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**Pearson
Edexcel GCE**

Centre Number

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Candidate Number

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History

Advanced Unit 3

Option E: War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

Friday 9 June 2017 – Morning

Time: 2 hours

Paper Reference

6HI03/E

You must have:

Source Insert (enclosed)

Total Marks

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Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer **ONE** Question from Section A and **ONE** Question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
– *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in **all** your responses
– *you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

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P 4 9 1 3 8 A 0 1 2 4



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SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3.
Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

- 1 'The accelerating European arms race after 1900 bears little responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

- 2 'The peace treaties of 1919–22 were primarily based on the victorious powers' self-interest and desire for revenge.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

- 3 'The nuclear arms race significantly stabilised US-Soviet relations in the years 1949–63.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

- 4 'Both the United States and the Soviet Union were genuinely committed to Détente in the 1970s.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS

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Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen question number: **Question 1** **Question 2**
Question 3 **Question 4**

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TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS



SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the League of Nations failed in the inter-war period because it was ignored by the great powers?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

‘Britain and France were primarily responsible for the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939.’

How far do you agree with the view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)

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E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

**Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.**

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

‘Stalin’s expansionist foreign policy was mainly responsible for the development of the Cold War in the years 1945–53.’

How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s due to President Ronald Reagan’s ‘military and ideological assertiveness’.
(Source 10 line 33)

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS

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Chosen question number: **Question 5**

Question 6

Question 7

Question 8

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(Section B continued)

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TOTAL FOR PAPER = 70 MARKS



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History

Advanced

Unit 3

Option E: War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

Friday 9 June 2017 – Morning

Sources Insert – Section B

Paper Reference

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1

(From Sally Marks, *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World 1914–1945*, published 2002)

The League could not fulfil its primary goal of preserving peace because it lacked power. It was often paralysed by the unanimity requirement and lacked ability to cope with defiance by a great or even regional power. It was disowned by Washington. Even London and Paris often maintained only a distant relationship, providing lip service for the sake of public opinion. Though France had hoped to make the League a real instrument to preserve the *status quo*, London's view was that it should be an international round table but not an international War Office. Like other powers, Britain had no objection to delay and discussion – but not where its own vital interests were concerned. As state sovereignty remained intact, there was no way to ensure co-operation with, or obedience to, the League. The great powers ignored Geneva, deciding great matters elsewhere among themselves.

5

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SOURCE 2

(From Ruth B. Henig, *The League of Nations*, published 1973)

The slump of 1929 cast a dark shadow over the League, which was lengthened by the Manchurian crisis of 1931. Caught in severe economic and political cross-currents, nations cast about for traditional national principles to guide their policies instead of looking to the League for the possibility of internationally concerted action. Hitler worsened the situation for the League. It was in his interest to weaken any existing international body which could conceivably halt his expansionist designs. He did not find it difficult to undermine members' faith in the League's disarmament machinery at the League Disarmament Conference of 1931–3. Mussolini completed the destruction of the League by exposing the inadequacies of the League as a peace-keeping body. After the conquest of Abyssinia and Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland, the League ceased to count as an international centre of any importance.

15

20

SOURCE 3

(From an article by Adam Roberts, *Towards a World Community?*, published 1998)

The League of Nations failed partly because its proposed mechanisms for achieving security were inherently flawed. The idea of collective responses to acts of aggression could not work when there was no agreement among states as to whether particular acts constituted aggression; when there were arguments about whether economic sanctions or military force were appropriate responses to such acts; and when the League's decision-making procedures required unanimity, which was simply not attainable on most security issues in the 1920s and 1930s. The League earnestly discussed major crises – and it heard powerful pleas for action against Japanese, Italian and German uses of force in the 1930s – but its responses were ineffective.

25

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E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4

(From R. J. Overy, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 2nd edition, published 1998)

In 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany, and not the other way round. A large part of any explanation for the war must rest on this central point. France and Britain had complex interests and motives for war. They had to take decisions on international questions with one eye on public opinion and domestic politics and another on potential enemies elsewhere. The traditional picture of the western democracies vainly trying to uphold the spirit of the League of Nations, and the strategy of 'collective security' in the face of totalitarian pressure, can no longer be upheld. British and French policy before 1939 was governed primarily by national self-interest and only secondarily by moral considerations. The British and the French, just like the Germans, were anxious to preserve or extend their power, and safeguard their economic interests. In the end, this meant going to war in 1939 to preserve Franco-British power and prestige.

SOURCE 5

(From Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis*, published 2001)

The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, told Parliament on 1 September 1939 that 'Responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor, who has plunged the world into misery in order to serve his own senseless ambitions'. Such a personalised view necessarily left out the failings of others – including the British government and its French allies – which had assisted in enabling Hitler to accumulate enough power to determine the fate of Europe. Internationally, Hitler's bullying and blackmail could not have worked but for the fragility of the post-war European settlement. The Treaty of Versailles had given Hitler the basis for rising demands, accelerating drastically in 1938–9.

