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Examiners' Report
June 2011

GCE History 6HI02 D

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Introduction

General comments

Once again candidates have been very well prepared for this option. Most, if not all, candidates seem to be fully aware of the assessment objectives that the examination is testing and attempt to present clearly focused responses. There is increasing evidence that candidates are planning their answers. In an examination which tests sophisticated source-handling skills it is essential that students should take time to plan their responses before writing. Indeed, it is noticeable that the minority of candidates who still tackle the sources in sequential order rarely, if ever, present evidence of planning. It is, of course, essential that for awards in the higher levels the sources are used as a set. There does still seem to be some confusion over the use of contextual knowledge for part a) questions. It should be remembered that part a) is testing AO2a only. Therefore, although contextual awareness should be applied to see the full implications of statements within the sources or to see the significance of the information contained in the attributions, any references should be brief and directly focused on developing arguments from the sources. Long passages of contextual knowledge are a waste of time and may actually lead the candidate away from the task. Part b, of course, does require candidates to deploy their own knowledge, although this should, where possible, be integrated with, and develop from, issues raised in the sources. As well as AO1, part b questions also address AO2b – the ability to analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, how aspects of the past have been interpreted and represented in different ways. This does not require the formulaic examination of the nature, origin and provenance of a source, and certainly stereotypical comments on the objectivity of historians are unhelpful. It is only necessary to explore the attribution of a source where it helps to advance the evaluation of the representation contained in the evidence.

Candidates should be aware of the conventions of writing History and it was observed this summer that a significant minority of candidates used abbreviations that were not acceptable e.g. LL (Land League) and RTCs (Round Table Conferences).

Question 1 (a)

Many candidates handled the sources very well and had a good grasp of the meaning of the question and the ways in which the sources could be used to answer it at both face value and in consideration of their provenance. It was impressive to see that some candidates realised that land can be both an economic and a political issue and that the two are not mutually exclusive. Such candidates generally scored highly. Many candidates tended to equate political revolution with violence and economic reform with non-violence. Whilst this could be a fair assumption, some candidates began to alter the question and discuss whether the Land League was violent or not, straying from the question focus which was whether its purpose was economic reform or political revolution. Weaker candidates paraphrased the sources and took them solely at face value; they often confused the meaning of political and economic, thus finding themselves unable to answer the question with any precision. Most candidates were able to use source 3 at some level, despite it being a more unfamiliar type of source. Too many candidates still make only a cursory reference to provenance, and at a rather basic level without any consideration of the implications of the point e.g. Parnell was a politician.

Yes to Land

Political revolution:

- source 2 - openly

violence - 3 + 2 openly buying arms - conjunction w/ 2, suggests that this is to initiate PR because LR is "not enough". Moderate live only to "prevent coercion" - i.e. demands for economic reform. Is P's attesting to land reform a moderate live? "regain freedom"

Land reform:

- mainly P's speech, talking about all LR activity being to do w/ "unjust rents" - i.e. economic factors. "Land question" to be settled and no mention of political agenda -

- Land Bill will satisfy a great number

3 - could be suggesting that violence is being used to promote LR or PR

((a) continued) In source 2, Davitt quite clearly attests that the main thrust of the Land League has moved beyond land and economic issues to focus primarily on political ones. The fact that he prophesies the LL will be used to "regain freedom" for Ireland is a clear illustration of this, while his assertion that the Land Bill is "not enough" is a testament to the fact that the nature character of the Irish question had shifted from economic to political at that time. If we take this in conjunction with source 3, similarities emerge - source 3 shows the Land League lurking with many weapons, while source 2 ~~was~~ claims that "people are quite openly buying arms". Although the "bombs and bullets" of source 3 could simply be a reference to the violence the LL used to initiate economic reform, source 3 suggests that the arms are being used to promote a more radical, revolutionary reform - to allow Ireland to "regain her freedom as never

((a) continued) before"; i.e. to establish a degree of political devolution or political revolution.

