the Jews.

Outlines
with some
eval chosen
works.

✓

J

P.T.O.

BP1 L4 - A range of relevant material is included, often precise to demonstrate understanding with appropriate citations. Some aspects lacking depth.

BP2 L4- - Some contextual knowledge is used + relevant to debate. Judgment on Q is reached but not always substantiated.
 Often used well. Some lack of balance but this is expected in Level 4

BP3 L3+ - Analyzes the views in chosen works + explores some differences in view but at times this is not always developed between 3 chosen works.
 Views are well analysed + explained. Differences are explicitly noted + reasons suggested but these are weak as is expected in L3.

BP4 L3+ - Judgments made about 3 chosen works but not always developed or substantiated.

BP5 L4+ - Largely well written + structured however some confusing phrases used which lack coherence. Areas which lack clarity are very limited.

27/40 Moderated up.

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(accessed 27/10/2016)
- 

Coursework resource record

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History

Centre name:

Candidate name:

Resources used. The three works chosen for the assignment must be asterisked.	Page/web reference	Student comments	Student date(s) when accessed	Teacher initials and date resource record checked
<p>Hitler and the holocaust</p> <p>History today</p> <p>Alan Farmer</p> <p>Issue 58 2007</p> <p>*</p>	<p>http://www.historytoday.com/alan-farmer/hitler-and-holocaust</p>	<p>Farmer takes the viewpoint that the Holocaust was not a long term plan and it was a result of victories in battles and wars. I have taken this from the text because Farmer heavily refers to Operation Barbarossa which was the invasion of the Soviet Union and explains how this meant the Holocaust started. I have chosen Farmer to be one of my three works because he has shown a simple and explicit argument to how the Holocaust was not a long term plan and he gives a lot of evidence to back this up. His view is very one sided but this makes it easier to compare this work to the other ones which I have chosen which is another reason why I chose this.</p>	<p>22/09/2016</p>	
<p>An Interview With Prof. Hans Mommsen.</p> <p>Published 12th December 1997.</p>	<p>http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf</p>	<p>Mommsen does not believe that the Holocaust was a long term plan like Farmer and I chose to research him because he is included in Farmer's article. I looked at this article to see if I could use him as one of my final works but he did not have enough explicit content for me to be able to make a consistent judgment on. Therefore, I am going to look further to see if another</p>	<p>22/09/2016</p>	

<p>The holocaust in history Michael R Marrus Published in 1987</p>	<p>Chapter 3</p>	<p>historian can support the view that the Holocaust was not a long term plan.</p> <p>This chapter explored lots of different views from different historians who had different takes on whether the holocaust was a long term plan or not. The opening page explained by Marrus suggests that he does not think the Holocaust was a long term plan but this is unclear throughout the whole chapter. I did not choose this as one of my three works and I carried on to look for better works which worked better for me because this book does not give a clear and extinct viewpoint. This makes it difficult to make an argument which supports your view so this would be a good work to use to support other points I have made.</p>	<p>16/10/2016</p>	
<p>Hitler and Nazi Germany Stephen J. Lee Second Edition</p>	<p>Chapter 8</p>	<p>Various historians were used to create an argument to why the holocaust was and was not a long term plan but Lee's writing would suggest that he did not think the Holocaust was a long term plan because he mainly speaks about the war years. This is a good thing to support one point of view more than another but it is hard from the quotations I have taken to make an argument about if the Holocaust was a long term plan or not. I have chosen not to use this as one my final works because I would like to find a work which will give one extinct viewpoint.</p>	<p>19/10/2016</p>	
<p>The Adolf Hitler Historical Museum</p>	<p>http://www.hitler.org/writing/s/first_writing/</p>	<p>This is a copy of the Gemlich letter which I found to show that the Holocaust was a long term plan as it was written in 1919. This would compliment my essay well but it does not explicitly say Hitler's intentions which limits its usefulness. This means it cannot be used on its own as one of my three works but I will carry on looking to see if I can find something which uses this to support their argument.</p>	<p>27/10/2016</p>	

<p>The War against the Jews 1933-1945 Lucy S. Dawidowicz Published in 1975 *</p>	<p>Chapter 3 and Chapter 8</p>	<p>Dawidowicz definitely believes that the Holocaust was a long term plan because throughout her book she gives evidence and judgements which heavily support this. She believes that it is a long term plan because she uses Mein Kampf heavily which shows Hitler's anti semitic views from 1925 and she also refers to the Gemlich letter. This therefore led to me using Dawidowicz as one of my final works because her judgement is the opposite to Farmer so these two compliment each other. Dawidowicz is easy to get a viewpoint from so the structure of my essay will compliment this.</p>	<p>27/10/2016</p>	
<p>Christopher R. Browning The Origins of the Final Solution. Published by Arrow. 7th April 2005 *</p>	<p>Chapter 3, Chapter 9 and Chapter 10</p>	<p>Christopher Browning has the viewpoint that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but there was always a plan to remove the Jews when he came to power. This shows the view that the Holocaust was not a long term plan but it wasn't a short term plan either. This would support my other two works because it can be used to contradict or support the evidence I have used but can also be used on its own to create a whole new argument. This work also uses a broad range of evidence and takes into account most significant evidence which makes it a good piece of work to use overall. This is why I have chosen to use it as one of my final works because it is very easy to follow and gives a distinct viewpoint.</p>	<p>4/11/2016</p>	
<p>History of the Holocaust</p>	<p>http://www.pojetaldin.org/holocaust/en/history-of-the-holocaust-shoah-basics/the-reasons-for-the-holocaust.html</p>	<p>Most of this website is irrelevant to the question that we are focused on but it does give good knowledge to support the interpretation of Dawidowicz. It can be used as a piece of evidence to support Dawidowicz as it can actively compliment it. However, it cannot be used on its own to form an argument as it does not form an explicit enough viewpoint to give an answer to the question. This therefore means that I did not choose this as one of my final works.</p>	<p>07/01/2017</p>	

