



General Certificate of Education

AS History 1041

Unit 2: HIS2J

Britain and Appeasement, 1919–1940

Mark Scheme

2009 examination - June series

This mark scheme uses the [new numbering system](#) which is being introduced for examinations from June 2010

The specimen assessment materials are provided to give centres a reasonable idea of the general shape and character of the planned question papers and mark schemes in advance of the operational exams.

Further copies of this Mark Scheme are available to download from the AQA Website: www.aqa.org.uk

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Generic Introduction for AS

The AS History specification is based on the assessment objectives laid down in QCA's GCE History subject criteria and published in the AQA specification booklet. These cover the skills, knowledge and understanding which are expected of A Level candidates. Most questions address more than one objective since historical skills, which include knowledge and understanding, are usually deployed together. Consequently, the marking scheme which follows is a 'levels of response' scheme and assesses candidates' historical skills in the context of their knowledge and understanding of History.

The levels of response are a graduated recognition of how candidates have demonstrated their abilities in the Assessment Objectives. Candidates who predominantly address AO1(a) by writing narrative or description will perform at Level 1 or Level 2 depending on its relevance. Candidates who provide more explanation – (AO1(b), supported by the relevant selection of material, AO1(a)) – will perform at high Level 2 or low-mid Level 3 depending on how explicit they are in their response to the question. Candidates who provide explanation with evaluation, judgement and an awareness of historical interpretations will be addressing all 3 AOs (AO1(a); AO1(b); AO2(a) and (b) and will have access to the higher mark ranges. AO2(a) which requires the evaluation of source material is assessed in Unit 2.

Differentiation between Levels 3, 4 and 5 is judged according to the extent to which candidates meet this range of assessment objectives. At Level 3 the answers will show more characteristics of the AO1 objectives, although there should be elements of AO2. At Level 4, AO2 criteria, particularly an understanding of how the past has been interpreted, will be more in evidence and this will be even more dominant at Level 5. The demands on written communication, particularly the organisation of ideas and the use of specialist vocabulary also increase through the various levels so that a candidate performing at the highest AS level is already well prepared for the demands of A2.

CRITERIA FOR MARKING GCE HISTORY:

AS EXAMINATION PAPERS

General Guidance for Examiners (to accompany Level Descriptors)

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The indicative mark scheme for each paper is designed to illustrate some of the material that candidates might refer to (knowledge) and some of the approaches and ideas they might develop (skills). It is not, however, prescriptive and should only be used to exemplify the generic mark scheme.

When applying the generic mark scheme, examiners will constantly need to exercise judgement to decide which level fits an answer best. Few essays will display all the characteristics of a level, so deciding the most appropriate will always be the first task.

Each level has a range of marks and for an essay which has a strong correlation with the level descriptors the middle mark should be given. However, when an answer has some of the characteristics of the level above or below, or seems stronger or weaker on comparison with many other candidates' responses to the same question, the mark will need to be adjusted up or down.

When deciding on the mark within a level, the following criteria should be considered *in relation to the level descriptors*. Candidates should never be doubly penalised. If a candidate with poor communication skills has been placed in Level 2, he or she should not be moved to the bottom of the level on the basis of the poor quality of written communication. On the other hand, a candidate with similarly poor skills, whose work otherwise matched the criteria for Level 4 should be adjusted downwards within the level.

Criteria for deciding marks within a level:

- The accuracy of factual information
- The level of detail
- The depth and precision displayed
- The quality of links and arguments
- The quality of written communication (grammar, spelling, punctuation and legibility; an appropriate form and style of writing; clear and coherent organisation of ideas, including the use of specialist vocabulary)
- Appropriate references to historical interpretation and debate
- The conclusion

Specimen Mark Scheme for examinations in June 2010 onwards

GCE AS History Unit 2: Historical Issues: Periods of Change

HIS2J: Britain and Appeasement, 1919–1940

Question 1

01 Use **Sources A** and **B** and your own knowledge.

Explain how far the views in **Source B** differ from those in **Source A** in relation to Britain's response to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia. (12 marks)

Target: AO2(a)