§. In source 2, Davitt also talks about needing to take a "moderate line" in order to "prevent Coercion" because there are fears abroad that the government may have the league "crushed".

This also suggests that tendencies to promote economic reform perhaps were mainly centred on 'saving face' - that is, avoiding explicit political radicalism in order to stave off revolution. If we consider this with source 1, in source 1, Parnell talks about the ~~it~~ ~~he~~ solely in terms of its desire to promote economic agrarian reform, stating that all "activity" ~~is~~ will influence, and is geared towards, "the nature and content of the Land Bill. He speaks of "unjust rents" and the "land question" - there is no reference to political revolution. This seems to contradict source 3 - but given that Parnell is here making a public speech, it is possible to argue that he is "taking a

((a) continued) moderate line" in order to stave
Thus, he is trying to ensure the LH is "left alone" ^{so} it can
off Coercion. He talks about boycotting, ^{intimidate. political}
but not about a "Rising" - this ^{revolution}
could suggest that he is indeed trying
to allay fears of political ~~no~~ revolutionary
intentions in order to ensure the British
government did not abolish the LH.

In assessing this, it is important to
consider that Parnell is giving a public
speech, where tact and diplomacy would
be necessary for the reasons explained
above, while Davitt is writing a private
letter. However, Davitt is addressing
the letter to John Devay, ~~to~~ who
supported the LH - it is possible to
argue that Davitt was exaggerating the
political motives of the LH in order
to secure Devay's favour and support,
particularly probable given the strength
of ~~the~~ the political movement in
America.

Source 3 is slightly more problematic.
As aforementioned, if used in conjunction
with source 2 it suggests that the
purpose of the LH was political rather
than economic/agrarian, as the "arms"

((a) continued) are being purchased to be regain Irish freedom. However, the source could also be suggesting that the LL is merely trying to intimidate Gladstone into making economic reform through the threat of violence, without political motivations. We might also consider that this source is being used to convince the British govt of the possible "Rising" in order to make them enrich the LL - it could be a primarily propaganda.

In conclusion, I agree with the statement of the question. Davitt's letter to Dewey, despite our concerns over his motives in writing it, certainly suggests that the LL's purpose is political revolution and an effort to "regain freedom as never before". Parnell's speech might be considered conciliatory - he is trying to suppress political motives to prevent backlash. I also believe that source 3 supports cause 2 more than it supports cause 1.



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Examiner Comments

This response contains sustained cross referencing and the integrated use of provenance to support a range of arguments. It is difficult to see what more a candidate might be expected to do in an examination – this response achieved top level 4.

Question 1 (b) (i)

This was attempted by slightly fewer candidates than question 1bii, but was still a fairly popular choice. The question elicited some high level responses which explored the complexity of both Irish and English politics and their inter-relations in the defined period. Many candidates were able to offer an analytical approach and to begin to relate the sources to their own knowledge. However, the standard of own knowledge was highly variable. Whilst some candidates were very knowledgeable, others relied very heavily on the material in the sources and a significant minority did not always have a secure grasp on the chronology of events. It was an exceptional answer that ranged fully across the required time period of this question; most candidates concentrated on either the earlier part of the period or the end of the period. The sources prompted references to specific named politicians and weaker candidates generally did not go beyond these politicians. A number of candidates found it hard to integrate the arguments in source 5 into their answer, especially those candidates who approached the answer in a narrative style.

Answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) of your chosen question.

* (b) To some extent I agree that the reason that political rivalry was the main one stopping Home Rule from being passed, however, there are other factors to consider.

Between the 1835 - 1914 it had been predominantly the Liberals and Gladstone that had publically shown their support for Home Rule. However, the Conservatives were always against Home Rule. When Gladstone had introduced the 1st Home Rule Bill, it was heavily defeated by the House of Lords. This was mainly due to the fact that the majority of the Lords were in fact Conservatives, this meant that the Bill was highly unlikely to be passed, as the Conservatives were against it vehemently. This theory is backed up by Source 6 when it says 'Conservative adoption of the name "Unionist" after 1836 acknowledged the measure of their commitment to the Union'. This indicates again that the

Conservatives did not want to break up the UK. This is mainly because many feared that by letting Ireland go, it would be the beginning of the end of the British Empire as other countries would make a bid for freedom.* They felt that this would lose Britain its status

((b) continued) as a Great Power and reduce their influence on world politics.