Example 3
Moderated mark 40/40 Level 5

This script demonstrated the qualities of all the bullet points in Level 5, so was awarded a mark at the top of the level. There is a real sense here of the candidate exploring and discussing the issue raised by the question. A range of relevant material has been appropriately selected and deployed with precision, and used with discrimination to support a judgement based on the differences found in the three works. Valid criteria are established and applied in reaching a judgement, based on a logical and coherent argument.

Centre Marks

39/40

Mod Mark

Coursework authentication sheet

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History	
Assignment title:	
Historians have disagreed about the significance of <u>German Foreign Policy</u> in the origins of the First World War.	
What is your view about the significance of <u>German Foreign Policy</u> in the origins of the First World War?	
With reference to three chosen works:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analyse the ways in which interpretations of the issue differ Explain the differences you have identified Evaluate the arguments, indicating which you found most persuasive and explain your judgements 	
Have you received advice on the title from the <i>Assignment guidance service</i> ?	Yes
Centre name:	Centre number:
Candidate name:	Candidate number:
State the examined options that are being taken:	
Paper 1: Option 1G: Germany and West Germany, 1918–89	
Paper 2: Option 2G.1: The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911–46	
Paper 3: Option 35.2: The British experience of warfare, c1790–1918	
Mark awarded	Comments [<i>Comment box expands as you start entering text</i>]
39/40	See attached sheet for comments

Teacher declaration

I declare that the work submitted for assessment has been carried out without assistance other than that which is acceptable according to the rules of the specification.

Assessor name			
Assessor signature		Date	20/4/17

Candidate declaration

I certify that the work submitted for this assignment is my own. I have clearly referenced any materials used in the work. I understand that false declaration is a form of malpractice.

Candidate signature		Date	20/4/17
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Additional Candidate declaration

By signing this additional declaration, you agree to your work being used to support Professional Development, Online Support and Training of Centre-Assessors and Pearson Moderators.

Candidate signature		Date	20/4/17
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Edexcel Year 13 History Coursework /Marking Grid

Date: Summer 2017 Entry

Name:

Centre Number:

Candidate Number:

Mark: 39 / 40

	Level	Comment
Bullet Point 1	5	Excellent range and appropriately selected and cited. Points and facts are deployed with precision. Candidate establishes a clear and sustained evaluative argument. The debate has been clearly understood.
Bullet Point 2	5	Reading / research has been used with discrimination. The candidate reaches a sustained overall judgement. Contextual knowledge is fully integrated and linked closely to the debate.
Bullet Point 3	5	The candidate has analysed differing views in the 3 chosen works and clearly explains the various issues linked to the interpretations. The candidate has a very good understanding of the nature of historical debate.
Bullet Point 4	5	Candidate establishes valid criteria to analyse the arguments in the 3 chosen works. Judgements have been fully justified.
Bullet Point 5	5	Knowledge is deployed very effectively and reveals a clear understanding of the conceptual focus of the essay title. Essay is concise and effectively focused. Arguments are logical and coherent.

Name:
Candidate number:
Centre number:
Centre name: \

Historians have disagreed about the significance of German Foreign Policy in the origins of the First World War.

What is your view about the significance of German Foreign Policy in the origins of the First World War?

With reference to three chosen works:

- **Analyse the ways in which interpretations of the issue differ**
- **Explain the differences you have identified**
- **Evaluate the arguments, indicating which you found most persuasive and explain your judgements**

Interpretations on the causes of the First World War vary widely between different historians and the significance given to the role of German foreign policy is varied between them too. It could be said that Fritz Fischer's argument is the most valid, who believed Germany's aggressive foreign policy and the pressure they put on Austria-Hungary was the most significant cause in the outbreak of the War. Fischer focuses on documents highlighting key events such as the September Programme, Germany's role in the July Crisis of 1914 and the records of meetings and conversations between the leaders of Germany and their ally Austria-Hungary. However, it could also be seen that Gerhard Ritter provides the most valid argument in believing that German pre-war foreign policy was largely defensive and aimed only to keep Austria-Hungary as a European Power. Instead, Ritter believes Austria Hungary should hold the main share of responsibility for the outbreak of War after pressing for such an outcome, analysing the ambitions of the country's leading figures. Finally, it could be said that AJP Taylor provides the most valid argument. Taylor explores the idea of 'War by Timetable', combatting both Fischer's and Ritter's arguments in saying there was no key antagonist in the First World War and that not a single country at the time particularly wanted war. Instead, using mobilisation as a deterrent, Taylor believes the European powers were forced into war due to its complexed and rigid 'timetable'. All three Historians give effective points of view and arguments. However, in order to evaluate its validity, each argument must be set against the work of other historians and each argument's flaws must also be considered. Furthermore, we must assess the ways in which each author's background and the time period in which they were writing affects the validity of their work.