SOURCE 6

(From Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History*, published 2001)

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 convinced Hitler that Britain and France, which on past evidence he regarded as weak, could not fight a general war to save Poland. This suggested that the effects of Nazi aggression against Poland could be localised. Western efforts to bring the Poles to the negotiating table convinced Hitler that he was dealing with British and French leaders who were 'below average' and 'little worms'. Hitler failed to understand that Poland was not primarily the issue. The British and French had drawn a line in the sand with their guarantees to Poland, signalling that they would not tolerate further German challenges to their rights and status as great European powers. Hitler decided to risk crossing that line. It apparently came as a shock to him when war was declared.

Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7

(From Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, *The Cold War, 1945–1991*, published 2006)

The steady stream of Soviet actions in Eastern and Central Europe, in Germany, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in Iran, aroused Truman's fears about Stalin's ultimate ambitions. Collectively they appeared to the US as a deliberate programme designed to undermine Western influence in areas bordering the Soviet Union as a prelude to a complete communist take-over. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, following Mao Tse-tung's victory in China in 1949 and the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in the same year, were regarded as further blows to American security. The intervention of communist China in the Korean War in November 1950 convinced Truman that the war had been engineered by Moscow as a means of distracting the United States' attention from Europe. American forces in both Europe and Korea were strengthened.

SOURCE 8

(From Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, published 1996)

Stalin's road to the Cold War, in the years after 1946, was strewn with miscalculations. He did not want to provoke American and British 'imperialism', yet he overreacted to any perceived threat in Germany and in Eastern Europe. In response to the Marshall Plan, Stalin began to consolidate a Soviet security zone in Eastern Europe by ruthless police methods and intensive Communist propaganda. Trying to stop Western separatist policies in Germany, he triggered the Berlin blockade crisis. By sanctioning North Korean aggression, Stalin subjected the Koreans, his Chinese ally, and the rest of the world to a bloody and protracted war that contained the real danger of a global conflict.

SOURCE 9

(From John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*, published 1972)

The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external situation – circumstances beyond the control of either power – left Americans and Russians facing one another across devastated Europe at the end of World War II. Internal influences in the Soviet Union – the search for security, the role of ideology, massive post-war reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin – together with those in the United States – the ideal of self-determination, fear of communism, the illusion of being all-powerful fostered by American economic strength and the atomic bomb – made the resulting confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers sought peace, but in doing so yielded to considerations which, while they did not trigger war, made a resolution of differences impossible.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10

(From D. Deudney and G. J. Ikenberry, *Who Won the Cold War?*, published 1992)

Ronald Reagan's military and ideological assertiveness during the 1980s played the lead role in the collapse of Soviet communism and the taming of its foreign policy. It delivered the knock-out punch to a system that was internally bankrupt. As former Pentagon officials like Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle have argued, a combination of military and ideological pressures forced the Soviets to abandon expansionism abroad and repression at home. The Reagan military build-up limited Soviet military options while pushing the Soviet economy to breaking point. Reagan's supporters stress that his dramatic 'Star Wars' initiative showed the Soviets that the next phase of the arms race would be waged in areas where the West held a decisive technological advantage.

SOURCE 11

(From an article by Raymond L. Garthoff, in *Diplomatic History*, published 1992)

The West did not win the Cold War through geopolitical containment and military deterrence. Nor was the Cold War won by the Reagan military build-up and the Reagan Doctrine. Instead, 'victory' for the West came when a new generation of Soviet leaders realised how badly their system at home and their policies abroad had failed. Only a Soviet leader could have ended the Cold War and Gorbachev set out deliberately to do so. He was the first to recognise that mutual political accommodation, rather than military power for deterrence or counter-deterrence, was the defining core of the Soviet Union's relationship with the rest of the world. The conclusions that Gorbachev drew from this recognition, and the subsequent Soviet actions, finally permitted the Iron Curtain to be dismantled and ended the global confrontation of the Cold War.

SOURCE 12

(From Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War*, published 2008)

The real balance of economic power between the Soviet Union and its empire was heavily weighted *against* the USSR. The vast reserves of oil, gas, and metal ores in Siberia should have made the Soviet Union a wealthy country. But the USSR made energy and raw materials available at low cost to its socialist allies, who had little to offer in return. The USSR's annual subsidy to its Warsaw Pact allies through the discounting of oil prices amounted to about \$3 billion. This state of affairs locked the entire Warsaw Pact into obsolescence* and kept the Soviet Union in relative poverty. The defence budget absorbed about 50 per cent of the Soviet Union's gross national product annually. Gorbachev knew no social change was possible without ending the arms race with the West. Only this would free up the gigantic sums spent on the military.

* obsolescence = declining usefulness or passing out of use

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