

MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2014 series

9389 HISTORY

9389/11

Paper 1 (Document Question), maximum raw mark 40

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge is publishing the mark schemes for the October/November 2014 series for most Cambridge IGCSE[®], Cambridge International A and AS Level components and some Cambridge O Level components.

Page 2	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Generic levels of response

Part (a)

Level 4: Makes a developed comparison [12–15]

Makes a developed comparison between the two sources, recognising points of similarity and difference. Uses knowledge to evaluate the sources and shows good contextual awareness.

Level 3: Compares views and identifies similarities *and* differences [8–11]

Compares the views expressed in the sources, identifying differences and similarities. Begins to explain and evaluate the views using the sources and knowledge.

Level 2: Compares views and identifies similarities *and/or* differences [4–7]

Identifies relevant similarities or differences between views/sources and the response may be one-sided with only one aspect explained. Alternatively, both similarities and differences may be mentioned but both aspects lack development.

Level 1: Describes content of each source [1–3]

Describes or paraphrases the content of the two sources. Very simple comparisons may be made (e.g. one is from a letter and the other is from a speech) but these are not developed.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Part (b)

Level 5: Evaluates the sources to reach a sustained judgement [21–25]

Answers are well focused, demonstrating a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Reaches a sustained judgement about the extent to which the sources support the statement and weighs the evidence in order to do this.

Level 4: Evaluates the sources [16–20]

Demonstrates a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Begins to evaluate the material in context, considering the nature, origin and purpose of the sources in relation to the statement. At the top of this level candidates may begin to reach a judgement but this is not sustained.

Level 3: Uses the sources to support *and* challenge the statement [11–15]

Makes valid points from the source to both challenge and support the statement in the question. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 2: Uses the sources to support *or* challenge the statement [6–10]

Makes valid points from the sources to either support the statement in the question or to challenge it. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 1: Does not make valid use of the sources [1–5]

Describes the content of the sources with little attempt to link the material to the question. Alternatively, candidates may write an essay about the question without reference to the sources.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Page 3	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Section A: European Option

Liberalism and Nationalism in Italy and Germany, 1848–1871

The Liberals in Prussia

- 1 (a) Compare and contrast Sources A and B as evidence of the differences between the Liberals and the Prussian government. [15]

Both sources are from the Prussian government, A from the head of state and B from the newly-appointed head of government. Both focus on the army budget crisis of 1862. The Prussian king wanted to spend more money on the army to make it more professional following a disorganised mobilisation in 1859. The Liberals in the parliament (or *Landtag*) wanted to maintain the traditions of citizen soldiers within the army; they wanted full-time military service to last for two years as opposed to the three wanted by the government. The Liberals kept rejecting the government budget. In September 1862 the King appointed Bismarck as his prime minister. Bismarck's solution was to ignore the Liberals and simply continue to levy taxes, even though the *Landtag* had not agreed. This went on until 1866 when many Liberals agreed to the government budget following the defeat of Austria.

King William, in Source A, puts the government's case. In 1862 he had been regent and king for only four years. The *Landtag* was set up only in 1849. The crisis was in some ways a struggle for power between conservatism and liberalism. Source A focuses on the political struggle within Prussia. The King, though putting one side only, is ultimately correct in his assertion that 'no agreement is possible between these two views' – at least before 1866. Source B makes no mention of the domestic crisis – though this famous speech is made to the budget committee of the Lower House of the *Landtag*. Bismarck is trying to educate the deputies in the realities of power politics outside Prussia, if within Germany. Both Source A and Source B are hostile to the Liberals. While the King concentrates on a specific domestic crisis, Bismarck's opposition is a more fundamental concern about the complete ineffectiveness of Liberals in furthering the interests of Prussia and Germany.