It could be said that Fritz Fischer holds the most valid argument that Germany's aggressive foreign policy and the pressure they put on Austria-Hungary forced the outbreak of the First World War. Evidence for Germany pushing for a war can be found in the words of Ludwig von Moltke, Germany's Chief of Staff who 'asked Jagow to precipitate a preventative war as soon as possible' (1) saying that Germany were 'ready, and the sooner it comes, the better' (2). Germany's clear urgency to fight a 'preventative war' came from its fear of having to fight a war on two fronts, against France and Russia. Evidence to support the validity of Fischer's argument that Germany pushed Austria into war can also be found in the conversations between the German Ambassador in Vienna and Kaiser Wilhelm. According to Fischer, Wilhelm, angry at Von Tschirschky's 'very reserved and counselled moderation' taken in the days following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, said he should 'drop this nonsense' and 'finish with the Serbs, quickly' (3). Evidence outside of Fischer's writing of aggressive German foreign policy, in particular, aggression and agitation throughout Europe, can be found in both Moroccan Crises. The First Moroccan Crisis was initiated by Kaiser Wilhelm's declaration of the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and his country's freedom after

France attempted to implement the 1904 Entente Cordiale by presenting the Sultan with a programme of economic and police 'reforms'. With little to no real interest in Morocco, such a declaration can be seen to have been done by the Kaiser and his government simply to create tension in the Anglo-French Entente, strengthening Fischer's argument. Similarly, the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911, was initiated by Germany in far more a dramatic way than needed. Responding to the presence of French troops in the country, Germany sent its warship, the *Panther*, claiming to be defending the Sultan against riots that had erupted, but ended up violating the terms of the Algeciras convention. Again, evidence of unnecessarily aggressive action from Germany increases the validity of Fischer's claim that Kaiser Wilhelm and his country 'would regret it if we let this present chance, which was so favourable to us, go by without utilising it' (4), as it shows how Germany had previously tried to stir the world climate to benefit their place in Europe, and hoped to do the same in 1914. Further key evidence for German Foreign Policy leading to the outbreak of the War can be found in the 'blank cheque' given to Austria by Germany stating 'Germany's unconditional promise to stand by Austria even if 'measures against Serbia should bring about this big war'' (5). Not only that, Germany's role in the creation of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia can also support Fischer's argument. During the Austrian Ministerial Council of July 7 1914, all participants agreed on the need for war with Serbia and 'on the presentation of an ultimatum with unacceptable demands which would equally lead to war' (6). To support his argument, Fischer shows how much this decision was affected by German pressure, showing the words of Count Sturgkh when telling Tisza, he 'feared that 'a policy of hesitation and weakness' would lose Austria Germany's support thereafter' (7). This 'fear' that Sturgkh felt makes the pressure put on Austria by an aggressive Germany apparent and solidifies the validity of Fischer's argument. Finally, further evidence for why Germany 'were determined to force a conflict' (8) can be found in the policies of Flottenpolitik and Weltpolitik. In short, Weltpolitik aimed to build a colonial empire, transforming Germany into a world power, while Flottenpolitik aimed to expand the German navy after the passage of the 1898 Naval Law. Both policies increased hostility between world powers and are further evidence of aggressive German expansionism and imperialism at the time. Such evidence could therefore be said to again prove Fischer's argument that Germany aimed and knew 'certainly that war would break out' and that they 'had arranged all this very cleverly' (9) to be the most valid, supporting the concept that German foreign policy played the most significant role in the outbreak of the First World War.

Fischer's argument can be strengthened further when compared alongside the work of other historians such as Mark Hewitson. Hewitson studies German aggression but particularly the role of the leaders of Germany and how 'German nationalism ... became a means of escape from the conflicts and fragmentation of Wilhelmine Society' (10) at the time, and was used to steer support away from the SPD. Hewitson's therefore shows how the leaders of Germany used imperialist ideas to produce nationalistic feeling in Germany, that then led to European conflict, to mend their own society. Further validating Fischer's argument, he therefore believes that it was Germany who played the most significant role in the outbreak of the First World War. Similarly, Andreas Hillgruber's argument that Germany took a 'calculated risk' can further the validity of Fischer's writing. Born in Germany and writing during the time of the Fischer controversy, the two historians can be directly compared. By encouraging Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, Hillgruber believed Germany aimed to break the Triple Entente and therefore provoke a conflict with Russia alone, supporting Fischer's argument that German Foreign Policy aimed to stir the world climate of the 1900s. This 'calculated risk' led to the outbreak of the First World War. Therefore, while Hillgruber agrees with Fischer that German Foreign Policy bares sole responsibility for the war, he disagrees with Fischer partly, claiming that Germany's actions made not have been as vicious as they seemed, challenging the strength of Fischer's argument.

