



General Certificate of Education

AS History 1041

Unit 1: HIS1H

Tsarist Russia, 1855–1917

Mark Scheme

2009 examination – January series

Mark schemes are prepared by the Principal Examiner and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation meeting attended by all examiners and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation meeting ensures that the mark scheme covers the candidates' responses to questions and that every examiner understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for the standardisation meeting each examiner analyses a number of candidates' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed at the meeting and legislated for. If, after this meeting, examiners encounter unusual answers which have not been discussed at the meeting they are required to refer these to the Principal Examiner.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of candidates' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

Further copies of this Mark Scheme are available to download from the AQA Website: www.aqa.org.uk

Copyright © 2009 AQA and its licensors. All rights reserved.

COPYRIGHT

AQA retains the copyright on all its publications. However, registered centres for AQA are permitted to copy material from this booklet for their own internal use, with the following important exception: AQA cannot give permission to centres to photocopy any material that is acknowledged to a third party even for internal use within the centre.

Set and published by the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance.

Generic Introduction for AS

The AS History specification is based on the assessment objectives laid down in QCA's GCE History subject criteria and published in the AQA specification booklet. These cover the skills, knowledge and understanding which are expected of A Level candidates. Most questions address more than one objective since historical skills, which include knowledge and understanding, are usually deployed together. Consequently, the marking scheme which follows is a 'levels of response' scheme and assesses candidates' historical skills in the context of their knowledge and understanding of History.

The levels of response are a graduated recognition of how candidates have demonstrated their abilities in the Assessment Objectives. Candidates who predominantly address AO1(a) by writing narrative or description will perform at Level 1 or Level 2 depending on its relevance. Candidates who provide more explanation – (AO1(b), supported by the relevant selection of material, AO1(a)) – will perform at high Level 2 or low-mid Level 3 depending on how explicit they are in their response to the question. Candidates who provide explanation with evaluation, judgement and an awareness of historical interpretations will be addressing all 3 AOs (AO1(a); AO1(b); AO2(a) and (b) and will have access to the higher mark ranges. AO2(a) which requires the evaluation of source material is assessed in Unit 2.

Differentiation between Levels 3, 4 and 5 is judged according to the extent to which candidates meet this range of assessment objectives. At Level 3 the answers will show more characteristics of the AO1 objectives, although there should be elements of AO2. At Level 4, AO2 criteria, particularly an understanding of how the past has been interpreted, will be more in evidence and this will be even more dominant at Level 5. The demands on written communication, particularly the organisation of ideas and the use of specialist vocabulary also increase through the various levels so that a candidate performing at the highest AS level is already well prepared for the demands of A2.

CRITERIA FOR MARKING GCE HISTORY:

AS EXAMINATION PAPERS

General Guidance for Examiners (to accompany Level Descriptors)

Deciding on a level and the award of marks within a level

It is of vital importance that examiners familiarise themselves with the generic mark scheme and apply it consistently, as directed by the Principal Examiner, in order to facilitate comparability across options.

The indicative mark scheme for each paper is designed to illustrate some of the material that candidates might refer to (knowledge) and some of the approaches and ideas they might develop (skills). It is not, however, prescriptive and should only be used to exemplify the generic mark scheme.

When applying the generic mark scheme, examiners will constantly need to exercise judgement to decide which level fits an answer best. Few essays will display all the characteristics of a level, so deciding the most appropriate will always be the first task.

Each level has a range of marks and for an essay which has a strong correlation with the level descriptors the middle mark should be given. However, when an answer has some of the characteristics of the level above or below, or seems stronger or weaker on comparison with many other candidates' responses to the same question, the mark will need to be adjusted up or down.

When deciding on the mark within a level, the following criteria should be considered *in relation to the level descriptors*. Candidates should never be doubly penalised. If a candidate with poor communication skills has been placed in Level 2, he or she should not be moved to the bottom of the level on the basis of the poor quality of written communication. On the other hand, a candidate with similarly poor skills, whose work otherwise matched the criteria for Level 4 should be adjusted downwards within the level.