Levels Mark Scheme

	Nothing written worthy of credit.	0
L1:	Answers will either briefly paraphrase/describe the content of the two sources or identify simple comparison(s) between the sources. Skills of written communication will be weak.	1-2
L2:	Responses will compare the views expressed in the two sources and identify some differences and/or similarities. There may be some limited own knowledge. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed.	3-6
L3:	Responses will compare the views expressed in the two sources, identifying differences and similarities and using own knowledge to explain and evaluate these. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed.	7-9
L4	Responses will make a developed comparison between the views expressed in the two sources and will apply own knowledge to evaluate and to demonstrate a good contextual understanding. Answers will, for the most part, show good skills of written communication.	10-12

Indicative content

Source A makes the following points:

- Italy was not a strong power in spite of Mussolini's exaggeration
- despite Stresa, Britain could not stand by and allow the conquest of Abyssinia
- the British electorate favoured the League and collective security, but the government wished to maintain good relations with Mussolini
- the government led on League sanctions in election year
- sanctions were half-hearted
- a 'private' (Hoare-Laval, though not stated as such) settlement was attempted
- British policy was to support the League and avoid a 'breach' with Italy.

The view given in **Source B** comes from an Ethiopian source highly critical of British and French policy. It makes the following points:

- that in the early private talks between Hoare and Laval ‘neither had any interest in preserving Abyssinia’s independence’, and agreed to stop the League taking any effective action and not to go to war with Italy
- later the Hoare-Laval Pact was made as a ‘compromise’ to stop the Italian Abyssinian War
- this was unjust in proposing to give Italy almost two-thirds of Abyssinia.

The sources therefore differ overall in that Source A gives a reasoned view (rationale) for Britain’s dual stance of working both through the League to condemn Italy’s invasion and bilaterally with France to maintain good relations with Mussolini. On the other hand, Source B is a totally (biased) Ethiopian/Abyssinian explanation that Britain and France were not at all concerned with preserving Abyssinia’s independence and from early in the crisis had decided not to take effective action (sanctions) against Italy, nor to go to war with her. The Hoare-Laval Pact is condemned as unjust. There is scope for pointing out detailed differences of both content and tone between the two sources, e.g. points about the need for the British government to take notice of public opinion in a democracy, or of differences of the type of language used. However, both sources agree, despite the differences in tone, on sanctions being weak and Britain’s and France’s determination to avoid a breach with Italy.

Answers should utilise some own knowledge to place the comparison of the two sources in context. British and French governments’ policies were heavily influenced by the objective of maintaining the Stresa Front against Hitler. This is mentioned in Source A but not in Source B. There may be reference to Mussolini’s prevention of the Anschluss in 1934, concern of Britain, France and Italy over German re-armament, the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty and wider issues of British appeasement policies.

Question 1

02 Use **Sources A, B** and **C** and your own knowledge.

How important was the Abyssinian Crisis in influencing Britain’s policy towards the dictators from 1935 until March 1938?

(24 marks)

Target: AO1(b), AO2(a), AO2(b)

Levels Mark Scheme

Nothing written worthy of credit.

0

L1: Answers may be based on sources or on own knowledge alone, or they may comprise an undeveloped mixture of the two. They may contain some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or they may address only a part of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **1-6**

L2: Answers may be based on sources or on own knowledge alone, or they may contain a mixture of the two. They may be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the

focus of the question. Alternatively, they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured.

7-11

L3: Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question using evidence from **both** the sources **and** own knowledge. They will provide some assessment backed by relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but they will lack depth and/or balance. There will be some understanding of varying historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material.

12-16

L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good range of appropriately selected evidence from the sources and own knowledge, and a good understanding of historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good skills of written communication.

17-21

L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued. The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence from the sources and own knowledge, incorporating well-developed understanding of historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary.

