

HISTORY

9697/13

Paper 1 Modern European History, 1789–1939

May/June 2014

3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

You may use an HB pencil for any rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO **NOT** WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer any **three** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

All questions in this paper carry equal marks.

This document consists of 4 printed pages.

Section A: The Origins of World War I, 1870–1914

You **must** answer Question 1.

GERMAN POLICIES BEFORE WORLD WAR I

- 1 Read the Sources, and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources, both individually and as a group.

Source A

It is absolutely vital for the German government to obtain success at the very outset of a war and attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It will be very important that the German government should persuade their soldiers that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

We find in all the German plans proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France because a German defeat at the outset would have such an unimaginable effect on Germany. With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of propaganda groups, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

Germany has wished to upset the balance of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort. They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice.

Report from a French diplomat to his superior, March 1913.

Source B

The day has now come when we must go to war, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere efforts. Russia has set fire to Europe. We are at war with Russia and France – a war that has been forced upon us. I repeat the words of the Kaiser: 'We enter the war with a clear conscience.' We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. Fifty years are not yet passed during which von Moltke, the great general, said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But we go forward to meet it with complete confidence. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle. Behind them stands the entire German nation. The entire German nation is united to the last man.

Speech by Bethmann Hollweg, German Chancellor, 4 August 1914.

Source C

In the Serbian crisis of 1914, the impression grew stronger and stronger that Germany wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude in any other way on a question which did not directly concern us. The urgent requests and definite assurances of Mr Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, followed by the Tsar's positively humble telegrams to the Kaiser, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, the warnings of the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, and Signor Bollati, the Italian Ambassador to Germany, and my urgent advice, all were of no avail. Germany persisted: Serbia must be massacred.

From the memoirs of Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador to Britain, 1912–1914), written in the 1920s.

Source D

German naval policy was announced by von Bülow (German Chancellor, 1900–09) and by the Kaiser's own speeches. 'Sea power is world power.' 'The future of Germany is on the sea.' 'Control of the seas will pass into our hands.' But they added, 'The beginning and end of British policy has been the attainment and maintenance of British naval supremacy.' Naturally; since if Britain loses command of the seas, she dies of starvation in a few weeks. Therefore the problem for Germany was, by long patience and concealment, to undermine Britain's naval supremacy without her knowing it. Then, it might be hoped, Britain would be wise enough to accept the new situation. If not, the German fleet could strike.

From 'The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906–1915', written by a British historian, published in 1922.

Source E

German politicians and military leaders were divided immediately after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. General von Moltke, the army's Chief of Staff, believed that war was sure to break out. The politicians stuck firmly to their view that there would not be such a disastrous outcome, provided that I did not order mobilisation. Not until General von Moltke announced that Russia had closed their frontiers and issued mobilisation notices did the politicians realise what was happening. Their resistance collapsed. They had not wished to believe in the war. This shows plainly how little we had expected – much less planned for – war in July 1914. Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The Foreign Ministry was hypnotised by its belief in peace at all costs. It completely eliminated war as a possible strategy by the Triple Entente and therefore rightly did not interpret the importance of the signs of war. The facts prove Germany's peaceful intentions. However, there are innumerable pieces of evidence that, as early as the Spring and Summer of 1914, when nobody in Germany believed that the Triple Entente would attack, war had been prepared for in Russia, France, Belgium and Britain.

From the memoirs of Kaiser William II, published in 1922.

Now answer the following question.

'Germany was following policies of peace before World War I broke out.' Use Sources A–E to show how far the evidence confirms this statement.

Section B

You **must** answer three questions from this section.

- 2 Assess the view that Napoleon Bonaparte was not interested in the ideals of the French Revolution.
- 3 'The introduction of steam power was the most important cause of the Industrial Revolution.' How far do you agree with this judgement?
(You should refer to **at least two** of Britain, France and Germany in your answer.)
- 4 Compare the contributions of Mazzini and Cavour to Italian unification.
- 5 Why did 'New Imperialism' cause rivalries between European countries in the late nineteenth century?
- 6 Assess the problems that faced Lenin from the October Revolution in 1917 to 1924.
- 7 Why did the Weimar Republic lose support after 1929?
- 8 How different were the political aims of Nicholas II from those of Lenin and Stalin?

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