However, there are other reasons as to why Home Rule was not passed between 1835 - 1914. The main reason was the fierce opposition to this in the largely protestant Ulster. Throughout the time period, Ulster acted like a ticking time bomb that would explode the moment that Home Rule was passed. For example, by 1914 the Ulster Volunteer Force had over 90,000 members and the UVF said they would fight. Ulster they also sought support from politicians, which when in source H it says says that 'Ulster Unionists were determined to stop him and turned to English Conservatives'. This shows that during the period Ulster were so desperate to stay in the Union they would use both political and armed tactics. Ulster ~~was~~ so wanted to stay in the Union as they feared that the Catholics would treat them incredibly harshly and that

they would have to flee the country
Another reason that it wasn't passed is
because ^{some} people did not believe that Home
Rule would be a practical solution to the Irish
Problem. For example, the Conservatives planned
to 'kill Home Rule with kindness'. To do this



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Examiner Comments

An interesting response. The candidate clearly understands the question focus and uses sources 4 and 6 in conjunction with some valid own knowledge to argue a case, although it is neither well nor fully developed. There is certainly sufficient qualities here for level 3 in AO1. Although there are level 3 qualities demonstrated in the use of sources 4 and 6, the failure to make use of source 5 restricts the answer and it was awarded top level 2.

Question 1 (b) (ii)

This was slightly the more popular question for candidates to tackle and was generally competently answered. The sources were used as the basis for argument and many candidates integrated effective own knowledge with these sources and indeed, went beyond what was contained in the sources. Many candidates were particularly well informed about the role of the Easter Rising in the rise of Sinn Fein and of the importance of the conscription crisis and the best responses were able to supply significant and relevant detail. However, there was also a significant minority of candidates who did not go substantially beyond what was contained in the sources and even some who treated this question as if it were testing the skills of an a question. Some candidates also had difficulty in understanding the arguments presented in source 8 and tended to extract quotes that did not demonstrate a secure grasp of the source.

Answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) of your chosen question.

*(b) Several of these

Yes:

Irish Volunteers - supported SF,
different approach in that they refused
to fight A "minority" at this time
though"

B - definitely because the IPP is
supported on all other matters.

Had line against other things, e.g.
Irish convention

9 - Easter Rising.

((b) continued) ~~See~~ Several of these sources strongly indicate that the different approach for "England's War" was the main reason for their increased popularity. Source 7 illustrates the fact that the Irish volunteers had split into two camps, with MacNeill's groups supporting Sinn Féin; thus, the decline in their popularity can be seen as ~~due~~ owing to the fact that they were opposed to the war, ^{as they managed to secure the support of} ~~Source~~ ^{military} ~~body~~ ^{body} similarly, ~~suggests~~ Though at this time however, the Irish Volunteers under Redmond were still a minority - it was the shifting circumstances in the war which increased SF's support.

The prime reason why their anti-war stance facilitated their ^{SF's} growth in support is centred on the growing unpopularity of the war in Ireland. Sinn Féin referred to it as "England's War", and this certainly reflected the sentiment of many Irish people at the time. For the Irish, ^{Nationalists} Home Rule was a "cheque" continuously "post-dated", while the incorporation

((b) continued) of the Ulster Volunteer Force into the 38th Regiment of the British Army, ^{but not the National Volunteers,} was deemed offensive to them. The ~~17~~ National Volunteer nationalist soldiers fighting on the Front. Thus, the growing unpopularity of war in Ireland pushed many people to support Sinn Féin due to their hard-line anti-war stance.