Criteria for deciding marks within a level:

- The accuracy of factual information
- The level of detail
- The depth and precision displayed
- The quality of links and arguments
- The quality of written communication (grammar, spelling, punctuation and legibility; an appropriate form and style of writing; clear and coherent organisation of ideas, including the use of specialist vocabulary)
- Appropriate references to historical interpretation and debate
- The conclusion

January 2009

GCE AS History Unit 1: Change and Consolidation

HIS1H: Tsarist Russia, 1855–1917

Generic Mark Scheme

Question 1(a), Question 2(a) and Question 3(a)

- L1:** Answers will contain either some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **0-2**
- L2:** Answers will demonstrate some knowledge and understanding of the demands of the question. They will **either** be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question **or** they will provide some explanations backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or depth. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **3-6**
- L3:** Answers will demonstrate good understanding of the demands of the question providing relevant explanations backed by appropriately selected information, although this may not be full or comprehensive. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **7-9**
- L4:** Answers will be well-focused, identifying a range of specific explanations, backed by precise evidence and demonstrating good understanding of the connections and links between events/issues. Answers will, for the most part, be well-written and organised. **10-12**

Question 1(b), Question 2(b) and Question 3(b)

- L1:** Answers may either contain some descriptive material which is only loosely linked to the focus of the question or they may address only a part of the question. Alternatively, there may be some explicit comment with little, if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be generalised and assertive. There will be little, if any, awareness of differing historical interpretations. The response will be limited in development and skills of written communication will be weak. **0-6**
- L2:** Answers will show some understanding of the focus of the question. They will either be almost entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the question or they may contain some explicit comment with relevant but limited support. They will display limited understanding of differing historical interpretations. Answers will be coherent but weakly expressed and/or poorly structured. **7-11**
- L3:** Answers will show a developed understanding of the demands of the question. They will provide some assessment, backed by relevant and appropriately selected evidence, but they will lack depth and/or balance. There will be some understanding of varying historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, be clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. **12-16**

L4: Answers will show explicit understanding of the demands of the question. They will develop a balanced argument backed by a good range of appropriately selected evidence and a good understanding of historical interpretations. Answers will, for the most part, show organisation and good skills of written communication. **17-21**

L5: Answers will be well-focused and closely argued. The arguments will be supported by precisely selected evidence leading to a relevant conclusion/judgement, incorporating well-developed understanding of historical interpretations and debate. Answers will, for the most part, be carefully organised and fluently written, using appropriate vocabulary. **22-24**

Question 1

(a) Explain why Alexander II decided on a policy of reform in Russia. (12 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

Alexander's motives for reform were varied:

- defeat in the Crimean War, not long after Alexander II's accession. highlighted the need for change. Russia's antiquated social and economic structure and military backwardness had been shown up and put Russia's continuing status as a Great Power in doubt
- Alexander II had had a relatively liberal upbringing and was temperamentally inclined to social reform (but not political reform), to remedy the worst excesses in society
- there had been pressure for reform for many years – particularly of serfdom. There was fear of major serf unrest unless there was 'change from above'. There were also moral objections to serfdom
- change was necessary if there were to be significant economic growth, e.g. serfdom tied people to the land; agriculture was relatively unproductive; there were no reserves of the labour which would be necessary for industrialisation
- there were specific motives for all the reforms, e.g. military reform was tied to social reforms like emancipation, and was also necessary if Russia were to learn the lessons of the Crimean War; legal reform was necessary if the legal system were to be seen as fair and independent of government interference; educational reform was necessary if Russia were to develop a better educated ruling and administrative class; local administrative reform was necessary to compensate for the decline in the nobility's influence and importance after emancipation.

It is possible to argue that all these factors were equally important, or for a high level they can be compared and prioritised, e.g. were the reforms a considered attempt by the regime to stave off revolution or pressure for change from below, or were they a genuine attempt to be morally, socially and economically progressive, or a combination of both?

- (b) How successful were Alexander II's reforms in modernising Russia before his death in 1881? (24 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

One of the key issues is the extent to which Russia was actually modernised before 1881:

- politically there was no change. Alexander II had never intended political concessions. His autocratic powers remained intact – *zemstvos* had only local administrative powers
- economically there was little change. Agriculture remained unproductive and subject to pressures such as population rise. Industrialisation (including railway building) was at an early stage
- socially Russia was still a rigid society, with nobility, peasantry and relatively small middle class.

Expectation of change was complex, e.g. Slavophiles looked to the peasantry and rejected Western influences for modernisation; most peasants were very conservative; 'Westernisers' were relatively few in number. Opposition to the Tsar was divided, with varied motives, not all to do with modernisation, and it was ineffectual. The reforms in any case were relatively limited in impact, e.g. there were still political trials independent of the normal courts; assassination attempts and the Polish revolt led the Tsar to reverse some reforms; control over universities was tightened; censorship was tightened again. The educational reforms had a fairly narrow impact. The emancipation of the serfs did not lead to radical, social or economic change, certainly not for most ex-serfs themselves.