22-24

Indicative content

There is considerable material contained in the sources:

- **Source A** demonstrates the difficulties for Britain having a coherent and clear policy as a democracy with the government wishing to keep in line with public opinion, yet at the same time maintain a relationship in the Stresa Front with a dictator and aggressor
- **Source B** gives the view that appeasement of Italy led to the sacrifice of Abyssinia, and views this as almost the intended policy of Britain and France
- **Source C** is quite clear that the Hoare-Laval Pact 'was to maintain the Stresa Front', 'by sacrificing Abyssinia.' The public reaction, the resignation of Hoare and Baldwin's reversal of policy meant the collapse of the Stresa Front in that Mussolini left the League and went into alliance with Hitler. The source asserts that sanctions 'destroyed the Stresa Front' and the Hoare-Laval Pact destroyed 'the effectiveness of collective security and the League'. It concludes that the dictators believed Britain would not go to war. By implication there is an argument that Britain would not only not go to war over Abyssinia, but neither in response to other acts of aggression as well.

Own knowledge should be well-utilised to consider the importance of the Abyssinian Crisis in influencing Britain's policy towards the dictators up to the Anschluss. There may well be expansion on the argument in Cawood's statement in Source C. Contextual material on relations between Britain and Mussolini's Italy should be related to demonstrating why the attempt to appease Mussolini over the invasion of Abyssinia was made in the context of maintaining good relations between the two countries and a united front against Hitler's Germany, but backfired. Contextual points which may be made include the following;

- in the early 1930s relations between Britain and Italy remained generally good despite Mussolini's clear intentions about the Mediterranean being 'Mare Nostrum' and designs on Abyssinia

- with the threat of a revived and re-armed Germany under Hitler, it was Italy which took the lead in developing the relationship to bring Britain (and France) closer together to oppose Hitler's breaking of the Versailles Treaty. Italy had prevented the Nazi takeover of Austria in 1934 and initiated the Stresa Front of Italy, Britain and France in April 1935 to oppose the common German threat and in particular prevent further German rearmament
- though committing itself to the Stresa Front, Britain undermined the relationship with Italy by direct negotiations with Germany over the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, finalised in June 1935, an act which significantly strained the relationship and trust established at Stresa
- the new Foreign Secretary (from June 1935), Sir Samuel Hoare, did then work hard diplomatically to keep Mussolini and Italy on the side of Britain. The countries worked together both in the League and bilaterally
- Mussolini believed that even if he had not been encouraged to invade Abyssinia by the close co-operation at Stresa, at the very least Britain (and France) were not going to object to his colonial adventure to give Italy a gain of the kind denied to her in 1919
- Abyssinia, however, was a member of the League of Nations, which responded to the Italian invasion in October 1935
- economic sanctions were imposed, but Britain, in its attempt to appease Italy, strongly supported the exclusion of oil and kept open the Suez Canal to Italian shipping, which meant that the Italian war effort was not seriously hampered
- in December 1935 the 'Hoare-Laval Pact' proposed giving extensive territorial and economic rights in Abyssinia, and in practice about two-thirds of Abyssinia, to Italy. When details were leaked in Britain, there was very strong protest (out-of-line with the political and public's usual support of appeasement). Cinema newsreels had shown the devastation heaped upon defenceless African villages by Italian aircraft and flame-throwers. Largely as a result of public and press opinion, the government abandoned the plan to appease Mussolini and Hoare resigned. The government's efforts to maintain good relations with Italy had brought fierce criticism which continued with the completion of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia by May 1936.

Britain's policy was disastrous over Abyssinia as it failed to stop the Italian conquest and the move of Mussolini from potential ally of Britain (and France) to the side of Germany. Specific points relating to British policy as a result include the following:

- following Hoare's resignation, Britain supported the League's position in condemning the Italian invasion and refusing to recognise the conquest, a position which infuriated Mussolini and ended any possibility of Italy remaining as an ally. The attempt at appeasement had failed with the government's primary objective of maintaining the Stresa Front completely unsuccessful
- Hitler had been able to reoccupy the Rhineland in March 1936 with hardly a murmur from Britain (or even France). The British public had demanded stronger action against the act of aggression by Italy than that of Hitler (occupying his own 'backyard')
- the reaction to the whole Abyssinian Crisis by Britain can be constructed as well-intentioned in the aim of retaining a united front against Hitler, but was unsuccessful and achieved the reverse of its intentions by driving Mussolini towards Germany. Britain was helpless to stop the signing of the Rome-Berlin Axis in November 1936. Quite clearly the British government's attempt to appease Mussolini over Abyssinia had backfired. Arguably it was a crucial step in influencing British policy which failed to prevent, and might even have encouraged, eventual European war
- military action by Britain (and France) in 1935 might have deterred Italy, strengthened the League and discouraged Hitler from his later acts of aggression. Britain over-estimated Italy's military strength. (Reference in Source A)