Source 8 perceptively suggests that this was indeed the most important reason for their growing popularity. In referencing the fact that the IPP were still supported by the "vast majority" on all other issues, Denis ~~my~~ refers to the relative unpopularity of separatist nationalism in Ireland and indicates that it was the SF's stance on the war, and not their ~~views~~ ideological views about Irish politics, that caused their support to sky-rocket at this time. He explains how many Irish men would "not dream of fighting in 'England's War'" and so converted to supporting the Sinn Féin party. In saying this, Denis also

((b) continued) indicates that the IPP's support was dwindling due to their encouragement to Irishmen to involve themselves in the war.

⚡ In assessing the role of the war and Sir Fein's approach to it, it is also important to consider the impact of the conscription crisis of 1918. Though this was also opposed by the more moderate IPP, who left walked out of the House of Commons and established an anti-conscription campaign in Dublin, the tactlessness of the British government indeed pushed many Irish nationalists to switch their loyalty to Sir Fein due to the party's ^{hard-line} approach to the war. The huge impact of the conscription crisis is illustrated by Arthur Griffith's re-election into East Cavan by a huge majority.

However, it was not only Sir Fein's militant stance on the war which resulted in the shift in Irish political sentiment - their hard-line responses to other pieces of Irish legislature also helped

((b) continued) to ensure that they engrossed greater public support. This is evidenced most prominently by the failure of the Irish Convention of 1917-18. The convention, Asquith's means of distracting Irish dissidents while he focused his efforts on the war, was designed to come up with some solution to the Irish question. With Redmond as its leader. Ultimately, it failed to do this - as its leader, Redmond experienced a significant decline in public support and the power of the IPP was virtually nullified, as illustrated by their the fact that they secured just 6 seats in the 1918 General Election. Sir Fein, by contrast, won 73 - having boycotted the convention, they secured the loyalty of those nationalists who had become disenchanted with Redmond's tiresome moderate policies and ^{the} indistinct nature of the IPP. Thus, Sir Fein's approach to other issues, and not just "England's War", resulted in their increased support.

((b) continued) While sources 7 and 8 suggest that their war-stance did increase Sinn Féin's support, source 9 offers an alternative - Collier suggests that the Easter Rising had a huge impact. Though the rising itself was unsuccessful, Britain's heavy-handed response in executing 15⁰ of the rebels resulted in a huge loss of Irish opinion of British rule. The ~~fact~~ that Sinn Féin were widely believed to have been responsible for the Rising - a "misunderstanding", as Collier terms it - and this resulted in a huge wave of support for Sinn Féin and the rebel "martyrs", who were given moral credence over the brutal government. As Collier says, the aftermath of the rising resulted in "a series of spectacular by-election victories" for Sinn Féin and its allies, and the "steady decline" of ^{support for} Redmond's Irish Party. Thus, source 9 ^{can be seen to counter} ~~concludes~~ the view that it was Sinn Féin's stance on the war that caused ~~new~~ Irish support to

((b) continued) shift ~~down~~ from 1914-18, suggesting that the impact of the rising was hugely significant. Indeed, it was ~~one of many factors~~ which resulted in the brutality of the government forced many nationalists to reject the idea of any alliance with such a ruthless and ~~no~~ violent excessive organisational political body. Therefore, the support for Home Rule parties declined because they pushed for some form of Anglo-Irish connection - Sinn Féin, champions of independence and separatist nationalism, secured the support of the disillusioned Irish masses.

In conclusion, I agree that it was Sinn Féin's stance on the war which resulted in the huge ~~so~~ switch in ^{nationalist} Irish allegiance from the Home Rule parties to Sinn Féin. Though Collier's assessment of the impact of the Easter Rising carries significant interpretational weight, I do not believe that it could have had so profound an impact without the foundations.

((b) continued) laid by the impact of WWI.

~~Source~~ The 1916 Manifesto is a testament to the fact that many were unwilling to "offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen" — in conjunction with source 8, we can see that this ~~resulted~~ was the main issue which caused support for Sinn Féin to increase. Source 8 was written in March 1916 — clearly this was a crucial issue at the time, which was only exacerbated by the Easter Rising.