Therefore the answer is likely to be that the impact of modernisation was quite limited and the essentials of the economy, society and government were largely intact in 1881. For a higher Level (Level 3 or above) there should be a focus on **modernisation** and not just whether reforms were 'successful' or otherwise.

Question 2

- (a) Explain why Nicholas II's regime survived in Russia between October 1905 and the meeting of the First Duma in 1906. (12 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

There were several reasons, including:

- arguably 1905 was not a revolution at all. It was not co-ordinated but was a collection of largely disparate events: Bloody Sunday, the Potemkin Mutiny, strikes, the St Petersburg Soviet, nationalist outbreaks, some mutinies in the army, resentment at the defeat in the 1904–1905 War, a reaction to famine, etc. All these events were relevant and some fed off each other, but there was no one cause or direction
- the bulk of the Army stayed loyal to the Tsar. Force was used successfully to suppress revolutionary activity

- the regime could still call upon great reserves of traditional loyalty
- those involved in anti-government protest or actively were very divided. Those wishing for radical regime change or political/social revolution were very much a minority (e.g. the Soviet). Liberals mostly wanted some constitutional concessions such as an elected parliament, not a social revolution
- the Tsar made – or appeared to make – important concessions, e.g. in the October Manifesto. Offering civil rights and the Duma appeased liberals seeking limited change and divided them from the minority of ‘real’ revolutionaries
- there were other concessions such as a relaxation of censorship and a legalisation of trade unions

The best answers will probably prioritise or link the reasons effectively.

- (b) How successful was the tsarist regime in restoring stability to Russia between April/May 1906 and the outbreak of war in 1914? (24 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

It is possible to argue either way whether the regime was stable or not in 1914, partly depending on how the level of stability earlier in the reign, particularly in terms of the 1905 Revolution, is evaluated.

Evidence might include:

- a discussion of how ‘unstable’ the regime had actually been beforehand. There may be some overlap here with part (a), but the focus of this question is on what happened between 1905 and 1914, not the 1905 Revolution *per se*
- overt opposition to the regime was largely crushed after 1905. Stolypin rooted out opposition and largely crushed it, e.g. through summary courts-martial and executions in the countryside. Many revolutionary activists were in internal or external exile. Police infiltrators kept a close scrutiny on political organisations. There is a debate about the extent to which there was radical political activity developing in centres of industry, among the growing industrial proletariat, but the evidence that it was organised or a major threat is hardly convincing. The Socialist Revolutionaries were the largely revolutionary party, but they were peasant-based and not well-organised enough to be a significant threat
- the manipulation of the Dumas showed that the Government was still in control. The first two Dumas did not last long because the regime objected to their composition (containing some radicals) and attempts to get more change from the regime. Manipulation of the franchise led to the much more compliant and longer lasting Third and Fourth Dumas
- there had been limited reform after 1905. Political parties were legally recognised, could meet legitimately and even publish newspapers since censorship was relaxed (although editors were still subject to arrest if they were too provocative). Accident and health insurance was introduced in 1912. There was limited reform of the Church, although it remained closely linked to the state. Educational reforms in 1908 started a process of introducing universal primary education and more secondary schools, with a big increase in spending on education

- there was an upturn in militancy from 1912. The Lena Goldfields massacre in 1912 followed a strike. There was an upsurge in 'political strikes', culminating in a general strike in St Petersburg in July 1914 and there were occasional peasant protests
- the economic picture was mixed. An economic downturn which contributed to the 1905 Revolution was reversed after 1906, with a boom 1909–1913. On the other hand, Stolypin's agricultural reforms had mixed success. Laws between 1906 and 1911 allowed peasants to leave the *mir*, consolidate their holdings and be more progressive farmers. Redemption payments were abolished in 1907. There was successful colonisation of some regions. However, only a minority of peasants took advantage of the new laws, land transfers sharply declined by 1914 and most peasants remained conservative and poor
- the Tsar lost able ministers. Witte had been dismissed after the 1905 Revolution. Stolypin was assassinated in 1911 – although unpopular, he had been competent, unlike some of his successors.

