

Section A: The Origins of World War I, 1870–1914

You **must** answer Question 1.

CRISES IN MOROCCO, 1905–1911

1 Read the Sources, and then answer the question.

When answering **Question 1**, candidates are advised to pay particular attention to the interpretation and evaluation of the Sources both individually and as a group.

Source A

When Kaiser William II spoke to Cherisey, the French agent, the talk was at first unimportant. Yet when the latter conveyed his respects and greetings from the French government, the Kaiser replied that he wanted free trade for Germany and complete equality of rights with other countries. He said that he would like to negotiate directly with the Sultan, the free ruler of an independent country, as an equal. He would be able to justify his claims and he expected that these claims would also be recognised by France. Cherisey became pale. He was about to reply, but was briefly dismissed. He withdrew with bowed head.

On the whole the brief visit of His Majesty worked splendidly, without any unfortunate event, and apparently made a great impression upon Moroccans and foreigners. His Majesty was highly satisfied.

Report by a German diplomat on the visit of Kaiser William II to Morocco, 1905.

Source B

I had a long discussion with Mr. Lloyd George, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. I explained to him why the political policies of Britain during the last six years were bound to lead to the present uncomfortable situation. Britain was formerly on the side of Germany and the Triple Alliance, now it was on the side of Germany's opponents. Morocco had been used as a cause of dispute between Germany and France. France had been encouraged to hope for revenge with help from Britain. The Entente Cordiale had become a barrier against alleged German expansion and aggressiveness. There were spy stories and fears of invasion. Germany's intentions and motives were twisted in the press and nothing had been done to stop it. (*Kaiser William II's handwritten note on the report: 'A very good summary!'*) I said that the unchecked poisoning of public opinion caused a dangerous threat of war, a threat that Lloyd George and I are both convinced that our governments wish to avoid. (*Kaiser William II's handwritten note: 'That is not my idea at all. If Britain wants to have war, just let her start it. We'll give her what for!'*)

The German Ambassador to Britain's report to his government about relations between Germany and Britain, 1908.

Source C

In a quarter of an hour, there will be an astounding announcement by Germany. Our ambassadors will announce the arrival of the gunboat 'Panther' at Agadir. We have encouraged German firms and businessmen to send complaints and appeals to Morocco. We chose Agadir because no Frenchmen or Spaniards live there. It leads to the richest mineral and agricultural parts of Morocco. We shall take this district as we need a place to settle in.

An announcement by a senior official in the German Foreign Ministry to the chairman of a German nationalist society, 1911.

Source D

France, which had been awarded influence in Morocco by the treaty of Algeçiras in 1906, found it necessary to send an expedition to southern Morocco. Germany, imagining for some reason that France had expansionist plans, thought that it was entitled to have compensation elsewhere. It opened negotiations in 1911 by sending the gunboat 'Panther' to the Moroccan port of Agadir. This was a blundering and bullying sort of diplomacy. Britain was naturally concerned and wrote to the German government. The letter was ignored for several weeks. Meanwhile, we learned from France that Germany was making quite impossible demands on her as the price of withdrawal from Agadir. It is hard to say whether there was a real danger of war. I made a speech to clear the air with the approval of the British Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the rest of the government. The German government was naturally furious because its gunboat diplomacy had received severe and well-deserved criticism. The truth was, of course, that the German government had over-reached itself and pursued a policy that was difficult to justify. Germany believed that the French government was weak. The German Foreign Ministry imagined that a sudden and dramatic threat of force would terrify France and that Germany would win considerable concessions in Morocco. But Germany was not prepared to go to war with both France and Britain to win this gamble.

Lloyd George, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1911 and later wartime Prime Minister, from his Memoirs, published in 1938.

Source E

The Kaiser landed at Tangiers in 1905 and announced his support of Moroccan independence. He hoped to break the Anglo-French understanding. A conference at Algeçiras considered the Moroccan question. Britain's response to Germany was to show its support for France, not to back off. Grey, the British Foreign Minister, secretly asked the War Office to initiate military conversations with the French. For the French, military talks could only be about Germany, the most obvious threat. The Entente Cordiale did not collapse under German pressure but was strengthened. In 1911 Germany once again challenged France in Morocco, and once again revealed that the members of the Entente Cordiale shared a common hostility to Germany.

A recent British historian explains the importance of the Moroccan crises in 1905 and 1911.

Now answer the following question.

'Germany's policies in Morocco from 1905 to 1911 were completely unjustified.' Use Sources A–E to show how far the evidence confirms this statement.

Section B

You must answer **three** questions from this section.

- 2 Why were attempts to reform the ancien régime in France up to 1789 unsuccessful?
- 3 Did the Industrial Revolution do more to benefit or to harm the working classes by the end of the nineteenth century?
(You should refer to developments in **at least two** of Britain, France and Germany in your answer.)
- 4 Assess the claim that Garibaldi was the greatest of the leaders who brought about Italian unification.
- 5 Why did public opinion in major European countries give widespread support to imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century?
- 6 Why was Lenin a successful revolutionary leader in October 1917?
- 7 How far did Stalin continue Lenin's policies in the USSR up to 1939?
- 8 Which affected Europe more by 1914, Marxism or Liberalism?

Copyright Acknowledgements:

Question 1 Source E

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