Fischer also believed that aggressive war aims and preparations can act as evidence for aggressive German foreign policy leading to the First World War. Fischer discusses the

'September Programme', written by the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in September 1914, which he believes 'was also a statement of war aims because its general principles, if carried into effect, would have permanently changed the face of Europe' (11). The value of Fischer's argument is increased when realising Bethmann-Hollweg's was planning the 'future extension of Germany's power' (12), which could be seen to be an aggressive aim. However, this desire to further a country's power was not exclusive to Germany. Social Darwinism, an idea prevalent throughout Europe during the time, meant that many countries saw nations as a biological species that must compete against each other in a struggle to survive and gain their 'place in the sun'. This can therefore act as evidence to limit the value of Fischer's argument that German foreign policy was the most significant factor in the origins of the First World War as every other country was trying to do the same. However, Fischer goes on to strengthen his argument by revealing how Hollweg's Programme, in order to sustain German security for 'all imaginable time', must weaken France to such an extent 'to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time' (13). The elimination of France and Russia as independent Great Powers, actual points in the programme, can be seen as clear evidence for German aggression that led to the outbreak of the War. Germany's aims for European dominance can be found in the exact wording of the programme. For example, making 'France economically dependent on Germany' and reducing Belgium, 'if allowed to continue to exist as a state' to a 'vassal state' (14). Such evidence clearly shows the aggressive nature of Germany's plans, strengthening Fischer's argument that it was aggressive German foreign policy that played the most significant role in the outbreak of the War. However, there are clear limitations to Fischer's argument. Fischer's 'timetable' has often been criticized as inaccurate. Hollweg's September Programme was first created on the 9th of September 1914, almost three months after the outbreak of the war and cannot therefore be taken as evidence of pre-war intentions that led to its outbreak. Secondly, Germany was not alone in making plans for post-war European territorial gains. After France were defeated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, they wanted revenge against Germany and to take back Alsace and Lorraine. This point is supported further by AJP Taylor who believed the countries of Europe 'all muddled into war' (15), mentioned later. Further evidence can be found between 1870 and 1914, where France doubled the size of their standing army. Not only that, Russia too had long-standing explicit war aims. This shows that Germany were not the only country to plan for war and expansion, limiting Fischer's argument. Finally, it could be said that Hollweg's Programme was simply the hopes of an individual, not the formal policy of the whole country. Therefore, although there is clear evidence to support Fischer's argument that Germany's War aims and plans show its responsibility in the outbreak of the First World War, there are also clear limitations to the validity of his argument.

Similar flaws in Fischer's argument have been found that are important when evaluating its validity. Firstly, in his writing, Fischer places a lot of emphasis on the War Council of 1912 as clear emphasis for aggressive military planning. However, the Chancellor was not present at the council. It could be argued that his absence shows the meeting lacked seriousness and did not actually contribute to the outbreak of war at all and I therefore reject this as legitimate evidence for his argument. Secondly, Fischer also uses the report of the German Army's Quartermaster, Waldersee, that the Army 'can move at a moment's notice. We in the general staff are ready; there is nothing more for us to do' (16). Historians claim Fischer failed to take into account that Waldersee reported every year that the Army was 'ready for war' and this was no exception. Similarly, Fischer fails to take into account the role of Germany during the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912. When Austria and Russia confronted each other over Austria's aims to restrict Serbian gains, Germany stopped Austria from fighting against Russia. This therefore limits the validity of Fischer's argument that aggressive German Foreign Policy was most significant cause in the outbreak of War. Similarly, the way in which external factors affected Fischer's argument have to be taken into account. German born and educated, he has no reason to be biased against Germany. Not only that, Fischer was one of the first historians to be given access to the archives of East

and West Germany, which contained unseen documents created by the Reich government during the First World War. Hence, his writing, having been based on archival research, unlike earlier printed source-based writings, enhances the validity of his argument and the information he is using.