- however, war at the time could have equally forced Mussolini into the arms of Hitler just as actual events did
- crucially important was Britain's and France's failure to lead the League into effective action against Italy
- the Abyssinian Crisis signalled the end of any League effectiveness against aggressors and indeed the death of collective security
- in March 1938, the appeasement policy, despite its failure to stop Italy, had become even more firmly established under Chamberlain and did nothing to prevent the Anschluss. Unlike the position in 1934 when Mussolini stopped absorption of Austria into the Reich, he supported his Axis 'ally'
- Hitler noted the weakness of Britain (and France and the League) over Abyssinia and was encouraged to pursue his own 'acts of aggression'.

Question 2

- 03** Explain why many Germans regarded the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as unfair. (12 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Levels Mark Scheme

- Nothing written worthy of credit. **0**
- L1:** Answers will contain either some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **1-2**
- L2:** Answers will demonstrate some knowledge and understanding of the demands of the question. They will **either** be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question **or** they will provide some explanations backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or depth. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **3-6**
- L3:** Answers will demonstrate good understanding of the demands of the question providing relevant explanations backed by appropriately selected information, although this may not be full or comprehensive. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **7-9**
- L4:** Answers will be well-focused, identifying a range of specific explanations, backed by precise evidence and demonstrating good understanding of the connections and links between events/issues. Answers will, for the most part, be well-written and organised. **10-12**

Indicative content

There was a whole range of reasons including the following. Responses are not expected to cover all of them.

- the Treaty was a 'Diktat' without German input and imposed under the threat of renewal of war if not accepted
- imposition of the 'guilt clause'

- the crippling reparations payments (and effects on the German economy)
- the disarmament clauses: no air force; confiscation of the fleet; a small navy in future with no submarines; an army of just 100 000
- the territorial losses in Europe: Alsace-Lorraine, small areas to Belgium, but particularly the large areas in the east to Poland, Danzig to the League of Nations and separation of East Prussia
- the loss of all colonies especially as they were in practice taken over by the victorious powers as 'mandates'
- status of the Saarland for 15 years
- demilitarisation of the Rhineland
- exclusion from the League of Nations. Many Germans regarded the League as designed to enforce the Treaty of Versailles and to keep Germany permanently weak.
- many democrats saw the Treaty as unjust as it was imposed upon the new German Republic, which had replaced the Kaiser and Reich who were deemed responsible for the Great War
- many saw the Treaty as being made primarily in the interests of France and as a 'revenge treaty' not only for the war but for the 1870–1871 War and its consequences
- some Germans saw it as the harshest treaty in (modern) history, perhaps overlooking the terms imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk
- for many on the right, the fact that Germany was no longer the dominant political, economic and military power in Europe as she had been since 1871, and that Slavs were now the equals of Germans, was unacceptable.

Question 2

- 04** 'During the 1920s, Britain foreign policy failed to maintain the post-war peace settlement of the Treaty of Versailles.'
 Explain why you agree or disagree with this view. (24 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Levels Mark Scheme

- Nothing written worthy of credit. **0**
- L1:** Answers may **either** contain some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question **or** they may address only a limited part of the period of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **1-6**
- L2:** Answers will show some understanding of the demands of the question. They will **either** be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question **or** they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **7-11**
- L3:** Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, backed by relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but they will lack depth and/or balance. There will be some understanding of varying

historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **12-16**

L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good range of appropriately selected evidence and a good understanding of historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good skills of written communication. **17-21**

L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued. The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence leading to a relevant conclusion/judgement, incorporating well-developed understanding of historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary. **22-24**

Indicative content

Certainly British governments came to accept that the Treaty had been harsh, there was some appreciation of the views of Keynes, and in particular there were moves to accommodate the 'new' democratic Germany and cement a permanent European peace based on mutually accepted agreements rather than the imposition of 1919. The approaches of governments of different political colours varied to some extent.