- (b) How far do Sources A to D support the view that the Liberals were a serious problem for Bismarck? [25]

Context: The absence of an end date in the question means that complete answers need to cover the period from 1862 to 1871. In terms of the question, these nine years divide in 1867. In the first five years, relations between Bismarck and the Liberals were awful; in the second four years, Bismarck and the larger part of a divided Liberal group in the new North German *Reichstag* became allies.

After the revolutions of 1848–49, the Liberals became a growing political force, both in Prussia and in Germany. In 1861, Prussian liberals formed the German Progress Party (DFP) which in 1862 became the largest group in the Prussian Lower House, leading the opposition to the government's army bill for the next four years. Bismarck was appointed in 1862 in a desperate attempt to solve the constitutional deadlock between Prussian government and Prussian Liberals. He was an out-and-out conservative with few allies in the Prussian government. He was the last resort of a king who was threatening to abdicate. Bismarck's approach to the crisis was to confront the Liberals. His 'blood and iron' speech, his first public speech after taking office, caused great controversy, even within the government. He then asserted that there was a 'gap' in the constitution which enabled the government to raise taxes without the *Landtag*'s approval. This stand-off lasted for four years. Then the defeat of Austria changed the picture completely. Most, though not all, Prussian Progressives were won over by Prussia's creation of a *Kleindeutsch*. Together with

Page 4	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Liberals from other states of North Germany, they formed the National Liberal Party. Bismarck was conciliatory. He introduced an Indemnity Bill which stated that levying taxes since 1862 had been unconstitutional. The National Liberals became the largest party in the North German *Reichstag*. Bismarck worked with them, if on his own terms, until 1879.

Analysis: The three primary sources in this question all come from the first period, the time of conflict. Two of the three portray the Liberals as a problem for Bismarck and the Prussian government. Source A, from the Prussian king, asserts that no agreement was possible between the government and the Liberals over army reforms. Source B, from Bismarck himself, not only illustrates the gulf between liberalism and the Prussian government but also widened that gulf at the time. Source C is from a Liberal. Though we do not know from which state the author comes, his disparaging comments about medium-sized and small states strongly suggest he is Prussian. The author welcomes Prussian success over Denmark, even though he is no enthusiast for Bismarck. Thus he approves the policies of Bismarck. The content of Source C suggests that by 1864 the Liberals were ceasing to be a problem for Bismarck.

Source D is from a historian writing some seventy years later. Without mentioning specific events of the 1860s, the author nevertheless explains how the achievement of *Kleindeutsch* required war with Austria. Mere ‘expression of faith in Liberal ideals’ would not lead to German unification. The Liberals, well-meaning but self-deceiving, did all they could to oppose Bismarck – until he unified Northern Germany in 1866–67. Then most Liberals turned to cheer him. Source D shows the Liberals to be a problem for Bismarck until the defeat of Austria. Source analysis shows the Liberals to be a problem for Bismarck in 1862 but not from 1864, possibly, and from 1866, definitely. Whether they were a serious problem, even in 1862, is an issue which requires source evaluation to address.

Evaluation: Addressing the question with regard to the nine years from 1862 to 1871 is impossible because of the absence of any references, even in Source D, to events after 1866. However, candidates could use their contextual knowledge to show how limited the sources are in addressing the question in its full form. The sources do help answer the question with regard to the time of conflict between Bismarck and the [Prussian] Liberals between 1862 and 1866. Sources B and D complement each other. Source D can be seen as a slightly expanded paraphrase of Bismarck’s best-known argument, as found in Source B. That a German historian writing in the latter years of the Weimar Republic should take this position could be seen as surprising. A Weimar historian might be expected to be more sympathetic to Liberalism. Writing in the 1920s, soon after the First World War, he might be expected to be more critical of ‘blood and iron’. Even if a surprise, Source D does support Source B.