It could be argued that Gerhard Ritter provides the most valid argument in that it was aggressive Austro-Hungarian policy that led to the outbreak of war in 1914. Ritter believes Germany's principal goal in 1914 was to maintain Austria-Hungary as a great power and that the 'real impetus for the outbreak of this crisis did not issue from Prussia-Germany' (17). Ritter shows Austria's Chief of General Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, to be a man who like many of his colleagues 'certainly wanted war' (18). Having been dismissed for his overly aggressive stance toward Italy in the 1911 Italo-Turkish War, it is clear to see how Ritter's argument that Austria-Hungary were too an aggressive nation, is one of value and strength. Hotzendorf, a man who believed the future of his country could only be 'settled on the battlefield rather than at the conference table' (19) can again be seen to have driven his country to war by the fact that he had asked for a 'surprise' war to destroy Serbia more than 25 times before 1914. From this, it could be said that the Austrian General Staff played more of a significant role in the outbreak of the war than German aggression, validating Ritter's argument. Although Fischer's claim that Germany's General Staff's readiness to 'support the Monarchy (Austria) through thick and thin' (20) shows the pressure they were putting on Austria, he fails to take into account that Hotzendorf was ready to enter into War with Serbia 'without even consulting the German ally' (21). From this, it could be said that German pressure had little impact on Austria's decision for war, weakening Fischer's argument that the Germany pushed Austria into war against Serbia. Having said that, Fischer too states how only a few days after the assassination, Austria began to realise the opportunity to 'settle accounts once and for all with Serbia by a war in which Germany would be behind them' (22). Not only that, the fact that Fischer also explains how Hotzendorf had contacted Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister in Germany, to say that 'Austria should mobilise; she should cut through the knot' (23) strengthens his argument. Both Historians at times agreeing that Austria showed a readiness for war strengthens their arguments due to their clear respect for factual evidence. To further his argument that Austria-Hungary played the most significant role in the outbreak of the war, Ritter goes on to explain how Conrad's influence made the 'radical militarism that believed political problems could be solved only by force of arms' (24) prevalent throughout Vienna in the build-up to world conflict. Evidence of Austro-Hungarian aggression pre-1914 can be found in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909. Previous to the crisis, Austria-Hungary had been wary of Serbia who wanted Bosnia, due to the large population of Serbs living there. Hence, the Foreign Minister believed that the best way to deal with the Serbs was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which they did in October 1908, further showing the aggressive nature of the leaders of Austria in the run up to 1914, strengthening Ritter's argument. The crisis permanently damaged relationships in Europe, especially Austria-Hungary's, and is seen as one of the key causes of war in 1914, strengthening Ritter's argument that Austria-Hungary played more of a significant role in the outbreak of the War than German Foreign Policy. Having said that, there are also limitations to Ritter's argument. Writing in 1962, Ritter said he felt profound 'sadness' while thinking that Germans may not be as patriotic because of Fischer and did not appreciate the 'anti-German' ideas he was sharing. It could therefore be said that his extreme nationalistic views and patriotism may have affected his writing, pushing the blame away from Germany and onto Austria-Hungary, limiting the strength of his argument.

However, the validity of Ritter's argument can again be strengthened when compared alongside the opinion of other historians such as Christopher Clark, who after analysing each Power's reaction to the murder at Sarajevo, believed that it was Austria-Hungary that played the most significant role in the outbreak of war in 1914. In particular, 'the hawks' of Austria-Hungary who Clark believes forced their country, and particularly their foreign minister, Berchtold, to act against Serbia. Clark states that Austria-Hungary's 'hawks'



thought that the assassination was the perfect excuse to land a 'pulverising blow against the kingdom without giving any consideration to such scruples' (25). Evidence of a poor and untrustworthy relationship between the two can be found in the 1906 Pig War, when the Serbs did not renew their trade agreement with Austria-Hungary and so they banned all imports of Serbian pork. From this, we can understand why 'the hawks' of Austria-Hungary 'pressed for a rapid military strike against Belgrade' (26) at such an ideal time as the assassination of 1914. Such events and their consequences perhaps explains why Hotzendorf, along with many others, believed 'mobilisation should be ordered without any further negotiations with Belgrade' (27), because if they didn't, their country's security would once again be risked. Clark's, and therefore Ritter's, argument is solidified further through his consideration of what Franz Ferdinand, would have wanted had he survived the crisis of 1914. Through showing the calm and non-aggressive characteristics of the Archduke, Clark is able to highlight how the 'hawks' pressured their colleagues, and then the world, into conflict. Being able to see how Clarke's argument shares the belief in the significance of Austrian aggression in the outbreak of the First World War, strengthens the validity of Ritter's argument.