Pertinent points to demonstrate that Britain's policy failed to maintain the original settlement include the following:

- overall context of changing views, as experiences of the Great War faded, that Germany had been treated too harshly in the Treaty of Versailles and that to maintain permanent European Peace the rehabilitation of, and accommodation with, Germany were central
- at the Paris Peace Conference there had been significant differences between Britain and France over the treatment of Germany with the latter taking the harder line. From 1919–1923 differences continued bedevilling Anglo-French relations on how to treat Germany. France was determined to punish and make Germany pay for the cost of the war despite a compromise being achieved by the allies in 1921 over the amount of reparations payable
- British governments under Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Baldwin and especially MacDonald took a more conciliatory and pragmatic line concerning enforcement of the terms of Versailles, and understood Keynes's view that a permanently crippled Germany, especially economically, would hinder, if not prevent, the recovery of the whole post-war European economies
- the first Labour government's important role in getting the French and Belgians to agree to withdraw from the R uhr and in particular getting them, as well as the Germans, to agree to the revised scheme of reparations' payments under the Dawes Plan. That Plan acted as a springboard for further reconciliation
- Britain supported the League of Nations from its establishment in 1920, but during 1924 the Labour government, and MacDonald in particular as Foreign Secretary as well as Prime Minister, was noticeably more active and put forward the 'Geneva Protocol' aimed at outlawing war. The policy was sympathetic to no further punishment of Germany
- though the Conservative government from late 1924 abandoned MacDonald's 'Geneva Protocol', Baldwin and especially Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, appreciated that Weimar Germany was democratic, wished to participate as a 'European partner' and that Gustav Stresemann was genuinely seeking reconciliation
- Chamberlain played a leading role in achieving the Locarno Treaties in 1925 and particularly the most significant one. The discussions at Locarno in the autumn of 1925

marked the most important landmark in reconciliation since the end of the First World War. In 1919 the territorial settlement of the loss of land, principally Alsace-Lorraine and the permanent demilitarisation of the Rhineland, had been enforced upon Germany. At Locarno, the British government believed that Germany now accepted voluntarily that these arrangements were permanent. The treatment of Germany was completely different from the approach taken in the Versailles Treaty

- Chamberlain, together with Briand and Stresemann, wanted genuine reconciliation and as a further gesture of goodwill agreed the early admission of Germany to the League of Nations. Germany had been excluded from membership in 1919
- in 1926 Britain withdrew her occupation forces from Cologne (though allied forces remained in occupation of the rest of the Rhineland)
- the main advance in international relations after Locarno was the Kellogg-Briand (Paris) Pact in 1928. Though initiated by the USA and France it was enthusiastically supported by Chamberlain (and most members of the League) in the strongest development to date to 'outlaw war'
- as a result, all British troops left the Rhineland in 1929 (and the French in 1930), well ahead of Versailles Treaty date of 1935. Britain trusted Germany to abide by the Versailles – and Locarno – Treaties to keep the Rhineland demilitarised
- the positive attitudes stemming from Locarno and 'Kellogg-Briand' continued with preparations for a World Disarmament Conference. Throughout, Britain played a leading role and Henderson was chairman of the Conference when it finally got underway in 1931.

Points which may be made to disagree with the view in the quotation include the following:

- what British governments were trying to achieve during the 1920s was a permanent European peace to which a democratic and peaceful Germany was essential. Therefore, the concessions made to Germany and agreements were aimed at this objective and had to take into account changed circumstances and a different regime in Germany whilst at the same time upholding the main principles and terms of Versailles
- evidence that the aims of British policy during the 1920s was a permanent peace, based on and developed from the victors' enforced settlement at Versailles, working through and outside the League, is seen in, for example, the Dawes and Young Plans on reparations, the Geneva Protocol, the Locarno Treaties, admission of Germany to the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, early withdrawal of occupation forces and Germany's full part in the Disarmament Conference
- the main Locarno Treaty signed voluntarily by Germany, confirmed the territorial arrangements for Germany's western borders and the Rhineland as decreed in the Versailles Treaty
- one of the main aims of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which was attached to the Versailles and other peace treaties of 1919–20) was to achieve world disarmament (to follow the enforced disarmament of the defeated powers). The Kellogg–Briand Pact and Disarmament Conference were therefore fully in line with the Versailles Treaty
- the decade was marked by eventual stabilisation of Germany which did not threaten European peace, an aim of the peace settlement in 1919
- therefore British policy did not undermine the Versailles settlement, but built upon it by achieving genuine reconciliation and permanent peace through negotiation and agreements.