Bismarck’s speech, a deliberate provoking of the *Landtag* Liberals, itself suggests that the Liberals did not pose a serious threat to him, once the context of the speech is taken into account. When making the speech, Bismarck was new in office with few supporters. He was vulnerable. In such a situation, he could risk antagonising the Liberals only because they were *not* a serious problem. Source C confirms the judgement of Sources B and C. It shows how easily the Liberals were won over by a Prussian military victory over a minor European power. This victory was not a victory for nationalism because Bismarck sidelined the nationalist candidate, which makes the Liberals’ abandonment of their principles more shocking. A group so easily swayed could be no serious threat. Source A remains as the one source which does argue that the Liberals were a serious threat. However, the King writing a letter – presumably private – in 1862 was bound to argue thus. The Progressive Liberals in the *Landtag* were causing constitutional deadlock. William I was unused to an assertive parliament. He exaggerated the crisis, as shown by the other three sources, even after evaluation. The Liberals were never a serious threat to Bismarck.

Page 5	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Section B: American Option

The Origins of the Civil War, 1846–1861

The Raid on Harpers Ferry, 1859

- 2 (a) To what extent do Sources A and B agree on who or what was responsible for causing John Brown to lead the attack on Harpers Ferry? [15]

Both sources are critical of the actual attack on Harpers Ferry. Source A calls the raiders 'desperate' and 'misguided' while Source B describes John Brown as 'insane'. Though it does not mention John Brown by name, Source A does focus on the issue of who was responsible for causing the attack. It lays the blame for the raid on 'the leading Abolitionists of the North' who, it says, provided sympathy and financial support for the plan. In other words, Brown is something of a puppet. Source B, by contrast, does mention John Brown. Even if it sees him as insane and a 'monomaniac', Source B is more sympathetic towards Brown. It sees him as driven mad by 'the chain of events' leading from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise – which was overturned by the 1850 Compromise – to 'Bloody Kansas' in the mid-1850s. By breaking the Missouri Compromise and by sanctioning the later violence in Kansas, the slave states caused John Brown to feel such a sense of injustice that he felt it necessary to lead the attack on Harpers Ferry as the first step in the process of restoring justice. Thus Source A blames Northern abolitionists while Source B blames the South, a clear contrast.

- (b) How far do Sources A to D support the assertion that people in the North supported the raid on Harpers Ferry? [25]

Context: The raid on the US armoury at Harpers Ferry in late 1859 was a very dramatic incident which did much to upset the already delicate balance between North and South. John Brown, 59 in 1859, had been a well-connected Northern farmer and businessman who, in the 1850s, dedicated himself to the abolitionist cause. He had become involved in 'Bloody Kansas', the sack of the town of Lawrence in 1856, causing him to kill people in what became known as the Pottawatomie massacre, which in turn led to a conflict at Ossawatimie in which his son was killed. He spent the next two years travelling the North trying to find men, money and materiel to start military action against slavery. He hoped that seizing the armoury at Harpers Ferry would spark slave revolts across the South. The raid was botched. That it happened at all, however, alarmed many in the South, especially those who feared slave rebellions. The rapid execution by the Virginian government of the raid's leader, John Brown, did much to anger the North. Many abolitionists saw him as a martyr to a noble cause. Others thought him insane to undertake a raid which was bound to fail.

Analysis: Two sources clearly support the assertion: A and D. Source A argues that Northern abolitionists provided support, both in words and in money. Source D provides extracts from a plan drawn up by abolitionists to undermine slavery by means of a series of illegal actions, including incendiarism. Both maintain that abolitionists in the North were plotting against slavery. One source – Source C – is less clear-cut. It argues that 'hot-headed abolitionists ... in the North' are active in encouraging slave conspiracies and 'Northern philanthropists ... are glorifying Old Brown'. This is not quite the same as supporting the Harper Ferry raid, however. Source B does not support the assertion. It explains the raid as being a reaction against the policies of the Southern states to tilt the balance based on the Missouri Compromise of 1820 in their favour. On the question of Northern support for the raid, however, it is silent. Thus content analysis would suggest some strong support for the assertion and only limited support against.