Finally, it could be seen that AJP Taylor gives the most valid argument in believing that war was brought about by the concept of 'War by Timetable'. Taylor's 'How Wars Begin' looks into the complexed and rigid structures of railway timetables which Taylor argues forced Germany into being seen as the key cause of the First World War. Taylor combats both Fischer's and Ritter's arguments, by showing that Germany's nor Austria-Hungary's leaders were the only to prepare for world conflict and that the War of August 1914 was not an accident but 'a war of design: a war...long prepared for' (28) by almost all of the European Great Powers. Evidence to support Taylor's view can be found in the documented war plans of each world power. Previously mentioned, France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, meant 'imperialist paranoia' began to settle in around Europe and each of the Powers worked hard to prepare plans to protect themselves against the next large conflict. For example, Germany developed the Schlieffen Plan, France had Plan XVII formulated by Ferdinand Foch, Austria-Hungary had both Plan B and R, and Russia developed Plans G, A and 19. Further evidence to support the validity of Taylor's argument can be found in the fact that, at the time, Britain was the only European Great Power without conscription, meaning every other country had troops prepared for conflict. Therefore, it cannot be said that the leaders of Germany were the only to prepare for war, limiting the validity of Fischer's argument that German war plans are evidence for aggressive imperialist foreign policy that led to the outbreak of the War. Furthermore, imbedded in each Power's war plans were preparations for mobilisation. Due to the huge number of forces that had to be deployed by each country, timing was key, meaning that 'mobilisation plans had been timed to the minute, months of even years before and they could not be changed' (29). This meant, to a certain extent, that European Powers had to agree to an almost inevitable war that was bound to happen when their plans for mobilisation clashed or went wrong. Due to the 'Imperialist Paranoia' mentioned earlier, if one country began to mobilise, the others would take it as a warning and begin to mobilise too. To make things worse, 'all mobilisation plans depended on the railways ... and railways demand timetables' (30). These so-called 'Timetables' are what Taylor believed caused the First World War. The problem was, Germany, for example, had a force of 9,898,000 troops that it had to organise and then deploy, depending on the actions of its neighbours. It is therefore understandable that 'modification in one direction would ruin them in every other direction' (31) because if Austria, for instance, decided to mobilize against Serbia, it could not then mobilize against Russia as they would then have two trains going against each other, which was impossible. Such evidence increases the validity of Taylor's argument. If a Power was to change its mind, it would be 'at least six months before the next lot of timetables were ready' (32) meaning they would be incapable of fighting on the front they chose. From this, it is hard to fully blame the leaders of Germany or Austria in their roles in the origins of the First World War; they, like many others were in a very tough predicament and could not adopt a 'wait

and see' mentality, limiting Fischer's and Ritter's arguments. Combatting Fischer's view, Taylor believes that it was the pressure put on Germany to get in 'one blow first and so decisively that they would have eliminated one enemy' (33) due to their fear of a two-sided war and being the unfortunate first European Power to strike, that saddled them with the blame for the war.

In conclusion, although Taylor's argument of 'War by Timetable' is a very good one, it is certainly not the most valid. Recognising the demands put on countries at the time by the rigidity of Railway Timetables and assessing the consequences of such systems, Taylor believed that the powers in 1918 became victims of timetables, meant to act as deterrents. The increase in European military preparation and tensions that grew as a result, provides Taylor with a convincing and effective argument. However, Taylor's argument fails to take into account the imperialist nature of the 1900s and the willingness of many nations to fight after the increasingly hostile crises of the time, making his argument the least valid. Ritter too provides a very convincing argument, through the exploration of both countries' foreign policy in the lead up to the war. Ritter believes Germany's principal goal in 1914 was to maintain Austria-Hungary as a power and that the real cause and desire for War came from Austria. Ritter's most convincing point, I believe lies in the lack of motivation needed from Germany for Austria to go to war. However, Ritter's evident nationalistic views, patriotism and dislike for Fischer may have affected his writing, limiting his argument's validity. Therefore, due to the limitations of these arguments, Fischer holds the most valid argument. Fischer argues that aggressive German Foreign Policy aimed to deliberately provoke war during July 1914. While Fischer perhaps places too much emphasis on the 1912 War Council, he believed that Germany's war aims and programmes agitated and inspired the European Powers of 1914 into War. Furthermore, Fischer focuses on the pressure put on the Austro-Hungarian government during the crisis of July 1914 and how they forced Austria to produce an ultimatum 'designed to be rejected' (34) through the fear of leaving them as an ally if the plan was not fulfilled. Fischer's use of archival evidence, unlike earlier printed source-based writings, strengthens his argument further due to the accurate and wide range of factual evidence and documents used. Hence, I believe that Fischer produces the most compelling argument with the greatest validity and therefore also agree that German Foreign Policy played the most significant role in the origins of the First World War.

Word Count: 4000

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5. Fischer, Page 55
6. Fischer, Page 56
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39 / 40

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25. Clark, CM, 2012, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914, 2013 Paperback, London, Penguin Books, Page 392
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- <http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm>
- <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany>
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- <http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/78634996357/how-germany-planned-the-first-world-war>
- <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austriancouncilmeeting.htm>
- <https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918>

Appendix 5: Resource record

Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in History				
Centre name:				
Candidate name:				
Resources used. The three-works chosen for the assignment must be asterisked.	Page/web reference	Student comments	Student date(s) when accessed	Teacher initials and date resource record checked
*AJP TAYLOR – How Wars Begin	Chapter 4 (The First World War) – Pages 99-122	After finding the relevant chapter, I read through the text, taking note of key arguments relevant to the discussion. Taylor focuses on 'War by timetable'. This is the idea that no one wanted to start the war and that everyone used mobilisation as a deterrent. He argues that the Germans had a very tight timetable and couldn't afford to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. The fact that Germany was the first to strike is why they were saddled with the blame for the war.	28 th of August 2016	
*GERHARD RITTER – The Sword and the Sceptre 2	Chapter 10: The General Staffs and the Outbreak of War – Pages 227-239	Ritter is one of Fischer's best known critics. He believed that Germany's principal goal in 1914 was to maintain Austria-Hungary as a great power and that German foreign policy was generally, largely defensive. Ritter criticises: Fischer's belief in pressured-bellucose Germany leadership, his portrayal of Austro-German relations in July 1914, his dismissal of aggressive Austrian policy. Having said that, Ritter did believe that Germany could be partly blamed due to their mistaken evaluation of European power politics in July 1914, including French and Russian readiness and British neutrality.	29 th of August 2016	