Responses should achieve a balanced view.

Question 3

- 05** Explain why Neville Chamberlain signed the Munich Agreement of September 1938. (12 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Levels Mark Scheme

- Nothing written worthy of credit. **0**
- L1:** Answers will contain either some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **1-2**
- L2:** Answers will demonstrate some knowledge and understanding of the demands of the question. They will **either** be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question **or** they will provide some explanations backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or depth. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **3-6**
- L3:** Answers will demonstrate good understanding of the demands of the question providing relevant explanations backed by appropriately selected information, although this may not be full or comprehensive. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **7-9**
- L4:** Answers will be well-focused, identifying a range of specific explanations, backed by precise evidence and demonstrating good understanding of the connections and links between events/issues. Answers will, for the most part, be well-written and organised. **10-12**

Indicative content

There is a range of reasons and debate over Chamberlain's policy and 'achievement' in signing the agreement. Relevant points and material include the following:

- Chamberlain's own background. He had lost a close relative in the Great War and sympathised with the anti-war sentiments in Britain. War was to be avoided if at all possible. He had entered politics quite late in life (despite coming from a 'political family'). His experience in office before becoming Prime Minister was in domestic affairs mainly as Minister of Health and Chancellor, where those he dealt with were British and 'trustworthy'. His assumption that he could deal with Hitler as a straightforward 'gentleman' who would keep his word was wrong, but believed by Chamberlain during the period leading to the Munich Agreement
- as soon as Chamberlain became Prime Minister, it was clear he was going to pursue appeasement policies to avoid war and these were evident in his dealings with the dictators over the Spanish Civil War and Hitler over Austria
- unlike France (at the time of Locarno), Britain had given no guarantee to Czechoslovakia which remained to Chamberlain 'a far-away country' and its people 'of whom we know nothing'
- however, Britain was a great power and had to be involved in any change of status of Czechoslovakia. Any avoidance of that would have seriously undermined Britain's

standing. Chamberlain believed by applying appeasement policy to the Sudetenland issue and by involving himself centrally, war could be avoided

- the main initial step was to send the Runciman mission, which reported favourably on the claims of the Sudeten Germans, but which was overtaken by events
- given the prospect of war breaking out, Chamberlain met Hitler three times in September 1938. At Berchtesgaden he conceded the principle of cession to Germany of some of the Sudetenland and persuaded the French to support it on his way home
- he flew to Godesberg a week later with Hitler planning an immediate occupation. Chamberlain made it clear that Britain would fight if Hitler would not negotiate. Hitler agreed to a postponement of action for a week. Britain prepared for war
- at Munich, Chamberlain and Daladier conceded the Sudetenland to Hitler, thus letting him have by negotiation, what Chamberlain would not let him have by force. The Prime Minister returned a hero claiming 'peace in our time' having avoided war for Britain and Europe
- in terms of historiography the Munich Agreement is regarded as the high (or low) point of appeasement politics. Most interpretations view Chamberlain as honest, genuinely seeking a lasting peace, even if regarded as mistaken and misled
- there is little evidence in September 1938, that Chamberlain believed he was gaining a year, or indeed any time, for Britain to re-arm and prepare fully for war. The rate of re-armament was stepped up, but was outstripped by the German build up in the year following Munich.

Answers should provide balanced arguments whatever the conclusion in terms of the most important reasons.

Question 3

06 'Neville Chamberlain's policy towards Germany in the period after the Munich Agreement up to May 1940 was confused.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

(24 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Levels Mark Scheme

Nothing written worthy of credit.