Page 6	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Evaluation: Source A is from a Southern newspaper and thus its argument that the North did support the raid is to be expected. Source D provides support for these arguments, though little trust can be placed on Source D, as is shown later. Contextual knowledge does confirm that Brown did have some support from some Northern abolitionists, even to the extent of funding the raid. Admittedly, only a small group did so but it did include on its outer fringes Frederick Douglass, the ex-slave and leading abolitionist. In addition, many more Northerners did sympathise with Brown's efforts. Source B is a Northern source, which focuses on explaining why the raid occurred. Though it blames the slave states of the South for bringing about a 'chain of events' which provoked John Brown into organising the raid on Harpers Ferry, it is silent on the matter of support for the raid. However, if the South is to blame for Harper's Ferry, by implication Northerners are not. Source C, a second Northern source, was written two days after the execution of John Brown. It indicates Northern support for Brown 'as a saint and a martyr' but makes no mention of the raid on Harpers Ferry. The way in which Brown faced his trial and execution aroused a great deal of sympathy in the North. The source shows great support for John Brown **after** the raid but none for the raid itself.

Source D is a rather strange source. Published at the start of the civil war two years later, it claims to be part of John Brown's plans at the time of the raid on Harpers Ferry. It talks of 'John Brown and others', arguing that the author did see Northerners as supporting the raid. The content of the source is confusing. According to Point 3, the author – presumably John Brown – is addressing slaves in the South. However, Point 1 talks of slaves in the third person. In addition, Point 1 is very muddled indeed. How can you convert the property of slaveholders to the benefit of slaves by burning buildings, killing cattle and leaving crops to waste? The author is a Southern supporter writing an anti-abolitionist history, presumably to try and sway public opinion as uncivil peace turns to civil war. And though John Brown's exact plans varied week by week, meeting by meeting, his main aim was not to persecute slaveholders, as Source D suggests. Thus Source D is most unreliable. Thus on evaluation, the sources do support the assertion, even though only a very small minority of Northerners actually supported the raid before it occurred.

Page 7	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

Section C: International Option

The Search for International Peace and Security, 1919–1945

Britain and the Beginnings of the League of Nations

- 3 (a) Compare and contrast the views expressed by Hankey (Source A) and Crowe (Source B) about the issue of whether Britain should support the proposed League of Nations. [15]

Hankey (Source A) is heavily against Britain becoming involved in the proposed League of Nations. He argues that:

- membership of the League would give Britain ‘a sense of security which is wholly fictitious’
- feeling protected by the League, Britain would be likely to reduce expenditure and commitment to ensuring its own military preparations
- the League is bound to fail sooner or later, leaving Britain militarily weak, unprepared and unable to defend itself
- there was a danger that other countries, such as Germany and Russia, would continue to develop their own armed forces, which would pose a major risk to a militarily weak and unprepared Britain
- other countries would be unlikely to support the League, leaving Britain unprotected against aggressor states such as Germany.

Crowe (Source B) is more supportive of the idea of a League of Nations, believing that it offers Britain the best opportunity of avoiding future wars. The League would be able to:

- allow countries to settle their disputes through ‘conciliation and compromise’
- enable disputes to be settled peacefully by allowing time for discussion and ‘resourceful diplomacy’
- enable any country which threatens international peace to be confronted by ‘a general combination’ of other countries.

Both sources come from 1916, a time when Britain was still heavily involved in the Great War against Germany. There was general concern that such a war must be avoided in future, and this concern had led to proposals from many quarters for some form of international organisation to make future wars impossible. Crowe accepts that ‘a conference cannot force a resolution’, but argues that an organisation such as the proposed League of Nations offers Britain the best chance of avoiding involvement in war in the future. Hankey is, perhaps, less idealistic and his views make a remarkably accurate prediction of the weaknesses which were subsequently to afflict the League.