<p>*FRITZ FISCHER – Germany's aims in the First World War</p>	<p>Chapter 2 (Germany and the outbreak of War: The miscalculation on British neutrality) – Pages 50-92</p>	<p>After finding the relevant chapter, I read through the text, taking note of key arguments relevant to the discussion. Fischer believed that Germany was solely responsible for the 1st World War. It was the aggressive foreign policy of both Germany's leaders and people that led the World to War. Although not used in my original assignment, Fischer's argument was useful in allowing me to gain a greater understanding of Historian's views. With Fischer's being one of the most well-known and perhaps controversial arguments of any Historian's, it was interesting to see what modern Historians were aiming to challenge.</p>	<p>14th of September 2016</p>
<p>OTHER: MARK HEWITSON – Germany and the causes of the First World War</p>	<p>Chapter 3 (Nationalism and Images of the Enemy) – Pages 39 - 56</p>	<p>After finding the relevant chapter, I read through the text, taking note of key arguments relevant to the discussion. Hewitson combats the traditional view of a severely nationalist German public who were keen for war due to the fear of encirclement and the power of their enemies. He believes that most people were very secure in their country and did not want to go to war. There was a lack of nationalism in Germany and war was only wanted by those in charge of the country to escape the corrupt and dismantled German system.</p>	<p>1st of September 2016</p>
<p>OTHER: CHRISTOPHER CLARK – The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914</p>	<p>Chapter 7 – Murder in Sarajevo: What is to be done: Pages 391 – 404</p>	<p>After finding the relevant chapter, I read through the text, taking note of key arguments relevant to the discussion. Clark focuses on the 'hawks' of Austria-Hungary and how they put immense pressure on the leaders of their country. This pressure, Clark believes, is the most significant cause of the First World War. However, Clark also focuses on the relevance of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's mentality towards the Serbs before he was killed. Clark reveals that the Archduke did not actually show any aggression towards the Serbs and believes that if he survived the crisis, he would have removed the hawks, and remained cool in negotiations with the Serbs.</p>	<p>5th of October 2016</p>
<p>OTHER: ANDREAS HILLGRUBER – Germany and the two World Wars</p>	<p>Chapter 3 – The German Leadership in the Crisis of July 1914:</p>	<p>When undertaking my study of the causes of the First World War, I came across the concept of 'calculated risk', believed in by Andreas Hillgruber. He was particularly helpful when finding historians to compare with Fischer. Though his belief in "calculated risk" Hillgruber also places the blame on Germany for causing World War I. Also, being born in Germany and writing during the time of the Fischer Controversy, it was very interesting to be able to directly compare the two historians with each other. Hillgruber's argument that</p>	<p>10th of October 2016</p>

	Pages 22 - 40	Germany's "calculated risk" that went horribly wrong is a concise and valid argument however I do not believe it to be stronger than Fischer's. Hilgruber believes by pressuring Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, Germany hoped to break the Triple Entente and provoke a conflict with Russia.	
Critically assess why historians disagreed on the causes of the First World War - Melanie Konzett	www.literra.net/file_download/12/w1_history.pdf	I used this site to help me gain an insight into the many different opinions of Historian's on the causes of the First World War. The document provided me with a concise and well-detailed account of different opinions, in which many of the Historians I was studying featured. Not only that, the document also showed me where the relevant chapters were in my Historian's works, along with key quotes.	15 th of September 2016
The Planning of War – John Godl	http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/plans.htm	When developing AJP Taylor's argument of 'War by Timetable', featured in 'How Wars Begin' I wanted to gain greater knowledge of each countries preparation for War. Through the document, I was able to expand my knowledge and found precise facts on War Plans such as Germany's Schlieffen Plan, France's Plan XVII, Austria-Hungary's Plan B and R, and Russia's developed Plans G, A and 19.	24 th of September 2016
Encyclopaedia Britannica – The Social Democratic Party of Germany – David P. Conradt	https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany	During my time analysing Mark Hewitson's argument, I began to understand the relevance of the SPD in Pre-War Germany in Hewitson's argument and felt I needed to gain a greater understanding of both their policy and origins. Through Encyclopaedia Britannica, I was able to see why the German government were so keen to lose the group support through War, mainly due to their long history of a shaky relationship.	30 th of September 2016
Austria-Hungary and Serbia – The melting pot of World War 1	http://www.johnclare.net/causes_WW1_AustriaandSerbia.htm	Clark's argument focuses on the pressure put on the Austro-Hungarian government by the 'hawks'. Not fully aware of why there was such hatred between Austria-Hungary and Serbia I began to look for some context to the matter. Through searching the internet, I found this site which provided a well-detailed timeline of events that caused tension between the two countries up to the start of the First World War.	3 rd of October 2016 – Mr. Gosling
	http://fall12	While completing my project, I began to understand the need for the	21 st of