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Examiner Comments

An assured and cogently argued response that has an excellent range of own knowledge to support the arguments derived from the sources. This response reaches a strong level 4 in both assessment objectives.

Question 2 (a)

Candidates generally found these sources understandable and accessible on some level. Most candidates grouped sources 10 and 11 together and then judged their arguments against those presented in source 12. Stronger answers were able to draw inferences from the sources and then went on to cross reference the finer details. It was also a characteristic of stronger answers that they engaged the two issues of 'widespread' and 'long-lasting' raised in the question explicitly, often by effective use of the provenance of the sources. Weaker answers tended to paraphrase the content of the sources and often struggled with elements of the provenance e.g. confusing Motilal Nehru with his son or placing the events referred to in source 12 in the period 1919-22. There were a small number of candidates who used this question as an opportunity to describe all they knew about the events; this cannot be credited in this section of the examination. Candidates should be encouraged to ensure that they spell names correctly, especially when they appear on the examination paper – a significant minority of candidates misspelled Gandhi.

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box . If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then indicate your new question with a cross .

Chosen Question Number:

Question 1

Question 2

(a) The Amritsar Massacre caused a wide outcry from Indians directed towards the British rule. The massacre may have been the cause for the long lasting hostility from the Indian people to the British rule.

A speech made by Motilal Nehru at the meeting of congress (Source 10) which states that "all talk of reform is a mockery", this would suggest that the most powerful Indian figures agreed in accordance to the Indian people, that "talk" of reform is not enough and possibly that direct action needed to be taken, which would suggest that the Amritsar massacre was the direct cause for the hostility to the British.

The extract from the article written by Gandhi, ^(Source 1) it states that he originally believed that the people who were responsible for the massacre would be punished or dismissed, but upon learning they wouldn't face responsibility he began to question his "loyalty to a

((a) continued)

government so ~~evil~~ evilly manned, this would suggest ~~that~~ he wanted rebellion against the British rulers. However this article was written by Gandhi, who would later start the non-cooperation movement which was aimed at being completely non violent in its methods. This would suggest that not all anger from the Amritsar massacre lead to violence and hostility to the British rulers.

The section of evidence given by Hafiz Hussain states that "the immediate cause of violence was the act of Hindus in forcibly closing shops during the campaign". This could suggest that Indian-Muslim violence and aggression was not caused completely by the Amritsar massacre, but more so by the tyranny of the majority from the Hindus. This suggests that while the massacre did anger the Indian people, it was not the direct cause of violence towards the British rule.

To conclude, the evidence given in the sources suggest that the Amritsar massacre may have been the catalyst for the violence in India. It was not the main cause of it, as the

((a) continued)

oppression alone from both Hindu majority and British rule caused most of the violence.



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This is a weak answer to the question and contains many problems. It paraphrases aspects of the sources in quite a simple way. It lacks a secure understanding of what the question focus is, so there are few clear links to the specific terms of the question. There is an attempt to use some knowledge about Gandhi to contextualise source 11. This just tips the response into the bottom of level 2.

Question 2 (b) (i)

Answers were split fairly equally between the two questions. There were some very good responses to this question at the higher end which made full use of the sources and integrated them with a strong knowledge base which enabled candidates to provide factual references to many aspects of Gandhi's political career which were not there as pointers in the sources. Some candidates were able to distinguish between political skills and spiritual ones at an extremely focused level, making some relevant and well supported points. Sometimes there was an imbalance in the way in which the question was approached, either in favour or against the statement. Weaker responses tended to rely heavily on the sources and therefore did not encompass the whole chronology of the question. Many of these went through the sources one by one, adding in own knowledge and commentary as they went along. However, it was evident that some candidates had only a superficial knowledge and tended to repeat only what was in the sources. A few candidates went beyond 1945 for which they could not be credited.

Answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) of your chosen question.

* (b) Do you agree with the view that Gandhi lacked the political skills required to lead India to independence in the years 1920-45?