- (b) How far do Sources A to D support the view that Britain joined the League of Nations despite having doubts about its prospects of success in preserving international peace? [25]

Context: The horrors of WWI led diplomats and intellectuals in many countries to argue that there was a need for some form of international organisation which could prevent any future repetition. The old Concert of Europe and balance of power concepts had clearly failed to prevent war. Various proposals were put forward throughout the war, and US President Wilson was adamant that the League of Nations should be written into all of the post-war treaties which emerged from the Paris peace negotiations. Many diplomats, including Lloyd George, were rather less convinced than Wilson about the prospects of such a League being

Page 8	Mark Scheme	Syllabus	Paper
	Cambridge International AS Level – October/November 2014	9389	11

successful. Ironically, this included diplomats in the USA. However, public opinion in Britain and other European countries demanded that action be taken to ensure that there could never be a repeat of WWI. As Hankey (Source A), Lloyd George (Source C) and the cartoonist (Source D) imply, there were fundamental weaknesses in the League. By encouraging member states to disarm, the League itself would become militarily weak since it relied totally on armed forces provided by member states in order to enforce its decisions through collective security.

Analysis: Main support for the hypothesis comes from Source A, in which Hankey argues that the League is bound to fail leaving Britain at a major disadvantage, being militarily weak and unprepared to protect itself against aggressive nations such as Germany or Russia. Lloyd George (Source C) clearly has some doubts about the League's prospects of success, stressing that it could only succeed if all member states fully honoured their commitments to the Covenant. In particular, he argues that it was essential to avoid a repeat of the military escalation between states which had led to WWI. He appreciates, however, that this would depend on genuine trust between nations and makes it clear that he could not allow Britain to fall behind other countries in terms of its military preparations. Source D is concerned that the League will have insufficient power to deal with major international disputes. With no armed forces of its own, the League would have to depend on 'moral persuasion' to force compliance from aggressor states.

In challenging the hypothesis, Crow (Source B) argues that the League would be 'the effective way to prevent war', and that its decisions would be upheld by 'a general combination' against any nation which failed to accept them. The League, he suggests, would provide a fair and unbiased platform for the settlement of disputes without recourse to war. Lloyd George (Source C) expresses hope that other countries will share Britain's commitment to the League and, if they do, the League would be able to succeed. Despite the League's potential weaknesses, the cartoon (Source D) depicts it as unflinching in the face of 'international strife'.

Evaluation: Source A was written in May 1916, at a time when the war against Germany was at its height. Hankey argues that the proposed League is both naïve and idealistic, suggesting that other countries will simply ignore it – either because of their own aggressive plans or because of their own weakness/disinterest/national interests. Hankey clearly sees Germany as a potential threat to world peace when the Great War is over. It is interesting that he also sees Russia as a potential threat to future peace – this was before the Russian revolution and at a time when Russia was a war-time ally of Britain. Hankey's views are reflected in both Source C (which has doubts about the commitment of other countries to the League) and Source D (which sees the League as weak and unable to defend itself).

Source B was written at a similar time to Source A. With British public opinion horrified and tired of the Great War, there was general hope that some means could be found to avoid a repetition of such horrors in the future. Written by a British Foreign Office Minister, it reflects the developing interest of the British government in establishing some form of League of Nations at the end of WWI.

In Source C, the British Prime Minister is speaking shortly after the establishment of the League of Nations in Part 1 of the Treaty of Versailles. The source therefore contains the views of the man who actually agreed to Britain's entry of the League by signing the Covenant. While hopeful that the League will succeed, he clearly shares some of the concerns raised by Hankey (Source A) and is realistic rather than naïve in his views.

Source D is the cartoon based on the opinions of the artist and the newspaper in which it was published, but is also likely to reflect (and even to have helped shape) public opinion in Britain. Published in the year following the establishment of the League of Nations, it reflects some of the views expressed in both Sources A and C.