In 1914 the regime briefly benefited from an outburst of patriotic support at the outbreak of the First World War. Some interpretations, mainly Soviet ones, argued that the regime was heading for meltdown because of a growth in revolutionary consciousness amongst workers, led by the Bolsheviks. Other interpretations are that overall the regime had made a significant recovery by 1914, its opponents were limited in their threat and it was only the disaster of war which eventually brought the regime down. A good answer will begin to explore the debate, and consider different interpretations of how stable the regime actually was.

Question 3

- (a) In what ways was military failure important in the collapse of the tsarist government in February/March 1917? (12 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b)

Indicative content

- Russia entered the war with a great show of national unity in 1914, prompted by patriotism, hiding much of the dissatisfaction and disillusionment which many felt with the regime since before 1905. However, that new unity was never going to last unless Russia showed itself successful in war.
- The regime simply could not cope with the strains of the First World War. Russia's great power status was deceptive. The economy suffered from the strains of total war; there was inflation, shortages exacerbated by a breakdown in the transport system, demoralisation. There were enormous casualties and major defeats, from the early days (e.g. Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes). The Duma and other politicians demanded more share in Government.
- Nicholas II's reputation suffered from his assumption of military command in 1915 – meaning he took personal responsibility for military disasters. The regime's reputation also suffered from 'the Rasputin factor' and its reputation for incompetence at ministerial level, which can be related to military failure since it was that failure which had prompted the Tsar to go to the Front, leaving government increasingly in the hands of the Tsarina and Rasputin. The Government drifted, particularly since the Tsar had already adjourned the Duma and dismissed those ministers who supported the Progressive Bloc.

- There is some evidence of increasing radical influence on the home front, although many revolutionary leaders like Lenin were in exile. Their anti-government propaganda could only be helped by defeat.
- Military failure, involving loss of land, massive casualties, had a decline in morale, could only exacerbate anti-government feeling, until by 1917 the Tsar had nobody left who considered him really worth supporting.
- Whilst the strains of the First World War affected all regimes, including the victorious allies (except the USA) because of economic costs, etc, the impact on the 'losing' countries was bound to be worse, since there was not even the prospect of victory to soften the blow of problems on the home front such as inflation, shortages, the breakdown of the transportation system – which added to the horrors which the Russian army had to endure. Even a more competent regime than that of the Tsar would have found it difficult to cope.

A good answer will probably prioritise aspects of military failure and/or examine the balance between them.

- (b) How important was the role of Lenin in bringing about the collapse of the Provisional Government in October/November 1917? (24 marks)

Target: AO1(a), AO1(b), AO2(b)

Indicative content

Lenin's role was very important:

- his leadership was decisive to the Bolsheviks. They had accepted the setting up of the Provisional Government and initially supported it. The Bolsheviks had limited support in Russia. Lenin's return galvanised the Bolsheviks into opposing the PG (the only party to do so)
- Lenin's April Theses provided concise propaganda and a clear plan of action against the PG, e.g. the only party to oppose the War, and their policies of peace and land may have secured some tacit support outside Petrograd, although it is difficult to prove this
- Lenin's leadership after winning the argument in the Party in April was unrivalled – enabling him to triumph in internal Party discussions about the timing of Revolution in the autumn
- Lenin possibly was the idea leader; determined and a combination of both theorist and man of action.

Other factors were probably equally important:

- the PG made many mistakes; continuing the war out of loyalty to the Allies and a desire to establish authority and prestige through military victory, postponing wanted reforms such as land reform and setting up a Constituent Assembly, underestimating the threat of the Bolsheviks, the handling of the Kornilov Revolt which played into the Bolsheviks' hands
- the PG's power was limited by its non-representative character (not elected), early competition from the Soviet (Order No 1), divisions between socialist and liberal members
- the continuation of the War meant that existing problems also continued – shortages, casualties, demoralisation etc

- luck, e.g. the critical military and economic situation in the autumn of 1917 gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to act; the Bolsheviks had most of their activists in Petrograd, the centre of government; the role of Trotsky was also very important in organising the tactics of the Bolshevik takeover; the failure of poorly supported PG to summon enough loyal forces to prevent the Bolshevik coup.

NB: it is equally permissible for answers **just** to evaluate Lenin's role, or to consider Lenin's role in relation to **other** factors – but there must be a main focus on Lenin.

A good answer will address Lenin's role, but also examine some of the other factors and relate them to each other. There should also be an overall judgement, well-substantiated.