Although Gandhi was an educated man having previously been a lawyer, he seemed to lack political incapability when it came to leading his country to independence; sources 14 and 15 certainly seem agree with this. However, source 13 presents the fact that Gandhi, despite seemingly hopeless when it came to politics, still had an ability to spread popularity and, thus, achieve political success and a wide, broad base of supporters to eventually reach independence.

Agreeing with the former view, sources 14 and 15 imply that Gandhi was detached from politics: "he stood so singularly remote from political politics." Using the word 'remote' suggests he is completely removed from politics and thus lacked the political skills to lead India to independence. Nehru's observation that "salt-making was spreading

like wildfire", Blaming the salt march, compares with source 14 as it evidently is not a political achievement by Gandhi that required significant skill in leading India to independence, rather it was just a mass movement that resulted in the

((b) continued) increased production of salt. ~~We also know that Gandhi used violence, furthermore,~~ although the salt march of 1930 was significantly a popular movement, Gandhi chose mainly Hindus to join the march with him; not including the Muslims is not a political step towards independence because it suggests inequality. We also know that, when Gandhi was given an opportunity to campaign for independence on behalf of his country at the Round Table conferences in 1931 and 1932, he took a passive role. He did not significantly achieve anything at the conference but merely turned up as he believed it was his presence at the meetings that was important. This, therefore, agrees with the statement that he lacked political skills to lead India to independence.

Source 14 takes this criticism of Gandhi's political skills further by referring to him as an alien: "It was rather like talking to someone who had stepped off another planet." Alienating Gandhi, however, of course implies that without support, Gandhi could never lead India to independence.

((b) continued) people alienated Gandhi as Nehru suggests he was questioned from the beginning: "we felt a little ashamed or having questioned the value of this [his] method." Using the pronoun 'we', Nehru could be referring to other political leaders, suggesting that if they looked down on Gandhi from the beginning, they can't have expected his skills as a politician. In the early 1920s, we are also aware that Gandhi was primarily only popular with the peasantry and workers who respected his traditional way of life, proving that many educated and 'skilled' middle class workers still did not recognize the skill in Gandhi and certainly not think him to lead their country to independence.

On the contrary, both James 13 and 15 oppose the view that Gandhi lacked the political skills to bring India to independence. Ashton takes the more extreme stance in James 13, stating that Gandhi performed a "major role" in the "reorganisation" of Congress which then "became more like a political party." Talking of the 'new Congress constitution' that was adopted, Ashton certainly implies that Gandhi did have political skills and despite the various divisions in the party, previously hindered by extremist Tiltak and the

((b) continued) moderate Gokhale who promoted the peaceful 'Swadeshi' movement, Gandhi still used his peaceful skills in politics to "keep (top) the party together". Source 15 supports the idea that Gandhi did, in fact, have the needed political skills: "we marvelled at the amazing knack of the man to impress the multitude and make it act in an organised way." Nehru, here, tells us ~~of~~ ^{of} Gandhi's ability to achieve largely spread support which, in itself, is a political skill and, although not promoting his views through speeches, rallies and propaganda like the other political leaders, Gandhi had his own way of promoting political views and still had the capacity to lead India to 'Swaraj' or self-determination. The Gandhi-Irwin pact also demonstrates Gandhi's political success, despite Irwin's criticism of his skills in source 14. It was a huge step for Gandhi, a person who the Indian population saw as "one of them", to meet the Viceroy of India and the Irwin Declaration paved the success: although no date was set for independence, India could still largely owe the step forward to 'Swaraj' to Gandhi and his political tactics.

In conclusion, the three sources largely disagree with the statement that Gandhi lacked political skills to lead India to independence because

((b) continued) they are all likely to speak political successes themselves, thus proving that Gandhi must have had political skills to a certain extent otherwise he would not have made such an impact on India and ~~the~~ significantly contribute to the road to 'Swaraj' or self-determination as much as he did.