<p>Debate over the causes of the First World War – Sarah Dwyer and Tara St. Onge</p>	<p>his423.providence.wikispaces.net/Debate+Over+the+Caus+es+of+World+War+1</p>	<p>exploration of the backgrounds of each Historian to understand how the contextual elements of an argument affect its validity and utility. Through the use of this website and the small introduction to each Historian it mentions, I was able to gain a greater understanding of the backgrounds of Fischer, Hillgruber and Taylor. Not only that, the site also gives a small introduction to the background to World War 1 and a very useful timeline of key dates at the end.</p>	<p>November 2016</p>
<p>What Were Germany's Goals When War Was Declared in WWI? – Scott Thompson</p>	<p>http://classroom.synonym.com/when-war-was-declared-wwi-20859.html</p>	<p>This site gave me a brief overview of some of the main reasons and goals Germany had when entering into the First World War. Whenever I was unsure of why a certain individual had said something, quoted by the Historian, I was able to find reasoning in their words. The site also helped me to gain a deeper understanding of the details of the 'September Programme'; a key factor in Fischer's argument.</p>	<p>22nd of November 2016</p>
<p>Unit 301 – From Kaiser to Fuhrer 1900-45 – Angela Leonard</p>	<p>Pages 20-37</p>	<p>Similar to the article by Sarah Dyer and Tara St. Onge mentioned earlier, through Angela Leonard's work I was able to gain an overview of the background of the First World War. Inside her work, she explained the history, interests and relationships of the European Great Powers, a brief outline of the reasons and attributes of both Weltpolitik and Flottenpolitik, the Alliance system pre-1914, the effect of the July Crisis, interpretations of German diplomacy before 1914 and a summary of viewpoints in relation to the causes of the First World War. I found this document particularly helpful during my analysis of Fritz Fischer's argument as it showed both the strengths and weaknesses in his argument while providing facts to back up both.</p>	<p>24th of November 2016</p>
<p>How Germany planned the First World War - Süddeutsche Zeitung, Germany's largest broadsheet newspaper.</p>	<p>http://internationale.sueddeutsche.de/post/78634996357/how-germany-planned-the-first-world-war</p>	<p>When analysing Fischer's argument, I wanted to gain a greater understanding of Hollweg's 'September Programme'; a key point to Fischer's argument. Through this webpage, I was provided with a concise and clear outline of German planning for the First World War and how the September Programme played a role in the lead up to conflict.</p>	<p>24th of November 2016</p>

<p>Primary Documents - Austrian Ministerial Council Meeting Minutes, 7 July 1914 – Michael Duffy</p>	<p>http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/austrian_councilmeeting.htm</p>	<p>When analysing both Fischer's and Ritter's arguments, I wanted to gain a greater understanding of the importance of the Austrian Ministerial Council Meeting of July 7 1914, held just before the outbreak of World War. From the article, I was able to find the exact minutes of the meeting and therefore could understand how apart from the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, all attendees voted to present Serbia with an ultimatum so severe that it could not be accepted and would therefore lead to a declaration of war. More interesting is how Fischer claims that some accepted the idea of an ultimatum only due to the fear of losing Germany as an ally.</p>	<p>2nd of December 2016</p>
<p>Germany from 1871 to 1918 – William H. Berentzen</p>	<p>https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Germany-from-1871-to-1918</p>	<p>During my research on the themes of Social Darwinism and Encirclement, I wanted to find evidence for some of the reasons Germany may have felt the way they did. Therefore, after some time searching the web, this article provided me with a detailed review of Germany's history before the First World War and I was able to see how certain aspects affected their policies in the years before the war. Sections on the economy and foreign policy were particularly helpful.</p>	<p>5th of December 2016</p>

Annotation and marking

Marking by most centres was generally accurate and there were relatively few centres where moderation resulted in an adjustment of marks to the whole cohort. Many centres annotated their students' work thoroughly, using the wording of the mark schemes and showing where they had identified specific levels on the different bullets. Their summaries on each candidate's authentication sheet gave a brief resume of performance on each of the five bullets. This practice is to be commended and encouraged. There were some centres, too, where internal moderation was not required, but it had been undertaken, presumably as a precaution. Again, a practice to be commended.

There were, however, some problems:

- Where marking was inaccurate, it was usually in the assessment of bullets 3 and 4. There was a tendency to reward work at level 5 where there was no real understanding demonstrated of basis of the difference in the arguments presented, and the nature of the historical debate. The problems with bullet 4 have already been touched upon. These impacted on marking in that teachers had difficulty in identifying where, and in what ways, criteria were established and applied.
- A small number of centres failed to annotate the work of their candidates. It was thus tricky – and hard work – for moderators to establish just why specific levels and marks had been awarded on each of the five bullets. It would be politic to remind centres that moderation is not re-marking, but an assessment of the accuracy of the centre's marking.
- There were several instances where the students' work had clearly been marked by two different people, and where there was no indication that any internal moderation had taken place.

Overall, performance by candidates and their teachers represents an excellent start to the teaching, research and assessment on this particular component. Challenges have been embraced and met, and where there are problems, it is hoped that the E9 reports and this, Principal Moderators Report, will serve to rectify these.