0

L1: Answers may **either** contain some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question **or** they may address only a limited part of the period of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **1-6**

L2: Answers will show some understanding of the demands of the question. They will **either** be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question **or** they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **7-11**

L3: Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, backed by relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but

they will lack depth and/or balance. There will be some understanding of varying historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **12-16**

L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good range of appropriately selected evidence and a good understanding of historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good skills of written communication. **17-21**

L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued. The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence leading to a relevant conclusion/judgement, incorporating well-developed understanding of historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary. **22-24**

Indicative content

Responses should assess whether Chamberlain's policy was confused. Whatever the conclusions given, there should be an overall balance in evidence and arguments, for example that peace was maintained for a time after Munich but that Britain had gained time to prepare for war.

Evidence and arguments that policy was confused include the following:

- initially the Munich Agreement was regarded by Chamberlain (and most people in Britain) as a genuine 'triumph' bringing 'peace in our time'. It was therefore believed that war would not come. On the other hand, the rate of re-armament of all forces was accelerated
- the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was a shock to Chamberlain, as he understood that he had been duped by Hitler, and that Munich and appeasement politics had not ended or reduced the threat of European war. No longer could Hitler claim that he was just uniting the German speaking peoples of Europe. In his Birmingham speech Chamberlain claimed in effect to have abandoned appeasement. Yet he took no action, nor joined with France, to defend or oppose militarily the occupation. However, the rate of re-armament was again increased
- Chamberlain quickly signed treaties with Greece, Romania and Poland which were under threat from the dictators, though strategically and militarily all were extremely difficult to assist. That with Poland was the most important
- immediately after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler began to threaten Poland with demands on Danzig and better access to East Prussia. Despite the treaty with Poland, little was actually done to improve British protection of that country
- this could have been done by agreement with the Soviet Union, but Chamberlain, unsympathetic towards Stalin and Communism, was hesitant to do so and avoided top level negotiation. Churchill and other critics wondered whether appeasement politics really had been abandoned
- Chamberlain's uncertain approach was partly responsible for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. Stalin had been annoyed by exclusion from Munich and the lukewarm relations emanating from Chamberlain's government. The clear victim of the Pact would be Poland, the defence of which Britain could do little (or nothing) about in reality
- in September 1939 Hitler may have believed that Britain would not fight over Poland as it had not done so a year and six months earlier over the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia respectively. On this occasion Chamberlain had been pushed too far,

and despite not being able to send any effective help to Poland, declared war. Yet there was also an element of appeasement in that the ultimatum allowed Germany the chance to withdraw

- during the 'Phoney War', evacuation and preparations against aerial bombardment took place, the navy blockaded German ports, but the British Expeditionary Forces took no offensive action from France. Yet Hitler, having conquered Poland and secured 'the east' through the Pact with Stalin, was obviously preparing for assaults to the north and west
- Chamberlain was criticised for weak direction of the war and failure to provide sufficient naval and other forces to prevent the loss of Norway led to such strong opposition in the Commons and country that Chamberlain had to resign. (Ironically, Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty and therefore the minister responsible for the deployment of the navy.)

The evidence and arguments that Chamberlain's policy was not confused include the following points:

- the main argument is that Chamberlain realised the danger emanating from Hitler's foreign policy and from Munich onwards stepped up re-armament as the prospect of war increased. Chamberlain had given Britain a year (or other period of time) to prepare
- though appeasement remained Chamberlain's policy after September 1938 in that he believed the Munich Agreement had brought the prospect of peace, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, he clearly abandoned appeasement as demonstrated quite clearly in his Birmingham speech
- from March 1939 his policy was again quite clear in that further aggression by Germany would be opposed and hence the treaties were signed with the states at risk. At home, preparations for war with for example 'call-up' and plans for evacuating children, were made
- Chamberlain honoured the treaty with Poland by declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939
- during the 'Phoney War', arrangements for defending Britain from air raids were efficient
- troops were immediately dispatched to France to help the defence of that country
- the failure to defend Norway was more Churchill's responsibility than that of the Prime Minister.

Stronger responses may refer to the historiographical debate about Chamberlain's policy.