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Examiner Comments

This response clearly understands that there is an issue to be discussed and uses the sources very effectively to drive the line of argument and is thus level 4 for AO2. There is evidence of integration of the sources and own knowledge, but the own knowledge could perhaps be a little more specific and also needs to encompass the entire period. Thus, this answer is top level 3 for AO1.

Question 2 (b) (ii)

Answers were split fairly equally between the two questions.

Most candidates were able to recognise the different representations of responsibility presented in the sources, and most achieved some element of balance between them in their answers. Candidates were then able to integrate this with varying degrees of own knowledge to support the line of argument that they were pursuing as to which was the most significant factor. The best responses contained a range of specific and detailed own knowledge to support the interpretation that was favoured. Weaker candidates tended to rely heavily on describing sequentially what was in the sources, and although many were aware of Nehru's relationship with Mountbatten's wife and of Mountbatten's desire to get home for the Royal Wedding, this was often described rather than utilised within a clear analytical framework and were often the only pieces of own knowledge present.

Answer EITHER part (b) (i) OR part (b) (ii) of your chosen question.

* (b) (ii) many responsibility for hasty + violent partition lay with Mountbatten.

The late partition of India 1947 created a hostility and suspicion amongst India^{and} Pakistan, one that still plagues their relationship to this day, as stated in Source 17, "the British left behind a chaos," plans were certainly hastily drawn as it seemed "the only option left," mentioned in Source 16. The responsibility can not, however be directly laid back to Mountbatten. The Indian independence Act 1947, had finally given India the freedom it desired, and one principle stated it would be entirely in control of "internal affairs, foreign affairs and national identity." The 1946 Cabinet Mission, described in Source 16, "offered hope." Jinnah wanted a united India and political protection for Muslims, whereas Gandhi wanted the opposite, a long in agreements, Mountbatten "became convinced" it was "the only option" and fearing a swap of "events they could no longer control" by

Source 18, he gives his own views, calling Jinnah a "psychopathic case." Despite the enormous advantage provided him, Jinnah did not care for either. The second round table conference began with the

((b) continued) Simon Commission of 1930, showed an already divided India, Source 17 describing a "growing wave of bitter-intellectual-communal violence", divided Congress policy and Gandhi's condemnation of it was support, something he would not morally endorse, whereas Jinnah criticised the policy and demanded a separate Muslim state, "Pakistan was worth the sacrifice of 10 million Muslims." "Wavell was 'exhausted', Mountbatten 'drove the arrangements through', almost viscerally keen to get rid of a swamping India, he had 'indulged his lifelong fondness for acceleration ... bringing forward' Indian independence. Source 17's view seems to suggest Mountbatten did have key responsibility in such an action, however perhaps it had justified to "make critical adjustments in India's favour." Correspondingly the partition of Bengal had not been Britain's strongest move under Curzon in 1905, in which East Bengal and Assam were under control of viceregal-Governors due to high levels of political unrest, similarly the "bitter... violence" leaving a possibly "half a million" dead in Punjab, Mountbatten

saw the need of retaliating, and already original intention of the government "by the second half of 1948."

((b) continued) Mountbatten's role as the final viceroy was key, India had long hungered for some form of immediate self-government, Mountbatten thought something was needed and did not wish to prolong the "date of independence," rather he "put pressure on" for adjustments in "favours." Source 17, gives the view it was partly directly Mountbatten, yet Britain itself was in "haste to get shot of India." Therefore both parties still had an active role of administration of India and are last safely held responsibility without the other. Whicor's Source 16 ~~also~~ seems the preceding events put pressure on Mountbatten so that he became convinced, devising arrangements "through opposition." He clearly knew what he wanted as he had "had many meetings with Mr Jinnah", which rejects the hastiness of the action although the year of independence had been brought forward.

Overall




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This is an example of level 2 work in both assessment objectives. The candidate is lifting many quotes from the sources and although some of the points made have some implicit links to the question, the argument is not explicitly developed. The selection of own knowledge to support the argument is patchy; it is, for example, not clear what relevance of the partition of Bengal is to the focus of this question.

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